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The Attitude of the Labour Party to Reform of 
Parliament, with particular reference to the 
House of Cammons, 1919-1951. 
The thesis examines the Labour Party's view of Parliament as an 
instrunent through which the transition from Capitalism to Socialism could 
be made. The traditional interpretation of the conservatism of the Party 
on this issue is re-examined and an attempt made to explain the principles 
governing the attitude of the Labour Movement towards the question of House 
ot Cammons ref'onn as a reflection of its broader concept of the role of 
Parliament in society. 
After a prel~ary survey of the pre-war oonflict that existed 
in the Labour Movement between those who 'believed in the parliamentary 
method and those who tavoured industrial actiQn. the study concentrates on 
t ' . 
he weaknesses of Parliamentar,y democracy brought about by the Coupon 
:Election of 19l~. The Vigorous_Labour response in support tor direct action 
and the na. ture of. the direct actionist case are examined and a 
distinction drawn between ~hose who saw it asa substitute for, and those 
Who regarded it as a supplement to parliamentary method~. Its·, inter-
connection with intra-party disputes is examined closely. 
A study is made of. the relationship between· the Labour Party and 
the Ccrnmunist Party of Great Britain indicating the centrality of~the issue 
ot the parliamentary method as a fundamental source of division between them. 
An e~amination of the intellec;ual,attack on Parliamentarism is made by 
stUdYing the Guild Socialist Movement and its alternative philosophy with 
particular reference to the writings of G.D.H. Cole and S.G. Hobson, 
de:nonstrating its failure to understand the pragmatic philosophy of the 
Labour Party. 
Basing the argument upon the Labour Party's commitment to the 
prinCiples of strong government and fair representation the study 
continues with a detailed e.xamination of the various proposals to 
d~ocraticise the existing legislative and electoral system. Proposals to 
increase House of Commons control over the Executive are also looked at. 
The Party's attitude to women's suffrage and proportional representation is 
followed in detail throughout the nineteen-twenties, culminating in the 
case of P.R. in the 1931 economic drisis - which itself is re-examined in 
the light of recent evidence. 
The post-1931 period deals with the intellectual attacks made 
Upon Par1iamentarism by Laski, Strachey and the Socialist League. It 
examines the disputes between those who saw the conflict as being between 
Capitalist democracy and Socialism and the mainstream Labourite view 
aSSOCiated with Bevin, Citrine and Morrison,among others,that the real 
COnflict was between democracy and .dictatorship. The intra-party disputes 
ariSing fram these differing interpretations are fully examined in the 
Context of the attempts of the C.P.G.B. to affiliate to the Party and to 
P~anote the policy of the United Front. The Party's proposals for 
". 
legislative and executive reform are also studied in relation to.=the Party's 
cQmnitnent to' an efficient and effective Parliamentary system. 
The final chapters are concerned with the changes that took place 
as a result of the impact of the war. The relationship of the executive and 
legislative branches of goverrment is fully examined both in war-time and in 
the period of the Labour Government of 1945/51.· Particular reference is 
~ade to the' divisions between Party members who were members of the different 
branches of government. The demands for electoral reform and control of 
a~inistration are studied with an emphasis upon the pragmatic approach 
adopted by Labour.Members of the executive power. 
The thesis ends by showing that the Party's ccmnitment to 
certain principles of refonn had not changed, even if the application 
had, and draws the broad conclusion that British Socialism remained the 
particular product of a peculiar culture. 
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The purpose of this thesis is to examine the Labour Party's 
view of Parliament as an' instrunent through which the transition fran 
Capitalism to Socialism could be made and to study in detail the Party's 
attitude to House of Commons Refonn as a reflection of the larger views 
Which were held about the nature and role of the Parliamentary method 
, 
itself. It: is designed to ascertain the strength or weakness of the 
Party'S belief in the "functional capacity of Parliament to deal with 
Whatever demands are made upon it" (1) and to consider those changes 
which Were thought necessary to ensure that Parliament was fitted to 
Play~ an effecti~e ~d pr~per role in the establishment and development 
of the Socialist Cc:mmonweal the 
The ~bour Party inherited fram the broad movement fram which it 
d ' . 
eVeloped a variety of opinions about the capacity of Parliamentary 
institutions to solve social ills and create an econanic structure which 
eliminated the excesses of wealth and poverty and allowed ~anplete 
indiVidUal self-development through collective action. The very fact 
of. the Labour Party was proof that the majo~i ty view was one of faith in 
established Parliamentary methods and institutions, but there was a strong 
. . 
and very vocal seotion of the Labour Movement which did not share that 
faith and utilised such opportunities as they had to dispute the majority 
Yiew. 
-----------------------------------------------------------------------1. A.H.'Hanson, "The Labour Party and House of Cc:mmons Reform" 
Parliamentary Affairs (Vol. X, Autumn, 1957, pp. 454/68, and 
Vol. XI, Winter, 1957/8, pp. 39/56) reprinted in A.H. Hanson 
Rlanning and The Politicians (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 
1969), pp. 44-66. (45). All references are to the reprinted 
article. 
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The conflict that existed in the Labour Party in the years between 
1919-1951 was therefore a continuation of an existing conflict rather 
than the emergence 'of a new one, while the changes made by the Labour 
Government of 1945-51 represented the ultimat~ victor,y of pro-Parliam~ntary 
OPinion. What makes the overall period so important, however, was the 
Political ~ontext in'~hich the arguments tookplacej th~ chronic 
instability of Parliamentar,y democracy "throughout Europe and the estab-
lishnentof the Labour Party as'the second great Pa~ty of the nation. 
" . 
The false antithesis that existed in the inter-war period between 
dictatorships of the Right and dictatorships of the Left had attractions 
tor those in the Labo~ Party who favoured Marxist rhetoric but not 
~ . 
Bolshevik methods. Reinforced by the misguided logic of politically 
na"ive intellectual~ and revolted by 'the'conservatism of MacDonald's 
leadership and, betrayal they represented a concerted threat to Labour's' 
commitment to Parliamentary democracy. Yet their threat was in real 
tenns no gre~ter than'their~tellectual forbear~; It was the fact 
that Labour had dislodged the Liberals a~ the al ter~ative government 
Which gave th~seideas an ~dded dimension 0 andsim~e . ~f . importance~ .,. , 
In the years 1919-1951 the Labour Party re-examined, or,was forced 
to re-examine, its basic beliefs about Parliament and' to' ~tate and 'defend 
its View of the proper function~g of Parliament in the p~litical process. 
There is scme reason to assert "its success in this field, . "Simultaneously 
With the laying of the foundations of the Welfare State the Labour 
G . 0." '. ' ' " 
overnments of 1945-51 brought parliamentary democracy up . to date. ,; '.,' 
aenceforwar~ the task was one of consolidation and deferi~e." (2) Yet' 
----------------~~----~-----------------------------------------------
2. 
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this was not achieved without a great deal ot intra-party oontliot 
1I'h1ch this thesis will examjne. In addition, it was achieved. with a 
variety ot. tactios all designed to secure the basio ohaDges which the 
Party thought necessary but whioh were fiexible enough to take acoount 
ot politioal realities. 
In part the following study will re-examine the thesis put torward 
. by the late A.H. lIanson that the mainstream ot Labour's politioal 
thousht in the field ot parliamentary reto1'Dl has been-conservative. 
This he attributed. in part to "the influenoe ot our unbroken tradition, 
centuries-old, ot parliamentar7 govercment; and in the extraordinary' 
Capacity ot our institutions gently to lead the most rtl8ged and 
<r 
reVOlutionar;y_minded. politioal characters - a l4a.rton or a Kirkwood for 
instance - along the paths ot oonstitutional oonformity" but more 
importantly to the development ot the Labour Movement "~ong gradualist 
lines, guided. by a leadership which understood politiC~ mainly in terms. 
ot electoral activities and parliamentar.r debate. Suoh a movement 
oOUld readily see in a demooratioally-elected. House ot Commons its most 
apProPriate instrument. To moderate middle-of-the-road Sooialists, who 
neVer oeased. to dominate the party's counoils, sohemes tor the radioal 
retOl'm ot parliamentary' govercment * seemed unnecessary' and dangerous: 
'tlnnecessar,y because it ..... diffioult to prove that a trad1tionally-' 
Patterned lIouse ... ould m.az:mfaoture Socialist legislation less etteotiV'ely 
than Liberal or Co~errative; dangerous because any suggestion that Labour 
might 18¥ impious hands on the ark ot the Coneti tution 'Would inevitably 
beexploit~d by politioal opponents to alienate those sensitive marginal 
'VOters in whose hand. lq the key to parliamentary majorities." (3) 
.... 
3.'-' Il>1A •• p. 46. 
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J.s a broad sweep Hanson' s conclusions ~e undoubtedly sound, 
although perhaps he did not ~e tull allowance tor what Ralph Miliband 
has called "the infinite ~ptabilitY ot social-democratic leaders to 
conservative purposes" (4) or tor the reasons behind the moderation ot 
.. " 
middle-of-the-road-Socialista". Clearly Parliament&r,y institutions did 
"" 
reinforce the gradualiat tradition ~t the Party but did they do so to 
the extent ot d~stroying the party's' desire tor ,l9to~? Alternatively 
, might not the values ot the Party hav~ reinforced theinsti tution ot 
Pat'liament rather than vice-versa? Partot the task ot the present work 
is to disentangle these overlapping and intertwined motivations. ' 
In addition to the general question or the nature and role ot 
Parliament in' the Party 's thinld.~ there we~e ' vital questions concerned' 
With the institution's ~~mposition and working.' Those concerned with 
the Composition ot P~liament centred around issues SuCh as electoral 
reform, while the actual' funotions: ot the House ot Common~ raised questions 
about changes in the procedure ot the House and. its relationship with the 
Executive. . .. ~" " The debate about the electoral system 11'8.8 largely concerned 
1I1th questions~oh as Women's Suftrage'and proportional representation. 
The Labour Party's attitude to th~ l~tte~ has what mght b~ called a "bad. 
presa" much ot which has been quite unjustitied. What, this thesis ,,111 
do is ""examine the prinCiples to which the Party was committed and the ' 
taetics which it adopted to'sec~e the impleulentati~n of those Principl~s. 
The study ot changes in theprocedui-e ot th~ HouSe ot COnlmo~s'rlil go ",', 
b " " " " 
8y'ond the reterenoes made by Hanion to the proposals ot the I.L.P. and. 
the Sooialist League to' examine the general' :positio~ ot the P8.rt:r '8.8 a 
lIhole toward the question ot procedural change, its unfortunate intemix 
.... 
4 ... 11. Mlliband, The Sta.te' in' Ca italist Socie ' (London:, Weideoreld & 
,NicOlsOll, 1969 , ,p .. ~121 .. * •• ,. ~ •• ~ •••••••••• # , 
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with the intra-party disputes ot the 'Thirties, and the extent to which 
the issue we.s simply a matter ot the ~pplication ot party principles 
rather than matters ot oOnf.'liot between members ot the party in executive 
or legislative positions • 
. A1 tho1l8h the reactionary influence ot P~liamenta.rism is implicit 
in Ranson and central to llalph Miliband' s Parliameht·a;tSbbialt'stn (5) 
the extent ot this influenoe has never ~eaii; 'b~~~ '.;b~~~"" ':i~ 'mlib~d's 
Oase such proof as he produced. tended to measure the extent to whioh the 
La.bour Party's interpretation of Sooialism differed from his;"own.. The 
actual intlu~nce of Parliament upon. the values of the Party is far more 
diffioult to trace than i. OOlDDlOnly asserted •. ~ One small aspect which can 
be exami.ned." however, is the willingness of the party to push for minor 
refo~s such as the p~ents ot M.P.'. or the revision of House of Commons 
Standing Orders and the ease with whiCh it surrenders to the very evident 
forees of inaction whioh appe~ to be a oomposi te part of the :British 
Parliamentolry system.. 
The importanoe ot the following 'Work derives not from the fact that 
it is based upon oompletely new sources, although in recent years the 
Jn1nutes of both the Cabinet and the N.E.C. have shed. new light on old 
Oontroversies, but that it draws together existing evidenoe around the 
OOlDmOll theme ot Rouse ot Commons reform. .: By so doing it shows how and ... 
'W~ tha Labour Party was ablato establish itsored1bility as a 
., 
COllBtitutional Party and become a respected part of the politioalsoene. 
It illuminates the fact that without. a sound politioal, sooial and .... 
Philosophioal base the Labour Party's broad proposals for economic ohal:l&. 
'Were valueless. . 
-
5. -- R. WJ.iba.nd, Parliamentary Sooialism: A Study in. the Politios of 
'--iLabou; (London. George .Allen & Unwin, 1961). 
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Ot course any study ot the Labo'ur party exam1 ning a particular 
theme is quite oapable ot produoing a 'Warped perspective. The more 
BO when the study hardl.7 ~ouches on such important issues as the General 
Strike and the conflicts over toreign policy in the late 'Thirties. 
Even 1£ the latter can be omitted on grounds ot irrelevan~e the "nine 
dqs" ot 1926 require aore explanation. Although the idea ot the 
general. strike 'Was very important to a section ot the Labour Pa.rtr in 
the early, '!L'wenties and 'Was explioit in the to:rmation ot the COUllOU 
ot Action in August 1920, the intellectual commitment to the idea 'Was 
something quite separate trom the industrial action ot Mq 1926. It 
is pertectl,. olear, the General strike ot 1926 was an industrial 
cODfliot which the Government ot the daJ quite deliberatelJ turned into 
an alleged stru&gle tor the constitution and 'Which some trade union 
leaders, such as J .H. "Jimmy" Thomas, accepted as such, ~beit in 
histriOnio terms. The period itse1£, unlike that ot August 1920, was 
too intensely conoemed with the da¥-to-~ industrial situation to 
have relevance for this particular thesis. Whilst the inclusion ot 
the General Strike might help detend. the thesis against charges ot 
1n.tellectuaJ.ism it 'Would be an Ullllecess&ry' and, misleading diversion trom 
the general. theme. 
The bulk ot 'What tollows is inevi tabl,. narrative with some analy'sis 
at conceptual and numerical levels. The details which are produced are 
d.esiened to illustrate the theme and reinforce the basic contention ot 
the theSis that the Labour PartJ's attitude to House ot Commons retom 
ia an exam1nation ot the Party's-SOCial and pclitioal. philosopny in the 
years 1919-1951. 
CHAPTER ONE 
~ LA:BOUR PARTY AND THE HOUSE OF COMMONS :BEFORE 1919. 
9 
It was a combination of the quickening of the processes of social and 
econanic change and the political repercussions of the advent and course of 
the First World War that produced the essential conditions for the 
realignment of political forc~s behind the ideological banners of 
"Ca 't PJ. alism" and "Socialism lt and the replacement of the Liberals as the 
Party l' 1 . 
o a ternatJ.ve government by the Labour Party., The causes of the 
decline and fall'of the Liberal Party are still a matter of academic 
Controversy,(l) but what is clear is that the Labour Party emerged fram the 
"Coupon Election" of December 1918 in a far stronger position than it had 
been before the outbreak of hostilities sane four years earlier. Although 
. its Parliamentary strength was a mere 60 Menbers (2) as canpared with 42 in 
the second election of 1910 it had fielded 361 candidates, as compared with 
56, antt- had increased' its. total. vote fram 0.4 million to 2.2 million. (2a) 
More . . " , 
sJ.gnificantly the split.in the Liberal forces meant that the Labour 
Party we.s now the 1arges t opposition Pe.rty in the House in tenus of seats and in 
the country in terms of votes. (3) 
The pre-war Labour Party had been in a much wea.!.cer position. Although 29 
Members had been returned to Pe.r1iament in 1906 the Party's failure to 
make ra . d ...' 
PJ. electoral advances and its very obvious dependence upon, the 
Liberal ,., 
. ~avernment had produced a great deal of disil1usionnent in the 
PD~ty as a Whole. The election of Victor Grayson as :Member for Co1ne 
"alley . ' 
J.n 1908 'was taken as evidence of the Par1iarnente.ry Labour Party's, 
--------------------------------------------------------------1. 
2. 
2a. 
3. 
A \lseful collection of essays can be found in J .A.Thanpson, The Co1laps~ , 
..2.t..the British Liberal Party (Lexington, Massachusetts: D.C. Heath,1969). 
See Note 1. 
FiftY-~eve!1 lab'our 'candidat~s ~r~ returned a.t the General Election. The 
number wa~ increased by the addition of two unendorsed candidates and 
JOSiah Wedgwood, formerly a Liberal. U.P. 
This increase in the total vote also represented an increase in the 
percentaze of the total vote cCl::lpared to 1910... ". . , 
The Independent Liberals; the "Wee Frees" received 1.4 million votes 
8.r'~ returned 34 Members. Seventy-three Sinn Fein Members had also 
bee.n elected but, they refused to truce their seats. 
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d . , ". . 
tpelldenoe on the Liberals, a dependenoe otten more apparent than real, 
but ot great importanoe in the years between 1909 and 1913 when the 
Osborne Judgement threatened the very existenoe ot the Party, a threat 
, 
whioh was only partiall:tJ r~oved by the introduotion ot payment tor 
)( . 
. embers ot Parliament in 1911 and the passage ot Trade Unions Act ot 1913. 
The failure ot th~ Labour Party to em~rge quiokly trom the shadow . 
or Liberalism waS' a funotion of its olose eleotoral ti~s with the Liberals 
and its own internal divisions. These divisions were very often the 
. produot ot the ditte~ing ideologi~al interpretations ot the role ot the 
Labour Party in Parliament. The l.L.P. oontingent led by Philip Snowden 
Baw Parliament primarily in t~s ot th~ arti~ulatio~ ot ~eneral 
Pr1~ciples ot Sooialism whereas th~ Trade union~st 8~tion, som~ ot whom 
had. doubts' about Sooialist do~trtn:~, ~looked to'Parliament to seoure' 
inunediate solutions to theirprim~ economio ~ievanoes. The divisions 
. in the :P.L.P. weakened. ;its hold over the rank-~-tile as the 'foo'&1 p~int 
or pOlitiOalaotirtt; for e~onomi~ and ~ooial ~nds' a.n~. st~ecgthened the 
hands ot those 'who p~eached thatPar11amentarlsm repre~ent~ olass 
COllabora.tion ~d a 'weakening o~ the oias~ ~trtl8gle in sooiet;. , . These. 
o . . '.. .:. . .... . . . . ,., , 
PPosing points ot view were not new to the Labour Movement and, indeed, 
~ ot the early internal strll8gles ot the Sooi&1 Demooratio Federation 
in the 1880's a.nd 1890's had bee~ fO~ht over th; dElsi~ability a.nd 
erreotivene~s or using '~arliam~nt ~ apolitio~'1nstrument tor sooi~ and 
. 6ConoIllio 0han8e.(4)· In due time m8ny ot the .. d.irect actio~ist~" tound' 
themselves ideolog~O&1ly' alienated from th~ Labour Party ~d foiiow~d their 
predoIlline.o:tly Marxist ~ewpOi~t t~ 'its ~ogi~~ conol~sion'1n . the to:matiO~ 
4. .' Details ot these conflicts ca.n be tound in J. Cl~on, The Rise and 
Decline of Sooialism in Great :Britain 188 1 24 (London: Faber & ' 
- Gwyer, 1926 and T.R. Taylor, Parliament and BittiSh Sooial Demooracy 
::1.881-19°7 (Unpublished M.A. Thesis, Keele, 1967 • . .' ........ ' 
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ot the COIllD1U.D.1st party of Great :Britain,but in the years 1910-1914 led 
b;y Syndicalists such as Tom:Malm, A.J. Cook a.o.d James La.rkin a.o.d plainly 
enoouraged by the milita.o.cy of the suf'fragettes, the Conservatives' 
Challenge t'o the Government' over Ulster and the pliability of the Liberals 
under pressure, they so1l8ht to translate industrial militanoy into tangible 
economio auooess. In some instanoes noh as the ports strike ot 1911 they 
did secure cha.ng.s, but in doing so only a.o.tagonised the otficial Union 
leadership and the Parliamentary Party by their ~esponsible"use of the 
national strike for pseudo-political ends,altbou8h even the "responsible" 
1 ' -
eaders had recognised their potential industrial power by the formation 
ot the Triple Industrial Alliance between Xational Union ot Ra.11w83'Jllen, 
'rhe ,~ra.nsport Worlcers' Federation and the Jttners' Federation ot Great 
:Britain. Yet the ':Big Five' Labour leaders J.n: (Jimmy) Thomas, Arthur 
!tenderson, BamS8iY' JkcDonald, -3.R. Clynes and Philip Snowden all challenged 
the SrndiOalist claims that it was through industrial action alone that 
• 
ettective politioal change oould be achieved. (5) Syndioalism was, and 
r ' -
IIna.1ned, a dootrine adhered to by a vooiferous minority which in the, 
changing Circumstances and conditions ot war-time ta.ed with an'artioulate 
group ot young middle-class intellectuals in the Guild Sooialist move-
lIlent.(6) 
!rh. d1 viSions over the use ot Parliament as a viable political 
inat~·- ' 
"'WoII&ent in the promotion ot sooial progress were quite different in 
essenoe from the conflicts which arose over matters ot the application of 
SOCialist PrinCiples. The former were matte~., of democratio prinoiple 
(in etteot a branch ot the Reyilioniat dispute among left-wing intellectuals) 
..... 
5. See, tor ~le, 'P. Snowden, 'Socialism and SyndiCali~ (London: 
" COll1ns, 1912), eapeoiaJ.l.y Ch. XIV. The idea ot a general strike whioh 
"as central to syndicalist theory was not ne" to the :British Movement. . (' 
.It had had amongst its earliest exponents Roberl Owen but aw a practical 
"eapOD, it had fallen into disrepute with the failure ot the Chartists. 
6. S " 
ee below Chapter :3. 
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the latter were matters of politioal judgement. The former sought to 
defend Parliamenta.r1sm, the latter to prove that it worked. Women's 
auttrage was a oase in point. The Labour party was the onl7 politioal 
group whioh as a party' su,pported. the prinoiple ot equal poli tioal rights 
which it adopted at the Conterenoe of 1901 and whioh it oonstantly 
~ 
adVOoated (despite tactioal shortoomings) until the' prinoiple was finally 
established b7 the Representation of the People Act 1945. However, there 
Was "a shup division o~ opinion as to whether the vote should be given 
, 
immediately to women or whethar it should form part of the larger reform 
or tull adult suffrage. One section held the view that to get the 
Prinoiple established would be 8. great step forward. Another held that 
any'retol:m ~t1ng women the vote on the existing basis would onl7 inorease 
the POwer ot the propertied classes • .' !rhe latter view oarried. the· 
COnferenoe in 1906 by a narrow majority a.nd full adult suffrage beoame the 
pOli01 ot the party. -(7) The stanoe was not an overwhelming suooess. 
1'b.e more militant wo~en sutfragat;t;es believed that some Trade Unionists in 
PartioUlar were not as enthu.siastio tor female suffrage as they should have 
been. (S) In 1912 Mrs. Pankhl1.rst and her followers dema.rlded that the 
Labour M.P. 's should oppose th~ Liberal Government on ever:! question, 
1rha.tever the issue, until Asquith and. the Government were driven from' 
otrioe or Oompelled. to give 'the vote., Whatever sympathy might have 
~sted for female autfrage it was extinguished by this politioally 
imPractioable demand whioh .. would ••••• completely have frustratedaay 
1ntluenoe that Labour oOuld~bring to bear on political events ••• -(9) 
.... 
7. 
Se. Constanoe Rover, Women's Suffrage' and Party Politios in :Britain, 
1866-1914 (Londons Routledge & ICegan Paul, 1961), pp. 146:161 • 
.. 
9. Franois Willlams, Fifty Years' l4aireh: The Rise ot the Labour PartY 
(London I Odhams Press, 1950), p. 194. 
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" 
Only the emotionally inseoure George Lansbttry' acoepted. the demand, 
resigning his seat at 13011' and 13ranle;y to tight a bye-eleotion on the 
issue, whioh he lost large~ beoause of the antagonism brought about 
by Some of the militant suffragettes' actions. ' The result showed. not 
o"'~ -
--J the wisdom of Labour's action but was a vindioation of their faith 
in Parliamentary institutions: G.D.H. Cole was surely right in regardiDg 
the activities of Mrs. Pankhurst's followers as part of the general 
revolt against the Vert parliame~tarism to whioh the Labour Party was 
COIllDlitted.(10) 
The extent of this commitment was a funotion of the development of 
the Party as the politiOal instruia'nt of the organised working-class as 
repr'esented by the 'Trade Union Mo;ement.' . Trade Union leaders who had . 
come to power and office thrOugh the relatively well-ordered prooesses 
of Viotorian England saw in Parliament the effective means of Bol vil'l8 
their economio grievanoes. Political action was essential. to economio 
and sooial. change, a view shared by the ma:joritr of the Sooial. Democratio 
Federation and Independent LabourParly despite the factional'opposition 
or J40rris and others whO' saw no hope dIi Parliamentarlsm for' the kind of'" 
I ~'\ ' 
reVOlution they had i'n m.nd. '.The inevitability of gradualness whioh 
characteriSed the Fabian Socialist approach to politics reinfo:rc'ed thi. 
Pa.'t'liamenta.r1sm.' As Ralph Juliband haS pointed out, -ot political 
Parties claim:tn8 sooialiSm to be their aim, the Labour "party 'has alWl\YS' 
b ", , ' , ',' , " 
een one of the most dogmatio - not about sooialism, but about the ' 
P8.t'liamentary system. !mpir1oal and flexible ,about all else, its leaders 
have aJ.1t'~S made devotion to that System their fixed point of reference 
10. G.D.R. Co1e,!r1tish Work! Class Politios 18 
Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1941 , :.'p. 212. 
",,-
(London: 
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'and the condition:i,ng factor ot their political behaviour.... The Labour 
Party has not only been a parliamentary party - it has been a party deeply 
jmbued by parliamentarism: - And in this respeot there is no distinction 
to be made between Labour's political and industrial leaders. Both have 
been equally detezmined that the Labour Party should not stray tron the 
narrow path of parliamentary politics. ·Cll) This is undoubtedly true 
althOUgh Mlliband' s aSl!Iertion that Parliamentary politics are narrow was 
not a View shared by most earl,y Labour leaders. Arthur Henderson, tor' 
eXample, writing in 1918 opined that lithe tri1.lDph of democratio prinoiples 
in politics and industry and social lite is a matter simply ot wise and 
oapable leadership and resolute and united effort on the part ot all 
Seotio~s of the organised movanent.·(12) Parl~ent was, in Labour's 
eyes, the sovereign instrument for authoriative political deoision .... king. 
They fUlly reoognised that political ohange was not per se suffioient to 
oreate a new soo1e~ but they believed that treedon'and equalit,r oould onlY 
flourish in a society where politioal democracy was practioed. liThe war 
ha' 
s prOved to democraoy~ Henderson wrote, "that a diotatorship whether 
With one head or tive, is inoanpatible with its spirit ani its ideals even 
in war-t~e."(13) ~evolution was not in the BritiBh tradition (a doctrine 
, 
held dear by the British Labour Movement and eventuall,y oonoeeded by ita 
oriti~.(14) They indended to use fraditional British oonstitutional 
Dlethods whioh would aot as a'restraining influence upon wUd and 
reVolutionary ideas. It was beoause the British Trade Union Movement bad 
developed in an anpirical rather ,than an ideological tradition that the 
-
11 ' 
• " R. Miliband, Parliamentary Socialism, p.13. 
12. A. Renderson, The Aims of Labour (N~ Yor~~ 
1918), p.22. 
13. !!oe. oi t. ' ' . 
" ,:, 
Hue bsch , 2nd Edition, 
14: _.See, tor example~ John Straohey, What Are "e To Do? (London: Viotor 
.GOllanoz, 1938), Part I. 
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Labour Party became and remained loyal to' the Parliamentary method. On 
the rare oooasions t~at the leaders ohallenged the Parliamentary system 
they did so in the liberal tradition ot John Looke's detensive right ot 
rebellion rather than an id~OlogiOally aggressive inte~retation ot class 
rule •. ' In general they did not deviate trom the view that the economio 
reconstruction ot SOCiety was possible through Parliamentar,y means, or as 
Arthur Henderson wrote "the path to the demooratio control ot industr,y lies 
in the common ownership' ot the means ot productbl..~'15)which could only be 
aoh1eved through politioal. means., Whatever doubts ~ have existed in 
Henderson' s mind about parliamentarism were removed by his experience or .. 
war-time government S the questiorB raised by the advent ot the Russian 
!evolution. J .H. Th~ caught the mood when he remarked in the House or 
C . 
ommOIlS, "that so tar as our constitution is conoerned it gives full and 
f ~ 
ree politioal expression to the people's will."(16) , 
Because the Labour Party as a whol~ did not r.gard Parliament as the 
instrument tor the political legitimisation or capitalism, even it.the 
. vested interests or oapitalism were represented by the emessive munber ot 
Members ot Parliament on the Conservative and Liberal benches,it tollowed 
t ' . 
ha.t they sa" little need to undertake extensive reto:rms ot the House ot 
C· -
ammons. Thus, whilst Protessor Hanson's view that "to moderates and 
lIliddla-ot-the-road Socialists, who have ~ever oeased. to dominate the Party' s 
counsels, sohemes tor the radioal retom ot parliamentary government seemed 
b . 
oth unnecessary and dangerous, "(17) 'is essent1allytrue it is somewha.t 
o. -
veratated. " J4aay proposals for the radioal ret'orm ot the House ot Commons 
have been proposed by,seotions of the p~Yt only to be turned down on 
15. Hend erson op.oit.,p. 28. 
16. lI,e. Dfiip.113· cc' 688.; .11.1 referenoes are to the 5th Series.', 
17'. Hanson~ oP.Cit~,p. 46. ; , 
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empirioal grounds, partly related. to the moderate temperament ot the 
leadership but also b~o&Use ot the recognition that the traditional 
politio81 struoture in Great Britain provided an outlet tor personal 
. and l41nisteriaJ. power tar more desirable than that available to 
,. 
indiVidUal Jlembers of Parliament. The tact was 'a reoognised. partot 
the I.L.P.'s Objectio~ to Cabinet Government and irresponsible 
Department~ism. 
The Labour Party was, however, devoted. to the prinoiple ot universal 
adUlt suttrage' and to' inter-relatedohanges designed to produce a Rouse 
ot Commons more representative ot the nati~n~t large.' The enfranohise-
ment ot women, ohanges in the eleotoral system (sometimes in tavour of 
Proportional represe~tation and on other oooasi~ns for the altemative 
vote - a situation re:t'le:,ting ge~e divisions in the Part,.) and the' 
determination to secure theacoeptanee and applioation ot the prinoiple . 
ot "one person, one vote" wereretlected in the Party'S' attempt to 
int~oduCe a :Bill 'enacti~ suoh pro~osaJ.s ~to" Parliam;nt in 1911."(18)" 
'rhe Jretorm ot Parliamentary prooed~e pl8\Yed little part in the att~t. 
ot the Party to '-seourea fuller demooraoyperhaP~ becaus~until the 
powerlessness ot Parliament ~a.s revealed 'in the "t~e ot authorlta:nan 
it not despotio go~ernment, ~er w~time donditions, the question 
limply did not arise to eny great extent outside the "Root 'and :Branoh" . 
oriticisms ot the I.t.P. 
Labou:e's inability "to oapit~ise on it~ position in theyearl 
between 1906 and '1914 re.tleoted th~ract ~t .it had, t~ some ext~t, 
, . 
reached. the 'Comm~nl by virtue ot the Liberal' I generosity. Bot one 
-
-" ,., .... ','" ",:0 ". • .... ' '",,,. '''--'''' d_' 
18. ' Se. R.R. Schl.oesseJ:, The Twentieth Cen9ffi Retorm :Bill, Fabian 
.< Tract, 153, (London: Fabian Sooiety,1911. See note 2. 
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Labour Member had been returned fran a three cornered contest in a single 
~emberoonstituency in the election of Decanber 1910.(19) ,Moreover, the 
Liberals were detennined not to allow Labour to advance too far, or too 
qUiCkly: certainly there was no desire to penni t the development of a 
distinctive ~r4 party strong enough to allow the Liberals to be replaced. 
The rnaroh of events, however, proved to be stronger than the forces 
resis ting than and the. outbreak of war produced. a ca tbartic response amongst 
Liberals. Divided about the origins of the conflict and unhappy about its 
, ~ <-< • 
prosecution, the Liberal Party found itself assailed fran all sides and 
:1n ','.,,'," . " 
, ' December 1916, through the personal opportunism of IJ.oyd George, bowed 
. . ' . 
t " 
o those predaninantlY Conservative forces demanding a more vigorous 
prosecution ot the war by the' central 'government. It was Labour's good 
, ,.;rr-<'! ., ~, . t .' ' • " " .. ' " , . , 
,ortune that although as deeply divided as the Liberal Party the majority 
ot the leadership, including !ndi viduals like MaoDonald and Snowden who 
, , 
"ere '., , .' , .' , , 
'. ,opposed to the war largelY because of the foreign polioy whioh had 
b ., , '" " .' 
rought it about, were prepared to p'ractice the. art of the party tolerance 
d' ",' "',., ,,, 
uring Labour's association with the Government • 
. " 
4 ~ ...... ' 'c 
,That association had begun early" in the war with the Industrial and 
El '. ; ', ... ' . ,..", 
ectoral Truoes of ~ and 29 August 19~ respeotivelY and the instruction 
• , f '-. > ·'.. . 
o lOcal affiliated bodies to render all possible local support in t~: 
reOruiting oampaign. (20) The endorsement of this course ot action by the 
, ~. 
Trad U ' ,!. , 
es nion Congress reinforced Labour' •• tand and the rift that existed 
betlreen the bulk of the P~tya.nd the I.~.P. whioh vigorouslY "opposed 'the 
. ~ 
"ar. That the rift did not d~velop into a pe:z:m~ent cleavage and destroy 
.~ .. . 
Pa.rt " , 
, :y unity is a tribute to Arthur Henders on , s leadership of 
j , 
-~------------------------------------
19. COle~ History of the Labo~r Party (L~don: Roti.tledge &: Kegan Paul, 
1948), p.4 •. 
20.. Wil14 --s, 6 
..&.CIUl op.cit., p.22 •. 
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the Party and proved to be a vital factor in attracting disillusioned 
Liberals to Labour's ranks atter the oessation ot hostilities.(21) 
!l'he demands ~e upon industry by the military not only relieved the 
nation ot widespread unemployment but oreated a orisis situation in the, 
delivery ot munitions whioh necessitated the signing ot a formal agreement 
between the Trade Unions and Government, later embodied in the MUnitions 
ot War Act ot July 1915, which provided for la.-rge-soale Governmental 
interferenoe in industrial lite, especially in the enforcement ot oompulsory 
~bitration and the direction ot labour. The importanoe ot industrial ' 
labour's oontribution to the war-e£tort was recognised by the Government's 
1 - . 
nV1tatioll to the Labour Party to join the Coalition whioh had been formed 
in Ma.y 1915. Atter some initial hesitation oaused by fea.-r of oompromising 
its independenoe the Party decided in favour ot acoepting the invitation. 
In praotice the Party's role proved to be a very junior one notwithstanding 
li d . 
en erson's presenoe in the Cabinet (22) but it did provide the Pmy with 
SoverOl1lantal. experienoe whioh it had not had betore. Even it the Labour,' 
Party acted in some instanoes suoh as the Military Servioe Eill as the 
ineffeotive mOdifiers,or more otten, legitimisers ot unpopular polioies, 
it - ' 
a,performanoe ot that role was either so neoessary or suooesstul that 
- " 
lrhen Asquith resi8ned in December 1916 Lloyd George felt obliged to otfer 
lienderson a seat in his newly-oonstituted War Cabinet. ,The otfer "althoU8h 
Siven to the politioal party and primarily to Henderson" as its lead~r, 
deriVed not from politiOal but industrial oauses. It arose, not from: 
a.ny sreat support for the Labour Pmy, as a politioal force in the oountry, ' 
but trom the fact that it was the politioal voioe of the industrial workers. "(2~ 
...... 
21. !.bi!., 239/40. , 
22: .~!P~., p.222. Henderson was made President of the Eoard ot Education 
while William Brace and G.H. Ro'berls became an Under Secretary at the 
Xame Ottioe and a Government Whip respectively. 
23. ~i<!.., 1p. 239. 
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A.t·the same time Labour's representation in government was increased 
whereas that of the Liberals was diminished by the seocession of Asqui~ 
and his tollowers.(24) The.,Party's acceptance of Lloyd George's offer 
haa been tla new assertion of Labour's independenoe of Liberalism,"(25) an 
. . 
'independenoe which was made fully possible by the reorganisation of the 
p . . ' 
arty under Henderson' s guidanoe following his departure fran the Cabinet 
in A.ugust 1'17. The reasons for Henderson's resignation are unimportant 
in this oontext, what is important is that the de'o~ion to resign was a 
ltersonl!! deoision, the Labour Party remained represented in the War Cabinet 
in ." 
the person ot George Barnes. As .. oonsequenc~ the Labour Party main-
tained ita overall pOlitiO~ unity. 
''''Once treed tran Cabin~t duties Henderson devoted' hlmself" to ensuring . 
that Labour's newly reOognised'strength was capable ot post-war maturation 
Within a new framework of organisation. The pre-war organisation or the 
Party had been sketchy oonsisting of just over 150 local organisations and 
, .. 
less than 2,000,000 attlli~ted members. (26) The exigenoies of war-t:ime by , 
; 
an in '. . 
tensification of pres~ure 'on trade-union rights and praotioes," and the 
interference ot the Gov~~ent in ~dustry ('War Socialism' as it was 
POPUlarly known) had prov~d to "be adynamic faotor in the growth in' trade. 
unions and the oonversion 'or ~onservative trade union leaders to the 
doctrine ot SOOialism,: however nebulous~eir interpretation of it ma,y have 
been. By 1917 the number of local bodies attilia ted to the Labour Party ". 
had risen to 260.(27) Hende~son's oontribution to the Party's assertion· 
-
Henderson became a member of the War Cabinet, John Hedge Minister ot 
Labour, George Barnes Ministry of Pensions, William Braoe Under 
Seoretary tor Hane AffairS, G.H. Roberts Parliamentary Seoretary to . "_" 
the Board of Trade and J. Parker Junior Head ot the Admiralty. 
Traoey, OPe oi t., pp. 209/l0 •.. : " .. 
. .' .. -~ 
1!.oo. oit. 
26'-' . 
.Cole , A History of the Labour Party, pp. 9-15 • .cole's total figures 
tor 1913 whioh appear on p.SO are misoalculated. 
27 .. .............. " . « ... ~ ..• -'.....' ." ,'. 
• !b:i&., p.so. 
20 
of independenoe was to reorganise these a.f'f'iliated bodies, under a new 
(cOnstitution. Samuel Beer has pointed out that it was the organisation 
of the Labour Party as a Party that made post-war political independenoe 
.. , 
a possibility _ the adoption of Sooialism was fUnotional to the ohoice of' 
political independenoe.(28) "Henderson could respond aggressively to 
'. the • doormat in~ident' not onli because the Liberals were split, but also 
b . 
eCause the growth of' trade unionism at last provided the party with the 
. . 
means for a strategy of'· f'ull f'le~ independence •••• the inorease in 
organisational' power of' the unions did more than merely provide an 
oPPortunitY' for this strategy. It also virtually f'orced the Labour Party' 
to adopt it and to break politically with the Liberals.' The oommitment 
··to a 
.,.ooialiam •••• oan be regarded as a consequenoe of' this breaoh."(29) The 
b . . 
reach was reinforced bY'the Labour Party's involvement with independent 
peace moves late in 1917 and the adoption-in June 1918 of' a new and 
distinctive programme "Labour and the new Social Order"~ 
~e sections relating to ref'oDn of the Rouse of C~mmons were not in 
the least revolutiona.r,y. J.ll radical proposals for ohanging the fUnda-
mental role of Parliament in societY' suoh as those suggested bY' the Guild 
S . . . 
OCialists were disoounted and the only reforms advooated ... ar~ those whioh 
might be regarded as institutional ohanges. The 1918 Conference came out 
in favour of "oomplete adult suf'f'rage with absolutely equal rights for both 
s . 
exes, with effective,provision for absent voters and the best practioable 
. &l:ra.ngements for ensuring that every minoritY' should have its proportional 
and no more than its proportionate representat~on; civic rights for "' 
Soldiers and Sailors, shorter Parliaments •••• "(30). The Conference also 
--
., 
28. Samuel H. Beer, Modern British Politics (London: Faber& Faber, 
1965), p.149. 
29.· 1Pi4,., p~ 145. 
30' C ~ .. 
• ole, History of the Labour Party, p. 67. 
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" asserted that'some early devolution from Westminster of both legislation 
&Zld administration is imperatively called for'. It advocated that, 'along 
With the grant of Home Rule to Ireland, there should be constituted ~eparate 
statutory legislative assem~lies for Scotland, Wales and even England •••• • 
It . 
advocated the retention of Parliament at Weatminster as a 'federal 
assembly for the United Xingdom'."(31) 
Suitably aDDed with a sep~te programme and a new constitution the 
Labour Party made its final assertion of freedom when it deoided in 
November 1918 to leave the Coalition. Thus in December the Party fought 
the eleotion with 361 candidates as compared with 78 in the first eleotion 
in 1910, ~ despite a mea&re improvement in seats from 42 to 57, the 
inorease 10. votes from less than half a ~llion to over two million augered 
fundamental changes in the nature of EritiBh Politics.(32) 
-
31. 
32. 
k,oo.Cit,u 
.. . .. ~ . . . ,. 
~ace,y, op.cit. p.230. The statistios recorded here differs 
Slightly . .trom .those in Cole's History of the Labour Pa,rtz, p.5. 
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CHAPl'ER 1 - NOTES 
1. In briet the argument is between those who believe that 
Liberalism was dying in waves ot anare.histic viOlence 
before the First World War and those who believe that 
the course of the War finally killed it. Douglas argues 
that Liberalism was in tact reviving when it was struck 
down by J.squi th • statal decision to support a Labour 
administration in 1924 :. Cook that the decline ot the 
. Party accelerated. into its downfall by the same sequence 
of events. ' . 
The main. sources ot the controversy are: 
George Da.ngertield, The Strange Dea.th ot Liberal gland 
(London: Constable, 1936). . -
Trevor Wilson, The Downfall of the Liberal party 1914-1935 
(London: Collins, 1966). . 
Roy Douglas,bHist0?a: of the Liberal party 1890-1970 
(London: SidgwiCk &I ackson, 1971). c_' 
Chris. Cook,"A Stranger Death of Liberal England" in 
Lloyd George: Twelve Essays, ed. A.J .P. T~lor (London: 
Hamish Hamilton, 1971),pp. 287/313. 
2. The S.D.F. prOgramme ot the early 1880' s , derived. in parl 
trom the earlier demands ot the Chartists, had c&lledtor, 
amongst other things, Adult Suffrage, 1H.ennial Parliaments, 
Equal Eleotoral Districts, P8Jment ot M.P.'s, Strioter 
measures against corrupt practioes and Na.tional and Federal 
Parliaments. See C. Tsuzuld.,JIyndman and British Sooialism 
(Londonl Oxtord University Press, 1961),pp. 4071. 
P~ARr DEMOCRACY UNDER PRESSURE 1919-1922 
!he Consequences or the Coupon Election. . 
. LlOY-d George's decision to go to the electorate in December 1918 
w ~ 
as undOUbtably motivated by his own political opportunism and desire 
to r-.. ~-·
--.w. Prime Kin1ater even at the expense or splitting the Liberal 
Party. It was essential17 a short-sighted decision, the results ot 
which Produced the greatest strain on Parliamentary democracy in the 
period under review. :By skillful17. exploiting the jingoistic fervour 
engendered by the recently-signed A%mistice the total number of' successful 
COalition candidates returned to Parliament 11'&8 484' of which 338 wer~ 
Conservatives few of whom had fought in the war.(1) ,; Notwithstanding the 
Labour Party'a contribution to' the war effort ~. of its' most prominent 
m.eIIlbers. inciuding J4a0Donald, F.W. JoWett, Henderson and Snowden were 
roundly defeated. The I.L.P., &8 the representatives or the defeat est 
lins ot Paclf'icism, came in for particular rejeotion by the electorate 
1rhich POPularly rega.rd.edthe initials I.L.P. as me~~'"1 love ~s~ia". 
i , 
As a reSuJ.t·the bulk of the newly-elected P.L.P;CO~SiSt~ ot trade 
. union candidates.' This created friction betWeen the P.D.P. and it. 
tOl'lner members largely over' the Party' s c~e ot emphasis' awa;y . trom' the 
1r1d "" 
er issues ot re:tom to the more deta.1l8d. . discussion of industrial '. 
a.tt a.1rs. Inspired as mUch by personal. hostility' and ambition' as the '.; . 
&CtuaJ. Performance of the Parliamentar,y Party the critics: led' by MaCDonald 
........ 
1.' . 
J .14. McEwan; "The Coupon Election' of 1918 and the Unionist Members 
ot Parliament~. Journal or Modern History.XXXIV,Bo. 3, (September,. 1962~ Pp. 294-306. 
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oPPOrtunities, to attack the alleged failings of the Parly in Parliament. 
'rhe Validity of these criticisms are discussed below but what is important 
h ' 
ere is the tact that in practical tems the Parliamenta.ry Parly had no 
chance ot defeating a Government with such a numerical advantage and with 
. :, , 
Whom they often agreed on policy. Consequently, many in the Party took 
th' , , 
e View that the only eftective way of ensuring that their views were 
adequately ~ressed was t~ugh direct industrial action. Alan :Bullock 
~ POinted out that "the three years af'te~' the war we~ more disturbed by' 
o -, 
pen COnflict between the trade unions and employers,(and) between the 
lll'l1ons and the Gov"e~ent, than any other period in IIodem British history, 
~th the BOl1tar,r 'exception of 1926, the year ot the General Strike."(2) 
,rIn PU-t this W&a'but one asp~t' ot the pr~war discontent which'had. 
been cb.aneUed into the"~ effort &nd had re-emerged in an even greater 
OUtbreak of SOcial violence. The evident weakness of Parliament reinforced. 
that ~olenoe by etf~ctuailY legitim1~~ alternative forms ot authoritative 
deoilion_m&king. The ~ed1~y ot strl.ke action took precedenoe over the 
110 " ,,' ,,", 
re leisurely process of Parliamenta.r,y' and judicial rule. Certainly 
there were efforts mad~ by those elements ot the ~~ur Movement which were 
10' '.; ',' " 
on. to leave at the instru.otions of J40soow in order to' form the Commnni.t 
. . p , ' ,'" ",',', ' ' 
,arty of Great Britain,' t~ turn sooial unrest into a pol:1 tioal revolution, 
bu.t" there is little ~Ubt th8.t they received the broad support ot many' 
i . '~ . ' 
IldiVidu.aJ.s like :&bmanuel shin.ell, D~vid Xirkwood and "'others wh~ later ' 
b' ", , ""..., ,," ,,' ,', :-" ' , 
; ElCame PUlars ot oonsti tutionalism. The extent of the unrest was such, 
that the Goverrunentbadd~bts about its capacity t~ en.toroe tb~ 'law against 
lI'ha,t it tootrequentl1 saw a.ss: :Bolshevist Uprising and on ocoasion replied'" 
...... 
2. A. lhlllook, The Life and Times of Ernest Benn (London: l:Ieinemann, 
1960), I,p'p. 98-9. 
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with the use ot military torce, and the threat ot special legislation 
and mass prosecution.(3) Such measures only produced an instinctive 
unity among what was a loose amalgam ot groups with very little in canmon 
beYond a disrespect tor exiSting authorit,y and a desire to replace it 
With their own. When under pressure this contempt tor government was 
reiatoroed, while the conflicting notions ot how to replaoe it by a workers' 
government resulted in the bitter sectarianism that divided the Communist 
and Labour Parties in a tundamental contlict over the role ot Parliament 
in a democratic societ,y. 
The role ot thePart,y leadership in this period was a restraining 
one. Frequently 'protesting tha t d~ect action was the produ~t ot the 
1reakn " 
'r ess ot Parliament they argued that it was the sectionalism ot the 
~overnm tt ' . , 
en s, econanic and social policies which had given strength to the 
revol t ' 
u ~onary elements ot society. The all but open declaration ot war 
upon the SOViet Union' (a oountry whidh even it not adored by the Labour 
leadership, which had attached great store by the Kerensky regme, was 
still thOUght ot as having avowed Socialist objectives t~be' aohie~ed 
tbr ' ',' 
oUgh a working-class revolution) was regarded as an indioation ot the 
~ov' " " ,.,,' , 
ernnent's reactionary character.:' It$~\ repressive policy in Ireland 
was s . " 
een Ul asimUar light.' The 'post-war eoonanic and sooial polioies 
ot the Coalition saw the decline of 'the ideal ot -a coUntry tit tor heroes 
to live in- to a situation ot widespread Unemployment brought about by an 
artifiCially induced econanic bo~ that resul ted ~ -an org]" et speculation 
and protiteering in everytield. d (4) The Government's alowness to 
~~----------~-'-"------------------------
3. For det~us ot the unrest et 1919, its national and international ' 
~ontext, and its interpretation by contemporaries see David Mitchell, 
1:219: Red Mirage (London: Jonatban Cape, 1970), especialJ..y pp. 112/30. 
4. " 
" Cole , !!istory otthe Labour Party, p.9Q. 
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demobilise the rumours o~possib1e conscription and the aggressiveness of 
"uston Churchill (ot pre-war Tonypamy int'amy) inoreased. the possibilities 
ot politioal polarisation. The sheer deviousness ot its polioy towards 
th ., 
e Miners, towards Russia and Poland was sucoesstully designed. to bU1' time 
until "nomaloy" returned. It wu in this atmosphere that"D1rect Action" 
held ';'q in th; Labour Jlovement and it is to aD. ans.l.ys1s ot -this that we -
now turn. 
~l'eot Actions' 
The t~ "direct aotion" ~. used. in two . d1st~shable wqs whioh . 
att t - -. 
eo ed the idea ot Parliamentary government. On the one hand it meant 
th "'·", 
, USe ot the Labour Movement'. industrial power, usually in oonjunotion 
With, but ottenrithout retere~~e to,Labour's Parliamentary torces, in order 
. to force the go~ernment' t~ Ohange' oerta1nor 1ts' pOlio1es~ Th~ 'other use 
. . 
ot term Was its artio~at10~ by the "Lett~W1ng" ot the Party _ .. gr~ , .' 
whi : . - ' . . 
ch inciuded many ~ho were later to join the Communist Party ot Great 
:Br1 . '., . . 
. tain. - upon ita tOl.1ll&tion in 1920 - who spoke ot direct action as .. means 
ot e.ttecting the 'overthrOW ot Capital~~ by revolut'ioM.ry means~d in 
aocorda.!l~e rith Mamst dootrine.(5) The attitude ot the tomer was, as 
Alan BullOCk points out, "not to ov~rthrow the~vernment ,but to remedy 
.' what they' regarded ~ the' detioienoies ~t the dem~oratio sy~tem bY' torc~ 
the Government to oonoede SP'ec1t10 demand~, the nationaJ.1satio~· ot the mines 
'. ,"; 
. 01' the abandonment ot ~tervention against Russia.. " (6) To moderate direct 
aotionist.' suOh as busy' ~~a.id thepoi1oy ot d:ir~t act10n ;'a'8 ju8t1t1ed 
b1 the ~Oli tioal outoome ot the Coupon Eleotion. Shortly atter the 
.;. . 
.... 
5. et. tor example Ke'rberl Marrison' ~ 8P~eoh ~t the Labour PartiConterenoe 
(Labou:r Pa;rty Annual Conferenoe Report, hereatter L.P.A.C.R.), 1919,p.128 
With the a.ttitude ot Bobert W1l1iams, The New Labour Outlook (London: 
Leonard Parsons, 1921), and Wl1l1am Xellor, Direct Action (London: ~'~ona.m Parsons, 1920), both passim. •. " " 
6. 'BullOCk, op.oit., p.100. 
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announcement of the election results he wrote, "The election has created 
a Parliament that has none of the democratic safeguards of a Parliament _ 
especially a well-equipped critical Opposition and a guarantee of full 
disOUssion and exposure. Therefore the Parliament~ Opposition must came 
,from the outside."(7) Ms.cDonald justified his argument by declaring ~ 
greatest concern is not about the 1finD.ing and losing of Elections. It is ' 
With the institution ot Parliament. Never was there a. more ignorant. appeal 
Dlade to ign.orant people than that contained in the Coalition cry of 
"Bolab.evism" •••• ~Ra.ther than live under a. Parliament elected in such a. wq 
.. 
as to Crtlsh ~out Labour opinion by vaS; combinations of Labour's enemies, I 
Should welcome a S~viet Goverament which cruShes out Labour'; enemies.n(S) 
Iv " -
en,allOWil:lg for a necessar,y 8X8€€:eration and ambiguity bom of political 
oPPortunism and journalistio fervour, the reasons for which will be ' 
demonstrated shortly, the conservative nature of Kael)onald's views are clear. 
"Parliament", he said, "was only Parliament when it was representative. 
When it ~ . . 
ceased to be representative it was not Parliament, and, therefore, 
action tAt.. " ti 
-en against a non-representative Parliament was not an , -
Pa.rl iamentB.'t7."(9) Writing atter the events of August 1920 involving the 
COUnCil of Action MaoDonald claimed that industrial action for political, ends 
Was not ~l'" lie wrong. "Everything neoeasar,y to protect the constitution ia 
constitutional, it 'constitutional' means anything at all except passive . 
obed! - - ~ ( ) 
ence to &n1' outrageous acta done by men who happen to be Ministers." 10 
---
7. .!abour Leadera 2 J'anuar,y, °'1919. 
.!orwa.J:d ( Glasgow) J 11 J' anua.ry, 1919 ~ s. 
9. l.bi~. 13 September, 1919. Ct. "There must be means found for 
Chailengicg the abuse of its power by such a Parliament and "direct 
action" is one of them." Sooialist Review XVI, No.SS (J'anuar,v/Maroh, 
1919), P. 1S. .' ' '. " _ ' ,\ 
10 S ) 
·'_oc1aJ.1st Revi8W~~, No. 95 (October/December,192O ,pe 299. 
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It 
Was essentially an argument in favour ot consensus politics within a 
Parliamentary framework. "This Parliament," he argued, "has no moral 
authority. When politioal opposition is crushed by fraud or fo1"Oe, 
1ru1 -. 
:\1Strial oPposition is the only defenoe that is left. Still, I am as 
tar tro)U being converted to anti.Parliamentarism as ever I was, but if' I 
were so converted I should hail with delight the results just announoed."(11) 
!rhus Ka.oDonaJ.d did not favour the indiscriminate use of the direct a.otio~' 
"e~on, but took the new that it should only be used it it wo "BIlOoessf'ul. 
He never believed or intended. that it should be a substitute for politioal 
action through Parliament. (12) " 
!t'b.e revolutioll8.'ry' direot aotionists, however, had. no such faith in 
Parl~8ID.entary institutions. . Direct Action was to their wa:g ot thinking one 
01' the techniques available to the working-olasses in the tight to replace 
the existing Capitalist sooiety with one based. on Sooialist prinoiples in' 
acOOrd,J:lln 
-Aoe With the doctrines of Marx and Lenin. The theoretioal basis of 
th ' 
revo1utionar,y view were not given systematio expression until the . 
pUblioa.tion of Direct Action by WUliam MelIor (13) late in 1920 but the 
IUb t . . 
B anoe of the argument was frequent~ art1m1a.. tea by Bobert Williams a 
leAiti .. _ 
--~ exponent ot revolutionary direct action. ." ~"I am in favOur of direot " 
00 t -. 
. n. reI bY' the WOrkers th8J1lSelves," he wrote, "of the industries in whioh 
they are engaged, and, in fact, of ' the whole of the politioal affairs ot the 
OOUllt--. P 
-'" ~liamentar;r government has ceased to be representative •.. We JUIlSt 
n~ OA."",-
. --J on the preparatory work, in order to establish Soviet government 
in this oountry oomparable ,to, but not identiCal, with, the Bu.ssian institution. 
'---------~--~~~~~--~--~--~--------
11.' 
.!orwe.rd, (Gla.sgow),11 January 1919. . . , ., ., 
'2~ This po~t is made by R.E. Dowse in "A Note on RamsSiT' Ma.eDonald and'" , .~, 
Direot Action" Politioal Studies IX No.2,(1961h-PP. 306/8. See Note 1. , , , 
13 S '. -
• .. ,ee tootnote NO.2. 
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'!'here is no countr,r in the world where the working-class are so prepared 
to take OVer the aftairs whioh conoern them so intimately as in Great 
!rita.1n. !here is no real demooracy except that ot the passion swa;red 
mob."( 14) Direot action, theretore, WaB conoeived ot as part ot a wide 
ranging reV?lutionary c~e in British society in order to reconstruct 
it 011 SOViet lines, inoluding, in the short run,the institution of' a. 
dictatorship ot the proletariat. Thus the revolutiona.ry direct actionists 
differed tundamentall1 trom their more moderate colleagues in their rejection 
of the basic Principles of'Parliamentar,y government and the beliet that the 
Soo1aJ.lst State could be established b;y legislation passed b;y 8. treel;y and 
d~ooratlCally elected Parliament. 
}t was tor this reaSOll that .the debate on direot action to:med an 
. int 
8gral Part ot the wider debate ot "Democracy versus Diotatorship" and was 
Bee . -
11 Prilnarily in those terms by the bulk ot the Labour leadership both in 
Parliament and 011 the National Exeout~ve Committee. In turn, it was this 
attitude Which made the whole quest~on of direct action appear to be' a simple 
lIl&tter or ·Parliament versus direct action.", It was a choice ostensibly as 
11In ~ . 
ple as that desoribed b;y the .American commentator Scott Nearing:- "Two lines 
or acti . 
on presented themselves: one constitutional, the other direct •. It •••• ' 
labour was totollow constituti~nal means, it would elect ita representatives 
to lOOal goverruuent bodies and to Parliament, and would transfo:m British 
lOOlety by a series ot constitutional legislative and administrative acts 
troll .. 
. capitalist empire into awo~ers·republio. It it was to amplo;y 
direot ti -
ac on, it would seize the economio and Ji>0litioal machinery, smash 
the struoture or the old order and establish a working-class government b;y 
the di 
reot action ot the organised workers."(15) In practice, however, 
...... 
----------------------------------------14~ ~ilY Herald, 10 ~ 1919. 
15 '~'So . 
• . ott Nearing,' The Britiah' General Strike: An Eoonom1c Int retation 
, a.t its Background and Significance New York: V~ PresB,192 ,p.13. 
Ct. ~Ond Postgate, The Bolshevik .Theory (London: Grant Richards,1920), 
Ch. v. 
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· the direct aotion o~ the organised workers proved to be more elusive, for, 
as Alan :Bullock points out~ "although a General. Strike was constantly referred 
to and threatened between 1919 and 1926, no one on the trade union side ever 
. worked oUt' 'the problems of ~~ganisation involved, leave alone prepared for 
· &rmed, 1nsurrection. w( 16) The reason for this was that the direct actionists 
w . -
ere Politically organised. Notwithstanding what was said abou:t the failure 
of the Parliamentary La.bo~ P~ the moderate direct actionists never lost 
, th ", 
.eir faith in the political objectives of the Labour Movement, a fact 
d . . .' .' fI!Il~nst~ted b,- the lack of individual.' withdrawals from the ranks of the 
LabOUr Party. For the revolutionaries the formation ot the Communist part,y 
ot Great Br! taill theoretically provided the organisation for the overthrow 
· ot Capitalist society' ,~ut it, over presented a significant ~eri~al. 
· Challenge to the Labour Pa.rt,'. 
Clearly there were ma.ny in the Labour party who were contused about 
\ the lla..f..·- ~ . . . I' thi 
· ."l.I.4"e 0", the deba.te over direct action. A certain degree 0", s 
con.t'ua· .' . . . . . 
'. ion Can be attributed. to the political circumstances in 'Wh1ch~our 
t ' 
o'Urld itself atter the war. In the broadest context this was stated by 
t ' . " . .1,", ", , 
he Permanent COmmiSSion of the Second Intemational eaTly in Augul!lt 1919. 
~e Interna.tional, it declared,"must consider the foms ot'democracy and 
repreSenta.ti~e institutions, t~; place ot r~volutionSin "the transtorIlU\tion 
~S . , 
OQ1ety. (and) the relations between industrial and political Organisation 
and. lIl&as aotion ••• ~(17) At the domestio level these problems were 
_ 'e <." , I. <' 
intensified by the-disaster of the Coupon Election which effectively prevented 
tb. . '. . " ..... ' .' ...... .. 
, , e House of Commons from having e:n:y meaningful in.t'luence on the government. 
To ' "'" ,-- "-" .. '"'' ""-." .. "", .. ~',.,, .... ~ .... _,,~., "'''''''. 
gether With the devious policies adopted by the Coalition and the wide-
8pread, industrial fe~ent which'aCcompani~d the' end1.ng of the war the political 
'" .''''' , 
..... " .. 
16 . 
•.. BullOCk, loc.cit. 
17 ,~. . , ,....... ' ' 
• .. Permanent Commission ot Labour and Socialist International, Lucerne. 
1st-9th August 1919. Text ot Resolutions reprinted in L.P.A.C.R. 1919.~. 
Appendix XV,pp. 218-224 (218) .. 
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situation convinced many in Britain that social distintigration was just 
around the corner. (18) In such an atmosphere it was virtually impossible 
to draw the fine distinction between unconstitutional and extra-Parliamentary 
activities wh'ich can be seen in retrospect. In addition there is little 
doubt that the moderate direct actionists as a whole failed to state their 
posit 0, ~on clearly and frequently did not appreciate that they were in 
Political har~ess with ~dividuals who~e ott-declared' aim was the overthrow 
ot the Parliamentary system by revolutionary means. Sane, like MacDonald, 
were ° , " • 
JockeYing for their personal political advantage while others' like 
Smillee were concerned with'the establishment of political support for their 
ideas in the Party: 
SUch nuances of oPinion were not clearly definable immediately. As 
long ~s Labour had been divided on its political stand the question of 
tactics was not raised. This was especially true while Labour was' on the 
defensive as part of the governmental ~ar~achine. It was when the party 
became united' in Opposition that the divisions became apparent. These 
do • ~v~sions were all the more deeply held because of the issues with which 
they w 
ere concerned: the continuation' oi conscription' into peace-tUne; the 
Continued imprisonment of, and d1scrjroination against, Conscientious 
Objector • th 
s, e Governnent's blockade of Eastern Europe and, in particular, 
Allied military intervention in Russia. 
Th ' 
e outbreak of the Russian revolution had been generally welcomed by the 
Labour Part:v • ' 
., Relieved at the demise of "the most powerful tyranny in the 
world. It , (19) " ' , ' 
, and grateful that the war for the democracy was at last being fought 
----18. ------~~~----~----~~------------------~~e MitChell, op.cit., (page 23 note 3 above) ·cf.' Walter Kendall~ 
B e Revolutiona Movement in Britain 1 00-21: The Ori ins of ~tish Canmunism London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1969 • w.s.· .. , 
B rchill, The World Crisis: The Aftermath (London: Thornton " 
utterworth, 1929). . . ' " , ,..., ,'. ' , " 
19. 'M...anchester GUardian, 21 March 1917. ' 
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by democracies, Labour's attitude proved to be distinctly sympathetic. 
'rhe anti-w8.1:' seetion ot the party in particular saw the revolution as 
increasing the likelihood ot peace. Thus in June 1917 the B.S.P. and 
the I.L.P. organised a convention at Leeds to welcome the Revolution and 
eSPOUse the anti-war case. Both MaeDonald and Snowden spoke at the 
Convention in glOwing tems, and in ignorance, of the democratic nature 
of the nay Russian government. Resolutions were passed congratulatiIl8 
the Eussian people on their revolution, expressing satisfaction with their 
recently Sllnounoed peace aims, and calling for the full restoration ot 
CiVil liberties in Great Britain. A fourth resolution called for the 
establiShment, ."in every town,. urban and rural district (of) Councils of 
WOrlQn' ~ 
en-and Sold~ers' Delegates for initiating and co-ominating working-
class activity ••••• ft· so as to give etfeet to the polioy decisions ot the 
Cont . 
erenoe, While a ProvisionsJ. Committee was established to co-ordinate 
their Overall aotivities.(20) 
'rhe exact purpose o! this new organisation was a question Which 
revealed the different approaches·of the moderates and the revolutionaries 
to the Solution of politioal problems. Proposing the resolution W.C. 
~ - ' 
erson saw the nay organisation pr:1Jnarily in pressU.te-group " terms 
apparently expecting it to cperate successfully upon a politically aware 
gOvernm t ' 
en and eventually conquering it by political means. It 'Was neither 
SUbversive nor unconstitutional. " Revolution would oome only 1£ the ,,' , " 
authOrities resorted to tyracny.(21) Robert Williams had no such ideas •. " 
~~4_ hi ~~ the resolution meant nothing more or less than the 'Dictators p 
f' - -
o the Proletariat' and he advised those 'With cold !ee-b to leave the 
~at Happened at Leeds (London: Pelican Press, 1917). See Note 2. 
21. ~t Ha.ppened at LeedS', pp. 14/15. 
Convention, for Leeds was determined to break theinfluenoe of Labour's 
decrepit politioal and industrial machine. Parliament had never done 
anything for the working masses and never would. The Russians had shown 
the lrq by their contempt for their oonsti tution. They had '8U.Ooeeded, 
the parallel was obvious, "Go thou and do likewise. "(22) Willie Galla.oher 
foll ~ -
oved with similar sentiments while Sylv1a PaDkhurst asserted that the 
Pro . 
ViSional. Committee selected at Leeds would one dq be the provisional 
gOvertlment ot Great :Britain. (23) R.C. Wallhead, who was to issue the 
ceJ.l some years later to the'I.L.P. Left-Wing' to get out of the party, 
~ '
wed traits of woolly thinking in supporting the aotion.· The only able 
Voioe ot dissent throughout the whole proceedings came from Ernest :Bev1n 
lrho,-"-amongst other insights ot political S88aoity, questioned the motivss 
'ot the POliticians who were present at the Convention. Observing that 
the Platform. had said, "The tide is on the rise fo-; us," :BeTin asked, 
"Fo h' ~ . 
, r. om?, The professional. politicians ot the Labour Party?", a cutting 
:ttma.1.ic: which Provoked disorder in the Convention. (24) 
Graubard in reference to the Convention asked about MaoDonald and 
SnOWden, "Ra Were such men able to agree to a resolution creating extra-., 
Pa:tliamentar,y Soviets with sovereign powers?"(25) and pointed to the 
ll.nr .. . 
epresentative nature ot the Convention whioh came "not so much to debate. 
~t . 
o applaud, "(26) as the ~S1I'er. "1'he Leeds Convention was a well-staged 
demonstration ~d as such lett no pe~ent mark on .. the Labour Movement."(27) 
..... ,If 
. 23. !.b~'" p. 17. 
4 .. ,. ,. 
24. !9u..., p. 11.. . or., :Bullock, ; op.oit., pp. 75/6. 
S:R:' Graubud, :Brlti~ Lab~ '~d -the Russ1~ Revolution 191 -19 
(London: Oxford University Press, 195 , p. 39. Cf. J .T. l4u.rph¥, 
!..ew 1I0riz0E!! (London: John Lane, the :Bodley Read, 1941) ,p. 61. 
25. ;. :> 
26 •. Graubard, Qp.~it.,p. 40. 
27. lP;a.,p.40~· ·S~~ Note 3. 
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:But this is misleading. The resolution could mean the setting up ot 
S . 
OViets, it that is what one wanted it to mean. Yet Philip Snowden did 
not Bee it in this light, and it is doubt1Ul it J4acDonald did either. (28) 
Moreover, as Graubard records, Will Thorne spec1tica.lly denied that physicaJ. 
reVOlution was even Po~sible in Great Eritain.(2,9) What Leeds ~ signit,y 
Was that Labour waS alre~ di Tided between th~se' who looked to rl~lent 
revolution and these who looked to action through Parliament tor the 
tranSition to Socialism and that untiltaced. with the realities ot operating 
as a Cohesive bo~ olaiming to be the alternative government, both sections 
COUld agree on .. a suitable torm ot words to express their essentially ditterent 
ideas. !rhe tailure of democratie reason in 191~ merely eon.tu.sed this 
diViSion by creat~ a third' group willing to use industrial power tor 
poll t1caJ. ends but not" a,c;cepting any :BolsheVist notions of a ~TOlutiona.r.Y' 
Uprising. 
~e first large scale discussion ot the general principle ot d~ect 
acti ' 
on in the Labour Party took place at the P~'s Annual Conterence ot 
1919 Where a resolTition was passed ~ondemning Al.li~ intervention in Russia' 
and instructing the National 'Executive to consult with 'the Parliament &r1 
°omuatttee of the !f.U.C" with a. Ti~" to' efteeti~~ly enforcing Labour's' 
d8!n&nds "by the unreserved use ot their pol1 tical and industrial po;er." (30) 
'81mil';resolution on Cons~~ption was 1ntrod~ced by David Xirkwood.(j1).~ 
.. ~------------~------~~----------28 • 
29. 
30. 
. SnOlrden, AutobiographY,I, pp. 455/6.: See Note 4.' , 
Will !rhorne, Mz Life's :Battles (~~don: George Hewnes, 1931), p. 195.' 
!..P~A..C.R.··1919 ~ p.156 ft. 
31. !P~., Pp.166. The resolution~~ reterence to "the full power ot 
organiSed Labour" can be taken to mean Direct Jotion. This particular . 
DlOtion was adopted unanimously and without debate. " 
The Executive's Report, the debates on the subject and the hostility shown 
to'Wa.rda the P:L.P., clearly illustrate the tailure of' the Executive to 
understand the dual nature of' the direct actionist case and the failure ot 
th " 
e moderates to fully detine their position •. Aa it was few ot the latter 
COUld appreciate that they were being led into positions hostile to 
p '., 
arUamentar;r government, while the fomer regarded all Direct Actionists 
as reVOlutionaries. 
The Direct Actionist attack was led by Hobart Williama and Hobert 
Smill1e both ot whom argued that the govermnent t 8 policy was unconstitutional. 
Smi . -
1118 in seeking to prove this assertion showed a tendency to confuse ' 
POlitioal acumen with publio mOrality.' A.ttacking the gove1'mJlent, he Uked, 
~ they-rnot deceived the people?" Were they not retumed'to power under 
tal.e preten~es? Did not every member ot their Committee believe that the ' 
present government was' sitting in its place through traud?"(32) While it. 
a . ' . ~ b. &ppreoiated that tor democracy to funotion adequately a oertain level 
ot eleotoral rationality, . free from hyst~a,< hai to 'operate one can only 
conolude that Smillie'a assertion that Labour had the right "to get rid ot a 
Go?&rnment •••• sitting-there·through fraud and deceit"(33) ~d tend to' 
t . 
urther undermine the prestige of the House of Commons and political action, 
-hi . , -
oh Was oerta:1nl.y· not what he had intended. 
Several speakers at the Conferenoe failed to realise that their 
ob . jeot1ons to the moral standing' of the gOTernment led them to draw oonolusions 
-hi .... ,.,. . . 
oh oOuld be interpreted as being hostile to Parliamentary government. 
!rQml. . 
fly of' A..S.L.E.F.; for example,' bitterly attack.~ the government for not 
tuJ.1'iU1ng its election pledges, a condition he seemed to assooiate with, ." .. '.' 
~~--~------------------------------------------------------
32. This;,as on' a motion to ref'er back the section of the Executive's Report 
which did not acoept that industrial actionn for poli tioal ~urposes was 
an acOeptable object for the Labour party. L.P.A.C.R. '1919. pp. 116-123. Smi~lie's comments are to be found on pp.118. 
33. !!.oo.C1t: 
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democrat10 government. Then, deola.rl.ng that progress was the sole 
proVince of "the 1ntelligent progressive minorities," he voioed his own 
d ' 
CUb. that Labour would or oould . . ever win an election 1n a oapi t&1ist 
sOCiety even where it had a wid~ suffrage.(34) In so doing Bromley was 
unWittingly using the argument whioh the ~sts would use 1n justifying 
the Diotatorship of the Proleta.rlat. In reacting against the result of 
the 1918 eleotion lI18llY' people iG the Labour party like Bromley questioned 
the validity of majority rule and the effioacy of Parliament&1.'1 govemment. 
This is olearly illustrated by the speeoh of R.J. Danes, who proposed the 
r . 
esolut1on oondemning Allied intervention in Russia. Pointing out that he 
1r1ahed industrial. action to be thought of in tems of supplementing rather 
than 8U.bst1tuting politioal action, he argued that "nearly every movement 
~ . -favo~ of the working-cluses had been unoonstitutional."(3S) Clearly 
IlUch attitudes, reinforced by the oertainty of the rlghtnes; . of" the oause, 
COUld be used to justify any revolutionary action. 
Part of the direct actionist attack was oentred upon the' alleged 
failings of Labour's leaders in general, and the P.L.P. 1n particular. 
llromley, in his SP;eoh, called. upon the leadership to give the rack and 
flle the oall for which they were waiting. "It was the leaders who were 
t· -00 respectable, who didn't like to be roasted in the capitalist Press, who 
1 . . 
iked to be called level-headed 'hade Unionists. "(36) The rank and fU • 
. 
"ere only waiting for effective leadership.·, The attack on the P.L.P. was 
1Il0re severe. Herbert Morrison described. it as "a fa1lure1n the present· 
Pl.l'liament."(37) Its ranks were sadly lacking in quality, its outlook was 
.... 
-----------------------------------------------
34. 
35. 
36. 
37. 
!Pi!., p.120. 
!P..iA,., p.157. 
u. ........ 
.!biA,. ,Pp. 120/1. 
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diatinGtly narrow. It had failed to voioe the aspirations of the Labour 
Movement "on great national questions of prinoiple, on great matters of 
liberty, ~d on great matters ot international polioy."(38) Other 
delegates drew up specitio examples of the inadequacy ~f the Parliamentary 
Party. Its inability to do anything about the Glasgow strike, and the use 
or 1Ili11tary on that oooasion,was cited by a delegate from G~asgow. "The 
~ -
our Party in the House of Commons," he declared, "did not voioe the 
. . 
matter as the.y ought to have done."(39) Mrs. ~amber'of the ~.S.P. acoused 
, . 
th .' 
e P.L.P. ot failing to distinguish itself as a separate politioal. entity, 
a. faUura she attributed t? its Weriority oomplex, and urged that it adopt 
a more Dlilitant tone in the House of Commons. (40) 
Aoco;ding to Grauba.rd the a.1rect actioni~ts' case drew great strength 
,~- -' 
fl.'olll the failure of the P.L.P. to provide positive leadership.. On the 
~ . 
saian question tor example, ,"The Labour Party's protest in Parliament 
lack: . ' - "," ". 
ed both vigour ~ purpose", so that "as. Labour's weakness in Parliament 
beomn "'- .-' 
e """Greasingly apparent, the proponents of 'direct action' gained new 
prest ige."(41) This conclusion however does not acoord with the evidenGe. 
'- .-/ . ....". .. . In t ~ , 
he fiJ.ost place Labour'. ma.in weakness was less in qualitY than in quantity, 
'. :. &1' . 
aot "hiGh few direct aotiCllists seamed to appreciate. Herberl l4orrison, 
tor example, had stated that the Go;ernment' s poliey "was not war against 
·he - . B ViBD •••• but against the inte~ational organisation of Socialism •••••• 
(and) against the organisation of the Trade Union' Movement 'i*se~~ and as 
. "'" ";-. ' '. 
8U.oh Bhould be resisted with the tull political and industrial power of the 
'!r- • 1, 
lrhol ' 
e Trade Union l4ovement."(42) The Labour Party's role as Trade Unionism's 
~------------------------------------------------------------
38. !9c.oit. 
-
39. !bi~~;'P.129. 
40. ~~:cit. 
41. G;~~:~ ~..:..a, "-
-.wcw;u. VJ,1.cit., p.70. 
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pOlitioal am should be to oonduot itself in Parliament, "On the lines 
ot oPPosition, on the lines ot hostilit.1 to the Gover.ament ••• "(43) 
t - , -
aotios whioh he' seemed to think: wOUld somehow or other lead to the 
". 
gOvernment t s domf'all. " Similar ideas ".re expressed the following year 
"b' -, . . 
'1 Josiab. Wedgwood who told the 1920 Party Conferenoe that "he wanted the 
~ Labour Party to oppose, tor it was only by opposition that they would get 
their wSJ."(44) Eeliev1Dg that militant tactios would ~orease party 
lIl' , . " , . 
entbership, Wedgwood asserled that "it the Labour Party made themselves 
< 
as Objeoti~nable as they oould in the House hehad.'no(~doubt ~they oOuld 
'get their :au.ssian poli07 tollowed. "(45) '~The following year another 
del ' ." , 
aga.te approvingly referred to Parnellite tactios8.s the kind ot 
lIltl . itano~the P.t.P. should practioe.(46.) 
The relevanoe of suoh8.0tion waslWted 'for 8.s.Adam~on waS to point 
~60 ' 
members oould not dominate a House ot 700 members.(47) Certainly 
this waS true ot the House ot 'Commons silioe the 1880's when the ~iah 
p~ had. attempted to impose its will ~pon theHouse:' ~ addition' it 
ShOUld be remembered that a numberot individuals h8d. an' interest'1ritbe~ 
Oritioal or the P.t.P. "Rains83 MaoDonald,' with "his politioal sense gu,iding 
h1Ja, -8.8 'proOlaiming the need to; non-Parliam~ntai.y aOtlonbeto;e the .... 
p.t.P. had even reached westminste; 'even tho~h h1~ call was oouohed in 
oonservative terms. (48) ", MaCDonald's U'slike otthe P.t.P. and its' 
lIl-berSh!p oould only have been rei~orced by his 'humiliating failure to 
Bea ' ",. " . 
l1:re the post 'ot adviser to the P.t.P.' early in 1920.(49) Moreover, 
~~------~----~--~----------------~~~-----------------43. !&o.oit •. , ~" ' 
44. ·~:P:A:C.R. 1920, p.151 •. 
45. '~o,Oit. See Note 5.' ,; 
46·~P:A:C.R. 1921, p.187,' The del8gate was Mr. G. Thompson (Bolton 
, Labour Party) ,., . .", 
. -. ,,-. 
47. L - " , 
-:P.A.C.R. 1919, p.132. 
, See above, 'Footnote 12:., . 
, 
, This inoident is desoribed in tyman, Op.oit., pp.135/6. 
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defenders of JlacDonald have too often forgotten that his ambiga.oUB 
sta.tements on direot aotion, like those during the war, were 1Ipoken by a 
POlitioian whose main skill was to pl8.Y' both sides at onoe - though not 
aJ.wSfs dishonourably. (50) Nonetheless , it was notioeable how quioklY' 
the P.t.P. onoe under MaoDonald's leadership was praised by UacDonald 
hiJnaelt in the Socialist Review: In Ja.rruary 1923 he wrote "Labour is 
the OpPOSition and is funotioning as the Opposition. It has had even 
lIlore than its fair share of opportunities provided for it and has taken 
them 1I'ell. "(51), Of oourse, part ot this banter was directed at the 
~ .' - ' QraJ.s. "The Oppoai tion talls more and more into the hands of the 
tab - . 
O'tl't' Party" MacDonald wrote in JIq of the same year. Yet he could 
!lot - ' 
resist references to the alleged absence of an Opposition duri.ng the 
Pr,l'1ous Parliament. (52) "Clearly Ka.cDonald was far from being a dis-
interested observer. ' 
lhilip Snowden too used his colWlllls in the Labour Le8de;: to gloomily' 
~ , .. , 
reoa.at even before Parliament had met in 1919 that the P.L.P.' did not 
e.ppe~ to be a ~amic force, and although he took: great pains to deolare, 
hi. ,,_ 
'-.t'a.rti&1.ity, it is clear that he, like Ka.cDonald, was anxious to 
Pr ' 
'''ellt the new Labour Members, ot whom onlY' three had I.L.P. connections, 
fro" - ' 
• gettiD8 81rJ' credit which they, as the na.tural leaders ot the party, .t" • 
reall1deserved.(53) The Labour Lesder's oritioism throughout the period 
1919 ... 1922 was prl.m.arilY' an exercise in ~ti-Trade Union sectiona.lism based ' 
eaaelltiaJ.l.y on the temperam~ntal, 8Jl1I)tianal, intelleo~ and. pOlicY- ,,' 
differenoes between the "ad~~O~"Position ~f th~ I.L.P. and the oonservatism 
~---------------_/_"~~-------'-"--------------------------------
50. J.tary Agnea"' lIamiito~ oommented that ":Between 1919 and 1922 his only 
secure; su.pport oame from rl thin the -I .L.P •••• to the' I .L.P. he had 
been a hero. Now in going against the Bussian Revolution he jeopard-
1(1ed. his heroism." Uphil,l al~ the Wa.yl A Tb, ird Cheer for Democracy" , 
London: Jobathan.Cape, 1953),p.37. ,- ' .. -, - , 
51. 19oi8J.ist Review,No.112 (January,1923), p.,. See also "The Party in, : 
!!.arliament" Ibid., pp. 25/35. '.,.. '. - " . " • ~ . •. . 
52. Sea l'~~a.rd. ~asgow), 25 November 1922. Cf. 23 December 1922 (MacDonald). 
, . 53. :La'b9Jl:r:: Leader. 2 Ja.nua.ry 1919. See Bote 6. " . . 
"---------- ,----~~-- ------
of the Unions. (Slt.) This bias was partioularJ...y notioeable in the Labour 
!!.eadE!!: in its constant oritioism of the P.L.P. as a typical Trade Union 
body and its conolusion that members of the I.L.P. would make better 
~b -, . 
our M.P' s. (55) Moreover, while the Labour Leader was forever bemoaning 
the absenoe of MacDonald, Jowett and Snowden frcm the House of Canmons it 
ne"ler onoe referred to Arthur Henderson, whose party, governmental and . 
Parl' l.arnentary experience was, and remained, unma tohed by the darlings of 
the I.L.P. C 56) 
In January 1919 3nowden wrote, "Unless the Labour Party makes the 
best Use of its opportunities the movement among the rank-and-file tor 
unoffioial direot action .will· grow, but an effeotive Opposition in the 
HOuse of ..coomons •••• will convince the revolutionary element that Parliament 
oan be used as a potent instrument tor constitutional revo1ution."(57) His 
opt:Uniani about the·' revolutionary elem~nt' apart, Snowden' s analysis and 
conolusion stood in stark contrast to his own barren reoord as a leading 
~ . . 
OUr .member in the House of Canmons, both before and during the war, when 
the P.L.P. was fundamentally divided on a great number of issues •. Moreover, 
he should have noticed a far more astute observation made by the Labour 
~er~ 'London Diary.' .. "The direct actionists," it ccmnented, "are 
l;Uceh. -. ~ to reap a harvest from the hopelessness of the political situation."C5a) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------54.. 
55. 
56. 
57. 
58. 
In April 1920 the I.L.P. sent a letter to the N.E.C. complaining at 
the inactivity of the P.L.P. in the Parliamentary discussion and debates 
on foreign policy, particularly those oonoerned with the Austrian Treaty. 
See N.E.C. Minutes Vol. 19. 20 April 1920. See also Labour Leader, 
4. March 1920. 
,&"abour Leader, 1919 passim. Ct. MaoDonald' s "j,' Member. ot Parliament 
cannot be selected in the same way that a delegate .to a Trade Union 
Conference or an I.L.P. Conferenoe is. The jobs are altogether 
ditt'erent .... It Forward (Glasgow), 3 May 1919. 
See Note 7. 
tfbour Leader, .30 January 1919. Ct. MaoDona1d Sooialist Review,XVI,No.89 
April/June 1919), p.1Q4. . .' ' 
~bour Leader, 2 u'anuary 1919. Ct. MaoDonald's statement that the new 
Parliament "invited outside aotion" Times, 3 Januar,y 1919. The Italics 
are mine. 
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Indeed, the Labour Leader in an editorial had expressed the "oonviotion 
that the strength end influence of the party would depend l~ss upon its 
numbers end exertions in the Rouse than upon the energy ot the Labour 
agitation in the country ••• ''(59)'', 
The most oomplete and detached oritioism of the P.L.P. is found in 
an article by Willie Graham whioh represented in less vitriolic tams ths 
l.t.p. case. "Parliament demands the exclusive attention of the best minds 
it' ~ 
real progress is intended. From the ,very beginning that is impossible 
in the case ot Labour members. ' " Of the 60 representatives, practicall1 all 
are Overworked Trade Union ottioials. Du.e largely to ,the great development 
ot the Work of the Ministry ot Labour, to the establishment ot all manner 
Of' AdVisory Committees and Conoiliation :Boards and to the' demands of & 
el'eatll increased membership throughout the countr,y, the duties of these 
1Ilen have become harder then ever. The Unions expect results." 
"The inevitable effect is that the House of Commons can ~ee these 
1Ilen ,onJ..r occasionally. They are not able to appreciate its atmospheres 
bec&U t . 
se hey have not the opportunities; they lose touoh with legislation; 
there is no hope ot patient study; Committee work cannot be attempted tor 
lack ot time; end the critics are probably sound when they argue that the 
p -
&rliamentary party is not doing the best work. It is deteated not by 
lack ot ability, tor there is much solid sense intherariks, but by a 
8yatem. We must do all in our power to . secure the retum ot mat11 ot the' 
1Ilen who disappeared in Deoember. They, had the pa.rliamenta:r,y way., They 
lpeciaJ.illed. Above all, they had the prelimina.r;r training which enabled 
th_ to deal ett~tivelY rlt~ the sophistrles ~t ~ impro~tu Trea.su.ry 
..... - " .. 
:BellCh."(60). 
~---------------------~----~--------------------------------
59. ~our Leader, 9 Januaxy 1919. See Note S. 
60. -
"Parliament and Labour", article in Edinburgh Evening News reproduoed 
in 1'homas N. Graham, Willie Graha:m: The Lite of the Rib. Hon. Willis 
Q.r~ (London: Hutchinson ,194S~ pp. SA/5. See note 9. 
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There was some substance in Graham's criticism although its real aim 
w " . as to secure the return of many ot the men who disappeared in December" _ 
but 1f' the symptoms were obvious, the diagnosis was wrong for the kind of crit-
1 1 d 
o ~ which was made ot the P.L.P. betrayed the prejudices of its critic:S.:~ 
Q' ~ himself admitted "This Parliament was hardl.y elected before the 
?endetta against; all re~onable Labour rJ,presentatives was commenced."(61) 
~ . 
. El Parliamentary Party' a concentration on industrial ,affairs (the na.tural 
Pro~uct ot the composition ot the P.L.P. and the importance ot' industrial 
OOnfl1ct 1n the immediate post-war years) riled the I.L.P. which preterred 
. .. . 
to .ta.lk about w1der international issues. Thus when the Labour Leader 
cl&imed that "as it (the P.L.P.) 1s constituted at present it is not wortq 
ot d ~ , 
emocratic opposition. ' .. The .Parliamentary pa.rty does not represent the 
movement "(62),it was hitting at Trade Union.domination of the leadership 
01' '. 
the Party and its own exclusion from power •.. Objectivi.ty war ot little 
cons, 
. . quence •.. One delegate, at the 1919 Conference. ann~ced that M.P. ts 
'w . . 
ere returned to Parliament to put in attendanoe at Parliament, and 
" '. '" . , 
11 t".. . 
o u.l.,1lg should prevent them trom being in their ssats"(63) ~. a oritioism . 
whi . . . 
ch showed no understa.nding of. the operation ot the House of Commons ,.' 
and, 1enorance ot the nature ot what constituted & Parliamentary sea.t.,·. 
C .. 
ert&1nlyit made little allowanoe for the political:ditticulties in whiCh 
the P.t-.P. tound itseLt in ita attempts to be recognised a.s the official 
OpPO&lt10n.(64) 
. > 
'-----------------------------------------------------~------
61. !.1mel!! 12 April 1920, Quoting Fdinburgh Evening News. i C • " 
62. ~01U' Lead.er, 24 July 1919 •. It wunot untU 1922 tha.t the N.E.C. 
&greed to consult with the Trade Unions financially responsible for 
. lI.p. 's w1 th a view to allowing them tacili ties tor tull-time devotion 
to their Parliamentary duties. N.E.C. !4inlAs Vol. 25, 23 November 1922. 
63. ~P.A.C.R. 1919,p.128. Jlr~ W.R. ~·(~~rsm1thC~~t~~bour 
P~). . See Note 10. ' 
64~. See-Note 11.-
.u thO\18h the impetus for direot action had subsided by the time 
ot the 1920 aod 1921, Conferences (the Council of Jotion notwithstanding) 
criticism of the P.L.P. continued on much the same lines as before. 
CritiCism was not, however, couched in terms ot supplementing the P.L.P.'s 
, . 
numerical weakness but of strengthening its quality. The main line of 
attack was still the alleged failure ot the P .L.P. to behave according to 
. .. 
, the at8l1d.al'd.a supposedly set up by rank-and-file delegates. Emmanuel 
. Shinwell speaking at the 1920 Conference expressed conoern with "the 
. . 
etticienoy of the party in the House of Commons"(65) intima.ting that in 
al.l respects (attendanoes, it~ representativene;~ ~d its faith) it was 
.not Up to the required standa.rd. Another delegate (E.E. Hunter) criticised 
the P .L.p. for not a~ractiDg attention as ~he anti-"~ section ~f the 
P&.1:'ty had allegedly done. , "The charge and the cri tioism was that the 
p ~ 
arty Was not attracting att ention, that , it was not acting as the leader , 
,ot WOrking-class opinion in the House of Commons. "(66) Several speakers 
" a.ttacked the failure ot t~e P.L.P. to funotion as .~ Opposition b~ 
,8Jcpresaing the aspirations ot the Party. This continued criticism ot the 
P .L.p. at a time when Direct Jotion was on ~he wane clearly indioates that 
u.nJ.ess the P.L.P. had suddenl~ beo~e a ~osefUl. and vigorous fo~e in 
the House ot Commons such criticism was not tramed independently otthe 
., . .: ~ 
, Phenomenon ot direct action. The supposed failure of the P.L.P. was used 
b " . .. ""', .' .. ', '.' ,'" 
, y the direct actioniats and other anti-Trade Union, anti-P.L.P. ,elements 
1n the Party to 'augment' their ~ase not to prove i~.' It was these elements 
who attempted to mould Labour Opinion through "the p~y organs Of' p~paganda 
,(~our Leader; Daily H.ra1~ and J'orwa.rd) '~l of which were hostile to the 
, p.t.P. , 
~-------------------------------------------------------------
65. i.P.A.C.Re 1920, p.148. 
66. ~1d., p.151. 
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It is quite obvious that the criticisms which were mada ot the P.L.P. 
. - " 
bOUed down in the end to a matter' ot psychology and opinion. :Ben Spoor, 
himself a member ot the I.L.P. Parliamentary group,expressed this when he 
~a1d, "there was a teel:I:iy( that tor some Z'e~on or other the sixty and more 
'" , " . me #~,,#,# 
n in the Rouse had not done their work so ettectively as did twenty men when 
them-
-" were in the Rouse betore. "(67) Like Wedgwood ha attributed this 
f. 1i~- . . 
e ~ to the willingness ot the P.L.P. to compromise. Several speeches 
, . 
from the rank-:and-tUe at both Conferences pur8Ue~ ~he same ~heme: It was 
f ..... .. .... '" . 
81 t that the P .L.P. bad tailed to lead, that they had not put Labour t s 
o " 
. as. etfectively enough, tought hard enough, attracted enough attention 
arreceiVed deputations as they, ought. Such criticism. was not new, indeed, 
it '.' ,: 
had been an integral part ot the pre-war Labour politics, but it waB not 
entirely true either~ Rank-and-file movements inevitably tend to be 
°ri . . ;~ . 
ticaJ. of what they consider to be the leadership t s foot-dragging. Suoh 
crit '. '. .' '. . .. . . , 
1C1sm merely'reflected the frustration ot the Party with its exclusion 
~m .. ' '. ~ . .... 
real influence. It is noticeable, too, that the P.L.P. in 1921, 
thougn no~ substantially differe~t in pe~sonn:{ ~; ~aot1cs trom its 191~ 
< • ,." , • 
Co . 
Ul'lterpa.rt, far trom being condemned as a failure was being spurred "on to 
, ._ J -
ne '
a; er ettortsin the House of Commons."(6S) . 
It is quite clear that contemporary" cri tics neither knew nor cared 
. , . . ...' 
&bout the technicalities .of P~liamenta.r;y .opp~sition;. t~ey wanted effective 
~~ion ot a type which the P.L.P., by ... virtue of its Parliamenta.r,y position, 
CQ\ll.dnot Pro~d~.· Later critics have t~~ "~eadily ig~~r~" the d~rences 
lr~Ohwera made' by, and in ;avOurot~· the P.L.P., or have chosen to accept at 
fac . . .. '. "'. ., 
'"-Value soma ot the criticisms made at the time." Deapi te Snowd.an t s 
., 
'------------------------------------------------------------------67 •. !Pi~ •• p.152. See Note 12. 
68. .!;...P.A.C.~. 1921, p •. 17S. See Nota 13. 
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clalms to the contrary the speeches which Adamson and Cly,nes made correctly 
, , 
analysed the.problems facing the P.~.P.(69) Quite ,simply successive leaders 
,ot the Parliamentary Party,declared that criticism ot the Party's pertozmance 
Was a mixture of lies and the naive acceptance of the propaganda churned out 
b'" '. ,', " " . . . , ' 
'7 the capitalist press _ which was naturally anxious to prevent the P.L.P. 
• • -, l ', ' 
. ,tran attra~til~g the favourable attention ot the electorate. J.R. Cly.nes 
. ," , 
answering acharg~ trcm Philip Snowden that he was drit~ing a~ay fron 
Sooiali" '. 
sn commented, ~. Snowden requires but little evidence to pass a 
jUdgement upo~ his fellows. '. A.lin~ lifted tr~ the ,'~aPitalist Press' is 
. . 
at . '.,,' . . . .' 
times enough on which to give a verdict."(70) Criticism of the P.L.P • 
.Aa ,.... ' .' ,: .' ; '. . "', 
. 8msonnoted, "was almost an annual procedure •••• "(71) In reply to such 
Oritioisn,it was asse;t~d 't~t t~e att~nd~e r~cord of the P.L.P. in tb4 
exis" '. ... , ':' <" ',-,,/' " ." I '. .' ", co , , :.' 
'. ting Parliament was favourably ccmparable with that of any of its 
llrede ...... ,.... 
cess.~ra, ita opponents, the Party Conference and branch meetings. The 
1 - . 
e.at point stirred scme guilty consciences. (72) In his report to the 1919 
COnt -' .., .. .,. 
. erence Adamson in answer to critics ot the P.L.P.'s record pointed,out 
that ,." ,.'. ,~..., , . . 
'. an M.P.' s tme was limited by a variety of claims - including the 
cl Ern :,',', " '. ','~', : . 
&..nds Of local parties tor Members to make visits. Attendance in the 
<1ebating chamber' was :ot 'the sole' ~ri ter~ ot' an M.P. ,'s le~ tm:a te . 
acti~ity. (73) There was '. no need to'; lrlnt to' elaborate tor e~e~ Willie 
Gr " . .," ." '. ' 
&.ham came under attack f~an ~he, disgrunt'led m~oritY~(74) 
~---------------------------------------------------------
69. WU~ Adamson' and J .R~ ClYnes were; successive 1e~der8 
70. 1918-20 and 1920-22 respeotively.' " ," .. ' ,.' , 
!!bour Leader, 15 May 1919. , 
of' the P.L.P., 
7l.. '. ~.p.A.C.R. 1919, p.130. 
,. ~. 
72. 191A,., p.13l. 
73. k,..P.A.C.R. 1919, p.63 and pp. 130/2. 
74. Graham, PP.cit.', p. 93' , 
.-
.. 
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The .taots supported the Parliamentary leadership's case: the attendance 
r~ -
ora. ot both Clynes and Adamson was good while the most notable absentees 
Were older Members ot the Party s!Jveral ot whom (Abraham,' Crooks and Wilkie for 
~le) were to retire at, or betore, the next General Election. The 
oritics readily admitted that there was Party and Committee work to be 
a.ttended to in addition to the time spent occupying the Commons' benches 
1rhllst attendance figures could be deoeptive • (75) The alleged ineffiCiency 
Ub .. 
ade Unioll Members was denied; Parliamentary tactics were defended and 
ShortCOmingS recogllised. (76) In the tinal analysis, as Adamson pointed out, 
~ . 
.... lllatter how strongly or intelligently they might put their case, when 
th~ went into the Division Lobby they oould only return 60 votes."(77) The 
a.n81r ,r 
er Was more, not less political .activity, so as to ensure that Labour 
had inoreased representation in the House ot Commons. 
Si&nificantly the Party which was dismissed as a failure in 1919 was 
. be!l'I!» . ~ ta.1ntly praised by 1921. The arguments in its defenoe whioh had been 
lOomed by Hodges in 1919 were admitted by him to be valid in 1921. The 
POliti . 
oaJ. JIlethods which had meant 'failure' in 1919 were heralded as essential. 
in 19 . . 21, although the t.Clarion" in which the Right Wing ot the Labour Party 
- -, ,- ' 
freqUently wrote a.rlici~~·~ '~ever shared the views ot the I.L.P. on the 
question, o~ poor leadership' by the P.t.P.(7S) Not allot this oan be 
a.tt .. , 
rtbuted. to the failure of Direct Aotion in practice, suoh as the psycho-
"logica.lly detrimental. etfect of Black Friday tor example, ~though this, 
no doUbt, had its effect espeoially durirlg a period 01" inorea.d.in8 unemployment 
&.l:\d. an eIUployers' offensive; viz the Miners' look-out ··1921. (79) This change! 
'-----.--------------~---------------------------------------
77.' 
Spoor at the 1920 Conterenoe, L.P.A.C.R. 1920, p.152. 
See, for example, Clynes' speech to the 1920 Conterence. L.P.A.C.R. 1920, 
PP.154/5. L.P.A.C.R. 1921, p.180/1. 
;'.P.A.C.R. 1919, p.132. 
7s. See Note 14. 
. . .79. G.D.R. Cole opined that Bla.ok Fridl\1 "broU&ht an epoch in the Labour 
"'--' ". movement's history to an end." HistorY of the Labour Party, p.117. 
:: '.': ~_.. ~ .. - ----_.-, - "'-' --,--... _.- -."--"._".-,, _ ..._-, .. _._ .. ,_ ...... -.......... -- .... -.--... ,-.... - .. -,-.. ---.--.. ----.~-- ... ~ .. -. -_ ... -. -, -~ .......... '- , .. .. 
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attitude helped towards the re-establishment of political methods, 
although the very fact that the P.L.P. was criticised is evidence of an 
underlYing faith in political methods. Yet the P.L.P.'s defence did not 
go by default. Clynes speaking at the Annual Conference accepted in 
principle a resolution which attacked the continuing practice of allowing 
Trade Union officials to remain in their posts when they were elected to 
the House of Commons, but argued that the Conference should judge the P.L.P. 
11 
not by some imaginary standard of high efficiency which the critics believed 
they could reach if they were in their place, but by exactly the standard 
which the cri tics would have to keep if they had the job as Members of 
Parliament to do." (80) Clynes was never tired of pointing out, usually 
by 0 
1nference, that the most continual complaints among the I.L.P. 
,.,.-" 
eX~J.p.,s were not motivated solely by the interests of the party. There 
is lOt ' 1 tIe doubt that notwithstanding the fact that the P.L.P. w.as far from 
bei 
ng the dynamic force it might have been, the increasing imminence of a 
general election modified the criticism of several aspirant Labour M.P.'s, 
espeCially since the credit for the Council of Action belonged to the 
des 0 • 
P1sed trade union bloc. A recent commentator, moreover, \ has pointed 
Out' that, "the Labour Party made extensive advances between 1918 and 1921 
succeeding in the process in consolidating its position as the chief 
OPPOSition party in the country." (81) 
The P.L.P. may not have been the most brilliant advocate of the 
claims 
of new enfranchised Labour but it performed its role as dutifully 
as COuld be expected in the circumstances. Perhaps the best perspective is 
the fOllowing canment from Sidney and Beatrice Webb "What the militants in the 
count _. 
ry failed to allow for," they wrote, "was the impotence" of a small 
-----------------------------------------------------------------------80. 1·P.A.C.R. 1920, p.155. 
81. ~owling, op.cit., p.25. 
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Parli 
amentary seotion to secure the adoption of its own policy by a 
Parliamentary majority. But it is, we think, now admitted that it was 
a lI1' l.stortune that the Parliamentary Labour Party of these years never 
lI1anaged t -, 
o put. before the country the larger outlines of an alternative 
prograrrun b 
. eased an the Party's conception of a new social order •••• " 
Although the Webbs' canments were substantially those made by the I.L.P. 
~ ., 
of the p 
. .L.P. between 1919 ~d 1922, their remarks were in fact a criticism 
ot the P.L.P. of 1906-1911 when Snowden and MaCDonald were amongst its 
lead' . . . 
.' l.ng personnel. (82) 
Same understanding between the moderate direct actionists and the 
constit t' " . '. 
. u l.~nalists might have been possible had not the latter refused to 
admit th . 
e pOssibility of~campranise. 
Cm' . 
onterence of 1919, however, the Chairman, McGurk, put any such ideas out of 
During his address to the Labour Party 
. ' 
cOUrt -1 __ 
. ~llediately. WWe are either constitutionalists or we are not •••• 
constUutionalis ts. If we are oonstitutionalists, if we believe in the 
etticacv. 
. ~ of the political weapon, (and we do, or why do we have a Labour 
Party?)~ then it is both unwise 'a~ undemocratic because we fail to get a 
lI18,j ority at t"h . 
'. , e polls to turn round and demand that we should substitute 
1na . 
Ustrial action." (83) 
it . 
Was either oonstitutional politica~ action or revolutionary industrial 
No roam was allowed for a duality of approach, 
- . 
This approach, which was followed by the majority of Labour leaders, 
lias based Up ..' • .. . . 
on a posl..tive antipathy towards the revolutionary direct 
actionists. 
. As far as Jimmy Sextonwas concerned, for example, any concession 
to the d . 
. irect actionists would be "letting loose an element that was rife •••• 
------------------------------------------------82. S 
• &: B. Webb, it 688 gp.c ., p. • 
83. . . 
. 
~.A.C.R. -::-,,~~:...,;1:!;,;9~l~2, p.113. See Note 15. 
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·.in the Trade U~i~n Movement, that would take every advantage of the 
cOntu.sion,·' and 'nUw:e it impos~ible for them to exercise any controlling 
POWer. There was a seCtion whose intentions rriq be of the best, but 
his '" , ,'." , 
, qua;rrel with them was that their policy was a rotten one •••• they 
he.a. no JDaohinery 'to replace what they had. , destroyed. ' , Their only 
JDa.chine,1'1 would be' revolution. "(84)' F~r Sexton these 'mad dogs' would 
do nothing but harm to the Traci~ Union Movement. 
test it be thought' that SeXton' overstated or qgerated the case ' 
he 'I' , "'," , " ,," -
as advocating it should be remembered that he was a fair representative 
Of' the Solid !l'rade Union M.P. 'block. Clynes was another. Speak1n8 ~ 
OPPoSition to the res~lution'Call~ to~ direct '~tion on the issue of 
Alli ,', , ,,',," , " , , ' 
ad Intervention in Russia, Cl.ynes stated that while he supported 
industrial.' and strike action 'r~r economic aims, "he 'refused to use that ' 
1feapon tor so clearlY and obvious; a' political p~ose,asthatmenti~ned 
in the resolution."(85) "T~ing a swipe at those who bemoaned the ab~ence 
of' l.t.p. st~wart~'rro~ the P.L.P: 'he r~ind.ed the assembled delegates 
that While the Labour party had. been rejected at the polls, ev~n '!nth. 
tl:'eat induStrial centres, they still hoped' on~ ~ to' see a Labour and 
SoC1aJ.1st government. "What then ;~ld any class' be entitled 'to do 'which. 
rejected an action which' that Gove~ent ~t~.?" Were they going to-
conoed t ' 
e 0 every other or any other claas;the right they were claiming to 
eXercise? Did it me~ th~t any class 'whl.cheould exercise 'the pow~r'should 
have the right to terrorise a Labo~goverOment by the ~~' ot'~ me~~ 'or' 
lQanoevre that it could applY?" (86) The 1 Labour' Le8d.er r~o:cied s~astic 
~' 
~----~------------------------------------------84 " ,,' .' , 
• -frP.A..C.R. 1919,pp.119/120. Ct. Sexton's protest against the 
pernicious policy ot challenging the State by direct action." lhP. De}. 119,cc 1240.. ' "'., ' " d ~ 
85.' ", , 
!:?A..C.R. 1919; p.160. , , 
. ' 86. Ib -- ~ 
--!!., pp. 160/1. 
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Cries ot assent.(81) Pursuing the argument to its logioal oonolusion 
Olyn . 
ea deolared that, "the blow whioh they were threatening would not be 
'" . . OW at a Government but a blow at democracy."(as) 
Ba.:tph Miliband, & Left-Wing "oritio of the ~our Party, has interpreted 
01-... , 
., ...... 8 B:peeoh as as1dng, "tha.t the Labour Movement should deliberately 
tor b ~ -
e ear to use its power over urgent issues in the expectation that its 
oPPonents, in grateful. memory of that l'orebearan.oe, would also behave nioely 
~ . 
en Labo~ oame to oftioe."(89) . Suoh an interpretation, however, seems 
deSigned to tit Miliband's ~1m ~rejudiOes about the nature of eapitalist 
8001 ...... • 
• "oY and the way in whioh it allegedly induees Left-Wing purists to flee 
tro . 
Dl their ideologioal prinoiples; tor Clynes was merely implying that 'Whioh 
lIenderson ,ron behalt of the solid Trade thin b100 ot the Party made olear: 
"1" . 
. 0 tore. upon the oountry by i1legi ttmate means the polioy of a section, 
Pe~PB a minority, of the oommunity involves the abrogation of Parliamentar,y 
Gover...,., t . 
·-en , establishes a diotatorship ot the minority and might easily destroy 
elentually all our oonstitutional liberties." 
"It is, moreover, a two-edged polioy. . 'When Labour oonquers" poli tioal 
. Po,,' 
er and acoepts responsibility tor the machinery ot Goverrunent, I oannot 
aee it prepared to admit sq, the tollowers ot Sir Edward Carson, or the' 
~edical protession to set the Exeoutive at defianoe by any prooess ot direct 
aotion."(90) 
. . . 
Clearly the oonstitutionalists were oonfident in practioe,' as well in . 
the . '. 
0lY, ot their ultimate Parliamentary viotol.'Y through the polls. William 
! . 
ra.ce ot the South Wales Miners ohided the direot aotionists on this very pOint. 
~""'" 
ee· . .!!bour Leader, 3 July 1919. 
• ";'.P.A.C.R. 1919 p.161. 
Uiliband, :farliamentarl Sooialism, p.12.· 
Daily Herald, 14 July 1919. Ct. The Times' versbn 'ot 14 July 1919. 
J.H. Thomas' speech, Times 28 July 1919 •. Sir Edward Carson was at 
the-time making thunderous speeches against the possibility of 
'Ulster being tOl.'Qed to remain part ot Ireland. 
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Reminding than.ot their protessed taith in a Labour viotory, he asked, 
"Did 
they believe their. vision? Why, they had been proclaiming that within 
th ' 
e llext tew years they would see the oontrol of political opinion in this 
Ooun+- .. 
.... .1 and that a Labour Government should be power. Had they taith'in 
th~selves?It(91) The answer, as the moderates so otten said, lay in the 
~erteot state ot Socialist prOpaganda.· 
. " " 
Pemaps it was not taith that was laoking but patienoe; the direot 
aotioniats Were impatient, an impatienoe horn of the arroganoe of the 
intelleotual oertain~ that underlies the t~nets ot Marxist· and neo-Marxist 
. . 
aocial. and poli tioal. analysis. Ben Tillett was well aware of this when he, 
attacked 't' . .. , ... ,.', 
he middle-class and professional poli tioians' who were always 
8.nxiotts to lead the Trade' Unions into trouble but the last to help than out 
-, . ."... , 
or it 
• He made this oontempt tor them quite olear; "The lions on the 
Platt ' , "," ',' .. 
Ol1n had been rats when the sword had been drawn" he declared. (92) As tar 
as he ." ,. " , 
" 'Was ooncerned the deoision on industrial. aotion properly belonged to 
th Tr' I 
, e ade Union Movement not the Labour Party. ,The Conference evidently believed 
°thenri " . 
" se, tor it passed the resolution by a substantial majori tar. (93) 
The COnferenoe, however, oould not control the aotions of the party 
leaderShip which ren~ed predaminat~ oonstitutionalist in prinoiple and 
pra8natio in praotioe. Considering the inevitab~e' olash ot personalities, 
the a .' ,.' , . .' '.. .. _ .. 
. , iSloyalty of Robert Williams to colleotive deoisions and the emotional 
en ,. ." 
ergy that exploded at each stozmy meeting of the Executive, its own stanoe 
on '., , '.' ; . ~e,qUe8tion of direct aotion epitanised the tine art et ocmpranise. In 
,'----~------------------------------------------------91 t ' 
• ,~P.A.C.R. 1919, p.121. 
92. " 
" . '. :tbid, Pp. 158/9. The I.L.P. was as oontemptuous of Tillett as he was 
Of it, see Labour Leader, 3 July 1919. Tillett bad been the author 
ot a pamphlet Ills the Labour Party a Failure'fwhioh was oiroulated at ~he PortsmouthCo~erenoe (1908). ; See Robert Williams, The New LabO'llr 
..s.tlo~, p.28. _ <. - ." ,. ~ 
93·~P.A.C~R:c1919: 'P.161.· 1,893,000 votes to 935,000. 
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ita at ~ 0 
a. .. ement to the Conferenoe it had. noted that "many resolutions have 
been received at the Head Offioe indioating that there are some sections 
or the Movement anxious that an organised attempt to defeat the Government I s 
POlitioal. polioy b7 direot indu~~rial. action should be disoussed by a joint 
COnferenoe representativ~ of both the politioal and in4ustrial. movaments."(94) 
~oweV~'it had oontinued, 0 "th~ Triple Industrial. Allianoe has indioated by 
~esOlution their desire that the i~sue should be determined by the Trades 
Union Congress only."(95) '0' Its, own view 'was non-oommittal, "it the :British 
. La.b~ M~vement is t~ 'institut~ a new preoedent . in our industrial histor,y 
by ini tiat~ ~ general ~trike for' the purpose of achieving not industrial 
but politioal. objeots, it is imperative that'the Trade Unions, whose ~~bers 
are'to fulfil 1 the obl18ations implied in the' new polioy ~d whose finanoes 
it i ' '. 0 0 .' 
. a Presumed are to be involved, should realise the responsibilities such 
~ strike mov~ent would entail and should thems~lves d~t~r.mine the plan of 
any SUCh new oampaign."(96) 
. , 
On the 9th July 1919 the Executive' 88l'eedto' press for a special. 
COnterenoe "for the pup 0 se , of 'discussing whethe~, '811d by what means, direct 
1nduat~aJ. ~tion sho~d be taken to secure th;· adoption of the 'polioy of 
the Labour Movement on Allied Intervention "iIi Russia and the oontili.u~~e of 
C01l80~Ption."(97) 0 The Parli~ent8:ry Co~ttee of the T.U.C., howeTer~ 
~etuled to o~operate. ' " It had earlier refuseds:1.m11ar requests~m the 
l4izle~s and the Triple Alli~oe, on the gro~ds" t~t .'. aspeoial. Conferenoe 
---- ..... " ,-". 
94.' L 
_.P.A.C.R. 1919, p.27. 0 • 
95. to i 
_ 0.0 t. j ~., 
96. Loo.Oit~, Th~'~eoutiv~ h~'al.ready t~eddown ,;.'proposed24 hour 
atrike on the grounds that "it is not the business of the Labour 
Party to interfere with the. business of the Trades Union and the P~liamentary Committee o~ the Trades Union Congress." N.E.C. Minutes 
VOl~ 17., 25 June 1919~ ,; . 
--~E.C. Minutes, Vol.18., 9 July 1919. The resolution was moved by 
ramp and. Robert Williams. Tom Shaw and J. Wignall failed in an 
a.ttempt to refer the matter to ballot of the Trade Union Movement. 
The Amendment was deteated 14 to '.4 and the motion passed. by 14 
Votes to 5. 
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had no power to order the General Strike demanded by the Miners' Leaders, 
and. that "to de~lare such a threat rl thout the certainty of its -being 
carried o~t would reduoe the prestige of the Labour Movement, "(98) 
preterring instead to accept :SOnar Law's assurances on governmental polioy. 
:By the narrow majority of six votes to -four it again refused to call a 
SPecial. COnference. The Triple Allianoe therefore, . took its own steps 
to t01'Oe the issue by calling a ballot to ask its members whether they 
lIere in favour of withdrawing their labour to secure the abolition of 
conSCription, of military intervention in Russia, and of military inter-
"ention in Trade Union disputes."(99)· The result of the ballot was never 
annOUnced, Owing to the policy. statement given by Mr. Winston Churchill, 
Secret&r.tof State for War, in the HOuse of Commons on 29th July 1919 
lIhich effectively answered each of the questions asked by the Triple 
Allianoe. The Daily Herald. was elated and declared that the event was 
"th ~ e final and irrefutable proof of the necessity and etncacy of direct 
8.Qti ( . 
on" 100) a view which few observers then or since have shared. 
~ 
None of these events eased the antagonism within the party over the 
qUestion of direct action. Indeed,. they reinforced and polarised the 
tto aides in their views. . The constitutionalists had still less'faith 
in the likelihood of widespread rank-and-file support for industrial action 
and. oOmplete disrespeot for the direct actionist leaders, especially Hobert 
tllliams Whose deliberate leatages of oonfidential information were a 
cons~ant source or politioal embarrassment. At the Trade Union Contereaoe 
'-------------------------------------------------------------
98. ,V.L. All en,· Trade Unions ~d the·Gove~ent (Lond~~~: Lo~s, 1960),' 
PP. 153. Allen is quoting the minutes of the Parliamenta:ry Committee 
of the T.U.C., 8 April, 1919. 
99. :Bullock, oP~oit. ~. P.'· 105. 
100. ~aily Herald, 30 July 1919. 
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~l' ' 
919 the direct actionists were acc~sed ot attempting to fanent a 
revolution· in Britain, with the ultimate purpose of establishing a govemment 
on the SOviet model, whereas the constitutionalists argued that redress 
thro .. 
ugh the ballot box was still possible. (101) The Conference' disagreed 
and defeated all the devices put up by the Parliamentary Ccmnittee designed 
too prevent the appearance ot having gone revoluticma.ry, by reterring back 
the section ot the Report excusing its inaction and defeating a motion which 
"as hostUe to the idea of Direct Action. (102) However, no vote in favour 
or dir 
ect action 1'I8.S proposed and although the Parlianentary Canmittee had 
been 
censured tor falling to act on the issues upon which that censure was 
based the ' 
se issues had lost their immediacy. The hostile votes represented 
the f . rust~tion of the direct actionists with the failure of the leadership 
to dis 1.._ ' 
C'Jl:lrge governmental functions; notwithstanding the fact th8.t it was 
lot in . , 
a POsition to act as a government. 
The impetus for Direct Action decreased as unemployment rose and the 
~~ " " 
llnent and employers grew in coDtidence. The lrfiilers, having been " 
bOUght . ,,' 
off lrith the Sankey Canmission, were the first to teel the drop m 
the t . . 
eczpo when, in spite of the indiciment of private ownership which the 
C~s1on had elicited,' the Governme~t in'August 1919 finally disnissed all 
~~a ' -
nationalisation. A speoial oonference ot the T.U.C. in Deoember 
1919 l'e .. , , '" 
V'eQ..Led a. distinct unwillingness in the Movement to resort to extra 
p~U ' ' ~entary foroe.(103) A widespread ~es tor the Nation· Camp~ 
"as 1na ',' 
Ugerated without success. .&.nother special Conference (11 March 1920) 
~-"-'--------~~~~~~~~--------------------101. T' " 
102. 
103 •. 
Jades Union Congress Report, 1919, p.2l6/3l. Hereatter T.U.C. Report. ~ee also Clynes in The Times, 10th and 15th August 1919, and 8th 
eptenber 1919. 
Lu.c. Report. 1919. pp 288/300. 
h p .A.C.R •• 1920, pp 7/9. , T.U.C. Report. 1920, pp 87/90. 
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voted against using a general strike weapon to secure nationalisation and 
in favour ot "political action, in the tonn of intensive political 
pr~aganda in preparation for a General Election." (104) Recent bye-election 
and local election results no doubt played their part in generating hope 
for La'bour IS political future, while the continuing increase in Labour 
Party men'bership also contributed to that end. (105) . Increasingly the idea 
of direct action came to mean a tenn denoting economic action alone, such 
as a strike. 
The re-emergence of direct action as a po1itica1·torce came with the 
aove~entts blundering policy afrepression in Ireland and its support for 
the POliSh attack on the Soviet Union in 1920. In Ireland the Irish T.U.C. 
had sucCessfUlly secured the release of a hundred nationalists by calling a 
n-
Direct action was thus seen to work where political action general strike. 
had iailed. (106) The refusal of Irish railwaymen to move British troops 
or sup li P es was backed by the T.U.C. which, in a special session on 13 July 
1920 ~ 
, l.Iemanded the withdrawal ota11 British troops, cessation ot production 
ot Wa 
r materials for use against Ireland or Russia, with the recommendation 
ot " . 
a general down-tools policy" if these demands remained untulfil1ed. 
The 
stage was being set tor the confrontation of early August. 
The Labour Party had little trust in the Churchillian interpretation . 
Of the BOlshevik menace and even less in.the integrity of L10yd George.(107) 
Suspecting British and French collusion behind the ~olish invasion of Russia 
late in;April 1920, the London dockers, backed by Ernest Bevin, retused to 
-----------------------~---~~--------------~-----~-----------~ t " 
• ~P.A.C.R. 1920, pp. 9. T.U.C. Report 1920, pp.112/4. See Note 16. 
105 .. 
. • Although only Spen Valley had been won since the 1918 Election the 
Labour Party had cane a close second in several other constituencies~ 
106. . . See Q.aUy Herald, 15 April 1920. 
10
7. See tor example, Labo;r Leader, 20 Febru~ry 1919. The I.L.P. was 
still bitter over its war-t~e experience. The Right too had its 
gr1!vances. See Note 17. 
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lOad a ship oalled the ItJoJ.l.y George" with oases labelled .O.H.M.S. 
Munitions for Poland. It Bevin referring to the event shortly afterwards 
preterred to regard it as a purely industrial aotion based on moral 
preoepts not as an example ot dire"et aotion in practioe. (108) As long 
ls the POlish troops advanoed, the. Bri tish government remained ettioially 
neutral, but the sudd~n reversal ot Polish military fortunes brought an 
equalJ.y sUdden reversal in the British Governnent's polioy. By the tme 
ot the 1920 Labour Party Conferenoe, the threat to the Soviet Union hacl 
SUbsided With the Bolshevik oounter-offensive ot earlJ' July. . Thus when the 
B.a.p. lIloved 
an amenchent to a resolution calling for the :implementation ot 
the reo . 
. anmendations of the reoently returned Labour delegation to Russia, 
a.dvOOat" 
lng a general strike to oanpel the Governnent to oease its attaoks on 
aUsS:i.a "t . .-
,l. 'Was overwhelmingly' defeated atter a strong attack: on it and its 
-overs b ~ Ernest Bevin. (109) Bevin rejeotecl the implications of the 
resoluti 
on lfhich olaimed that the Trade Union Movement was a military force 
leadin . 
. g the revolutionary wing of the party. Swiping at the unre~istio 
P~ises of the B.S.P. Bevin made it olear that Britain was not ripe for. 
revOluti . 
.. on. Fundamentally, a Sooialis t whose relianoe was based on 
eduoat· ... _ / . . 
~ publio opinion to his own viewpoint, Bevin 1ntjmated that where· 
direot . 
aotion was neoessary he would take it but vividly showed his oontEmpt 
tor a." . 
oadernl.O theoretioians. . "Those who" talked lightly about leading ought . t .. .,. . .. 
o lcnow th 
ey oould not order a man at will to obey.... The Trades Union 
lt~~e t 
.. n Was not a military foroe where men had to go blindly, at the 
orders 
. of the leaders, one W83' or another.... He knew that man,y strikes that 
haa talc 
en Plfl:oe in this oountry had been a fiasoo owing to orders and 
----- / 
108. Bull. ." 
eck, .Qp.oit., p.l34. . 
109. 
%,P.A.C.R. 1920, pp. l32/lU and 143/4 tor the debate; 138 tor the 
endment and pp. 143/4 tor Bevin's speeoh •. 
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resolutions which could not be carried out when the time oame."(110) In 
general the tone ot the Conference resolutions was ~ore moderate than the 
preVious year with emphasis being,placed on the role ot the P.L.P. in 
arti -, CUlating the demands ot the Movement as a whole. 
~e retreat ot the Polish armies and the Bolshevik advance into Polish 
territor.y brought about a diplomatic threat from Ourzon that Britain would 
be obliged to intervene in favour ot Poland if the Russian troops advanced 
&rl1 further. The Times ot 6 August spoke as if war was imminent. (111 ) 
The La.b~ur Party ne~~d' no excuse to respond rapidly. It too thought war 
1ra.a it' 
n he ottr1ng but regarded it as being deliberately engineer.ed; by 
trigge~happy elements in the Cabinet. A manifesto signed. by a cross-
8eotion of the party representing eve~ shade of opinion,from Clynes to 
B.obert Williams, was published within 24 hours declaring that Labour would 
Itn t ' 
" 0 oo-operate in a war as allies ot Poland."(112) The follo~iDg ~ 
Prot - . 
eat meetings were held throughout the oountry. On the ninth a special 
Ineeting of the Parliamenta.r.Y' Committee of the T.U.C., the Executive Committee 
ot the Labo~ Party and the P.L.P., oalled at the instigation ot Ernest :Benn, 
Pa.ased a resolution pointing to the deliberate war-orientated policy ot the 
gOV'erllDlent and wa.rn11l8 the government "that the whole industrial power ot 
the -, , 
organised workers will be'used to de teat this war." It also resolved 
"the; . 
" t the Executive Committees ot attiliated organisations throughout the 
cOUntr.y be summoned to hold themselves ready to prooeed immediately to 
'-----------------------------------------------------------
110 •. Ibid., 1 jA 
--- p ....... 
111. 
, The leading editorial bad stated "It is a terrible truth that once 
" mOre we stand upon the ed8e ot a orisis traught with possibilities 
only less tragio than those whioh hovered over us in this first 
week ot August six years ago ••• We Dnlst face it with the same unanimity 
;-Od the same oou:rage with which we faced the orisis ot 1914." 2. August 
920. 
112. Counoil ot Action: 
~sian-Polish War. 
2£ Action Report. 
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London for a National Conference; that they be advised to instruct their 
~e~bers to 'down-tools' on instructions from that National Conference; and 
that a Oouncilof Action be immediate~ constituted to take such steps as 
~a b ' 
Y e necessary to carry the above decisions into effect." (113) 
, 
The Oom..ci.l of Action showed how wrl.ted the organised Labour Movement 
was on the issues. (114) Local councils sprang up as Labour in effect 
de~lared th' . " 
, at ~t represented public opinion whereas the government, 
S~t~ , - , , 
nally based on dubious electoral results, was out of step with reality 
and the mood of' the nation. - Few Labour voices were raised to cast doubt on 
th ' 
e WiSdom of the action, or to protest that the move was unconstitutional, 
~~" ,',
oUgh its unconstitutionality was readily admitted, its justification 
bein ' , " 
g the 'unconstitutional' policy of the government. (115) Locke's moment 
f ...,', 
or the ri Cfht ~ of rebellion had arrived. 
On 10 Au~~t' the Council, 'led by Bevin, who had been co-opted on to it, 
tnet L ' . 
lOYd George at 10 Downing Street, ~here Bevin declared that the Council's 
Policy Was "not ~erely a politi~al action, b~t an ~ction represe~ting the' full 
force at' " , ' , , 
labour end we believe we are rep'resenting the great desire and will 
of the '. ' -"'""',' ," " " ... 
maJority of the British people," (116) a declaration echoed by 
tnembers of the P.L.P.-in the' Hou~e. (117) On 13 AUf~;st the Conference called 
by the J . " .~ o~t Session met at the Central Hall, Westminster, where Bevin, ably 
sUpPort' . . ,"" . '. ." . 
ed by Clynes and Thanas~ both noted "const~tut~onalists," spoke 
apprOVingly of the necessity of fo~ing the Council of Action'. (lis) Thomas, 
----113.' -------~------.:.--------
.~ ;; 
1l4. .!Pg., p.3. See also L.P.A.C.R. 1921, pp.ll/1S.' 
A ccmplete list of the Members of the Council of Action is given in, ~.~e ,~.P.A.C.R. 1921, pp. 11/12 and in the Council of Action Report,p.3. 115. 
116. 
117. 
118. 
'--,.,' 
',
' "': 
. . - , 
, , 
See Note' IS. 
,~ily Herald, 11 August 1920. The Party's mistrust of Lloyd George 
~as so great that they sent a shorthand writer along with the 
eputation to see the Prime Minister. '.-
!:bO. Deb. >133, cc. 253-355 espe~ia1lY Neil MacLean's contribution ," 
cc., 346. - ': ' ..... -, -', 
-r c c ' .' ,,", -', 
-puncil of Action Report, 'pp~ 6/16. 
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in. PartiOUlar, pointed out that Parliamentary methods should alw~s be 
used unless, as in the present situation, they could not yield the right 
reSUlts in time.(119) The CouncU of Action 11'&8 instru.cted to st~ in 
., 
eXistence until the appropriate polioies demanded by the Conferenoe had 
been adopted by the government.(120) In the event this proved 'unnecessary. 
~e Government, whose intentions, Churchill notwithstanding, had been 
primarily to force the Bolsheviks into aecepting a diplomatic solution, 
quickly realised that it had gone beyond the bounds of public opinion and 
COlllDlonsense and reverted to the argument that the strong language of Curzon t s 
note Was designed to restrain radical elements in Russia not as a threat. 
The wa.r, it was claimed, w~ a figment of Labour's imagination.(121) 
Labour disputed this interpretation and hoi~ted the events into a 
oanon . . . 
of Labour's faith in itself. "There is no doubt whatever, that the 
acti - . 
on of the Labour Movement early in August prevented open war with Russia," 
the PA.'M- . . 
-"J Executive decla.red.(122) Thomas told the T.U.C. conference of 
19 .. . 
20 that there had been "for the first time, a united and determined working-
olass effort to challenge· the existing order 01' Parliamentaxy Government" and 
lrent . ' . 
on to draw the conclusion that the Labour Movement could "by unity and 
by the ." 
exercise of our political powers, detexmine our own form of govern-
~ent ••• "(123)MaoDonald, hispolitioal eyes ever open, put Lloyd George's 
t ,. 
oPen door' oomment in perspective when he wxote "there was no open door 
until ~ 
Labour appeared in front 01' it."(124) 
------------~---------------------------------------------
119. See Note 19 • 
. . 
120. Ib ~., Pp. 18/19. 
1
21. tt'!:C. Deb.133,oc 253. et., saq. co 663. :2 < Churchill later claimed that 
. ~l for.ms of military intervention were impossible" Qp.cit.,p. 268 • 
. Or an assessment of Churchill's influence on BritiSh policy towards 
intervention. See R.R. :lames, Churchill.: A Stud in Failure 1 00-~~. (London: Weidenteld & Nioo180n,1970 ,Part Ill, and R.H. Ullman, 
_ritain and the Russian Civil War (London: Oxford University Press,196a) •. 
12 --
1 2. ~P.A.C.R. 1921. See Note 20. 
23. TU" 
.. . 1 -.! .C. Report, :1920. pp. 62/3. 
~ . 124. !o~ ( · ~.~~rwa.rd Glasgow),28 Augu.st 1920. 
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In 't 
l.s own Vie'?1 and that of sane late:- CCLlmentators the Labour Movement 
had ef,f'ectively articule.ted public opinion. .As Alan Bullock expressed it, 
"Th ' . 
ose who called for action to pl'event war bad Llajority opinion on their 
side. ( , . 
'rhe Government t s recog;.1i tion of this fact was reluctant but decisive." (125) 
The tbr ., ' . " 
~at to the constitution had ccme from the government, Labour was as 
oQlJm·t-l. 
l. ~ed as ever to the constitutional road. (126) Its rejection of the 
l1.ewIY_f' . .' 
OlIned Communist Party's application for affilia tiol1 was to illustrate 
that. N ' 
et everyone, however, saW' it dn those tennso Shortly after the events 
of' Augu t . 
S , William l:ellor, a leading Canmunist member of the Guild Socialist 
llloV"ernen t'. Tlubll.· !':h" ed . 
. ' -t' - a slim volume which set out the case for direct action 
f'l:'om tt.' ' 
ue revolutionary point of view. (127) 
lIe11 
or argued that the real struggle m society was the class struwe, 
between th .r-
ose who had ,econanic power and those y.no wanted to obtam it. This 
stl'uggl ' ., .. 
, e was reflected throughout society. Politics and the results of 
POlitical':'" 
, action merely reflected these economic struggles. All political 
l:'esUlt . 
S and tactics were in fact dictated and decided by economic strength. 
~s~. '.' 
ength of the P.L.P. was derived fram its trade union base rather than 
t . 
l:'ora the'" . 
. nu.'nber of votes it could gain in the constituencies or seats it 
held' 
J.n the House 9f Ccm.'~~ns. (128) Parliament rather' tha.'n' being a s~ia1 . 
fol:'Uln 
where disinterested peqple met to solve Society's problems was ~ fact 
the 1 ' 
IJ ace Where econauically powerful groups met to legitimise their political 
and 1 . "; . 
,,0 ass claims. Victorie~ inside the House of Canmons, acc~rding to 
h!ello 
r ,Were in re~ity won by the organisation of econcmic forces outside 
----- ' 125~ .' 
BUllOCk, .9'p. cit., p.142. See Note 21. 
126. S 
ee Note 22. .. 
l2'7. s . < 
ee Foot.note 2 above ", 
l.28. ~~. J. T. ' rT a1 ton N~~bo~d -, "The ' Labour Party in the House is w~ak by 
ot'selt" not merely on account of its Eersonnel, but in the nature 
]I thir;gs. The Triple Alliance makes the Labour Party a power." ~~ (Glasgo,,), 10 l!ay 1919. Italicl!.Jn ~h~ OrieinaJ... 
' .... _} . 
.. '~ 
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the Rouse. Gains suoh as Universal suffrage were symbols of the growing 
economio power of Labour not of the effioacy ot political methods. As in 
the past the real funotion ot the P.L.P. should be to register the economio 
aspirations ·of an 1ndustrially'~onsoious seotion of the oommunity."(129) 
Mellor ;ent much turther than merely 'suggesting a seoonduy roie tor 
POUticaJ. activity. As far as he was ooncerned the State, Parliamentary 
gOvernment and demooracy in toto' was an attempt by the Capitalist ruling 
alas .' ....... . 
8 to divert the attention ot the wo1'kers trom the reality ot economio 
PO"e~. "Direct actionists" he declared, " ••••• deny that (universal adult 
BUttl'age) Within a speoifi~d geographioal ~group makes that group selt-
gOV'el:'!led, and they deny that the State is an expression" of th~ Wills ot all 
the people." (130) Those who did not agree rl th Mel10r were accused ot 
acQepting the Phi16sopMO assumptions of Capitalism and ot turni~ th~ state 
tl'OJll1tB real fUnotion as a part of the machinery of Capitalism "into the 
~e at a God •••• "(131) . The political superstmoture or' oapitalism was a 
tl:ont, desigUed to ~disguiB" the real na~ ot sooial:.disunity, Capitalist 
diotatorship and the reality ot the olass struggle. Parliament, the State 
and the press all propagated ideas ot a coDmnnrl.ty, 800i8J. unity and . 
COnstitutional myths in order to pr~vent the'workers tromreoognisiOg the 
tact that the,y were liv1n8 under a ~oeroive system of economio oppressio~ 
and that they had' the power to end it." For Me1lor the State was "merely 
an 1 . . ,. . 
nstrument of the economioal1y powerful oiassfor the suppression ot the 
non-dom1nantolass."(132) It was the "Exeoutive'COIIDDittee'ot th.e'Capitalist 
Olasa."(133) . ' ' 
-~---------------~------~~~~~------~~~~~-129. ,,_ 
-ellor'.9P.oit.,p.31. 
~i:! .. P~48. - See Note 23. 
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MelIor's contention that the existing society was not a demooratic 
one Was bas;d on the assertion that "political demooracy without industrial 
~d ' 
, ,eoonomio freedom is a sham."(134) It was in fact a disguised diotator-
ehi i " P n whiohthe possessors controlled the possessed, through the system ot 
wage slavery. The economio struggle was thus the st~le for liberation 
trom th 
e economio oppression called. Capitalism. For, the worker, MelIor 
declared, "the road to freedo~ lies not through the P~lling-booth, but through 
th" ' 
• WOrkShop gates."(135) 
This struggle for liberation was a world-wide and historio one. 
Capitalism had. served its historio mission and had ~evite.bly and neoessarily 
to bow b t' , 
, e ore the onslaught of Sooialism. The historio mission of the 
w°l'k:er ' 
, s 1!,as to overthrow the State and t:mnsfom it, by means of the D1 ' ,~ " . " , ' , ' ' 
atatol'ship of the Proletariat,into the historio role designed for it by 
~ -',' , 
et COmmunist Scientific philosophy. 
This was for MelIor the ultimate, object of Direct Action. The mad 
detenai ' , .' ' , 
ve policies adopted by Capitalist Imperialists towards the economic 
reVOlution in Russia and the success of the Bolshevik idea; ~estified to the 
oreati' " ,'" ' 
on ot the revolutionary historical situation within which. Capitalism 
WOUld b . 
e overthrown. . The workers ought to assist in this momentous struggle 
by " ' ._. " . ".: ,-
, the Use of direct action to secure the ending of the present forms of 
" OltnerBh1 . 
P and control.~!'036)" Nationalisation of the mines was tlms not an 
end i " -', . '.' . ' 
n itself but served. to ease the intensity of the struggle which would 
t " " . ',', ,,' "'" :' oll~ upon the assumption of power by. the Socialist/Communist/Proletarian 1 ,- .' -. - '. 
e "ements ~f Sooiety. Therefore, the fullest expression of Direct Action 
'--------~----------------------------------------1 " 
34. ~i~. p.52. 
135. Ibid' ' 
. --....;!. p.51. 
136 " 
• 19i2:, ,p.43. see Note 24. 
Was the Ihotatorship ot the Proletariat. Mellor oonoeived ot the 
Diotatorship ot the Proletariat as an essential part ot the economio 
reVOlution. He ohided "libertarians" suoh as l3ertrand Ru.ssell and 
~emotionalists" like Eth;l sno~~en to; their opposition to the idea. 
lIe aooused th~ ot not understanding that treedom was essentially an 
eoonomio rathe~ than a politioal conoept and ot being "detenders ot the 
values and Shibboleths ot Capitalism."(131) Ot oourse, the diotatorship 
or the proletariat, (the embodiment ot direct aotion), was not 'nioe' but 
it llas histono&! inevitability not 'nioeness' whioh matte~ed. It was 
~tl - . 
ously inevitable "on the theor,r ot olass struggle.~.".(138) It was 
nee '. . 
essa.ry in the interest ot the workers, whose minds were ologged with .. 
C8.pita:U.st propaganda.' It was necessary to deal with oounter-revolutionaries. 
, 
True, it involved-the suppression ot 'tormal' liberties, (undetined, but 
Pre . . 
Bwnably treedom ot speeoh, assembly, press and assooiation were not in 
aooorda.noe with revolutionaxy principles), but this was a pnoe worth 
P~1ng. All the diotatorship ot the proletariat really represented was 
. "th 
.. e Use ot the ooeroi ve State to ooeroe the' ooeroer8 t • "( 139) Drawing a 
OOlll • -... 
Partson Mellor olaimed that it was "the oounterpart in the transition 
PeriOd troUl individualism to Communism 'ot the diotatorship ot the few,whiOh 
. is th . ,-
e nOrmal and neoessar,y oondition under modern Capitalism."(140) 
Taking the overthrow or oapi tali8m and imperialism as -his .. objeot 
Uellor deSCribed the means neoessary to make this eftective. l3eoBnse 
CapitaliSUl was deea.Ying before their very eyes the time was short. Thus 
~------------------------------------------------------
131. Mellor, 6 f 65 op.oit.,p.51- 5. Quotation ram p. • 
138. III _i~, p.58. 
139. ~Oc.oit. 
140. ·'bc.Oit •. 
the sooner Labour organised the easier the transition would be. Theretore, 
the best polioy shOUld' be to oreate an a.:t'IDY' ot Labour through real 
industrial unionism, Central oontrol and the oreation ot a Commissariat. 
Mello·r Ba" hope in the ne1J General Counoil ot the T.U.C. tor oentral oontrol 
and rega.:rd.ed the Counoil ot Action and its local oounterparts as "the oadre 
~~ . 
eSoViet torm or organisation •••• "(141) and vindioation ot Direct 
Actl . , 
on in praotioe. Surveying the previous two years Mellor believed that 
Direot Aotion (threatened or aotuSJ.) , had ohanged the :Br! tish Govern:ment' s 
:P
Oli0
1 ot intervention in Russia. (142) ,The signitioanoe or Mellor's work 
18 as 1.._-' 
a .. ~binger ot the theoretioal oonf'liot ot the Thirties. As with 
~at . 
Oontemporary theoretioaly Marxist oommentators ot the period his analysis 
Was not ' ' 
oZlly late, .inadequate and wrong, but totally out ot sympathy ~th the 
pr8glnatic outlook and philosophioal tenets ot the Trade Unions and Labour 
Paxty- • !l'he impaot ot his work was minimal. 
:By 1920 the toroes whioh had. been temporarily united in advooating 
~~t t " . 
, ac 10n were split over two other issues - the role ot the International 
end the rela.tionship or the ne1Jly-tomed Communist party with the Labour , 
P~ . . , 
• ,These issues, under the guise otthe debate about demooraoy and. 
d1otato hi ' . . " ' 
rs p split the direot aotionist foroes into the more easilyreoog-
n1sabl • ' 
e refOrmist' and 'revolutionary' oamps, the one supporting Parliamentary 
end POlltioal aoti~n in' ~rder to 'oreat~ the new Sooialist sooiety,and the 
~ , . , -
er Willing out of J4a.rxi.st neoessity to forcibly wrest power trom the hands 
~~" ' . '" " 
. e ruling elite. " The first olash ot these new aligned groups was seen 
at th ... , . ' . ., . 
, • Party COnferenoe 1921 when the question ot the affiliation of th8 C" .. 
Ol!un.u.nist Party',~ t'Q the Labour Party was first debated.' 
~~-----------------------------------------------141. Ib 
-.!!., p.156. 
14~. ' , .!Pi~., p.44. ., 
~ . . . , , . ~ i~ . . ,.,. '.
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$bour and. the CommunE s: 
The Communist Party of Great Britain had been formed at the 
Foundation Congress ot 30th July/1st August 1920, when the l3ritish 
SOOia.l.ist Pa:rty and the Communist Unity Group ot the Sooialist Labour 
Party had amalgamated into one Mosoow-approved organisation. The 
C.P.G:a t " ( ) 
• • was he product or two years' "tortuous negotiations" 143 and 
l'tpl' ' , . 
esented only a small proportion or the total numbers of organised 
JIl911lb 81'shi ft'" ' 
, P 0 he pro-Russian sympathetio left-wing. Most of the others 
jOined. at th S . . , 
e eoond Congress held at Leeds on 8th and 9th January 1921. 
For the pUrpose' ot this study we are not" oonoerned with the details of' 
the UnitY negotiations, thoUgh these will be referred to 'in order to put 
the C ' , ", 
ommunist Party's relationship with the Labour MOvement into perspective. 
What i. important h;re is the attitude whioh the Communist Party took in 
l'elation to Par1i~entary demoo~8.oy beoause it was this, and all it' ent8.1led 
(l'eVolutiOnar,1 methods as a means to;Sooialiam, the Diotatorship of th; 
Proletariat and so forth)'whloh determined the Labom. PartY to" reject the 
CO~ist Party's applio at ion for affiliation: The Labour Party's attitude 
to the COIlllllUlii~t Party represents,' at the leadership level at l~a.~t,: its 
attitUde to the whole qu~stion of direotaotion ~d the role ot Parliame~t. 
1'he main groups whioh had. been invoiv~d in the unity negotia.tions 'were 
the :a.S.P. ~ the SooialiElt'~·' Labour Party and' the Worke;s' SO~ialist Fedemtion, 
the latter, along with' t~~ S.W.S.S. (a mDa.l.l organis;"iion whioh ~ventuaJ.ly·' . 
diSintegrated early in'1920) having taken'the place' otthe i:.L~P. whioh lWt 
fOUnd itself a.t' odds with the revolutionary groups.(144) 'Constantly" 
'--.::. ------~--~~~~~~~~~~~--~~~~~--
143. 
144. 
" 
L.J" MaoFarlana,· The British Communist P t Its Or ~velopment Until 1922 Lon~nt MaoGibbon & Kee; 
s~ Note 25. 
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Pro t . 
IIlp ed by the Third International the final. negotiations took place 
Without the main leadership of the Socialist Labour Party (S.L.P.) or 
the W.S.F. _ the latter having r,enamed itself' the Communist Party (British 
Section Third International.) in June 1920. The S.L.P. had pulled out of 
negotiations a couple of months previously. The same basic sectarian 
dosmatism was common to both defections, a sectarianism which had vitiated 
all p' 
reVious attempts at left wing 1U11ty. 
Two questions had defied agreement: firstly what role, if' any, should 
~ar1i 
amentar,y aotion pl~ in Communist strategy for the revolution which 
Was allegedly just around the corner? Secondly, should the United party 
&Ppl,. for a.f'filiation to the Labour Party? Wal ter Kendall implies that 
bu.t t - . 
or the SUpport ot the International. no lasting agreement would have 
been -
POssible on any basis. . The B.S.P. was fimly committed to both 
Parl • iamentary action and a.f'filiation with the Labour Party, being already-. 
inVOlVed With the Labour Party in Parliament in the person of Da.n Irving, 
lI.p. tor Burnley. It was prepared to see the isSue discussed, even 1£ 
rejected, by the new party but was manifestly hostile to Sylvia Pankhurst's 
a.nti -
-Parliamenta.r,y , anti-a.f'filiation, doctrinal It super-revolutionary, leftist 
teat . 
&.:rianism" ( 145) posture. The S.L.P., on the other hand, whilst prepared 
to t..;.... -
'"'t)ht Parliamentary elections, "ould have no tra.ck with the class-traitors 
)rho. led. the compromising and o~rom1sed Labour Party. During the early 
p~ . 
ot1920 it became deliberately obstructive to all attempts at Unity, so 
t~ . 
t the COll1lD.Unist Unity Committee was in fact a small unofficial body of the 
S.t p . . 
• ., although it contained important figures such as Bell, MaoManus and 
6\tld PeuJ.. (146) 
----
---------------------------------------------145. 10; USman, op.cit.,p.2O. 
146. -Mao 
__ .Fa.rlane,· op.cit.,p. 51/56. 
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In ~ 1~20 the :B.S.P. and the C.U.C. agreed to call a Convention to 
lTnite th 
eir two groups, a Convention at which the question of tactics and 
ILtUliationwould be discussed a,nd decided upon. Syl via Pankhurst made 
hel' unilateral decla;ration~t independe~ce, despite Lenin t s unfavourable 
att( ',., ., 
tude to her ea;rlier opposition to Pa;rliamentar;y action. (147) The 
B S P ...." .' ,', , .' , 
• • • iDunediately applied to Lecin for claritication and authority on the 
. " 
POint and received his reply ea;rly in July in .'which he declared Pankh~stts 
action had been ~ng and that he personall,ywas '"in fa~ur of participation 
in P8.1'l1amentand ot affiliation to 'the Labour ParlY on the co~dition of 
1rhol'~ t " 0 
4J ree and independent cowm1nist activity."(14S) Thus, well axmed, 
the ProVisional Executive of the C.P. upheld it~foUndation co~ess. 
At the Co~e~s thre"e re~olutions 'were passed. The first, proposed 
by- A~A. P1lrcell, a prominent Trade Unionist, and ~pported among others by 
WilliamUellor, decla;red "for the Soviet (o~Workers' Council) sy~tem as a 
111ee.~ '. - .. ,' -.' . 
Whereby the working~class shall achieve power ••• (and) for the ,. 
diotat .. '"" .. ,'... . ." . . • ' 
, orship ot the proletariat as a necessary means for combating the 
CO'Urlte . " , '. . . ',. " . 
r-revolution during the transition period between capitalism and 
C°Dllnuniem. tt( 149) The debate '-whiCh followed indicated' thatrtolenoe w~·· 
1'ag- ',' v ' 
61'ded as a legitimate, eve~ necessary, part of the process.(150) Having 
thus declared itself in favour '~f two ~eoess8.r,y oonditions for allegienoe 
to th . . .'..' '" . . - ,'. '. 
El Third Internation8J. it accoJi.di.ngly declared its adherenoe to that 
body. The neXt two resol~tions on pa;rliamentary action and affiliation 
to the Labo~ 'party; involved a~a.tdeal of debate~ Th~ mood for 'the 
1'ole ot Parlismentar,y action'had been set by the Provisional Committees 
.,
"-- "~'.. "., '.' ~ ,,>- "-,,~,~' 
See Note 26. 
, . 
. 
22mmunist Unity Convention Report, p.6. 
150 
• ~i!., pp.5/9 • 
Manifesto of 9 July whioh had. stated that, "Parliamentary democracy - that 
idol ot the sOOial reformist _ has been stripped of its veneer once and for 
all and •••• stands revealed ••• (as) 8n instrument of class oppression •••••••• 
engineered and wielded in the interest of the bourgeoisie. Against this. 
sham" .. ' ~ . parliamentary democracy of capitalism the workers t republic places the 
~d of direct representation and recall, as embodied in the Soviet idea, 
on! t" ...' ~ hose performing useful social se~ces being enfranchised."(151) Thus, 
tOlloW1' . 
ng the Russian example, the fundamental principles must ino1ude, 
em '" . 
Ongst other things, "the S~viet idea. as against the Parliamentary democracy." ( 1 
~ese '. ~ . ; ...., . 
notions were reflected in a strongly worded motion which stated blandly 
that :Th.e Communist Party repudiates th~ refonnist view' that a sooial' 
reVal ."'. . . , 
ution Can be achieved by the ordinary methods of parliamentary democracy, 
but reg~s par1i~entary and electoral action generally ~s providi~ a means 
~ , , , ' 
Propaganda and agitation towards the revolution. The tactios to be 
~l " . 
oyed by the representatives of the Party elected to Parliament or local 
bOdie . .. ". " " 
B nru.st be laid down by the Party itself according to the national or 
lOCal ' 
Circumstances. In all oases such representatives must be considered as 
hOldi .. _ ' , , ' 
'. -J,(S a mandate from the Party, and not from the partioular oonstituenoy 
tor ~ch the,y h~pento sit."(153) 
The rest of the amen~ed ~~tion'dealt rlth the ob1igation~ of a Co~ist' 
Part 
y Dlember Who stepped out of line. The severity of the motion and the 
. unoo . . ", , 
lIlproDlising nature of its interpretation was to worry such E.S.P. members 
aalio ' . , - ' 
bert Wi11iams and A.A. Puroe11 forcing several of' them to leave when the 
~ ., ... , ..... 
151 B' .,". , ,.' - ,. " , . 
• cell, 2P.cit.,p.54. Italics in the Original. There,is a photostat 
Opy of the document reproduced in the oentre pages of Elugman, op.oit. 
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• Bell t Joc.cit. 
153 c' , 
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COnflict between their prospects as Labour M.P.'s and their obligations 
as Carununist Party mEmbers became too intense. (154) 
However, for the moment affiliation was the issue, with a severe 
debate splitting the unity of the Congress, resulting in the end in a 
"Iictor'17 b ' 
, , " y a narrow majorloty 100:85, largely, so Bell' asserts, on the 
strength f L " , , 
o exu.n's Vloews, recorded J.n favour of affiliation. (155) It 
Was thi, ' 
s Which prompted the first C.P.G.B. application for affiliation to 
the L b 
a our Party on 10 August 1920. 
This 'will be dealt with ~hortlY, but a brief survey of the subsequent 
hist . . 
, o?, of the Cc:mnunist Party is :important to place later events in context. 
S' } 
,l!nUltaneously with the Congress, 17 July to 8 August 1920, the Canmunist 
Intern t' " '-
a ~onal was holding its second Congress. Various representatives of 
th ',.,." . / , 
e non~arliamentary group such as Jack Tanner of the S.S. and W.C. 
Move:ne t ' 
n , Wil1ie Gallacher of the Scottish Workers' Ccmmittee and Sy1via 
Pankhurst ot the C'arununist Party' (B.S.T.I.) were present to argue the 
non-att'l ' . , ~ iation, non-Parliamentary case. They met 'a Lenin who was determined 
to brOok no' . OPpOSition, even it it meant splitting the British Carununist 
i'., ,_ 
lllo"e:nent in two. (156) With Europe sUPPOS~~lY on the edge of total revolution, 
and th ..' " " ' " " . 
e Second International alledged1y about to collapse, Lenin wanted to 
ensure t" . 
hat new groups applying for membership ot the Third Inter'national met 
both th . 
e doctrinal requirements and the' disciplinary authority ot the Internatio: 
and through it, the Russian Bolshevik P~rty, ~hich contr~lled both its floor 
and the Executive C--~tt'e' e. t tIt· I.LIJIJl.I. He was detennined that any u ure revo u loons 
-----------------------------------------------------154,. Bell' 6 
, ~.cit., p.S. Kendall, op~cit.~ p~21S: See Note 27. 
155. 13 11 " ' . 
e , ~.cit., p.S7. 
156 
• Kendal1,op.cit., p.23l • 
PP. 53e/44. ' 
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'WOUld be in acoordance with the Russian experienoe and oontrolled by the 
!t'hird, International. Affiliation to the Third International meant 
dootrinal oontrol under the authority of the Executive Committee of the 
C d 
°IDmunist International as embodied in the twenty-one "theses" setting 
out . . 
the oondition.,~of entry which were put to the Congress - 8. point 
'Which finally kept the I.L.P. out of the Third International.(157) 
, The prestige of Lenin and the Third International made it quite easy 
for th . 
e C.P.G.B. to join the International without too Dl8llY' qualms. In 
acoordanoe With the instructions of the E.C.C.I., the C.P.G.B. joined in 
negotiations with the other dissident groups, now suitably ohastened after 
~eet1ng the master, whioh lead to 8. more broadly based C.P.G.B. following 
the Leeds Convention of 29/30 Jacuar,y 1921.(158) Xendall rightly comments, 
"the " ,. ,.',' 
... enernal intervention which would dictate, the future oourse ot British 
C°Dllnuni • 
em was thus present from the party's very inoeption."(159), Its 
aco »', 
tptance of Muscovite oontrol was quite apparent; it was a foreign-
ins~1red organisation, subversive of SO~ial relationships and frequently 
Out-at-touch with sooial realities. Obediently mouthing unrealistio party 
d~tri '" 
nee it was to prove its irrelevance/ to, and unsuitability in,British 
~ . ;. 
POl! ti ' ",' 
caJ. life by applying tor offioial membership of the Labour party in 
1920.' , . 
Relations between the LaboUr party and the C .P.G.B. oannot be seen 
. " .' - '. -
81Jnpl;y Within the oontext of British politios but in the wider sphere of 
the "-t " , 
, , , '.&.Q ernationaJ. Socialist Movement. ,For while overlapping membership, 
. . ~ 
'------------~----------------------------------------157 '" ',' 
• The twenty-one theses ma..v be found in J. Degt'a§ I Ed.. The Communist 
jrternatiOnal 1919-1943 (London: Oxford University Press ,1956),1, 
ll>. i6:172. ., " 
158 •. , le end~ op.oit.,Ch.14. 
159. Ib '~., p.233. ~, '. 
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especially. in the early 'twenties, blu:rred the profound differenoes that 
eXisted between the Lab~ Left and the Communistson the question of 
Paru 
amentar,y demooracy at the international level those differenoes were 
turned into the mutually exclusive philosophies of the Seoond and Third 
Internationals by the dogmatio seotionalism of the Russian Communist party. 
The failure of the Second International in 1914 to prevent the outbreak 
ot hostilities, as it had promised to do several years earlier, destroyed 
ita crediiUity in the eyes of most olass-oonsoious sooialists. Instead of 
uniting in Sooialist solidarity against bellioose nationalism the various 
na.tional ". 
wOrking-class organisations and parties supported their governments 
1r1 th differing degrees of enthusiasm. During the war attempts by the 
neutralist rump of ~he Second International to arrange meetings between the 
l'&r1OUs So iali " , 
. 0 st and Labour P~es representing the belligerent powers 
tailed -
Owing to the nationalistio feelings of the Party's oonoerned. . The 
!r1.t1 h . -
B Labour Party maintained its own links with the International Burean 
~~S . 
oOialist International and advanoed money to help in meeting its 
eJtpenses during the war-time emergenoy. However, not all members of the 
Party 04_ 
t o41.l Partioular the anti-war seotion of the I.L.P., were satisfied with 
a.d.herenoe to the Seoond International and they lent their support t~ suoh 
1Il0Ves 
as were made to recreate a new international movement out of the ashes 
ot the old. In doing so they were hoping to find a olass-consoious Sooialist 
~ol . 
e lrithin the Parliamentary system.: In fact, the anti-Second 
~-t . a ional movement developed logically into the Third International under 
the do 
ctrinal leadership of Lenin and just as logioally excluded those who 
t~d 
that dootrine and its anti-Parliamentary tenets unpalatable •... 
. The I.t.p. 's antipathy towards the Second International was aggravated 
by the . - ' . .. ."' ". '.' " '. " 
deciSion of the Special Labour Party Conferenoe in December 1917.' ", 
de~,~OOiaJ.iSt' Societies 'seParate representation from the offioial Labour 
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p~ ~ 
Y and Trade Union Congress delegation chosen to a ttend the Stockholm 
COnference. Consequently, it was no su:rprise when the I.L.P., nursing 
,its 'Wounded pride, although not .. inspired by such motives alone, disaffiliated 
from the Second International in which it no' longer had separate representation 
and asked its National Administrative Committee to make enquiries of the 
Third Inte:mational concerning possible membership. 
~e Third International, however, was created primarily to further the 
a.iJns of the Russian :Bolshevik Party' rather than to accommodate the views of 
the 1ndiVicl ...... ' parties who' , b t d ,~ sympathised with its general aims, u deplore 
ita methods. The crux of the differences between ,the I.L.P. and the Third 
International were mad.~lear by the latter's assertion that 'civil war was 
as necessary as the diotatorship of prolet~at which itself was an essential 
Part or the transition from Capi talimn to Socialimn and 'that . th~re was no ' 
true ' 
, SOcialism outside the pale of Third International. The issuing of the 
i'wenty'"0 ':' 
.. ne Theses of membership made it quite clear that control of the 
Intel.'national itself etreativel..Y l~ 'with the Ru~sian Communist party in Moscow.' 
The antagonimn which the Third Intem~tiorial' sreply to the I.L.P. 
creat ' ',.'. ' , ,". . . 
ed destroyed such sympathy as existed for the International. in that 
Party. ( 160) In particular it 8J.ie~ated thdse pacifist el~ents who had 
mOat ' , ' . ,,' - ; '" ',' 
cause to despise the failure of the Second International. to act in 
SOCialist harmoOy to prevent th~' outbreak of 'war' in 1914. A short time 
later "'.',' , " ' - -,~ , 
Similar arrogant tactios by the C.P.G.:B. which faithfully mirrored 
, its MuSOoVite progenit~r:~ienatea. th~ ta.bo~ P~ itself.' For the Labour 
Party as a. whole, 'the a.rrogano~of the Third lrite~ational was adequat~-
-~-;-' ----------------------------~--------------
160. 
London: 
74 
justitloation ot the Party's deoision to assist in the revival of the 
Seoond International. This body, whieh met at Berne early in Febru.ary 
1919, had declared itself unequivooably against Bolshevism and all that 
it represented. 
inSisted tha.t:"-
. ., 
In the words of the so-called "Branting" resolution it 
hA reorganised society •••• permeated with Socialism 
. e&nnot be realised, lDllch less permanently established, 
unless it rests upon triumphs of Democracy and is 
rooted in the principles of liberty. 
These institutions>~ich constitute Demooracy - freedom 
ot speeeh and of the Press, the right of assembly, 
universal suffrage, a Government responsible to 
Parliament, with arrangements guaranteeing popular 
co-opera.tion and respect for the wishes of the people, 
the right of association etc., - these also provide 
the working e1asses with the means of carrying on the 
-r e1a.ss struggle." . 
The resolution fully ~represented the pragma.tic philosophy of the Labour 
p~ - & philosophy which was to be constantly reiterated in response to the 
Pet'i,odi 
o cla.irn.s and applications of the Communist Party for membership. It 
reoel Ved 4'..' ~~ller elaboration eighteen months later at Geneva when a resolution 
lraa Paa . lea on the "Political System of Socialism."(161) This resolution 
Bp eo iti . . . 
. Oally repudiated "methods of violenee and all terrorism" and insisted 
that "1ft\.. ." . . . 
"".ne SOCialist Commonwealth ean come into erlstence only' by the conquest 
hi' Lab '. "-
Our of Government power." It continued, "Socialism will not base its 
POlltioal . . . .. ,. 
organisation upon dictatorship. It cann,ot seek to suppress 
J)e.tnoorao'lJ' : it 'D t ~ s histOric mission, on the contrary, is to carry emocracy 0 
oOlllPl t . , 
e lon." In particular, "Socialists will not allow factious minorities, 
talt'· -" ~ advantll6e of their privileged positions, to bring to naught popular 
ltbert " . .. 
'" y. Moreover, it w&s "the supreme funetlon ot Par1iament ••• to represent 
~~. . , ., " 
El POpUlar aspirations and desires trom the standpoint of the community 
as a "'hole• It 
'----------------------------------------------------161. S~e.;.p.A.C.R., 1921, Appendix IV, pp. 222-7 (226-7 passim). 
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More than anything else therefore the majority of the Second 
International represented the refo~ist philosophy of pragmatic and 
Parliamentary Socialism. Moreover, it took an aggressive stanoe in 
res • M 
, ponse to the Third International's attempts to infiltrate Socialist 
and Trade Union movements at all levels. It was for this reason that 
a lIl' . ,1nor~ty left to fo~ the Vienna (two-and-a-half) International. The 
lIlinori t I . 
"" y s V~ew expressed in the "Adler-Longuet" resolution, which 
aemanded, among other things, "free entr,y into the International for the 
SOCial " 
. ist and Revolutionary Parties of ~ll countries conscious of their 
class interests" and its movers s~ceeded when the International tound their 
. '. . 
If' lew unacCeptable. For the I.L.P. the problem which;'arose was based upon 
th' . 
. e con~adictory implications of their Socialist and Parliamentar,y 
conlfictions. While the to~er attracted them to the,Third International 
th ' . ' 
e latter repelled them fram it. Whilst still a member of the Second 
Int ' . , 
ernational the I.L.P. prepared a memorandum for submission to the Geneva 
COngr . 
. ess of the Second International on the question of the "Political, 3 " ' . . 
~stem of Socialism." (162) The I.L.P. summarised the main two political 
t 1 ,T _ " ., 
qUestions 
,raised by Bolshevism as follows:-
1. "Is a revolutionary dictatorship of the Proletariat 
necessary as a transition tram Capitalism to 
2. 
SOCialism? . 
Is the Soviet torm of Government the only tonn 
which will enable' the proletariat to exercise 
political power?" 
Its answer to both questions w~s "No.," It recognised that in Great 
Britain '. . 
,the authority of Parliament had Gieclined but argued that a country 
I 
"""---~------------------~--------------------------162. ' 
-?, , 
~e Memorand~'~' Soc~lism and' Government" app~ared in the Labour 
_ader, 18 December 1919,' it is also to be found in Forward (Glasgow), 
13 De";ember 1919. It is quoted passim. 
" . 
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°OUld not be oontinually ruled by torce. "The weakness of' the Sooialist 
Movement . ' Oannot be made good by Revolution, whioh rl th a diotatorship ~ 
BUcoeed f'o~ a time, but whioh i~ the end has to base itself on public 
., 
8.Ocept ance." '!'he answer lq in ~eotif'ying the ba.a. education of' democracy 
and . oO~ecting the impe~f'ect state of' Socialist propaganda (a vindication, 
it might be added,of' the arguments of Adamson and the P.L.P.). Unless the 
oa.pitalists fo:roed it upon them Socialists ought not to resort to violence 
"hioh 
. WOUld lead to massacre rather than revolution. The I.L.P. denied 
the Dlon Opoly of Sooialist purity attributed by some to the Soviet: system 
ot gov e~t. It could not accept that the direct representation ot 
tndu . . . st~ial interests should be the basis of' a political constitution and 
lOOked -th '. 
. "-" askanoe at:; the indirect elections whioh the Soviet· system 
illVol . Ved. ~y contrast the I.L.P., olaimed the dooument, "strives to adopt 
(the) p . 
arliamenta.ry system to the needs of democracy, and to supplement it 
lf1 th What industrial organisation is necessary to keep Parliament in vi tal 
, touOh . . 
with proletarian life." Whilst not oondemning Soviet departure from 
no . ~ politioal oonditions the I.L.P. ma.d.e it clear that the departure 
BhoUld b 
, e temporary not permanent.. In the final 8I'lalysis,therefore, the 
I t P . , . " . ." 
• • • tOok the view "that the election of, Socialists to Parliament remains 
the b . - .... 
, eat guarantee that the working-class oan have that Parliament .~, will 
be influenced by thei~ views." In a final section the I.L.P. rejected 
l)it-ect ,1_ . .' ~tion as a substitute tor Parliamentary action but oonsidered it one 
ot 8e ".' . . ',' 
Vera! weapons which the working-class might use to restore but not 
~". roy representative government.' It, therefore,., the I.L.P. was forced 
to ch ' 
oOse between Parliamentarism and revolution there was no doubt that 
it "Ould be the former which would emerge triumphant. The I.L.P. had no 
deait- '., ' , 
e to raise the issue to the level of oonfliot and persisted in the 
bel! ' . . 
et': that ideological class-conscious sooialism required an international 
... 
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outlet quite different from that of the Second International which appeared 
to be little more than watered-dOi7Il liberalismo However, whatever differences 
llli~ht 11. • 
ave ex~sted be~veen the Labour Party and the'I.L.P. on the role of the 
International their philosophy of Socie.lism remained in essence encapsulated 
Within a context of the ultimate value and purpose of Parliamentary democracy _ 
"aJ.ues h' , 
w ~c.n were different in essence and in spirit frOll those held by the 
CotnrnUUist Party of Great Britain. (163) 
In their initial application for Membership of the Labour Party the 
C.t> c. B 
• • • reiterated the three resolutions which had been passed at the Unity 
COnfer 
ence of 31 July and 1 August. (164) These resolutions not only 
deClared 
. the Party to be in favour of the Soviet system and the dictatorship 
of the 
proletariat but its adherence to the Third International. Moreover, 
the r -r 
esolutions rejected the refonnist view (held by the Labour Party) that a 
SOCial 
reVolution could be achieved through Parliamentary democracy. It was 
also stat 
ea that Carmunist l;!embers of Parliament would be bound by the decisions 
ot' the C • anrnUU~st Party not the 'electoral district for which they happened to sit. 
J:n SUlrt the C.P.G.B. declro-ed itself to be against those principles of Parliamentary 
Q~oc 
racy to which the Labour Party was committed. Consequently, it was not 
s~ris'-
l.ng When its application was turned down by the Executive of the Labour ~at'ty .. 
on the grounds "that the basis of affiliation to the Labour Party is the 
a.ccept 
ance at' its constitution, 'principles, programme, with which the objects 
ot' the 
CanmUUist Party do not appear to be in accord. It . (165) 
'------16~. --------------~----------------------------------------------------
..; 11Th • ' • • 
sp ' e difference between Socialian and Canmunism cannot be br~deed J.n ~r't . (0 t~' ~ m,ethod or in philosophy," Socialist Review, XVII: No.95, 
c ober-December 19m)., ,,' 
164,. t p' ~, pp. 18-22. 165 1: ·~'P.19 • 
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There is little point in tracing all the details of the C.P.G.B.'s 
applioation for membership of the Labour party through their various 
stages. What is important to note is that notwithstanding the irritations 
caused b;y- Communist Party activities in politics..) such as their antics at 
East WOolwioh in 1921, and in trade union affairs in the shape of the 
Minority Movemen; the basic reason for their rejeotion by the Labour Party 
and exolusion from its membership was the differenoes that existed over the 
Val:lle of Pa.:rliamenta:ry demoorac;y- and its concomitant view of the role of 
Parliament in SOCiety. 
WaIter Citrine, tor example, describing the disruptive role of' the 
lanor1t u_ " " y ~vement and its international mentor the Red International ot 
La -r " 
bour Unions, ru.efully admitted that the Trade Union Movement ~ere 
~~ -0" 
stio enOUgh to believe that the steadying influenoe and shrewd practioal 
c Jm ' .............. ~ ~onsen~ ot the British Trade Union Movement would be able to unite the 
.... ,. 
~&rri~'i~t1ons on tbe Continent into one homogeneous and world-wide Trade 
Union It· ".. -
n ernational. The results have soarcely justified our optimism •. We 
have - - . 
seen our movement •••• distracted and oonfUsed by savage critioism and 
~eak:e d ", 
ne by wholl;y- unwarrantable interferenoe in ouraffairs."(166) 
W " 
onetheless, in Citrine's view the real confliot was one of ideas. "Communism" 
~~t . - . 
o e, "has revived the olassio oontroversy between the reformist and 
l'eVoluti . - , " 
onary conoeption of working-class action •••• " It was a oontroversy 
betlree'" "t . " . -~ he advocates of revolutionary Communism and those who held the 
conoepti~n of social and economic evolution with whioh the British Trade 
Union 14 .. 
" ovement is historioally identified."( 167) _. 
'-----------------------------------------------------166 
• W. Citrine; Democracy or Disrltption: An Examination of Communist 
!..Innuenoes in the Trade Unions, (London: T.U.C.,> 19281 p.5. 
-1a.lios Mine. 
167. Ib 
-.!!., p.4o 
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. At the 1922 Conference Frank Hodges, Secretary of the Miners Federation 
ot Great Britain, made it clear that the differences were more than those 
t ' 
o persona.lity and method. "H,e did not want the Conference to CODle to a 
deciSion upon the actions of this or that Communist. He thought that would 
be ' " , 
. 'Wrong. But he wOuld'like it to come to' a decision upon the difference 
ot Principles that exist between the Theses of Communism and the Coneti tution 
ot the Brit '" ish Labour Party •••• He wanted to SSiY ••••• that a perusal of the 
oOnstl4-.. ,i. , ' ~~tion and statutes of the Communist Party was alone necessary to show 
,that there COUld be no reconciliation between the 'Communist Party and the 
Labour Party so long as tho~e statutes existed. The Labour Party was a 
Parii ," . " 
amentary political democracy. Its Constitution was based upon the 
demoora.tiotheory ,that our national i~stitutions must be so modelled as to 
giVe always the best expres'sion 'of the will of every' member of the nation. 
'rhat was the' fundamentalprinoipleupon which the Labour Party rested, 
impl' ",' 
, " Ying thereby that it was against' all forms of dictatorship. ' ' The ' 
O°Ill1nu.nist P~did not prof~ss •• ;.a belief 'in political democracy. It 
~~' , " , 
USe for politioal democracy •••• (or) democratic institutions •••• lt 
"'as a bel1eYer in the dictatorship ot a neucleus of people who were taken 
to represent the will of miilioDs of others." Although Hodges we~t on 'to 
e~aoterise the C.P.G:B. as "the iriteliectu~l ~l~vesot M~scow, unthinking. 
~eedine, acceptingdecre~sand'decisions without criticism or comment, 
taking orders trom the Asiatic mind," taking the" judgement ot middle-class 
ltuSSia. •••• the dictates ~d decrees of the same typ~ ot intellectuals whom' 
they despised in this country," ( 168 ) it was the Communist' s rej eetion ot ' 
ParI,,' 
iamentary democracy in favour of dictatorship that proved to be the tUn , .. , 
damental sticking-point. Even had the C.P.G.B. been a free agent it 
"--- , 
;16a' 
·';'.P.A.C.R.: 1922,pp.198. 
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WOUld ~ 
still have been rejected tor that reason. 
The proot or this is to be tound in the questionnaire drawn up by the 
Labour Party and submitted to the Communists in J~ua.ry 1922, tollowing 
disouSSi .. ons between representatives or the two Parties. The questions not 
only. insisted that the object ot the Labour Party was the achievement ot 
"the 1 
.. po itical, social and economic emancipation or the people by means of 
P8.'rli 
. amentar,ydemooracy" but enquired whether the Communist Party still 
adhered . 
to the Soviet System (whioh was understood to be inoompatible with 
parliamentary demooracy), and to the Third International (whioh it was 
1 ;. . ..... 
C &!mad was inconsistent with the oonstitution and objects of the Labour 
Party). 
Moreover, not only did the questionnaire emphasise the Labour 
P • .. . , 
arty S insistenoe on the use ot lawful means it oonfirmed the prinoiple 
that M . ' .. 
embers of Parliament were responsible primarily to their'oCllBtituents. 
Furtherm . .. 
ore, in ita rejeotion or the C.P.G.B. 's applioation,' I the National. 
Ebcecuti '. 
ve POinted out that the Communist's olaims "appear to be inoonsistent 
1ri th th . .. ~. , . 
e prinoiples and practioe or the Labour Party to be and to oontinue 
~~ . , ... 
a lawtul assooiation seeking lawful ends by lawful and constitutional 
JIlea.n 
s only." ( 169 ) 
4rthur"Renderson drew the implioations.ot the Exeoutive's refUsal in a 
speech to the Party Conferenoe ot 1~21.(110) Aftiliation, h~ told the 
COnter 
enoe, had been refused on the grounds otunity. Unity ot purpose, 
P:inoiple, conoeption and method was missing. The seoond reason was that 
the Co 
mmunists, oould not, because ot MUsoovite domination, honourably abide b '. . ....... ,....... '" ....... '".... ..... .. .. , .... Co. "" 
Y the deoisions of the Conferenoe or give ettect to the constitution. Re 
~----~--------------------~--------------169. bp.A.C.R·.·· 1922, pp. 74-83 • 
. 110. t p 'J'. ~ .A.C.R. 1921, pp. 165-1. . .-
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l"EIninded delegates that Parliament was the plaoe where Labour should 
be it it were to hold its own in British politios and then pointed 
out that it was the aotions ot the CanmwUst Party that lost the 
previoUS~held seat at Woolwioh ~here the oandidate had been an 
ind' , " "",' ' , 
l.Vl.dual "seoond to none as a Parliamentarian." Henderson went on 
t . , " 
o Chide the Camnun1sts tor their oontinuing anti-Labour oampaign, 
a C81npaign Which admitted no errors 
inSPired author~. 
on the part of its doctrinally 
'c 
, , 
In its Report to the 1924 Annual C~nterence the Executive 
, reiterated its view that th~ 'differenoes ot methods between, 
p " ." " ' , . 
arliarnentary demooraoy and aImed revolution were too great" to be 
overoane. It plaoed its taith; in the power of the ballot box and 
the ,:," ' , . 
, institutions ot tree democracy. "That ,the dit:tereno~s are 
tund . ' 
, 8Inental and unchanging is evident tron the taot that no person 
with ' ' ",' '.' . 
a beliet in Labour Party prinoiples oan beccme a member of the 
C· " 
crnmunist Party. Canmunists must renounoe Parliamentary demooraoy. "(171) 
< • 
The ali~tion that existed between the C.P.G.B. and the Labour 
p , 
arty wa~oanpletedby external events in the international sphere 
''" , ~ ~,: e.nQ ' , . ,.
the Trade Union Movement. Attempts to unity the three International 
Poli . ' .c '., ' , 
tl.cal organisations tailed through ill-will and the retusal ot the 
Third International to oeas~ oell-building taotios, to allow a oarmission 
to e . 
nqUire into the oase ot Georgia, or to liberate politioal prisoners{172) 
---------------------------------------------------------171. L P A 
-:. ••• C.R. 1924, p.39. 
l72. s " ., 
ee It.P.A.C.R. 1922, pp. 13-24 and The Seoond and Third International 
!!ld the Vienna. Union: Oftioial Report of the Conference between the EX~tives held at the Reiohsta Berlin on the 2nd A xil 1 22 and the 
.!2.110wing da.;:,s. London: Labour Publishing Co., 1922 • 
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,.AJ. ~ho~h by 1925 the Labour Par~ had passed a series of deoisions 
'. '. 
at the ~ual Conterence'wbich bad effectivelY removed Communists 
tran ~~. ranks of the Party the Trade Union movement persisted for 
~ n\l1l.ber of y~ars with its attempts tomach stme kind et international 
trade ,union unity. By 1928 irritation with the attitude of the 
C·' , ' . ~~sts abroad and their satallites in the Minority Movement had 
,brought these moves to an en~. (173) Yet whilst the tactios of the 
C 
ammunists proved to be the final straw, the ~itferences over the 
val.' ' . 
ue of pa~liament and parliamentary democraoy were so fundamental 
tha' ," , 
t the question which poses itself is why so many in the Labour 
, Par+- bell," eved that thee 1 i ? v differences were oapable of easy so ut on 
~"~ 
In the tirst plaoe ther~ is little 'doubt that the favourable 
re . ,... ,'; , '" ", ',.... ' , . 
sPOllse towards the Soviet Union Was based upon the belief tba t the 
Ruesi 
an revolution, even when its nature was fullY known, was an 
eJtper~ent in Socialism which ought 'to b'~ 'sU:pported :~v~n it there 
.. ere dittereno~s over the questio~ ot method. Hutobinson et the .A..S.E., 
tor' ~. 
example, told the Labour Party Conference ot 1920 that-there is no 
need '" .-' ..' . .,,' '. ; . -
. to be in tull sympathY with the policy and outlook ot the Russian 
BoJ. . " 
shevisn in order to teel that the struggle ~tthe So~i~t Government 
against oapitalist reaction~ both within and without is ot immense 
.IIlQnent tor all workers ~1 the ..-orId over.· (174) 
" . 
----~--------------------------------------------------17.3. Citrine, op.oit. ~ .An examination ot the M1.rlority Movement, 
i.e. its relationsbip with the Labour Movement is to be tound 
. in R. Martin, Coomunism and the British Trade Unions 1924-1933: 
. !..Study of the National Minority Movement, (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1969).' 'l 
, " '~ . , 
~.P • .A..C.R. 1920, p.133. See Note 28. 
, '. " 
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The ,emotional Left led by George Lansbur,y willingly ignored distasteful 
tacts to claim that "no set of men and women responsible for a revolution 
ot h' 
, . e magnitude ot the Russian Revolution ever made fewer mistakes or 
, -
ca:ried their revolution through with less interference with the rights 
ot individuals, or with less terrorism and destruction than the men in 
Control of Russia."(175) Other observers such as Ethel Snowden, Bertrand 
liussell d th" " 
an e Official delegation of the T.U.C. and Labour Party were 
1 '" " ' e~s, enamoured than Lansbury. (176) . 
Clynes frequently took ~ positive anti-Bolshevik line, relating to 
'~ " . , ' 
e ~ene~a.l. iSsues ot dem~cracy and dictatorship. Forwa:rd reported him 
as ' .•..... s~ing, "The workers must choose between government based upon elected 
in t ~ 
S itutioQS conSisting of men who are fit for the purpose and a Communist 
DiQtator sh1p, Wh~Ch indeed, can only be ot one kind~ It can survive only 
as it 
suppresses personal liberty. It has always had to be backed by 
lIlilita;ry authOrity and methods of force •••• "(171) Philip Snowden, too, 
e~e -
out strongly against Bolshevist methods. "Better continue to suffer 
unde ( . 
r Capitalism's) domination and oppression than gain economic power 
t~o"",':' - , ~ bloOd and slaughter," he told the 1920 I.L.P.Conference.(178) 
llaono ' , ' ' 
nald Used the publication of Moscow's Reply to the I.L.P. to confirm 
that t " ' 
he !ussians were "no fireside revolutionists •••• When they say 
diet at " 
orship, they mean dictatorship, when they sS\! Revolution, they mean 
blOOdShed 
and violence •••• the I.L.P. and the Third Intemational are oil 
----
----------------------------------------------175. G 
,. Lansbury, What I Saw In Russia (London: Leona.rd Parsons,'- ' 
920), p.ni. 
176. See Note 29. ; , '".,' 
, , 
171. ]I J8:t'Ward. (Glasgow),5 June 1920. cf. Clarion,24 September 1920 and ]Gb. D~.114)co 3001/2, 16 April 1919. 
'78 '. ,,',' , 
• l!.a.bour Leader, 8 April 1920. Cf. Colin Cross Philip Snowden' (London: 
Ba.rrie & Rockclitt. 1966») Ch.10. Snowden' s Autobiography,. .II, 533/42. 
and water and will not mix."(1'19) Yet as~bard points out "MaoDonald's 
oPPosition in the I.L.P. oame not so muoh from oonvinoed Marxists as from 
etnotion-ridden humanitarians. "(180) If these persons werelDlill:ing to make 
the th ' 
eoretioal distinotions that hindsight affords the practioe of the 
~h : 
s eVism eventually oonvinoed them that the theory was unacoeptable; for 
even in the depth of their ignoranoe peoPle: like Lansbury had no intention 
or deserting democracy in favour of' a diotatorship: and in the final analysis 
the real difference between Labour and the Communists l~ in their oonoepts 
or d . : : 
emooraoy and the role that Parliament as the supreme instrument of 
POlitioal power had. to plaur in the further~oe of reform. (181) 
'----.----------------------------------------~------179. {9rward: (Glasgow), 31 July 1920. cr. :Vlheatley who had argued: that 
torae was the only system with whioh the Russians were familiar" 
(and. that suoh oonditions did not apply to Grea.t :Britain. Forward. ~asg~») 24 January 1920. :.:. . . . 
180. G : 
rauba.:rd, Op.oit., p.188. 
181., See Wote 30. 
1. 
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CHAPTER TWO - NOTES 
Cf. Richard lu'man, "James Ramsay MacDonald ahci the Leadership 
> O(f the Labour Party 1918~22,. Journal of British Studies, Il, i, 
November, 1962), pp. 132-60. MaoDona1d' s views on the subjeot 
· were not unique. C11f'tord Alien 1I1so claimed that industrial 
and political a.otion were indivisible and that both were oanpatib1e 
with dEmocracy (See Labour Leader, 9 October 1919). Philip Snowden 
lexpress
ed similar views t (see Labour Leader, 31 July 1919; 21 August 919; 11 September 1919). On the Right of the Party, Tan Shaw 
asserted that the democra tio stream of Socialism "believes in the 
rule. of all the people and in Parliamentary aotion, supplemented, 
When needs be, by industrial aotion." "On Things in General," 
,Q.larion, 27 August 1920. . . 
2. .' Scme ot the original documents o ono e rned with the Leeds Conference 
are to be found in the papers of J .S. Midd1eton (Box 14) at 
Transport House under the heading "Fascist and Similar Bodies." 
Aooountsct the Conference written by individuals who were present 
. ~~ be found in Philip Suowden, .An Autobiography (London: ~vor 
3. 
.. ,.~oolson 8: Watsan, 1934), I, pp. 449-56. Robert Williams, The New 
~bour Outlook, pp. 80/5. . 
There is a brief referenoe to the Conference in J.M. Kenworth3, 
§.ailors. Statesmen and Others (London; Rioh & Cowen, 1933), pp.99-102 
::rbert Morrison, Herbert Morrison: .An Autobiography (London: Odhams 
ess, 1960), pp. 68/9 •.. ' '. 
. ,--' 
Seoondary referenoes of var;ing 1mport~ce are to be found in ~orQ E1ton, The Life of James Ramsay MaoDona1d: 1866-1912 (London: 
. oUina, 1939), pp_ 314/6. . 
R. Postgate, The Life of 'George Lansbury, (London: Lon8P18.nS Green, 1951), 
Pp. 169/70., and A. Bullock, op.oit., pp_ 74/6. '0> '. 
l{u:rph,y 'points out that one reason for the laok of s~~tained interest 
in the "soviet" was the faot that "we we10aned the Russian Revolution 
•••• but we knew next to nothing about how Workers' and Soldiers' 
Counoils were oonstruotedand had the vaguest ideas as to the 
Oonditions in whioh they oould and should be fonned." Murph3, 
.2P'0jJ,., p.63. .' .... . . .'. . 
. ~ . the Conference both Snowden and his wife spo~e> of the Re~olution 
W tellnS of its bringing about an early end to the war. See 
• -llat Happened at Leeds, pp. 7/8 and 17. 
~Y Agn~. Hamilton olaimed that MaoDona1d had ye~s later regretted 
· G- 8 presenoe a.t the Leeds Conference, M.A. Hamilton, Remembering My 
-9od Friends (London: Jonathan Cape, 1944), p.79. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
10. 
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et.) J .R. Ma.cDonald urging the P.L.P. to adopt Parliamentaxy tactios ~o that "the temper ••••• of' both industrial and politioal sides of -
II. he Labou:t' Movement should appear sans phrase on the f'loor of' the 
ouse of' Commons." .. FONard (Glasgow),.29.oCtober 1921, with his ~~a.1m that "Parliament should be used f'or def'ining the attitude of' 
1SeOcpart,y to the general polioy of' the Government." Forward (Glasgow), 
tober 1919. " , 
~~.~ however, MaoDonald "We Parliamentarians have no leg to stand upon 
dthe House ot Commons_oeases to be a place where reason meets reason 
, :n 9 ar€plment is marshalled against argument." Sooialist Review,xvII, 
, o. 3 ~A.pril!June 1920), p.106. " . 
~~ the time ot the Woolwioh bye-eleotion the Labour Leader oommented, 
Dla,k e return of'MaoDonald to the House at this partioular moment would .... 
ab e an enormous dif'f'erenoe in the politioal situation. 131 sheer 
h ilit,r he would rapidly become the leader ot the Opposition whether 
t: were tormally reoognised as suoh or not, and he would infuse into 
108FLabour Party the f'ighting spirit whioh it so badly needs." 
ebrtla.'ry' 1921. 
Maurtoe C~ling 'makes the point that "despite protestations ~f' ' ~?oenoe from the otfioal Labour leadership there WaIJ a ohronologioal. t~nneotion between Direct Action and the first serious inoreases in 
:B e Labour vote •••• " : . :Be i i of Modern 
-!ttish Politios (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,1911 ,pp. 109/110. 
For other ori tioism of' Trade Union Members ot Parli~ent see: 
:. &: :B. Webb, The Hi.ton of Trade Unions (London: Longmans Green, , 
eV1sed Edition, 1920) pp. 101 and 703. '.' 
J'. ' , ~ Rams~ MaoDonald, Socialism' After' the War (Manohester; National 
our Press, 1911b p.16. ' .... ' '.' .. " , '. ' 
~e ~abou:r Leader, '1 January 1920,' referred'to "the '~bsEmoe 'ot men 
ta.i real debating ability, and the meagre attendanoe of' members •. The 
lure of' the Party to impress Parliament and the publio has been ~:, not to the f'act that the' Labour view has not been put f'orward, 
11 to the f'act that it has not been put f'orward efrecti vely. " . '. 
et" ',' . ...., 
Op • !the work ot: a Parliamentary Labour Party whioh ought to be the . 
diPoSition to the Government, oannot be oarried on by men who have a 
a.b Vided interest, and whose outside work neoessitates their frequent 
~ence f'ram the House of Commons." 1 Maroh, 1920. See also .. 
CA; Donald t s ori tioism of' "slackness" in attendanoe. Sooialist Review, 
iPril-June 1920).IVIl,No .. 93, pp. 103/4. ',.. '. '. . . 
. . 
~th the LahourParty and .the t'W~e Free" Libe;~~ Claimed th~' right 
n i be regarded as the of'f'ioial.Opposition. The Speaker accepted . ' e~ ther olaim but recognised the right of' all Privy Councillors to 
ott on the OppOSition f'ront benohes. MacDonald oomplained that one 
r his critiCisms against the P.L.P. was that it never seemed to 
1 i oeniee this and other clianges in its powers. ,See Forward Glas ow , 
OctOber 1919. Cf'. Sooialist Review,xvI,No. 89 (April- une 1919 
P. 105. Some years later the New Leader complained "Attendanoe has ~ot, been up to high-water mm. :But this is largely beoause members 
108.1' too good-naturedly Yield to the shower ot: invitations to spend time 
the country when: Parliament is sitting." 10 April 1925. 
12. 
13. 
14. 
15. 
16. 
17. 
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!talics mine •. Spoor,of oourse, belonged to the I.L.P •. Cf. 
MacDonald "Everywhere there is a feeling of Parliamentary weakness" 
!orward (Glasg~w), 1 November 1919. Significantly enough s:imUar 
cQrunents were made atter the 1931 debaole. "Inside Parliament itself 
the wOllkers see the game being pla,yed in the same old way, except that 
the fifty-eight in 1932 8,l'e not playing it so effecte1y as did the 
thirty in 1906. It J. Scanlon, Decline and Fall of the Labour Party, 
(London: Peter Davies, 1932), p.245. The famous thirty of 1906 
constituted the P.L.P. when the challenge to Parliamentary democracy 
was at its pre-war height. See footnote 82. 
The kabour Leader had earlier re~orded its vi~ that "During the past 
session the Labour Party has not done as well as those who have 
:alised the possibilities of the situation would have liked, but it 
:1 s done a great deal better than most Socialists outside Parliament 
g ve it credit for." 1 January 1920. 
Thonas Shaw and J .R. C1.Ynesfrequently wrote for the Clarion. The 
T.G.W.U. Reoord noted in September 1921, "The Labour Party in the ~~se has worked together and rendered real service to those whan 
!ney represent. Our weakness is only felt in the Division Lobby. 
debate, in ccmmittee, or any other department of Parliamentary l~e, we more than hold our own, but argllllent, debating power, facts 
or figures oount for nothing when you go through the Division Lobby. 
A. large increase in the nunber of Labour Members is needed before 
OUr full power can be effectively exercised in Parlianent." 
Cf. J.H. Thcmas. "We have n6 right to substitute industrial action 
for our politioal disappoin1ments. We may disagree with the verdict 
ot the electors •••• but we are canpelled to aooept that verdict in 
:n.v democratio goverzment." H.C. Deb. 112, co 339. See also 
Rob Roy's" criticism of Robert Williams. Forward(Glasgow), 31 May 1919. 
!hilip Snowden wrote, sanewhat prophetically, "I do not interpret the 
~~ision of Congress to mean that Direot Action, even for a political 
o Ject, is in all ciroanstances repudiated •••• I could imagine 
c;roumstanoes where a general stoppage of work would be the most . 
; teotive means of opposing the policy of a governnent. Such a case, 
or instanoe, might arise, it a government prepared to embark upon a 
War whioh was opposed by the overwhelming majority of the people." ~b~ur Leader, 18 March 1920. Cf. B. Russell, Democracy and Direot -.QtJ.~ (LondOn: I.LoP., 1919), pp. 7/8. .. .. .. 
An article in the Clarion asked "We have won the greatest war in ~story. Who has won it?", and answered "it is quite oertain that 
b t has not been won by the paoifists, nor by the shop-stewards, nor 
R'Y the rabid anti-British Press, nor by Messrs. George Bernard Shaw, 
n 81rJ.say MacDonald and George Lansbury. These 'men have oontributed '. 
othing to the national sucoess but vituperation, sedition and 
ignorant inalice. These men have been as oonsistently mistaken, sour ~d Useless during the war as they were before the war, and they are 
Go <>day striving their utmost to render impossible the task of 
overnnent and a reconstruction, and to mislead and embitter the 
Worlcing-classes, and stir up mutiny." Robert Blatoht'ord "Bolshevism 
,or Democracy?" Clarion, 23 May 1919. 
18. 
19. 
20. 
21. 
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Robert Willtwns, for example, told an I.L.P. demonstration that 
"they had heard a great deal about unconstitutionalism but the 
Constitutionalists had taken unconstitutional action on Russia, 
tor they had never really declared war upon it, so that the 
workers were really being compelled to adopt the same extra-
constitutional methods for the restoration ot the British 
constitution." Forward (Glasgow), 13 September 1919.· 
Ct. MacDonald' s argument that "Everything necessary to protect 
the Constitution is constitutional, if 'constitutional' means 
anything at all except passive obedience to a~ outrageous acts 
done by men who happen to be Ministers. It Socialist ReView, 
XVII, No.95. (OctobexYDecember 1920), p.299 
. . 
Tan Shaw did question the 'Soviet' iIDplications drawn by the 
setting up of District Councils. Clarion, 27 August 1920. All 
but a handful of resolutions and other canmunications received 
at Transport House were in favour of the Party's action, indeed, 
sane affiliated organisations wished to extend it to the question 
of Ireland. (Council of Action material at Transport House). 
For a left-wing interpretation of the Council's role as a Soviet 
see The Guildsman, September 1920. 
" . ••• c' •• 
No Parliamentary effort could do what we are asking you to do, 
~ and desperate as all our measures, dangerous as they are, we 
believe that the disease is so desperate and dangerous that it 
is only desperate and dangerous methods that can provide a 
remedy •. (p.14) If this resolution (approving and endorsing the 
setting up of .. the Council of Action) is to be given effect to 
(it means a challenge to the whole Constitution of the country." p.16) . 
Cf. Ernest Bevin. "On the question of war, whatever our views on 
ordinary industrial matters, we felt convinced that we were 
justified in taking any, and every means." (p.7) Clynes "No 
Parliamentary or political measures •••• could be effective in 
themselves to save the country fram being canmitted to war 
against its will •••• " (p.12) All references are to the Report. 
A jOint meetin~ of the Executive C~itt~e of fue Labour Party 
and the Parliamentar,y Committee of the Trade Union Congress 
claimed "we are satisfied that the efforts or Organised Labour 
were wholly responsible for the action or the British Government 
in keeping the nation fron war." N.E.C. Minutes, Vol.20, 
18 October 1920. . 
J.R. Clynes argued, . "Labour hasn~~onlyledr.a:bour, it has led 
and interpreted the opinion of the country •••• Labour has made 
no mistake about this crisis. It should now make no mistake 
about never using the same sort of action, except in relation to 
.:the same sort of crisis. If c "How Revolutions Grow," Clarion, 20 
Augu:~t 1920. Italics in the original. co ., • 
continued/ •••• 
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21. 
(oontd.) 
22. 
Cf. MaoDona1d, Forward (Glasgow), 28 August 1920. Neither 
lthe Cabinet nor the L10yd George Papers throw very muoh new ight an the attitude of 'the government towards the Counoil 
of Action. On l5 August 1920 Hankey wrote to the Pr:iJne 
Minister, who was in Paris, "Our attitude appears to me to be 
just, logical, oorreot, representation of the entire (sic!) 
public opinion of the oountry, and admirably voiced in the 
ire ss • " He continued, "The Labour ~ouncil of A.ction' movement 
8 an unpleasant development, but, as they are merely taking ihe same line as the Governnent and the whole nation, no-one 
-f' so capable as you are of turning it to advantage and using if to strengthen yourrands. The real diffioulty will arise 
the Bolsheviks insi:l t on mpossib1e oondi tions at Yinsk. 
There will then be a struggle between the extremis ts and the 
moderates on the Council of Action, and, it the tomer (as I 
apprehend) get the mastery the Governnent'. position will be ! .. ::ty delicate one." Lloyd George Papers. E.24/3/6:(italics ~ • While Hankey was restrained :in his assertions, which 
were clearly biased, Lloyd George, who had desoribed direot action 
as ~Bo1shevism pure and simple" reflected the views of the rabid 
~tl.-SOCialist Sir Basil Thcmson who described the Oouncil of 
~tion in the following terms: "In fozm, the body is alOentral 
SOViet and is in oonf1ict with not only the Oonstitution of the 
country but the laws governing Trade UnionBn." ,- ,CAB. 24/110.-~ ort on Revo1utionar Or anisations in the United Kin dam: 19 August 
920, Report No. 68 in CAB. 110 1793. In a later report Thanspn 
asserted that "the fozmation of the Oouncil was the work of 
iraofeSSional revolutionaries .. '.. It ~,e. Russians. CAB. 24/l11/C.P • 
.30. 2 September 1920. 
See also Churohill's aocount in The World CriSs, p.269. Alternative 
recent interpretations of August 1920 are to be found in L.J. ~OFarlane, "Hand off Russia: British Labour and the Russian-Polish 
tt~' 1920." Past and Present, 38, (1968) pp. 126/152. N. Davies 
6 °Yd George and Poland 1919-20" Journal of Contempor!!y Histo;y~ 
, No. 3. (1971), pp. 132-155. 
"Our opponents knew and .till know that our only object was to 
p(revent another war a~inst Russia: T.U.C. Report, 1921, p.63 • 
.A. Thanas~ tir., F. Hodges "the motives that have brought the Council of 
otion :Lnto being are, transient. Their main object is peaoe. ' 
There is no desire to destroy Par1~entary governnent and there !8 no question of Soviet government." Labour Leader, 19 August 1920. 
B late as 1 October 1920 the Counail, oalling for public 
aemonstrations to be held on 17.October 192O'deolared "Following 
Upon these dEmonstrations it is proposed that the Labour Party ~hou1d seoure early opportunity tor a debate in the House ot 
Qnrnons. Local oounoils, therefore, are urged to do their u1most 
in making the demonstrations successful, and so help to strengthen ~e Labour r:okesman in Parliament." (Counoil of Action material: 
IPru/63/3. Italios mine.. . . 
,.1.. 
23. 
25. 
26. 
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Cf. "Parliamentary democracy is a myth exploded by the war and 
the developments arising fram the war. The Soviet idea or that 
of Workers', Soldiers' and Peasants' Councils is one which •••• 
goes right down to the roots of the Capitalist system and destroys 
'it at its very foundations." R. Wil1iams, The New Labour Outlook, 
p.160. ., 
Robert Wil1iams declared that "before the General Strike, the 
General Election pales into insignificance." Cf. his 1926 
Presidential Address to the Labour Party Conference in which he 
declared, "the Canmunist Party and the Minority Movanent still 
believes in the General Strike. The Labour Party looks wi. th 
confidence to the General Election." L.P.A.C.R. 1926, p.172. 
Details of the Unity negotiations can be found in the Official 
Report of the Canmunist Unity Convention (London: C.P.G.B., 1920), 
hereafter Communist Unity Convention Report.. . 
Tan Bell, The British Canmunist Party; A Short Historx (London: 
Lawrence & Wishart, 1937), Ch.3. 
Kendall, op.cit., Ch~11-15. . 
J. Klu2Jllan, Histo of the Canmunist Part of Great Britain· 
Fonnation and Early Years, 1919-24 London: Lawrence & Wishart, 
1968), I,i. . . . 
H. Pelling, The British Carununist Party: An Historical Profile 
(London: A. & C. Black, 1958).' ..,' 
For the reasOns for the breakdown of talks with the I.L.P. see 
MacFar1ane, op.cit., p.47i Kendan, op.cit., p.199i and Bell op.cit., 
P.52. 
She had written to Lenin in July 1919 asking for his opinion on the 
controversial question of Parliamentary action and had received 
the following reply: . 
:II.'.8lll personally convinced that to renounce participation in the 
parliamentary elections is a mistake for the revo1utionar,y workers 
of Britain, but better to make that mistake than to delay the 
fonnation of a big Workers' Camnunist Party in Britain." V.I. Lenin, 
"Letter to Sylvia PankhUrst" in ,On Britain (Moscow: Foreign Languages 
Publishing House), pp. 422/8 (424). 
For Bell's interpretation of the motion see Carununist Unity ~onvention Report, pp.9!11. One delegate at the Conference 
adVocated a scheme whereby a Communist Manber of Parliament 
would have to write an application for the Chiltern Hundreds 
~fore he entered Parliament and hand it to the Executive of 
the Canrnunist Party. In the case of the M.P. stepping out of 
line tha application would be posted to the appropriate authority • .Th~., p.15. Wi11iams was expelled fram the Cooununist Party for 
his part in "Black Friday." . . 
Cf. Philip Snowden "One can sympathise with and support the 
BOlsheviks without accepting their policy and methods as being 
appl~ble to other countries where political and economio 
conditions are altogether different." New Leader, 12 Februar,y 1920. 
See also New Leader, 9 January 1919. 
29. 
30. 
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!ritish Labour Delegation to Russia. 1920 Report (London: T.U.C. 
and Labour Party,1920). _ 
Ethel Snowden, Through Bolshevik Russi! (London: Casse11,1920). 
B. Russe11, !he Practice and Theory of -BolsheviS1! (London:George 
Alien & Unwin, 1920).. . _ 
For the confUsed reaction to Russell's book see his Portraits from 
!Lemory and other Ess~s (London: George Alien & Unwin,19561 esp •. 
Pp. 13/14. 
In his autobiography Left Turn (London: Martin Secker & Warburg, 
1930),John Paton, who-was not-unrepresentative of the I.L.P.'s 
views, summarised the Third Interna.tional's Reply to the I.L.P. 
as demanding not merely "acceptance of the principles of Marxist 
SOCialism from its adherents, but in its replies to the enquiries 
made by our delegation it insisted on dictating the main 
activities to be followed by the I.L.P. in Britain. It had 
worked out on the basis of the Russian experience a set of tixed 
rules which it appeared determined to impose as the common form 
ot authority in every country of the world. There was to be no 
deYiation permitted to meet special needs and conditions, the law 
Was laid down and had to be obeyed on pain of expulsion. "(P.SO) 
As it that were not enough the reply was delivered in "a hectoring 
dictatorial tone - a bullying note - which was singularly difficult 
to stomaoh."(pp.SO/1). 
CHAPTER THREE 
THE INTEt.a:.JinTUAI.S &: P.A:RLIAMENTARISM: 
THE CASE OF THE GUJIJ) SCCIALISTS 
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!he Guild Socialists: 
... ,. ~ .-
......... 'O •• 
.. ~ ~ . ~ . 
, The basic philos:pphical differences between the Labour Party and the 
COmmunists had repercussions t~ughout the organised Labour movement but 
Was most keenly felt in what might be called 'peripheral' movements such 
aa Guild ~ocialism which contained 8. dispropo~ionate number of active 
Cc COmmuni 
ats or COmmunist sympathisers in key administrative and decision-
making Positions. 
Guild SOcialism was essentially an intellectual movement having an 
ecletio philosophy representing, in the eyes of its best known propagandist' 
at least, the practioal application of Syndioalist doctrines to the 
:British i 
ndustrial situation.(1) Eschewing politioal Labourism as 
i~elevant, the Guild Sooialists attacked the 'orthodox Collectivism of the 
~-P - , 
arty as a patently inadequate appreoiation of' the nature of power 
in 800iet 
y. Moreover, they Gharacterised the supposed Colleotivist , 
SOlutio' ' 
- ns to the demands of Labour as a positive evil, which would merely 
8Ubat1tut - . 
eState oapi talism for private capitalism and thus, leave the 
lrO~ers t 
, a ill enSlaved to abstract economio forces. 
What the GUild Sooialists were concerned with was freedom; freedom to 
ena.ble th ' 
e individual to fulfill his crea.tive na.ture~ Freedom, they 
Ola.1xned ' , 
, inVOlved the pre-requisite conditions of controlling, as far as 
POSSible ' " , 
, thOse factors which determined the individual's life-style, 
Pa.t.1ioU,l 
arly the oonditions under whioh he worked. The majority of Guild 
SOOiali . 
sts, fOllOWing G.D.H. Cole, looked to the producers in society to win 
the ola 
sa struggle, and the doctrine of Pluralism,- with its emphasis on the 
i11egit1m 
ate olaim of' the State to sovereignty, to preserve it. The rest, 
'---~--------~--------------~---------------1. G.D.li ' '" ". . ' . 
Editi' Cole , Self-Government in Industry (London: G. Eell, Reprinted 
net on,' 1919~ Pp. 32-3. Cf. his The British Labour Movement: ~speot/Prospeot (London: Fabian Special No.S, 1951 }, p. 7. "" 
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diVided b t' . 
e ween the theories ot S.G. Hobson, Maurice Reokitt and Major 
C.R. Douglas, (2) preserved the State and its institutions to varying 
degrees, but were unable to inter-relate their ideas within the frame-
wo 'le . 
l' or the National Guilds League, and were forced to watch helplessly 
as intern:u wrangling and external pressure destroyed the guild idea. 
The ntai ' 
n concern here is not the industrial theories of the Guild 
SOOiaJ.ists, 
although these cannot be ignored, but those aspects of Guild 
SooiaJ.i t . 
e theory which were ooncerned rl th Parliament and House of Commons 
:toerorm• 
' These range from Hobson's Spiritual State with its oo-equal 
, 'P0l1t10aJ.' b ' 
. ~arliamenta.nd 'eoonomic' guilds - sovereignty lying with 
Parl1eme t ' 
n - to Cole's progressively weakened State in which sovereignt.y, 
in BO f&J:' as it 
existed, eventually becomes the provinoe of a 'Joint:Body' 
or ProdUQ ' , 
ers and oonsumers, which replaces, rather than reforms Parliament. 
'!'he apProach adopted here involves, first of all, an examination of 
GUild theo~r, , -
-J Partioularly in the writings of G.D.H. Cole and S.G.·Hobson, 
1f1th spe 'i 
c al referenoe to reform of the House of Commons. Muoh ot this 
1f111 be d' ' . 
a isouesion of the differing oonoepts of the State and its role in 
aociety. 
Secondly,' it is necessary to make an examination of the impact 
or Guild S 
ocialism on the Labour Party, Trade Union and I.L.P. oh'cles through 
the acti ' 
Vitiea ot the National Guilds League and prominent Guildsmen. 
~n~l -. 
. Y, there is an explanation of the Sudden demise of the movement in the 
earl~ , 
oJ twenties.' 
Al -
though the Guild Sooialist movement beoame popularly identified with 
the~ 
tinge and activities ot G.D.H. Cole .: "its-most obvious leader and 
'----- ' 
~--~--------------------------------------2,' 'l'h " ' . '., .', . " " . 
, ma e Contributions ot the Various "individuals to' the Guild idea 
, ot'1~e traced in S.T.Glass, The Responsible Society: The Ideas ,~ild Sooialism (London: Longmans, 1966). "A oontemporary , 
.• -b ount of the origin and development ot Guild Sooialism is to 
, c~~ound in Niles Carpenter,' Guild Sooialism: An ~storioal and 
. ~ca1 AnalYSis (London: D. Appleton, : 1922). _. '.:.. . ' 
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most ett ti 
eo ve exponent,"(3) guild theory owed its origins to A.J. Penty 
and. .S.G. Robson, both of whom later became Cole' s opp~nents within the 
National Guilds League.. Cole frequently acknowledged his intelleotual 
debt to R b ., 
. 0 son and The N~ Aee journal where the outlines of national 
guld theory,were fi;~t ·~~t~hed.(4) The Guild theorists were a.greed on 
most tund . 
'. amental issues, other than the role of the State, and a disoussion 
or any 0 . 
. ne of them oan suffice as a resume for them all. ,Thus the 
tOllowi . 
. . ne Pages will oonsist of an examination of the two main theories 
that are 1 ' 
re evant to House of Commons reform, those of Hobson and Cole • 
. When th ' 
e latter was not expanding on Hobson's ideas he was developing new 
ones ot hi 
, s Own. The ideas of A.J. Penty and Stirling T~lor on the one 
hand and D . 
, . ouglas and Oraee on the other will not be referred to in detail, 
P~ . '" ,. 
aJ.ily because, they barely touoh on the politioal aspeots of Guild theory. 
This oan '.
perhaps be illustrated by the brief nature of Penty's referenoe to 
POlitioal 
organisation in his 'Restoration of the Guild System. '(5) the 
bOOk whi h 
° heralded the Guild movement. , Penty envisaged a bioameral 
1 eeial at 
, '. ure, the lower ohamber of whioh would be eleoted on a territorial 
baSis, and t . 
oonoern.(6) 
he Upper ohamber by the Guilds. That was the extent of his 
:By" . 
Oomparison, both Hobson and Cole made substantial referenoes to 
POlitioal. 
Organisation, although it must be remembered that they developed 
~~ . 
, eories under pressure of demand. . Hobson, for example, developed 
~------------------------~~--------------
3. ~;e;~ay1" ~e SOCialist Tradit,ion: Moses to Lenin (London: Longman~ 
, ~ 940" p.434. ' , 
4 .. ' s ' , '" ,,':'.'.'" . .. ' . ~ . , ' t:~o!or ~xample, Cole's pretaoe to the first edition of The World of 
Lon ra A Disoussion ot the resent and future of Trades Unionism, 
St don:G. Bel~ 1913 ~ and his foreword to ::B. Pribioevio, The Shop . 
, ~ds' Movement and Workers' Control (Oxford: Basil BlaokweU) 1959). 
5. A.J. Pe'n:t~ ,.' ( d Sw S ..... :in '19~~). y,!he Restoration of the Guild System Lon on: en onnensou:.e , 
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hi 
s thoughts on the State in his second book ~ational Guilds and the 
Sta.te i . ~' n response to questions which had been raised by readers and as an 
B.D.B1fer toCole' s interpretati~n of the role of the State as the protector 
or the . 
oonsumer. (7) :By the time Cole ha.d. got round to restating Guild 
Sociali h . 
em, e had realised that whilst the emphasis of the theory was on 
industri"" ' ( ~ self-government, "its implications and oonclusions ••••• extend ed) 
OVer a ' . Oonsiderabl~ wider field than that of industry, and indeed •••••••• 
involve(d) a theory ot democratio representative government as a whole and 
ooustru.cti " 
ve proposals governing the general lines of politioal as well as 
ind ' 
ustrial reconstruction."(S) 
Any study ~f Guild Sooialist theory should properly start with 
S.G. Hob' ' 
son s work on National Guilds:(9) for notwithstanding the fact that 
A.J. PentY'~Sket~hed o~t'th~-~~~-ii~es of •• ~ •• guild theory, "(10) the latter 
-as" .~ , 
,al. together too medievalist and backward-looking for his oontempor-
ari
eS
."(11) Whereas Penty took a reactionary and wistful look' at the 
Dledie"u " ' 
8Uilds Hobson was oonoernedwiththe new oonoept of 'national 
rulds.' Hobson argued that under modern industrial' oapi talism the worker 
"'a.s red' , , ' 
, uced to the status ot a oommodity through the operation of the ,wage-
~~~. ' , . 
Having no oontrol over .the value of his produot he was thus robbed 
or hi. s ' . " 
, acred birthright and sold into eoonomio slavery. Moreover, basing 
his 9.rgum , ' ' , 
ent on the premiss that "eoonomio power prooeeds and dominates 
POlitioal. . , ' " 
, action,"(12) Robson olaimed that the sooial and economio oonditions 
"""'---.:... ' 
~------~--~--~~~~--~~~----------
7. S.G H b () 
• 0 son, !ational Guilds and The State London: G. :Bel1,1919 ,Preface. 
S. G.D.H. Cole, Guild Sooialism Restated (London: Leonard Parsons,1920)~.10. 
~. :.G. HObson, N~tional Guilds: An In ui into the W e S stem and the ~. (London: G. Bell 1914. The book was edited by A.R. Orage. 
10 ' 
• ~.T. Glass, Qp.oit., p.20. 
11. U C ' 
.' ole, "Guild Socialism and the Labour Resea:rch Department", A. :Briggs 
and iJ. Saville (Eds.) in Essars in Labour History 1S86-1923 (London: ~m1lla.n~1971hPP.260/S3C264 • Hereafter oited as Gul1dSooialism and 
..... LabQUr Research Department. . . 
12. S " .~. Hobson, National Guilds and the State, p.109. 
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01' four-fifths of the working population, wage-slavery as he called it, 
preVented their realising their rightful politioal power. "In all the 
POlitical democracies there are two classes of oitizenship the active and 
th " 
, et Passive. The active oitizen derives his authority from his economic 
pOI1 tion· th 
, e passive or subdued citizen is the wage-earner, who is 
ineVitably passive because he is caught and choked in the wage system."(13) 
ReJledial . ' 
measures such as universal suffrage had little effect, for "Politios 
18 larg ,..... ' 
e...., a question of psychology. Economic subjugation brings in its 
train Certa.t " 
n definite psychologioal results, which, in their turn, colour 
,and dOminate pOlitics."(14) For Hobson the over-representation of property 
'~~~. . ' 
sting HOuse of Commons proved that political democracy without 
economic .. ' 
, r eqUality was a sham.' 
~e dominance of the wage-system in the affairs of society had never 
been appr . 
eCJ.ated by the Labour Movement, which, with the exception of the 
SOcial J) , 
emocratic Federation, had dissipated its energies with proposals for 
mOdifY1 ' 
08 and living with the w~e-system instead of abolishing it. Only 
lrith the' b' , .. " , 
, a olition of the wage-system would the workers be liberated from 
bondage. 
The first step in' this direction was the need to r~ognise that 
eoonolllic', , ' . 
POWer precedes political power. The second was the ability to 
diatillgui ' 
POlfer but 
ah between economic and pOlitioal power, not as two tyPes of kindred 
as two separate kinds 'of power springin8 from altogether different 
'°ll.rce 
e. Because these t~~'klnds of power were different in essenoe it 
l' 1 ' 
o 10lred tha't the on" e' ( .. , th th 
' political) could not be transmuted into e 0 er 
(ea,. onoIllic).(15) . .." ., ' HObson drew the co~clusion "that,. economio methods are 
~ ------------------------~----------13. ' S 
.Il. RObson 
.. , 
14. Ibi ~, P.53. 
National Guilds, p.49.' 
15. L ~. 
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essential to the achievement of econanic emancipation; (while) political 
, Dle~hods are useless, because all poll tical action i'ollows and does not 
precede e i 
.. '. conan .c .action; that econanic power is the substance and 
poUt" . . . 
. 1cal.power its shadow or reflection." (16) HObson was, in effect, 
attaCking the orthodox Fabian Collectivist view that if the workers were 
able t . ~ achieve political power by organising themselves into a politioal 
torce in P . . 
arliament, and on other eleoted bodies, this could lead to a 
transfer of b " ., " . . 
, ., aS1C eoonanio power through the publio ownership et the means 
ot r . .,';, : ,'. ,'" . 
p oduchon brought about by legislative means. As he put it himself, 
"Le:' '. , 
,bour - ••• in seeking first the oonquest of politioal power, is grasping 
at the h ' 
, , s adow and leaving the substanoe untouohed." (17) Hobson, however, 
"'as goin 
,"r g a step further than simply registering his opposition to the 
W~d~ . ' . . 
, , of political action. It was, he thought, inappropriate, inadequate 
, ' 
and irrel 
eV&.nt. It was inappropriate in that politics could not solve 
toOl1 ' ,.
ante problems. .An eoonanic struggle must neoessarily be waged in the 
1ndustr..; .. , , 
'. -.a. aphere," (18) that is, by a direct attack on the real problems. 
It Wa.s 01 __ • . . 
. . •. ua.dequa te because it had in praotioe failed. While the Labour 
Part "1.._ 
, ~ 'ad bUSied itself in Parliament the real standard of living of the 
Workin '..' 
g-claases had decreased_ 
- , , 
In Hobson's eyes, at least, the politioal 
lIing of . 
. . the Labour movement had 
.. . , 
had a demoralising effeot on industrial' 
Dlilitanc~~ 
This only served'to emphasise the irrelevance of the Labour 
Pa.rt~ 1I .. '. ; ..' 
_ hich HObson variously desoribed as "an exhausting deviation and an 
appalling ll8.ste of t~e and nervous' energy. (19) and tla very expensive 
6InUI!I~ " . '. '. . : " '.. " " " 
. ent" (20) tull of careerists ~hose'political lives oould be ended at 
the dr ." 
,OP ot a Liberal hat. 
----~-------------------------------------16 . 
• ~., p.64~ 
17. 
~. 
~., p.289. 
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HObson's answe~ to the p~blem of how to create a rea1~ just society 
was to . 
assen that indust~ia1 action alone, possibly the general strike, could 
oreate the conditions within wnich the new order ot things could be established. 
It Was n t t 
o he transfer ot Capitalism that would lead to economic emancipation 
bu.t nth ' 
e oomp1ete transformation of all the factors that enter into wealth 
Prod~otion."(2'1) t 
, , This is a clear reference to Hobson's desire 0 change 
the Btat ~ 
us of labour from that ot a commodity into the essence ot industrial 
lite. " , , 
However, oenain essential preliminaries were necessary it this 
oh ' .,' 
&rlge were to be brought about. One, in partioular, was that the Trade 
'trnion DlOvem~nt was to be orga:nised on an industrial' ~~SiS , with a monopoly 
ot 1 ' . 
about" POwer, so as to enable it to oontront the Capitalis1a on better 
than eVe t " 
" n erms. ,The inevitable show ot torce would at last secure the 
Workers t ' .' . ' 
Victor,y and bring about t~e new society. 
1'hi' , <,'" 
S new social o~er would be functional in principle. Material lite 
woU.ld. be ' , . 
the province ot the guilds, which would co-operate with the State in 
the lnan ' ", ' 
aging ot SOciety _ subject to the principle ot industrial democracy. 
~~, ' 
. ,Hobson's intention was to allow the guilds complete autonomy on the 
~ou.nd "'. ' 
, s that the workers should be tree to g~vern themselves and b,ecause 
eoonollli' , , , ' 
, ·0 lllatte~s should be dealt with by the proper functional authority. 
~~ , """,' 
. ,nst'erring the oonduct ot material affairs to the Guilds (not only 
lfeal. th" . , , " ' : " 
. produotion but the responsibility tor maintainanoe in sickness, 
acoident ' '. • ,.," " ' 
" . and old age) statesmanship is lett tree to grapple with its own 
Probletns ' ' . ". ' ", ' , , ' 
, undisturbed and undeterred by olass oonsideration and unworthy 
econollli " , , ' ' · 
'" 0 p~essu~ett. (22) Funotional separation or economio and politioal 
POWer ~~~ld b~ing . stability to 'the state. IIobson envisaged a supreme' 'Guild 
'-----
-----------------------------------------<1. Ibid. ,0 
---.;;: , p.11. 
<2. 
'Ibid. 
~, P.256. 
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COuncil to co-o'rdinate the activities of the Guilds and to exercise 
appellate POwers in disputes between the guilds. Other problems such 
as the Law, MediCine and Defence, which were not suitable to organisation 
under th" 
e €Uildsystem would be dealt with by the normal administrative 
processes ot government. As tor the structure and role of the State 
.1Iobson 
revealed tew details. The State was to be the tinal arbiter, but 
given th . 
e vast role of the Guilds this could mea.n very little in practice, 
especially it Hobson's new society created the new outlook in men that he 
" , ~ 
eXpected. . -AS,to the functions of the State Bobson is hardly the essence 
0.1' Clarity. : "The problem ot statesmanship," he wrote, "will be to trans-
1Itu.te - - ' . 
••• •• economic power ••••• into the highest possible social and spiritual 
VOltag~. "(23) Yet when he states that the independence and supremacy of 
the St t·· .' .... , . 
. a e depends ultimately on "the moral powers and cultural cape.ci ty of 
nation' ' ' ." . 
s citizens"(24) it becomes clear that his idealism has got the 
better t . 
,0 his emotions. Moreover, when he expands this point by saying 
that "ha; , 
. ~ng solved the problem of wealth production exchange and dist-
ributl . . . . 
on, we mS\Y' rest assured that a. people thus ma.terially emancipated 
,'. "ill • ~ ~ , ; , J 
1Il0ve up the spiral ot human progress, and that out ot that part of ,. 
this III . 
OV9ment will grow a purified political system, in which great states-
, tna.nshi " ~ , . 
P ~ll plS\Y' its part,"(25) one is reminded of rhetorio of Rams~ 
~nonald - Unreal1sticrather than idealistic. Nevertheless, what Bobson 
'lraa getting at was that the State h~ a spiritual rather than a material 
, role to . ", , . 
. . plS\Y' in the new sooiety. . This was made explicit by his second b ' . < . .. 
ook, !!tional GUilds and the State • 
. . 
-----'-----------------------------------------
23. .!!?~., P.259. 
24., ~id., 
__ P.263. 
K.· .. 
· .. ··.········· . . 
, . ~ 
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!ational Guilds and the State set out primarily to answer the points 
.... ,. . 
made b .-. 
Y Oritios of his earlier book, in particular those made by G.D.H. Cole, 
who by this time (1920) was the leading intellectual light of Guild theory. 
Cola had argued that the economic process fell into two distinct funotions, 
the prod ti 
uc ve and the oonsumptive. The Guilds were the organisation for 
the prod 
Ucers while the State was the organisation speoifically designed to 
act as th 
e protector of the oonsumer. Both were sovereign in their own 
Spheres hil 
, w. e any disputes should properly be settled by a joint-oounoil 
represent! 
ng both oonsumers and producers. In answer to this Hobson olaimed 
that pr d . 
o uction and consumption were part of the same economio prooess and 
COUld. not be separated in the manner whioh Oole had done. Cole was trying 
to artit'1 
Cially balance functions which in the nature of things would balanoe 
themselv . 
. es or be naturally unbalanced. Finally, Hobson asserted the prinoiple 
ot the s 
OVereignty of the State as the basic prinoiple whioh should determine 
a.u.thorit y within sooiety. 
.. 
HObson first of all distinguished between the nation, the State and the 
20l'a:rrun 
ent, by oalling them Sooiety, I the supreme legislative authority and 
the adIni 
nistrative organs respectively. The nation was e~sentially "that 
pe:rvasive 
senae of national spirit and oonsoiousness that springs from a 
lite li' -
Vad in Oommon through many generations."(26) The government, a term 
"hloh oov . 
ered a regime, its personnel, and administrative organisation, 
"derives it . 
. s authOrity from and must ultimately have its functions defined 
by th 
. e Ita.te •••• "(27) It is subjeot to the State which Hobson variously 
deScribed ,,' . 
a.s the sovereign authority," "the organised expression of oitizen-
Ship" and. -
the "vooal organ" of the nation. (2S) Though tunotionless itselt 
~~--------------------------------------~ <6. 
<7. 
HObaon N . 
. ' _ational Guilds and the State, 
~'t P.101. 
p.101/2. 
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the State is the ul tima.te souree both of function and of coercive power, 
detiVi ' 
.. ng its power f'rom two f'actors. Firstly, its spiritual role. 
:Becaus " e politics ought to be the expression of the spiritual lif'e of the 
nation" thi 
. s means "that the business of the State is essentially spiritual ••• "(29) 
Butth~ .. 
Bpiritual nature of sovereignty also relates to the second f'actor _ 
that the t 
..8 ate is the instrument of a sovereign citizenship. "This 
01 tizenshi . " 
p, t~is sense of' nationality operating in the individual conscious-
ness, is the greatest tact in the lite of' a democratic people ••••• (and while) 
cit1zenshi . 
P containsand comprehends ••••• lesser motives and interests these 
Dlotbes and 
interests ••••• must ultimately merge into the will of' citizenship, 
:realis1 
ng in it the sovereign power. It is not mere rhetoric when we 
COllntet' 'th . 
r e sOvereign will of the monarch' with 'the sovereign will of the 
peoPle ,- It . . 
• is a declaration of democracy. It envisages no balance of' 
PO~er; it k ' 
nows ,no checks or counterpoises; it is an ultimatum that the will 
at' the c1 t1 . 
zens, in their civic capacity, shall prevail over every sectional 
~~" . .. . 
, ecOnomic or functional. Its .decision is the greatest r:£ national Sac . 
rfUnent "( ) 
s. 30 Thus the State's role as the spiritual leader of' the nation 1s d , . 
. epende t . 
. n .. upon what Hobson calls, "the sovereign quality ot a completely 
entranch1 . ' . 
Bed citizenship •••• "(31) Hence State sovereignty is essentially 
~ra.t1c - . 
.•.. ~•. The State is "the sovereign representative of democracy," dert ...• 
Ving its power trom the 'general body of citizens and acting as "the 
Dla~thpi . 
ece of the. citizen 'body."(32) Moreover, tor Hobson, "the democratic 
State 1 ' 
. S a SPiritual State to the extent that its citizens realise the tal 
29. ~., P.105 •. 
'30. Ibi ~., Pp. 102/3. 
31. Ib .. ~'PP. 133. 
32. Ibi "~, P.105. 
, .........................••......... 
: .. ' .. ~
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Prinoiple 'f' ~ . 
s 0 soc1al existence and insist upon their application to all 
a.J.ik '. . 
e without fear or favour."(33) The State is not only democratic but 
18 a.J.so n .f..._ . 
a."l.U.'ally practical. .,Robson described its role as a mission, a 
misSion whi h . . '
c unlike Co1e's artificial balance of functions, is obviously 
Correct ". . , 
• That the State should be sooiety's expression of its organio 
lite is 
apparent "on eve1:y ground, historioal, oonstitutional, legal and 
practioal.· "(34') 
••••• 
Rob '. . 
'. son reiterated. his earlier belief that a sooiety whioh was not 
diVidi' . . ' . 
ne itself internally over the question of eoonomio equality, beoause 
. the basio;" . ' 
. question of eoonomic freedom had been solved, would be a better 
SOCiety U ,'., . 
• nfOrtunately, Robson rarely ventures beyond the woolly general-
isa.tiorr to: 
SUbstantiate his assertions: "The new conditions of life 
ad.tunbrated i '" . '. 
n a democracy, eoonomically and politioally enfranohised, must b ' ' 
e reflected.' i . 
n a corresponding change of spirit in the State ••••• compelling 
8ta.teSlne '. . 
'. 1'1 to obey new spiritual truths," he declared. (35) What are these 
n~ tru.ths . . ' 
which will give spiritual guidance to fut~e statemen? Bobson 
does Ilot' .... . 
. eXpand the pOint other than to sa.y that they will be "natural, 
ine'Vit . 
, able and democratio."(36) 
Aa a 0' . . 
. Onsequence of his exposition: of the nature of the State Robson 
Dlaltes SOm ' . ".', . . 
. e reference to Parliament. Rejeoting Cole's notion of a territ-
OrtaJ.1Y ... b . . .' . 
b . ased Parliament representing the interests of thA oonSUll'ler and 
ei~ oo...e' . , . '.' . 
, qUal wl th the vooational producer organisations of the guilds, 
llobson deo . . . .'. .' . 
lares that by relegating the whole of the economio funotion to 
the Guilds ( . 
i.e., both the produotive and oonsumptive fUnotions) Parliament 
"-.......:. 
----------------------------------------33. Ibid' 
-.....;.;;.., P.143. 
34 Ib' 
• .....!9., PP. 108/9. 
35.'~. 
36. Ib1.a 
~., P.109. 
'.: ....... . ; ....... ~  
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-ouId be able to concentrate on the spiritual development of the nation 
unhampered by selfish economic interests. Besides, the State, as was 
mentio,nedearlier, was functionally unsuited to deal with economic questions. 
As lIobson put it, "why should the llurse rule the poli tice.l roost when 
presUDlabl th . 
y, e function 01' politics is to apply principles of public conduct? 
What has th St' 
" e ate to do with industry? This answer is, 01' course, that in 
the Past 
, generation great economic responsibilities have been thrust upon 
Parliament, hi 
' W ch at the present time concerns itself with indus~rial 
problems to the exclusion of its distinctively spiritual duties."(37) 
ltobson th 
en POints out that "if the political State is to undertake these 
economio t ' 
unctions J then it follows that" the economic battle must be tought 
OUt in p 
r
arl1a.ment and its administrative purlieus. "(3s) This seems to 
indicate . ., _ 
, a definite change from the anti-Parliamentary position Hobson took 
in latic ~ nal Guilc!!. although he by no means limited his sights to Parliamentary 
actio -........ ~ " 
n. "It is futile to condemn Direct Action in politics," he wrote, "if 
POlitics i" . ", . 
s degraded from its high estate to an eoonomic class struggle."(39) 
Parliam, . 
ent, therefore, can be legitimately regarded as being part of the 
eOonOlni 
" c struggle. 
As Was ., 
mentioned previously, Hobson regarded the State as the supreme 
legis1ati 
It ' Ve organ. In seeking to define this more closely he wrote, . St " ate Or . ' 
, ganisation is primarily directed to the main purpose of expressing 
the "ill ' 
. ot the Commu.nity, nationally through Parliament locally throueh the 
lOCal &1 . 
" "ected authorities."(40) ", Later, he became more explicit describing 
'----
-------------------------------------37. ~., XVi. 
tOO•oit ~.
38. 
39. 
40. 
~. 
~., P.122. 
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Parliament as the spine of the State struoture. Obviously,the State 
Was to have an important role. It would oo-ordinate policy and perform 
the legislative fUnotion. ~obson rejeoted the Soviet form of government 
"hich had many strong sympathisers in the Guild Movement _ inoluding 
G.D.H. Cole - desoribing the Soviets as "industrial bodies fUnotioning 
in the alien sphere of politios ••••• "(41) and generally not representing 
the int 
erestsof the oommunity. The latter fUnotion was espeoially 
important 
, as Hobson's oitizenry was the foundation of his State. In 
RObson' Gu ' . 
s ild State the Guilds had a monopoly of labour power whioh was 
held l' , 
n national trust on behalf of the oommunity. From this it followed 
that tt'th ' 
, 'e dispOsal or distribution of that produot must, in the ultimate, 
be ~d d 
, e by publio polioy ••••• "(42) that is, according to the prinoiples 
ot g 
eneral welfare. In the event of confliot Robson makes his position 
Pertectlv 01 
" ear. "On any great issue affeoting the general welfare, the 
<lttizen b ' ,-
ody will naturally disouss ways and means with representatives of 
the Guil ' , 
de - possibly a joint session of Guilds and Parliament and the 
Guild C' 
°ngress - but the final deoisionoan only rest with the State, as 
the to 
rmaJ.. representative of thenation."(43) However, such oooasions are 
'Unlikel'U' i ' " 
" n the new sooiety where eoonomio problems are of relative 
UDiInport . 
anoe, and 'Would anyway only be used as a measure of last resort. 
AlthOUgh oonfirming Parliamentary Sovereignty of sorts, Robson makes 
" ~e .' 
ar that the struoture of the institutions of the State will have to 
be ch 
aQged in order to enable it, to fully express the demooratio wishes of 
the nat! 
on. To enoourage this he olaims that the liaison between State . 
"'--..:. 
-----------------------------------------41. Ibid 
--.,;;.' 1'·84. 
~, 1'.110 • 
. ~.ctt. 
l ~._ 
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and guilds is best achieved through having the official heads of the 
guilds represented in Parliament in the same way in which Government 
departments are represented,., implying yet again that although the 
separ ti . 
a on of political and economic functions is the ideal it is 
impossible to achieve in practice. Therefore, while Hobson set out the 
Guild theory in a systematic form he did not do so logically. As a 
reSUlt while' the same underlying themes are present in both his books 
(the Spiritu . 
al nature of the State, the separation of economics and 
POlitics) the means of achieving the new society were not fully elaborated. 
Moreove 
r, although he began from a very definite anti-Parliamentary 
POSition R b . . . 
o son ended. up by tacitly accepting the strncture of the old 
POlitioal State, the purpose of which he remoulded by changing its environ-
ment • 
. ~ the time !ational Guilds and the State appeared Hobson's theories 
"ere a.lre~· a ne~iigable force within the N~tional Guilds Leaeue. This 
18 not . 
really surprising. : Hobson was never keen on the for.mation of the 
organ1' t .. . . 
Sa ion in the first place, . while Cole' s multitudinous books and 
~ltifa.rious activities had, to the outside world, made him "the person-
1tioati . . . v • 
on of the Guild idea."(44) The battles of the National Guild 
Leaeu.e '"""1' . . . w~ 1 be dealt with later. . What will be discussed here is the 
nature f C . '.' 
o ole's contribution to the guild theory as it affects Parliament. 
~~ '.. .... 
) bson Co1e' s ideas developed under pressure ald a comparison of 
~rid" . .. () 
". of Labour (1913) and Guild Socialism Restated 1920 shows just 
how f - .. 
ar they developed. Neverth;les~, the same basic approach as Robson 
Was eVid . . 
. . ent . in Cole' s earlier books 0 • Cole declared that the consumer 
~M~ .'
speCial protection and claimed that the State could best fu1fil1 
----.:.. ~. s~----~~-------------------------------
( oG. Robson, ..Pil,Q'rim to the Left: Memoirs of a Modern Rmlutlonist 
. London: Edwa:t'd Arnold, 1938), p.188. 
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this rOle. However, he argued the State should be made only of equal 
r&nkwith th ' 
e Guilds, proposing a 'joint board' later oal1ed 'joint 
COllgres tt', " 
S, as the medium ibrsett1ing matters of dispute and oommon interest. 
Like Ho ' '. 
, beon, Co1e believed that po1itioa1 action had not only failed but 
that it· 
was unsuited to what was essentially an industrial struggle designed 
'to creat t 
e hose conditions within whioh real demooracy oou1d effeotive1y 
Cole, too, hoped to create an active oitizenship whioh would 
eXercise f" ' 
e ~ective control over the governing of sooiety onoe the basio 
qUestio . , 
n of eoonomio equality had been settled.' Moreover, Co1e found 
,himself t 
a odds with the orthodox Co1leotivist methods of solving sooiety's 
Pl.'oblems ' vi . ' 
,a ew whioh was reinforced by the State's role in the suppression 
or indiYid " 
. :u.al liberty during the war. Co1e; like Robson, was oonvinoed 
that the t ' 
ra,nsfer of capitalism to the State would merely change the 
Personnel 1 
' nvolved in administration, but would reffect no real revolution 
1n Control 
, Which was the basio issue, tor, "unless the oitizens are oapable 
or . 
Controlling the Government; extension ot the power ot the State m~ be 
merely th . 
e traneferenoeot authority trom the capitalist to the bureaucract."(45) 
~~r ' . ' 
eally needed was structural ohange but not the type of unjust and 
sectional ' 
change advooat edby the syndioa1ists. 
The first preliminary sta,tem~'nt of Co1e' s views was to be found in his 
bOok _ " ' ~a World of Labour" wrttten before he was offioially a Guildsman b"t . '" ~ ..•• 
'" in whi " ....... ., 
ch he olearly showed his sympathy' with the Guild Sooialist ' 
mO~ement.(46) The Main ooncern of TK' World of Labour was with industrial 
aelr .. go · .................. . ~ernment which Co1e examined with reference to England, America, 
'"---- ' 
45. 
46. 
------~------~--------~------------~~~e, ~e World of Labour (1917 edition) p.347. unless otherwise stated _ 
lbi sequent references will be to this edition. ~., this Point is brought out in the introduotion to the 4th 
ion,(1919). 
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Franoe, Germany, Sweden and Italy. Cole argued that the signs of the 
time clearly indicated the "uprising of the group," with a psychology, 
ideal. -
, and action all its own. Cole regarded this new philosophy of groups 
as th ., 
e true principle of working class solidarity. The spin t of 
devoluti ' . 
on evident in the demands for greater Parliamentary control over 
the exeoutive, Home Rule and the like was evidence of this principle in 
practioe. 'l'he,~te two principles had, in turn, been instrumental in producing 
" 
,a reoonstruction of political and social theo:ty. "(47) The main emphasis 
ot this 
new theory was the recognition of the strength of economic power 
in sooi t ' 
e Y and of the need of society, acting in, functional groups, to 
OOntrol th ' 
e most Vital factor of economic life _ the workplace. MOreover, 
~P~ . 
- r amount importance of economic affairs in the modern world meant that 
"the lihol ' ~ e problem of government is essentially bound up with the control 
ot indust ,,( ) , 
ry • 48 Control industry and you will control the political life 
ot th . 
e nation aJ. so. 
This View perva.d.ed Cole' s discus~ion of the tactics that would be 
necess 
ary to Create the new society to which he referred. Economic action 
lIlUst com t 
e irat., This meant that "a Labour Party, at present ought to 
regard it ' 
s tunotion as subsidiary to that of Trade Unionism ••••• "(49) but 
just as th " 
is Would inVOlve a. revamped Trade Union movement (Cole's Greater 
UniOn! ) - -
SIll t so too. wOll.ld the Labour Party have to change from being a. social 
retOl'lll ' 
, P~y - that had. reformed nothing since 1906 - to being a. Socialist 
Party haVi ' -
, ng a revolutionary spirit and constructive policies to offer. ~IIl this -
. ' it appears that Cole expeoted dual actiyity in both the industrial 
8Jld ' 
POlitioal tields. He makes the point as follows" "Parliament will have, 
~-----------------------------------------47. Ibid' 
~·t P.20. 
48. Xhid 
" • ~·t P.394. 
49. Ibid 
-..;;;;:.., p • 4 23. 
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in future, not mer~lY' to clea'l" the ring for the industrial struggle, but 
to 1nte ' 
'l"Vene mO'l"e and more, to take over control from the capitalist, 
while on th ;1' . ' ( ) 
e r side the worker~ are assuming control." 50 Thus enoroaching 
Oontrol " ." ,', 
and the end of a olass-dominated House of Commons would secure the 
wOrkers paradise of a Guild St~te. 
Cole ' s i'd . 1· ." " ea 1Bm, though not altogether sound, was expressed in far more 
Oogent te~s' than that of" H~b~on. He too, wished. to free the State from 
econoIllic ". . 
encumbranoes. Re wrote, "oouldthe cont~l of industry be handed 
OVer to the producers, and' could all prOfi teerinz be eliminated, the State 
. WOUld be . 
set-tree to wO'l"k tor the deepening of national life, for the 
l'eaUsati· . : ., ' 
on ot a greater joy and a'greater individuality. It would be 
liberated t . " . . . 
. 0 work: tor the liberation of energy, instead of being preoocupied 
With th . '. 
e SOrdid task of patching up a false sooial truoe ••• :."(51) Yet 
While COl ' , . , 
e spoke of the hope of 'spiritual regeneration' he was immensely 
lll'a.ctical i h' " . ... ' . 
,n is assessment of the role the State should be pl~ing. "The 
State's b~siness (is) to distribute-wealth and t~ ~ra.nge servioes, to 
lll'OVide f ' ,,' '. .' . . 
or the well-being of the whole,~d to' aftord to every individual 
f'ull lIlean H , • ,.' .' 
s ot self-expression."(52) This meant, as far' as Cole was conoerned, 
that "th' . , . '.' ..' 
eState ot the future will not be the oentralised bureauoratio 
lIlech . 
aniBlll of' tod~; it will be the aiert and flexible instrument of the 
General Will ( . ", . ' 
." 53) To give' effect to the last point Cole asserted, "new 
lIlethod ' . - " ., . 
s ot democratic government will be eVolved, and, instead of the . 
abstl'act ", '. _. ., , '. 
. democraoy of the ballot-box, there will be a real democracy aiming 
~ ., 
50. ~. ,p.400. 
51. ~., p~410. 
52. ~~., 
53_ ,lbid 
--.;-, 
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not at increasing the absoluteness of its control, but at delegating 
tunction t 
s 0 self-gOVerning bodies within itself, and at the same time, 
harmon! i. . ..... 
s ng thel.r activities with th.e good of the whole. Parliamentary 
deVolut1 b . 
on ,. .means of the Connni ttee system, administrative devolution by 
the granti 
ne of Wider powers to local and ad ho~ authorities, and 
industrial d . '. .. 
evolution, by making the Trade Union a self-governing producing 
unit ill 
'w go hand in hand."(54) Although Cole made referenoes to the role 
ot the j i . 
o nt bOard of Parliament and National Guilds to settle points in 
diSpute h 
. e made it olear, in The World of Labour at least, that the ultimate 
a.u.thori t . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..... 
Y was that of the consumer. 
This View changed quite drastically by the time Guild Sooialism Resta.ted 
lras publi h 
,- s ed in 1920. Increasingly the role of Parliament was reduced from 
the Prate t . '.' 
c or of the consumer to a mere funotional body while the power of 
the jOint b 
ody was gradually increased until it played, in effect, the role 
in the n 
ew SOCiety that Parliament was perfoming in the old one. The 
Partnet'shi '.'. 
p between State and Labour ended with the abolition of the Sovereign 
State. 
This was clear in Self-Government in Industry where Cole assigned to 
th ' 
e State the important role ~f 'th~ '~~p;~~~ 'te~torial assooiation of , 
conSUme' . 
rs, but denied that its sovereignty applied throughout sooiety.(55) 
It, COla a .. 
Sserted, the new division of society has to be on ,vertical lines 
lnt· " .' , 
et'ms of Producers and Consumers rather than the inadequate legislative, 
aJeeCutive 
,jUdicial division of classical social theor,y,then it followed 
that it w . ',
. as impossible for a consumers body suoh as the Sta.te to conter any 
kind Of 
rights upon a produotive body like Trade Unions. , Indeed, Cole 
oonclUded, . 
rights ot associations such as producers and consumers, are derived" 
'----
--------------------------------------54. ,1QC.cit. 
---__ ~I~t~al~i~o~s~M~i~n~e. 
55. COl . 
, e, !elf-Government in Industry, Ch.5. 
ill 
not fr th 
om e State at all but by "virtue of their nature and the purposes 
tor lfhioh they exist. "(56) 
A.lthOUgh the State was tlp~s inter pares" among associations it 
could not l' ' '. 
c aJ.m the right to interfere in the productive process. As the 
Prot8€oni t f . 
B 0 the consumer, however, the State had the right to exercise 
sOme Cont 1 
ro Over the division of the national product, the national income 
and the c t 
on 1'01 of prices. Conflict, that unlikely event for which all 
Nldsmen lllade allowance but in which none really believed, was to be 
Bettled b 
Y a machinery of joint control, a joint congress representing 
. eqUaJ.ly 
producers and consumers.(51) By the time the 1919 edition of 
~Gove ' . 
, . - , .. _ . 1"nment in Industrx had been published, Cole had rethought his 
POsition' -" .. ' .... - .. 
"largely as a result of his conflict with Hobson. Hobson, because 
he COUld ' 
not accept COle's division of the productive process into two B . 
epa:rate Part . . 
s,-had asserted State Sovereignty over the productive process, 
lfhereaa C ' 
ole still took the view that in matters of production the Trade 
Unions sho . 
Uld have complete sovereignty. As a result of the conflict Cole 
l'e..exanu. 
ned the role of the State, and concluded that its functions should 
be 8till . 
further limited. The State, be it Parliament, Congress or political 
SOViet (th ,. ' 
e latter being wrongly interpreted by Cole as an idea similar to 
that ot th 
hi ,e Guild) Would deal primarily with" "the whole question of income" 
1t' le v&.rio' . 
us ~ hoc groups such as the National Co-operative Congress and 
the llublic . . . . . . , " 
Utilities and Health Congresses would deal with specialist aspects 
ot oon 
" SUlner protection. (58) . 
~ial Theob[ (59) and Guild Socialism Restated Cole gave theoretical j~st1ti~~tio~'r~~"th~ abolition'~£'St~t~ 's~~~~~i~~ty ~d the transfer of its 
'------56. lbi -----------------------~, P.128. ,. 
57. ,lbiA ~., p.23a/40. 
Ss. lri~roduction to the 4th Edition of 1919. 
59. G D 
• -H. C01e, ( Social Theory, London,' Methuen, 1920). 
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most im- . ~~ortant funotions to the 'joint board' which became the new 
funotional State. That 
some form of authority was necessar,y in any society 
1ra.s admit 
ted by Cole when he wrote, "If by 'State' is meant merely any 
Ultimate b ,11.... ., -
0"'J' there is no more to be said; in this sense everyone who is 
not an An 
archist is an advocate of State sovereignty."(60) What Co1e was 
a.ttacki _ 
ng Was the idea of a consumer's association claiming the right to 
eXercise B 
OVereignty in all aspects of sooial and economic life. Indeed, 
argued Col . 
e, just because the State does exercise wide social and economic 
functions thi ' 
s is no reason to suppose tha.t "its social function is panto-
llraematic 
and universa1."(61) In fact, when Co1e, subjected the supposed 
functions 0'" . 
• the State (coercion and co-ordination) to close examination 
and ana'- i ~s s, he found them to be illegitimately based. Co-ordination does 
not fall . 
Within the province of the State because disputes among associational 
~ups oannot, 
by the laws of natural justice, be decided by another 
a8800iat1 
onal group. Take co-ordination away and the right of coercion 1' .. ' . 
"'-la too 
, and with it the notion of State Sovereignty. Of the economic and 
POlitioal 
actiVities generally attributed to the purview of the State only 
that of Co . . 
nt:rolUng income and prices remains. The attributes previously ~~~t -
o the State &re now transferred by Cole to the joint board, which, t.J.t~ - " 
it is grandiosely described as the "democratic Supreme Court for 
i'unotional '-
S Equity" (62) really me~s that it has become the new consti tutiona.1ly 
o~erei . 
go AuthOr! ty in society. . This has implications for Parliament. The -
" f'Ulotion ' 
. al theory which -lay at the heart of Co1e' s analysis implied that each 
t'UlotiOnal . 
aSSOCiation has its own legislature and .. executive, illustrating ~S"t -
entpt to Create a series of functional democracies within the same sooiety. 
~~--------------~------------------6Q. COle s' .' 
. ,_elf-Government in Industry, p.32. 61, C 
ole S 
, -!?cial Theo;:;y, p.83. 
62. lb' ~, ];>.137. 
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Parliament 
would thus be reduced to a mere administrative role. 
In Qgild Sooialism Restat~ Cole destroyed the State as a viable 
pOlit1 ' " ......... , ....... " . 
Oal Unit in the new society which he envisaged. Throughout his 
"°rks Cl' " . 
o e had regarded the State as "the political machiner,y of government 
in . 
a. COD'llllllnity-." (63) For him there was no distinction between the State 
and th' . 
$ gOvernment that one finds in Robson. Its functions should be to 
" ftJCpress co . DUnon pu:r:poses and undertake oommon action on behalf of cOInmUnl.ties." 
In p:racti . 
Oe the State had. inevita.bly become the coercive tool of the ruling . 
~~S_"~ , , 
e Social class which dominates the economic life of SOCiety." 
. :But the ~ 
ar had, in Cole's opinion, created the necessary conditions for 
the cont . . ", , . 
rontation of guild-inspired working-class organisations such as the 
Trade U ni '" . .". 
r ona and the forces of Capitalism (The State and the employers). 
COle was' " ,.,'. 
occ ' 
Seeking to justify the struggle which he considered was bound to 
ur. Thus he attributed to the State none of those coercive functions 
it had cl . 
aimed and, f~hermore, developed a theor,y of function, derived f . -~ ( .". 
ot right 
eazu., 64) which purported to' give an understanding of the true nature 
S in SOCiety, but which, in fact, transferred to employees the right 
to Co 
eree the State. 
~e functional theory of demooracy, as Cole understood it, was most 
thoroughl . " , , . 
Y explained in Sooia1 Theory. Briefly, the theory ran as follows. 
The community (a complex'~r'i~di~d~~ associations, institutions and customs 
in a "a.t'ied ' , . , , 
and multiform relationship) is the widest sphere of social unity. 
Within the'" , . 
" . organism some funotions are organised while others are not. The 
Pe.ramaunt 
PrinCiple, underlying all social organisatio~ is that of funotion. 
"---~------~----------------------
Cole S If R ' _8 -Government in Industry, 
-!istated p 22 R d -, • • . (ia ~ Mateazu, Authorit Libert 
n on: AlIen & Unwin,1916 • 
p.110. Cf. Co1e, Guild Socialism 
"Demoorac 
· Y must be conceived in the first place as a co-ordinated system 
of funot! a.l 
on representation. "(65) According to Co1e, associations are 
"bOdies 0 t 
· rea ed by the will of individuals for the expression and fulfilment 
of Purpos' 
es which they have in common. "(66) "Every such purpose or groups 
of Purpo . 
· ses is the basis of the function of the association which has been 
Called into eXistence for its fuii1~~~t."(67) The touchstone of va1ueab1e 
aSSoOiati . 
ve activity is its relationship to the coherence ot society as a 
lIbole• ' 
As Co1e wrote, "the value and full development ot Society depends •••• 
on the lVid ' 
e prevalence and diftusion of association in the Commonwea1th ••• ~. 
(and) the' ' 
, successful co-operation and coherence of the various associations."(68) 
l!eca.use f , 
unction is "the principle underlying the unity and coherence of 
&sSOCiati"( , ' ,~ ons 69) and the key to personal, social and communal well-being, it 
1'Ollo"s th -' , 
at rights are derived from function Dot from the Stat" All 
&sSOCiati 
ons are equal.; all share the same characteristics. No association 
°an re 
present another function. 
Olllniscient 
, omnipresent sovereign State,"(70) with its equally pretentious 
'Thus, "the omnicompetent, omnivorous, 
Pa'rl1 
EUnent is a living lie. 
"The State, however important, is and can be. 
···.no mo 
re than the greatest and most permanent association or institution 
11\ SOCiety , , 
and ita claim even to any such position will have to be carefully 
OonSidered'''(71) An examination which in the event proved fatal to the State. 
One otthe major faults of the State is its detective representative 
sYstem. 
l!ecause function is the essence of representation "all trade and 
detnooratic ' ' ; " 
1'epresentation (must be) ••••• functional representation. "(72)' It 
'-----~---~------~~'-' ~--~~----------65. 
66. 
67. 
68. 
69. 
70 •. 
71. 
72. 
COle S 
, -2ci&1 Theo!1' p.108. "~., P.47.,· , 
Ibid " ' ~., P·49. ltalics in the Original. ~·'·'P.50. 
~. 
~, P.11. 
~.t P.81. 
'Cole C i 
" , ...;,U ld SOCialism Restated, p.33. 
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is impossible to substitute the will of one man for that of another, as 
this lead 
s to misrepresentation. This, Co1e held, was espeoia1ly true 
in the Oa 
se or Parliamentary representation. In attempting the impossible 
task or rep t ., 
resen ing the individual in every aspeot of his life M.P.'s 
ended up 
representing him not at all but obeying the party line. 
Represent t 
a ion must be funotiona1 and limited for men oon'sent to be members 
ot iUnoti 
anal assooiations in pursuit of specifio Qbjeots and oan only be 
represent d 
e SPecifioally not generally. It is impossible to represent the 
cOlllnrunal b d 
,ay in any form or organisation, a fact whioh results in the idea 
ot there b i 
e ng one sovereign body going out of the window. Moreover, because 
the 001 d 
Y emooratio form of representation is funotional representation it 
fOllows tha, , 
. r t the individual must have as many votes as he has points of view 
a.nd there 
must be as many separately e1eoted representative bodies as there 
are 1'uno t i 
ons to be represented. FUnotional sovereignty lies with the 
assOOiati 
ona, oommuna1 sovereignty with the inter-p1ar of assooiative 
actiVities 
Oonduoted by rational men. 
Thus Cole's final version of Guild Sooiety is one in whioh the State 
can no 10 -
nger adequately represent the tu11 oonsumer interests. Consumers 
cannot be . 
represented by what:, is now oal1ed "A po1itioal body," this task 
lies "1 th _. . 
the Co-operatives 0011eotive Utility Councils and other'"speoifio 
funotionaJ. ~ ho~ bodies." . The produotive side ofsooiety would be embodied b'IP th '., 
01 e Ind . . '. 
llstrial Guilds Congress _ "the final representative body of the 
GUild SYst 
em on its industrial side, •••• "(73) The new "state", i.e., the ~n~ .' 
authOrity in sooiety is the 'joint oongress', renamed the "Commune" 
and c _ o~osed t" " hi h 
. equally of produoers and oonsumers. Co1e s oommune w: 0 
"o1.1.l.d '.. . -, be Or . . . 
. ganised on looal" regional and national levels with each level 
"'---
------------------------------------73. Ib 
.' ~, P.70. 
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elected b t 
Y he one immediately below it, "would be mainly a source of 
tn~d ' 
amental decisions on policy, demarcation between functional 
bOdies d ' 
,an similar issues and of final adjudications on appeals in cases 
ot disput "( , .: 
e..... 74) In fact the five duties accorded the commune (problems 
ot tinance " , 
, , questions of funotional demarcations and policy, coeroions and 
other qu ti) , ; , 
es ons confer upon it many of the actual duties of Parliament and 
in the 8 h 
, p ere of legislation so much so that Cole actually designates it 
"the COnsti t ' , , , 
. uent Assembly and the constitutional legislature of Guild 
democracy. "( 75) 
All Cole had done in fact was restructure and redefine 
the Stat ' 
, e, its instituttons and its electoral arrangements. One other 
Point that . ' 
emerged from Cole's final position on Guild Sooialism was the 
cOlllIlli tment ',' ': , 
r '. to employ revolutionary methods. The inadequacy of political 
8.Ction was' , 
11 ,a GUild SOCialist dogma, Cole merely gave more reasons for it. 
e argued that 
even if a c1ass-consoious working-class could create a majority 
in Parli " 
, , ament it 'Would take a century before the necessary changes could be 
Dlade 1n soci~."' . ' , 
, e "J. The complete change which we desire," he wrote in Guild 
Socia1! . ' , ' ,.' '," ... " ~, "could not be carried through wholly by constitutional 
lIIeans, i~d~""'" ' ~stria1 or political, even if the governing classes were to allow th -. - ' 
e devel ."' .. " . - ' , , .' '" , 
, 0prnents which undermined their power to proceed to the end without 
resisti ' 
ng them by force; but at the best the unconstitutional "revolution" 
III1ght be r ", . 
, educed toa mere olearing away of what had. already become useless 
debris of , 
, a decayed system ••••• "(76) The irony of this statement is the fact 
that h . ' ", , 
" aVing oommitted himself to the revolutiona.ry path Co1e was to find that 
the Guild S ' , ",' , ,,', . 
" oCialist movement was effectively destroyed by the activities of th ' , 
e MoscOW"'i ' ~, ~spired revolutionaries. 
74. 
75. 
76. ' 
'--' " ' 
-'~.~ 
~., P.136. 
~., P.149. ; 
~., PP.1S7/S, Ita.lics Mine. Cr. The Guildsman, (September,1919)where 'o~ e wrote tha.t Guild SOCialists "welcome Direct Action and the growth ' 
'the the SOCial power of Trade Unionism as steps towards economic ar:d 
" refore also towards political, democracy." ." , ' . 
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The Ln 
-........: pact of Guild Socialism: 
The impact of guild socialism was derived primarily fran the inf'luence 
of its le d 
a ers, particularly G.D.H. Cole. It was he who led the assaults 
on the Fabian Society and induced the I.L.P. to look towards Guild Socialism. 
COUPled w' th ' ~ this was the work he put into Union affairs through his position 
as unpaid . 
research adviser to the Amalgamated Society of Engineers. Taking .. 
into accOUnt 
Cole's many books and pamphlets, issued individually or through 
the Na tional ' 
. GU~lds League, it becomes quite clear why he became identified 
as "the 
personification of the Guild idea." (77) 
Being 
a movement ccmprised, in the main, of intellectual and middle-
Class ind' . ~v~dUals (78) it was perhaps natural that the first Guild Socialist 
attempt t ' 
o f~d an outlet for their views should have centred upon the Fabian 
SOCiety A 
• ttracted by the Fabian Research Departnent which had been set up 
in 1912 th ~~.~~ 
, e ~~d SOCialists soon captured control of the department and used 
it as ab. 
ase Upon which they could organise opposition to the Fabian estab-
lishnent 
• Cole was elected to the Executive of the Society in April 1914, 
ana carri a 
e on a running battle to convert the Society to Guild Socialism, 
in the Resea h 
re Canmittee on Associations of Wage-Earners, and on the 
EJeeouti'V'e 
, until the final rejection of all his ideas at the annual meeting 
in 1915 
J after Which Cole resigned to join the newly fonned National Guilds 
League. (79) 
Oole mad l' 
e ~ttle reference to the Fabian society in his discussions of 
the Pro 
. pagation of the GUild idea. One point, however,: is very clear, the 
National G 
n Uilds League as an organisation had its· origins at Storrington in 
eCettlber 19' I 
~·and a subsequent meeting at Oxford early in 1915.(80) It is 
77---, 
• See Fo MaQnil~tnote 3, above. Cf. M. Cole, The Life of G.D.H. Co1e, (London: 
78. M·· an St. Martins Press, 1971), pp. 76/7 
, • Cole G i Ot. Cl ' _u Id SOCialism and the Labour Research Depa.rtment, p.26l 
., ay ton non ' t ' (9. Th ' ..:::..t::-.C~ ., pp. 151/2 • 
. ere are od ~ go accounts of the various rebellions in Y. Cole' s ~ 
and thot the Fabian Socialism (London: Heinemann, 1961) ,. Ch.XIll, 
80.'1' .e Same author's The Life of G.D.R.Chle, Ch.Vi. 
he Stor ' 
. r~ton docunent is published in Briggs and Savil1e,Qp.cit., Ch.12. 
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diffioUlt not to draw the conclusion that Cole realised that the coming 
battle i 
n the Fabian Society was as good as lost and was taking the 
apPropriat 
e steps to provide a? alternative platform for Guild Socialist 
Propaganda. At Easter 1915 the National Guilds League was formally 
inaugera t d .... -
e ~~ving among its objects "the abolition of the wage system, 
and the et.... ' 
s avlishment by the workers of self-government in industry through 
a demoorat! 
o system of National Guilds working in conjunction with a 
demOCratised State." 
Th . ' 
e whOle direction and tenor of the National Guilds League was 
ProPagand 
a, through lectures, meetings and publications. The latter ranged 
frOm a'Opea1 ~ s to both Trade Unions and Public on the guild idea to elaborate 
BCheme~ fo .. • 
- r Post OffJ.ce, MJ.ning, Railway and Education Gtulds. From 1911 a 
r&ettl' " 
ar journal Was published monthly under the title of "The Guildsman," 
later oh ' , " , ' , , ' , '" . " 
SJ'lged to The Guild Sooialist. However, the pure propaganda. of the 
te8€ue -- - " , , 
Was balanced to Some extent by ~he activities of the Fabian Research 
Department hi 
W ch produced, in the main, objective and factual information for 
use by T ' 
rade Unions in wage claims. Moreover, the columns of the New A~e, 
lfhioh still _ .... _ , 
gave SUpport to the Guild idea were constantly filled with the 
"ar1oUs deb 
ates OVer Guild theory. Thus it was possible for interested 
Parties to ' 
gain more than cursory knowledge of what the League stood for. 
The main Object of the League's propaganda was the Trade Union Movement ~" ' 
, ,'.' S impact was more a.pparent than real., Important members of the ~ad.e U' . 
nion Movement such as Frank Hodges of 'the Miners' Federation belonged 
to the ~ov" " , 
ement and attempted to convert their own organisations into Guild 
SOCialist ' 
organisa.tions. At the 1918 Miners' Conference Hodges 'SUccessfully' ~o"ed a r _ 
, esolution Calling for the redrafting of the Mines Nationa.lisation 
:Sill alo ,'" -, , , " ." 
ng Guild lines. Similar success was achieved in the Railway Unions, 
the ~ 
,ational Union of Teach~rs and the Construotion Unions." The Union of 
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Post Of tic W 
e orkers fully committed itself to the Guild Idea and actually 
made propo 1 
sa s along those lines to the Post Office which refused as a 
matte1' of Go 
ve1'nment policy. Two further successes were achieved in 1918 
"hen the T U 
• .C. passed a resolution in favour of the Guild Idea and in 
1920 when th 
e Building Guilds were formed.(81) 
However th 
, ere were ma.ny Trade Unionists, leaders as well as rank-and-
file, who had. 1 
ittle knowledge of the League or of Guild Socialism.(82) 
litoreove1' wh 
, en it came to oonorete proposals in the oase of the miners and 
the 1'ailw 
aymen the final produot oou1d hardly be described as Guild Sooia1ism. 
As E. Eldo 
n :Ba.rry pOinted out, ". though Cole saw this (the proposals for 
ve:t'tica1 j 
Oint-oontro1 throughout the industry) as the first step towaXds 
a 'Mining Gild' 
- u, and Frank Hodges, the Miners' seoretary was then a Guild 
SOCialist " _ 
, ' it is ,doubtful whether the miners really expeoted anything more 
than an enu 1 ~ a share in management with the State."(S3) Indeed, the Miners' 
lead. 
, e1's ass d 
U:t'e L10yd George that their intention was not to encroach further 
upon th ' 
e management of the mines. The Railw~ Nationalisation Bill also 
emphaSised j , 
oint oontrol rather than fully-fledged Guild Socia1ism.(S4) 
Seve1'al '.'
writers have Commented on the fact that the Guild Sooialist 
relationshi 
p With the Trade Unions was ended by the impact and influenoe of ~~ , . ' 
ssian ReVolution in October 1917 and its British brainohi1d, the 
C,p " b 
'\'?,.o. (SS) 
This seems to indioate that the actual inf1uenoe of the Guild 
"------
81, ----------------------See f 
Tb 'G Or eXample, the triumphant theme in "Notes of the Month" in 
82. --!.. uildsmal},z (February,1920). -,,',' - . 
M. COle, ..guild Socia.lism and the Labour Research De.I!arlme~, pp.275/6. 83. 
,(i!' Ba.t'ry, Nationa.1isation in :British Po1iticsi The Historical Background 
ndon: Jonathan Cape)1965',P.213. , ' 84. 
*c.oti,. The details of the proposed Miners' Nationalisation Bill De Le~:dUOed in F. Hodges, The Nation!\lisa.tion of the Mines (London: ' 
ard Parsons, 1920),Appendix II. 
85.. See f ( 
(;1" or e~le, M. Co1e, Growing Up into Revolution London: Longmans '~)1949),pp. 95/101. Pribicevic, Oo.cit. p.149; M. Colej The Life ' ~D.R. Co1e,Ch.x; K. Coatee and A. Topham (eds~) Industrial DemocracI 
itA C l:'eat Britain (London: Ma.cGibbon & Kee, 1965), Ch.4. a.nd W. Mellor, >---404. rttiqu. of Guild Socialism" L~ho",· Monthl;r. (November. 192'0. vp.397/ 
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SOOia.11 t 
III S wa.s derived from their ability to fill the ideological gap 
left b" th ~ e pre-war demise of the Syndioalist movement, and their capacity, 
th~()ueh th 
e work of the Fabian Research Department)to provide material whioh 
the Unto . 
ns oOuld use in the defenoe of their members' interests. The 
eme~gence of the Bolsheviks as the heroes of the extreme Left and the post-
war, Post-boom"offensive of the Employers and the Government, whioh put the 
TradeUi 
n on Movement on the defensive, destroyed the funotions whioh the 
GUild So i 
C aJ.ist movemen.t was attempting to disoharge. 
The fact is that the Guild Socialist sucoess was, to a large degree, 
to~tuitous 
• The ground for propa..~ating their ideas had been prepared, 
espeoiall i 
. y n the Railway and Mining Industries, by the Syndicalists. 
'l'his was rei ". 
'. r n.orced by the general raising of the status of Trade Unions as 
Part 01' th . 
e governmental machine during the war. "It wa.w these two funda.-
lIlental tact ' 
ora, the shift towards industrial action and the wartime 
e"Perienoe' h . 
, W ioh prepared the ground for the assertion of the idea of 
~O~kerst Co . 
ntrol. Without these basic conditions ••••• Guild Sooialism would 
lIlost pr~b b . 
a ly have remained(a) a small group of militant propagandists without 
~ch imp t' 
ao on the ,trade union movement as a whole. "(e6) As it wa.s, Guild 
SOOialism w . , 
as able to achieve some measure of influence because of the 
1ntelleotu. - . 
al fashion for workers' oontrol, and the impact of governmental 
POlioy in i' . . 
ndustry which oonstrained many Unions to. turn to the Fabian 
Research 
Department for information. 
Neverth 1 ' 
e ess, the kind of relationship which the Guild Socialists had ~th the '1' 
rade Union Movement should be kept in p~rspective. Pribicevio 
. POintedl . 
y rem,arked that "the primft~ if not the only, ooncern of most 
'Iln '-01 , . 
ions, inclu.di aft i t t 
.. " ~ the A.S.E., was the protection of their cr n eras s 
~~'----~------~~----~----------86, ~ice~',2P'Cit.'P.163. 
~ .......•..... ,.,. - l:"."· , . 
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whioh Wer th 
e reatened by dilution."(87) He continued, "there is no 
eVidence th t ( I. 
a any of the major unions supporting this demand for workers' 
Control) _ 
saw in it a step towards full industrial democracy as interpreted 
by their il -
. gu d iocialist advisers."(88) Moreover, the Shop-Stewards 
Movement . 
, with which the Guild Socialists had links in Sheffield and 
GlasgoW th 
, e latter through the work of John Paton, were favourable to 
GUild SOCial. . 
ism Only insofar as it provided an acceptable ideological 
~~f . 
. or their own Claims. The advent of the Russian Revolution 
provided 
a more forceful framework with the result that "as the influence 
01' the Ru 
.. ssian ReVOlution (grew) that of Guild Socialism declined." (89) 
The tuncti . 
ona of the Guild Socialists had been usurped by Bolshevism. 
01' eour 
r se, the most imnortant aspect of the relationship between the 
G -Uild Sociali . 
sta and the Trade Unions was the establishment of the Building 
GUilds in 19 
20. This was the outcome of two distinct developments that 
had taken 1 
. P ace within the building industry. . The first was the idea of 
a BUilder' P 
a arliament, a Whitley Council type of affair, on which both 
etnploYers -
and employees were represented and which was largely the brain-
ohild 01' 
Maleolm Sparkes.(90) His idea was to create unity of purpose 
1'(ithi 
n the industry so that all sections, masters as well as men, could 
. benefit. 
The second, Was the creation of the famous Building Guilds under 
the 
guidance Of S.G. Hobson. (91) . This co-operative kind of adventure was 
~---------------------------------------a7. !hi 
aa. 
~., P·49. 
Loc•Oit ~.
~., ~.149. 
90. S ee Ra: . 
Pubii ymond Postgate,The Builders' History (London: The Labour 
Con shing Co., 1923), pp.440 fr., and Mrs. E. Sparkes, 'Malcolm Sparkes _ 
pa; :truc(tive Pacifist' !'Ma.nuscript in the Malcolm Sparkes collection of 
thP re University of Hull). F. Matthews makes out an 1nteres~ing, 
, :Bu.~h not entirely oonvincing case for overlapping motives in The 
_._. ing Guilds~ in Briggs and Saville, op.cit., pp.284/331. . 
91. l4a.tt . .. . .. (l4arc~ewe, ~'Cit., passim., and the acoount in The New Commonwea.lth, 
,1920 Cr. S.G. Hobson's version in Pilf)rlm to the-Left:) .Ch.20/21. 
~ 
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POSSible b 
. ecause of the chronic shortage of houses. Master Builders, 
however d 
, espite generous subsidies offered under the Housing Act of 1919, 
found that . 
profits were to be found in greater quantities in other 
Oonstruotion wOrk. With the aid of short-term credit from the Co-operative 
organisati . 
ons and the acquiesoence of the Government the Guilds began 
opera.tion i . . 
n several local authority areas to fill the gap.(92) Although 
not run 0 
n entirely demooratio lines, the Guilds produced better quality 
hOUses at . 
cheaper costs and outwardly went from strength to strength with 
the f 
ormation in 1921 of the National Building Guild.(93) Similar small-
sca.le i 
gu ldswere fomed in the engineering, clothing, furniture and 
Printing i d 
n ustries. Unlike Sparkes, Hobson regarded the guilds as the 
first at 
.' r ep in wresting control from the employers. Unfortunately, the 
emplOyers t . 
. ook him seriously and ~p1ied their greatest possible pressure 
on a Gover . 
nment already wei1ding the I Geddes Axe'. The withdrawal of local 
authori ty "'-
SUpport under Government pressure and the end of the post-war boom 
tOok th 
e VirtUal strength awa:y from the Unions by ending the conditions of fUll . 
employment. Their finanoial position was precarious. As Cole 
remarked " 
, as they ~ade no profits, they oou1d stand no losses (and) the Trade 
'Unions h ' 
, owever, sympathetic, could not afford to finance them adequately ••• "(94) 
The tail 
G ure ot the Building Guilds, . coupled with the collapse of the National 
Uild Le&€u. 
e, Was the end of the Guild MOvement.(95) 
However, if Guild Socialism was dead by 1922 it refused to lie down~ 
and, indeed, 
registered its greatest political victory at the l.L.P. annual 
~ 
------------~~-------------------92. 
, ~i, B:~~~, "Guild Socialism: A Two Years' Test" American Economic Review, 
• • ('June,1922), pp. 209/37.. .......... '" '" ....... . 
93. ~~~~H.(Cole, !.Short History of the British Working Class Movement, 1789-~ London: George AlIen & Unw1n,1952),P.40b• 94. Ib 
, '~'t P.407. 
95. ~s it' . 
th wr ing before the collapse of the Building Guilds, also stressed 
. e intportance of their oontinuence to the Guild Socialist movement. • 
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Conterenc 
e of that year. 
the t • 
(96) Yet it was to prove a pyrrhic victory for 
Young men' 
who were attempting to continue to use the I.LJP., 
traditionally 
a Source of emotional power within the Labour Uovement, were 
in. tact 
gradually alienating it frOll the bulk of its effeotive political 
1eadershi 
p. Cole had noted in 1920 that the I.L.P. was redefining its 
Objects " 
so as to bring them into confonnity with Guild ideas." (97) in 
practice th . 
e. :unpact of the I.L.P. on the Guild .t:lovement was to rehabilitate 
POlitical meth d 
o s, a rehabilitation encouraged by the obvious unpopularity 
of the 
government, the failure of the Building Guilds and the wider 
d(;V'elollnen ts 
in the relationship between the I.L.P. 8.11<1. the Th:Lrd International. 
'The reaso 
ns why Guild Socialist ideas found a heme in the I.L.P. are 
not dif.(l' 
J.l.cUl t t f . 
!.t . r 0 llld. As theprincipaJ. group which opposed the war the 
.1>. Conta' ~ed ma~ Conscientious Objectors who att~ibuted their brutal 
trea'bnent to 
the mechanis.rn. of a centr8~ised State. These people, of whan. 
C1itt'ord All 
en, Fenner BrockwaY.and Bertrand Russell are the best known, 
were well . 
c1J.sposed 
to pluralistic doctrilles. (98) lforeover, the internal .. di\Ti"'i 
" ons or th 
l:n e post-war I.L.P.between the Parliamentary, Second 
terna tional . 
group consisting of the old-stYle leaders such as MacDonald and _ 
SnOwden a 
nd the pro-Bolshevik Third International grOU'lJ, which, looked 
'IIith ' '" faV'our 
. Upon direct 8.ction in politics D.lso created a fertile market for 'd 
J. eas whi 
ch Could claim an English revolutionary pedigree. (99) 
Par tbr 
ee years G.D.H. Cole utilised ti1e immense opportunities afforded 
~
96. '.:a E ------------------------
(t' • Dowse Left· 1.... C T encent Labour Part 18 ~-l 40 ondon. L' ~ tI"e entre: he Inde 1921"'22~ G o~gnccll3, 1906 J p.68. See also "The Progress of Guild Idea 
1'1. ~l.ld Socialist (llarch,1922). ;;7. ,.. 
I.1-.D.lI. . 
9 Oolel Qhaos and Orc1er in Industry (London: Hethuen, 1920), p.54. 8 •. " 
oIJowse 
I ~., p.67. See· Note 1. 99. 1) 
OiVse, Left . 
--=- l.n the Centre, p.65. 
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him in the organs of the I.L.P. press to propagate the Guild idea. His 
BUooess "as evident in the Report et the I.L.P. canmission on party 
polioy and the subsequent Constitution in which it accepted the need for 
the Labour MOVEment. to use its industrial as well as its political 
power. (100) The emphasis was on the former; "The Parliamentary Party 
oan do good service, but the core of the fighting will be in the workshops. "(101) 
.. Yet th . 
e Guild Socialists failed to win over any of the major political 
figures in the I.L.P.(102) Conseq~entlY, this severelY limited its aotual 
1!npact, to the extent that political, Guild Socialism had no permanent 
affeot 
on the Labour Party of the 1920' s. In the final analYsis it was 
the Coll 
eotivism of Snowden and MacDonald, however diluted, that proved 
to be th ' 
e m&1nst~ of Labour policy. 
·r 
The ~portanoe of individual leaders such as MacDonald and Snowden in 
OPPOSing Guild Sooialism should be borne in mind. Their absence fran the 
Parliam.entary Labour Party, though it restricted, did not destroy their 
:i.ntl.uence• Indeed, MacDonald' s stature in the party, a produot to a large 
c3egree t hi 
o s anti-war stand, was increased by the soandalous taotios of 
lioratio 13 
ottanley which led to MacDonald' s defeat at East Woolwich in 1921. 
MaouOnald 1 . , 
s aotivity in the poat-war period was not hampered by hisabsenoe 
frcrn th 'tr 
e UOUse of Ccmmons.(103) In the Labour Party of the 1920's it was 
the p 1 
ar i8lllentarianism of the pre-war period that was the daninant polioy, 
a POlicy L_ . ~~rdly affected by MacDonald's flirtation with direot aotion. 
------
------------------------------------100. !b'd 
1 ., p.68. .See also Appendix I. pp. 209/11 •.. 
101. .!!le Guil· d ..... an . 
. ------..;:=QUl=.:,'. (December, 1918). 
See N~te 2 •. 
:. ~, .QI?oit. pass~. 14acDonald, like Snowden, had written a 
ook in the pre-war period hostile to Syndicalism. J .R. MaoDonald, 
.§.tndicalism: A Critioal Examination (London: Constable, 1912). 
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The basic ideasof the Guild Socialists were simply restricted to 
their 
success in a rapidly declining I.L.P. As a creative influence 
GUild So i I 
c a ism was hardly more than a pre-occupation with the passing 
intellect . 
, ual fad of pluralism. Wha.t Guild Socia.lism illustrates is the 
fluid! t '#' 
, Y, o.\, the situation which faced the Left-Wing of the Labour Party 
in th 
. e post-war period. Easi6ally the choice was one of the political 
action t~ollgh the P.L.P. looking to the policy of 'the inevita.bility of 
gradualn , 
ess . with which to finish the job of elimina.ting a ca.pitalist 
system on it 
, " s last legs, or of bringing forward. the advent of the 
ineVit hI ' . 
a , e by revolutionary and extra-constitutional means. This choice 
diVided th 
e Labour party at all levels but, was particularly acute in 
SUch mov t 
r amens as Guild Socialism which attracted a goodly number of 
indiViduals Who were to form the nucleus of the Eritish Communist Party.(104) 
I . 
n fact, • the Nationa.l Guilds League was one of the most-broadly based 
:mo . vem~nts of the Left, covering the ground from Christia.n Socialism to C ' o~ism. , The Eolshevik Revolutio~ of October 1917 merely polarised the 
various t . 
'. S reams, of thought into two major groups. One identifying the 
GUild ide . 
. a With the Russian Workers' and Soldiers' Councils, emphasised the 
need to ' , 
overthrow capitalism first ~d then provide the Guild 'blueprint 
fOr the r '., . R kitt 
e-organisation of society'. The other, led by Maurice ec , 
"as op 0 ' 
p sed to violence and to foreign ideas such as EolShevism.(105) 
"Th 
, e rift" as Margaret Cole observed, "grew into a chasm. ~(106) The two 
----,,', ----------.;.-----------:---104. 
As Cole wrote, HA Communist Party has been formed in G~eat Eritain 
and a. Considerable number of members of the National Guilds League 
have jOined it. In this there is nothing surprising."' "The 
Communist Party and the N.G.L." The Guildsman (September,1920). See ~so The World of Lah~1r, op.cit., 1'.422, and Guild Socia.lism ~atateA,. ,.Ch.B • .... _ ..... of .. ~ • » .• ~ ~ ~ .... ~ ~ • ,. .... 
,See Note 4. 
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sides met head-on at the National Guilds League Annual Conference in 1920, 
when rasol ti 
u ons welcoming the Soviet fom of government and condemning 
Parltam t ' 
en ar,y government as an instrument of capitalist domination were 
passed.' A"'" ~Urther resolution, proposed by Cole, calling for "the dictator-
ship of th 
e proletariat" was not accepted but the proposition itself 
indicat d" ' 
a the mood in the Leao~e.(107) 
Thi' '" 
S Was confinned by a special conferenoe in Deoember of the same year. 
The Confe" . 
rence heard and approved, by a narrow majority, 70 votes to 62, the 
POlicy Pam hl' ' , 
P et prepared by Cole, who had been chosen for the task by the 
Ekecutive d ' 
, eclaring that the 1920 Conference decisions had, "definitely 
Placed GUil ' 
dsmen in the revolutionary ranks and made definite their breach 
With refo i ' , 
" r rrn st ideas and the state machine of capitalism." A' Programme ot 
Action' whi ' ' . 
ch wa.S also approved, provoked the resigna.tion of six Rieht-Wing 
lIlell'lber 
s ot the Executive.(10S) It was the beginning of the end for the 
If.G.t. 
LOcal guild 'groups, aliena.ted by what wa.s, in effect, a Communist 
t .. ,· ' , 
""'\eover' , , 
... a deliberate attempt to use the N.G.L. to further the revolutionary 
cause...' '" 
n thdrew their financial support and the League had to go onto a 
~~ '., ' 
ar,y basis~(109) Others adhered to the Douglas Credit scheme as the 
anSWer to 
the obvious failure of the League. 
Th " 
en at the end of 1921 the Communist party cbanged its attitude towards 
the Guild ' , 
, , SOCialist movement.' In November of that year, after Communist 
'-----------------~~--~-----------------------107. 
108 
• 
S;e "Notes of 'the Month", The Gui1dsma~,' (April, 1920) and the report ~ "The Annual Conference of .1920~·~The ,Guildsman, {June,192CJ. bf'~"Notes of the Month", (February, .1920}, ."It.seems to us to be the 
OUnden duty ot every Guildsman to support "the Socialist revolution 
" :ea.tns1; capitalism, in this country or any other, however much as he' 
a:y dislike, or even disapprove; of, the methods which it employs .• " 
~The Special Conference ot 1920", The Guildsman, ~anua.ry ,1921~ 
~. COle, !he Life of G.D.H. Cole, p.124. '~R~~ignations (of the Right-
w
tng 
at first).began.in.1921 r .before the year was out subscriptions 
• ere falling away and the offioe was given up; the League itself oame 
,io an end in 1923, and the Guild So~ialist ceased publioation. At 
, east the losses were quiokly cut." , . ., . 
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Dlembers had 
proposed the winding up of the League, William MelIor, by now 
a Prolllin t 
en member of the C.P.G.B., criticised the failure of Guild SOCialists 
to explain how they were going to effect the revolution.(110) In 1922 all 
the link .. 
s between the Communists and National Guilds League were severed. 
AI L J u--F . 
• • .~ arlane has pointed out, by this time the C.P.G.B.ts expectations 
ot ridi . . 
. ne into power on a revolutionary wa.ve had faded and it could no longer 
a.t't'olZd, to dissipate its small membership in extra-party activities. (111) The 
N.G.L w . 
. .' as one of severa.l movements to suffer from this change of tactics. 
It is perhaps unfair to Criticise the N.G.L. as an unwitting tool in 
the hand . . 
s of the Communists and too easy to highlight the obvious lack of 
POlitioal j 
. udgement which characterised the movement.(112) In the heady 
attnosPher 
r e of the post-war world when social conditions at home and-the BOlshe~'_ . 
Y.&4 threat· abroad seemed to indicate the imminent collapse of Capitalism, 
an attaohm . 
ent to the allegedly rational tenets of Marxist philosophy was under-
etandabl . 
e. In many respects the inadequacy of Guild theory, based as it was 
on 1.lnsub t . 
s antiated assumptions and reflecting the atmosphere of the time, is 
SYmPtOmatiC of the complete failure of the Guildsmen to understand the 
POlitical . 
realities of the world around them still less to predict its futQre 
development. 
COle himself admitted this in 1929 when he wrote, WWe have built ~ .. ~~ - . 
on the assumption that. all the irksomeness of ••••• work arises from 
detects . 
of SOcial organisation, and that in a world rightly organised each 
llla.o. "'ill •. .. . 
. find pleasure and some measure of self-realisation in the work which 
he dOes . . 
on the common behalf. What is more _ we have sometimes felt rather 
'---------------------------------~---------110. 
111 
• 
See Footnote 85. 
UScFarlane, !he British Communist Party, pp.36/7 • 
See Note 5.' 
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proud of ourselves P t· thi h d tl: t 'd al ~or asser ~g s, on t e groun ~ our ~ e was 
a higher ideal of pleasure in service than our critics could appreciate. 
Tha ' 
t has been our particular form of cant, and it had for a time a great 
appeal. But the modern world has seen through it. It (113) 
There were two reasons for this. One was the rehabilitation of 
the pol·t. ~ J.cal as opposed to the economic method as the primary means of 
, 
effectin 
g the transition to Socialism. The second was derived fran the 
fact that G . 
uJ.ld Socialism was part of intellectual fashion of pluralisn 
whi ' 
ch reflected a revolt against the "idealistic" theory of the state. (114) 
The essence ' 
of this revolt was the preservation of individual freedom in the 
face of the 
grOwing centralisation of the state. (115) One characteristic 
of this revolt and its Guild Socialist imitations was its devolutionary 
tendenci 
res. G.R. Stirling Taylor's three main principles for example were 
thOse ' 
of functional representation, self-managenent and decentralisation. (116) 
Cole to 
, 0 faVoured devolution on a regional and administrative level as well 
as by function. (117) 
Significantly, the orthodox rep~ to the Guildsmen was frequent~ 
conceived . 
, ,~ terms which appeared to favour devolution. It was general~ 
----113. ----------------------
115. 
116 
• 
G(.n.H• Cole, The Next Ten Years In British Soci~l and Econami~ Polic 
London: Maanillan 1929 p.16. Cf. H.J. Laski 'Political Science 
in( Great Britain a~d b1ran~e" .American Political Science Review 19, 
1925), p·99. "In 1920 gu:ild' sociali::m was the fashionable doctzine 
of the time; its influ~nce is now almost negligible." ' 
See Bernard Zylstra From Pluralism to Collectivism: the develo ent ~f Ifurold Laski' s ~litical tho ht Assen, The Nederlands: Van 
orcun, 1968 , Ch.I to Ill. ' 
H.M. Magid, En lish Political Pluralism: The Problem of Freedom and ~rganisation New York: olumbia University Press, 1941 , pp.5. ff. 
See also F.W. Coker I~luralistic Theories and the Attack upon 
tate Sovereignty" in C.E. Merriam and H.E. Barnes' (Eds.) A History ~Political Theories: Recent Times (New York:'Maanillan, 1924), 
PP. 80/119. . 
G(oRa StirlingT~lor, The Guild State: Its Principles and Possibilities 
London: George AlIen & Unwin, 1920), passim. 
~ee~ for example, his reference to the Jowett proposals in Guild 
.....22J.alism Restated, pp. 148/9. 
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acc,epted that Parliament was inefficient, out of touch with the politic al 
temper of th 
o e nation, and a number of proposals to improve the effectiveness 
Of Parli 0 
ament as a working institution were made. These issues which will 
be eJt9mi d . 
o 0 0 ne shortly, ,did not originate with the election of 1919 neither did 
they Oe 
ase to be imr>ortant with the fall of Lloyd George in 1922. They were 
symPtomatic of the widespread feeling within the La.bour Party that. the 
1nstitut1 0 
ons of Parliamenta.:ry democracy could usefully be improved upon. In 
one senSe this was proof of the underlying fa! th of the Party in the 
1nBtituti 0 0 
on itself - a faith which as has been demonstrated - the main exponents 
ot Guild So. 
oCialiBIll did not share, a fact which accounts to some extent for 
the fail 
o ure of the Guild Socialists to secure lasting intellectual holdson 
the Party. 
r 
The GUild SOCialist theorists had emphasised the two questions of 
l'epl'esent ti 0 • 0 0 
a on and strong government and the essence of the Party's attitude 
to Parli '.
amentar,y reform on the two dominant questions of the 'twenties 
(women's ' 
, SUffrage and proportional representation) is best understood in 
te:t'!ns 'f 
o its commitment to these principles of representation and strong 
gOverrunent "' 4"'. _ 
• AcCOrding to its theories on representation the Party saw Pt\:t'1iame .' 0 0 • ' 
nt as the institution in which political groups in society should 
be p_ 0, 
"'I,IPe1'1 . 0 
y represented in relative proportions to their strength in society 
alii a "hol 
e. It was natural that when faced with an electoral system which 
disotimi 
nated against sma.ll parties the Party should emphasise the imperfect 
natUl:'e Of 0 
, 00 the system and stress the need for reforms designed to alleviate 
ita i ' 
nOidenoe. However, the Party also believed in the principle ot strong 
gO~ernm,ent. t 
PolitiCal power was of little use unless itw~ used. 0 secure ~e~oi.' . 0 ~ist ideal, although the vaoilating and ultra-moderate MaoDonald 
waa h 
Qppy to exouse weak goverPJnent on the grounds that the Party did not 
130 
have the Parliamentary strength or quality to use its opportunities to 
the fUll. In the political situation of the 1920' s this was the inevitable 
reaction t L" 
" 0 abour's proximity to power and the increasing polarity of the 
Parties i '-
, n numbers at least, in the House of Commons, achieved at the 
eJCpense of the L' ib al t ~ ~_4 
er s. To the Labour Party the necessi y o~ ~~rer 
represent ,j"i' 
, a ... on was part of the broader aims of ensurine responsible government. 
In the 11' . 
" ght ot the developing situation the Party's emphasis on strong 
gOvernment ~ " . , 
. , a ... the expense of mathematical perfection was as natural as the 
Liberal t ' ", 
s SUdden emphasis on mathematic perfection at the expense of strong 
gOvernme t" 
n. As will be shown later it would be as easy as it is incorrect 
to diSIniss thi' , 
'. s change of emphasis as mere opportunism, for the change 
refleot d' , 
r e the realisation, rather than the rejection of :oocia1 democratic 
Princi l' . 
p es according to which Liberals and Conservatives were but different 
faces ot th 
e same Capitalist establishment. It was the peculiar olaim of 
the Brit 
ish Labour Party that whilst it oou1d identify the oommon oapitalist 
enetny it 
rejected the notion that the traditional political method:: of 
repreSenting various interest in sooiety was tainted or perverted by its 
SOCial. Co 
ntext. True, Parliament was not as representative or as workmanlike 
as it might have been, but the institution itself was not only an acoeptable, 
it "as th 
-.e mosl acceptable, mode of seouring politioal power. It was in ora ....... . 
er to make that institution more reoeptive to the demands which the Party 
~iQUlat d ' 
e that it pursued its representative prinoiples along the path of 
'U.tt1. Ve l'saJ. 
. '" . surfrage and the abolition of undue influenoes in eleotoral 
deCiSions. 
In short, it was to facilitate the pursuit of strong executive 
eOVel:'tune . . 
nt t~ be exercised in no different manner to that of its "capitalist" 
predecessors. 
In SUch a context the impact of the Coalition Parliament was almost 
bOUnd to 
" , strengthen anti-Parliamentary movements like Guild Socialism. The 
l)l 
remOVal f 
o the source of that strength, the unrepresentativeness of 
Parliame t . b 
n t y the General Election of 1922, destroyed any intellectual 
credence that GUild Socialism might have had. What emerged were the 
theorie 
S of representation and· strong government that were to play such an 
imports. t '. '. 
n Part in the inter-party conflicts of the nineteen-twenties. To 
ha.ve su. ' , . 
cceeded in their aims the Guild Socialists needed to convince the 
tabOur M . 
ovement of the relevance of their ideas to the real world of 
practiCal 
politics. By adopting an arrogant intellectual approach they 
ta.:l.l . 
ad to secure this end and became victims of their own political naivity. 
They f . 
ailed on the most fundamental issues of parliamentary democracy to 
conVince t ". . 
he Labour Movement that the basic pragmatic philosophy to which 
the Movem' ". , 
. ant was committed was worth sacrifioing for theoretioal nioities. 
:By 192~t ." . . . 
he time for theor.1 had past;the reality of political power held sway. 
, 
" .~ 
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CHAPTER THREE - NOTES 
!l!...GuUd Socialists 
1. 
2. 
3. 
5. 
~ong those influenced by Guild Socialist ideas were Clement (i tlee and Victor Gollancz. (See F. Williams, As It Happened 
ondon: Heinemann, 19.54), p.53. W. Golant "The Early Political 
ThOUght ot C.R. Attlee," Political uarter 40, (1969), 246/55, 
;:d GOllancz's My Dear Timoth.r London: Gollancz, 1952), pp • .3l2/l6. 
810nel Robbins also became attached to the theories ot the Guild 
(LoOOialists tor a short while. Autobiography ot an Econcmist ndon: Maanillan, 1971), Ch. nI. 
The main perscnalities ot the I.L.P. (MaaDonald, Snowden, Jowett 
and Wallhead)were all opposed to Guild Socialism. MacDonald 
;:iting in Parliament and Revolution (Manchester: The National 
p bour Press, 1919), said Nit the people do not understand 
~~li&nent, better government is not secured by splitting up its 
6wmtions." p.59. Snowden wrote that m~ GuSld Socialists gave the 
impression "that they exalted the importance of mere production 
. ,and placed it in a position coequal it not superior to the social 
~ganisation tor the satisfaction ot the individual's ever,y need." 
--:-bour and the New World (London: Cassell, 1921), p.16l. See also ~s article "State Socialism and National Guilds" Socialist Review, 
ol •. XVI, 89, No. 2., (April-June 1919) pp. 116-12.3. 
(~e let.B. Reckitt and C.E. Becheter, The Meaning ot National Guilds 
R ondon: CecU Palmer, 2nd and revised edition, 1920), pp.2l2!30. 
eCkitt and Penty had been arnozlgst the earliest to take a stand 
a.gainst Bolshevism, opposing at the N.G.L. Conference 1917 a 
~esolution we1cadng the Russian Revolution. See M. Cole The Lit! i- G.D.H. Co1e, pp.12l/2. See, too, an article by Reckitt in.!h! 
l4a,UUdsman (November, 1919), and Penty's contraa t of the ideas ot 
G rx and Ruskin in A Guildsman's Interpretation of Histoa, (London: 
eerge Allen & Unwin, 1920), Ch.XX. 
~. Cole , The Lite 'ot G.D.K. Co1e, p.122. "It was the difference, 
the t1nal.l.Y unbridgeable difference between those who when it came 
; the point supported ph.,vsical revolution and the 'cUotatorship ~ the proletariat' and those who repudiated both." Loc.cit. 
et. ~Ud Socialism and the Labour Research Departnent," pp. 279/00, ~le ~selt had attributed failure to the intellectual oomplexity 
c;.Ui1d Theory see The Br! tish Labour Movement, p.8. . 
l4:argaret Cole recalled that the Guild Socialists had Ha kind of ~~iBtine, almost schoolboyish innocence," which she attributed "to 
So e ,long shelter of the late-Victorian age in England," Guild .. 
of-Galism and 'the Labour Research Department, p. 261. See also The Lite ~ .'D.H. Cole, Ch-X. AleDllder Gray has wr1 tten, not unfairly, that 
th ere has probably never been a school ot writers so intolerant of 
soe OPinions of others, so violent and unrestrained in their language, 
oWn extravagantly ocetemptuous ot all and sundry, so assured ot their 
conr:ighteousness as the possessors of a peculiar illumination, so 
The ~dent that unto them had been committed the oracles ot God." 
., .. ---...: OOialist Tradition, p.~.36. 
CRAPI'ER 'FOUR 
SOME PROBLEMS OF PARLIAMENTARY 
REFORM IN THE ''lWENTIES 
134 
Can1 ta.U . ~ srn and Socialism: The dialetics of three Pa.rty politics in the 'Twenties. 
~ ~ '" .. ~ 
............... 
~' .' 
e aftermath of 1919-1922 on the Labour Movement was remarkably 
limited. 
The continued bye-election performances of the Party, the 
tail . :u.~e of direct action on Elack Friday and the return to Parliament of 
the Elelt 
. -OPinionated, self-seeking, pillars of revolutionary oonservatism, 
l.ra.cDona.l.d '" 
., and Snowden,at the election of 1922,helped to rehabilitate the 
Rouae of C " 
, ommons as the only legitimate place where Labour opinion might 
be V'oiced. 
NotWithstanding flirtation with direct action that produced 
the t" . ' ~9€ic nine days of the General Strike it became obvious tha.t Labour's 
~t 'r . " ", " 
lU'e 1111". i ~ n capturing political power and effecting the transition to 
SOciali ' 
am through legislative means. 
T ", 
o all intents and purposes 1919-1922 had been an unpleasant, 
tl'u.st~ati '.", 
. ,ng interlude whioh was best forgotten. What really mattered in 
the ninet " " 
" een-twenties was viotory in the simple oontest betweel1 Capitalism 
and, Sac i .. , 
, ~ism. One aspect of this contest was the polarisation of parties 
tha.t it' , :" . ' . ' 
inV'olved, a polarisation which the Labour party did all in its 
POWel' t ' . -, 
o exaggerate and ha.sten. - It was in this context that it used its 
c°lllpeti t ~ ", '" . ' . 
iV'e principles of representative.) and strong government to advooate 
the 0 "." -
01llPletion of the process of universal suffrage and to resist, in divers 
lIIannel'a ' 
, t the establishment of P.R. as the method of voting suita.ble to a 
detnoc 
racy. In respect of the former principle was supreme; in the oase of 
th ' , . 
• latt ' ' ' '-. ' , , 
. " er expediency was forced upon the Party as a result of the three 
Pe.~ .. . ,,' 
Y System. 
'rh .. " "'''''''''" ,,, . ",-"" 
e Labour Party's commitment to universal suffrage and the elimination 
ot 'Ilndu. ,'" 
,,' e influences need. not detain us for this was the first essential of 
135. 
democratic government in Labour ideology which was pursued by a variety of 
means involving a number of unsatisfactory compromises until the principle 
01' equ.al ... ·-Pfrr:.ne between the 1 h h ~~ ~ sexes was legalised in 928, and w ic 
t'olloiVed .. 
a similarly quasi-devious pattern in the pursuit of the removal of 
other bl-"~ ~shes against the principle of "one person one vote" in an 
e.tmosnhe ~ re free from undue influence. 
The Case of P.R. is entirely different. Notwithstanding the Party's 
8U.PPOsed bias towards P.R. ,this device was never accepted in principle by 
the Part 
Y. It was thought of as an expedient means of securing Labour's 
t'ull and proper representation in the House and, with the exception of the 
I.L P h 
• • w 0 saw P.R. in the context of Jowett's reactionary proposals for 
legis1 t 
,a ive reorganisation, the majority of those in the Party who favoured 
P.R did . . 
• BO because the,y saw it as a means of controlling the kind of 
i:t'reap 
onsible majority secured by Lloyd George in 1918.(1) Their attach-
ment to p 
. .R. w~s, therefore, a measure of their resentment against the 
~repres t '. 
en ative nature of Parliament under the existing system, rather than 
an expr 
aasion of their belief in accurate representative government as a 
. ~ood. thi 
ng .Iter se.. It wa.s understandable that a Party whioh believed its 
°Ppon " ... 
ents to be little more than a bunch of reactionary crooks should wish 
to -
experience more oontrol over them. It was equally a.s na.tural in the 
8itu.ati 
. on which developed tha.t they should seek to eliminate the Liberal 
Party· . ~hose relevance to the immediate struggle of Capitalism and Socialism 
"as 
, at the most, marginal. 
Representative government a.s an end in itself was of little use to the 
. tabou.r p . . 
. arty t· what it demanded was power - the power of strong g~vernment. 
"------------------------------------------------1. ~Obert Williams, for example, argued that Labour had been forced to 
purn to direct action because it was not properly represented in 
a arliament itself •. The New Labour Outlook, Op.oit.p.108. For a 
. imilar argument see .'!Direct . .Action"The Gtlildsm~n, (Septembe~ 191~ 
Thus lTb. tb en.e two uI'.derlyil'lg principles of representa.tive and strol"l,e 
gO"et'rlJllent were seen to clash it was inevitable that ei ven their under-
standi ne of the nature of the Capita.list/Sooia.list stru.eela the Labour 
P~ should be only too willing to utilise the opportunities offered them 
by the Working of the eleotoral system. As one oontemporary political 
OOlDInentat 
or noted, "the fact.that the eleotoral system prevalent in Great 
13titai 
n, simplifies the politioal situation, works towards the extermin.ation 
of the poli tioally senesoent Liberal Party and olears the w~ for its own 
rise t 
o power, is suffioiently legitimate reason for the Labour Party to 
9.Cquie 
sce in its retention."(2) True, George Lansbury blandly acoepted 
that th 
. e fact that the eleotoral system whioh had worked aeainst the Labour 
Part 
Y}n the past now worked in its favour was enough reason to dismiss 
p.lt. tth . ( ) OUgh not the A.V. to whioh the Party lent some degree of support. 3 
It 'if . 
. as also true that some like H.N. Brailsford believed "that Liberalism 
has 11 
"ed its life and (we) wish to see it disa~pea.r but not by these trioks 
Of the b 
allot box."(4) Yet the most fundamental truth is that "the leaders 
Of the . . 
party are sinoerely oonvinoed that from the standpoint of practical 
~ any system that tends'towards giving a olear parli~entarymaj~rity 
'is P~ef . 
erable to one whioh neoessitates the formation of minority parties 
and, b Y a distribution of seats in acoordance with laws of mathematical 
juatio 
e, threatens the permanent infliction of Coalition Government and all 
its t 
a tendant evils. "(5) The Party was nothing if not true to its praematic 
t1'aditi 
. on. 
'----
----------------------------------------------~. Fag so~~.~ertheimer, Portrai.t of the Labo,n' Party 
". 1929),1'.87.. . .... ...... , ....... ,. 
3. ~.C.R. 1926, 1'.273. 
4. ~ . ' .... 
~teader, 
(London: G.P. Putnam's 
7 November~. 1924. 
5.' vi'" ..... 
ertheimer 
·.·co. , Qp,cit., 1'.85/6. Italics Mi.l'le. 
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UnderlYing-all Labour's demands' in the 'twenties was the desire to 
make Parliament a more representative assembly (i.e., an assembly to which 
more Labour Members were elected) and to use it to effect the transition 
to Si-
00 alism: to accord it an active and progressive role in the economic 
struggle in society rather than allow it to be the passive and regressive 
instrument it had been in the past. What changed during the decade was 
not the Party'S beliefs but its tactics, not the Party's demands but the 
Oontext of those demands, not the Party's knowledge but its experience. 
Not th 
e least of these experiences was the working of the Parliamentar,y 
instituti 
on itself and the various proposals made to i.lnprove its 
l'~rrorm.a.nce. 
'~'·.e 
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13. ~e Effect:l.venesR of the Institution: Procedure, Devolution and ~lated matters in the decade of three Party politics. 
The nineteen-twenties wa.s a decade in which many radical solutions 
"ere pr d " 
o uced as means by which the difficulties experienced by Pa.rliament 
in deali 
ng with the multifarious problems it faced could be overcome. A 
"Il.riety f ' 
, 0 schemes designed to devolve power to subordinate legislatures 
"ere s 
uegested in order to secure more adequate treatment of, and control 
and foreignaffa.irs, and regional government and O"er, industrial 
a.dJninistration. Schemes to improve the working of the Parliamentary 
lIla.chin 
ery brought with them demands for procedural reform, while the Labour 
Part . 
. y, in Parliament and Conference, made efforts to remove the financial 
insec"Urit 
, y that was the lot of the non-union financed Labour Member of 
Parliament. I . 
n all these spheres of reform the Labour Party took the 
initiativ 
e, mainly inspired by the desire to ease the problems which the 
e~sti . 
, ne institutions posed for the transition to Socialism, and in particular 
to rem 
ove the conservative bias inherent in the structure and working of the 
!louse r 
. 0 Commons. It is this tact which will become apparent shortly but 
the 1'1 
rst problem to be examined is that of electoral administration to which 
the Pa . 
. rty had to respond in t~e years 1918-1922 and through which it developed 
and COdit -ied its own ideas by the middle of the decade. 
~ctor' 1 ._~a. ~inistration:- The attitude of the Party on this question is 
d~~"'" -.. .. - .. , -
_ nstrated not simply by the changes it proposed itself but also in the 
SUPPort ,it lent to the eftorts of individual Members to secure change and 
~~ -
El OPpOSition it raised to certain other proposed reforms. For example, 
the" .. .. 
fact that Members of the Labour Party were sympathetic to Bills designed 
to re ' . . 
. move the disqualifications imposed on clergymen in respect of 
Par1i ' 
, amentary and Municipal elections is indicative of the kind of changes 
Vfhich...the Party as a whole wished to see in the direction of the establishment 
1,39 
of the principle of one vote for ea::h p:rl}on'. (6) On the other hand 
the Part;)'a forceful opposition to the Representation of the People Acts 
(1918-1921) Amendment Bill in May 1922 was a fair representation of what 
it th -, 
ought of the provisions of that particular Bill. (1) The Bill, 
'Rhi 
ch Was introduced by Archer-Shee, a Conservative backbencher, proposed 
the en 
ension of plural voting; the disqualification of conscientious 
Objecto 
rs for a further five years; (8) increased restrictions on the 
qualification of alie~to vote; the disqualification of persons convicted 
of off 
ences which were punishable by a sentence of more than seven d~s; 
the abolition of the sprine register and an amendment to the scale of 
elect! 
on eXpenses. Doubtless the P.L.P. was right in claiming that it 
'lra.s 1m. . 
rPossible to take the Bill seriously and correct in using the opportunity 
to ass t' . 
er their belief that the vote should be based on citizenship not 
Pl:'iV11 ,., 
eve, for only six weeks earlier the House gave Archer-Shee leave, 
a:pparently by defa.ult, to ·.introduce e. Bill providirlfl for compulsory votins 
('lrith . 
a Variety of penalties attached).(9) Certainly the P.L.P. did not 
agree with that Bill for they had helped to defeat e. similar one two years 
:Pl:'eV1oUsly. (10) 
The most frequent demand heard from the Tory benches to which the 
Lab • -o~ Party opposed was that made for the 'abolition of the spring register.(11) 
'!'he Tori 
es'demands were apparently made on the grounds of the cost of the 
l:'egist, . 
er s Compilation. It was this reason that Mr. Dennis Herbert gave 
~ 
--------------------------------------------------6, :e (~n Spoor, for example, supported the Bill presented in 1922 
(parliamentary Papers 192~ 1, 811) and Georg'e Lansbury in 1924 
ar1iamentary Pa.pers 1924, 11, 321)., 
7. lk9. Deb. 153, cc 1113 et.aeq. 5 May 1922. 
a, c 
onscientious objeotors had been disqu~lified from voting for five 
~ears under the Representation of the People Act, 1918, Section 9(2) 
and 8 Geo.5. Ch.64. 
9. ~ Deb. 152,cc 246/50. 21 March 1922. 
10 
.. • SeeJI.c. Deb, 130,cc 2186-90. 23 June 1920. 
,11, F / ~ Or example, 'H.C. Deb. 121,co 399+872 3. 
140, 
When su. 
. ccessfully asking the House of Commons on 24 May 1922, "that leave 
be giVen to bring in a Bill to suspend temporarily the spring register of 
electors prescribed by the Representation of People Act, 1918."(12) The 
ProPOsed Bil . 1 met with solid Labour opposition and despite securing a hefty 
majority failed to proceed any further.(13) Four years later, however, 
~e~ . 
ancellor of the Exchequer, Mr. Churchill, introduced an Economy 
(Miscell 
aneouEl Provisions) Bill part of which provided for the abolition of 
the Spri~ register. The Labour Party opposed the Bill as a whole and the 
abOlitio 
n of the register in particular, attempting at first to report 
progress 
and then to support the reduction of the qualifying period for 
reBid 
enCe from three to one.(14) The opposition was based mainly on the 
t'act th t . 
, a the people most likely to be disenfranchised by the Bill would be 
the urb . 
an Poor whose disenfranchisement, it was alleged, would reduce the 
et't'ective 
ness of Parliamentary government.(15) The fact that the Labour 
Party reint d 
. 1.'0 uced the spring register twenty-two years later is evidence 
or the Co . 
nsistency and streneth of this view. Its subsequent abolition 
attar onl . 
y two years proves that the case was overstated. 
In,respect of electoral law there is little evidence to show to what 
~~~ . . 
b e tactics adopted by the P.L.P. were consciously dictated by 
eH et's whi . 
ch were generally held throuqhout the pft-hr. The nature of th ~ ~UJ 
eSe beli f 
e s,however, is clear. The Party not only consistently supported 
l'eVi Bions of 1 
l' e ectoral law (with one specific exception)(16) but by 1925 had 
. ol.'nru.lated it 
. El thoughts on the inter-related matters involved into a 
~~-------------------------------------'2 . . 
'; .!!:£: D~. 154,cc 1217-22. 
13. 
Probabl b bec y ecause the matter was already under review rather than 
ause of Labour's orroosition to it.· . 
'4 
>0 .oiIii 
~ ~t 194, co 687-726. 15 April 1926. The Bill had proposed to reduce 
15. It C ~s ing period or six months to three. ~ 194 . 
. . • ,cc 701-10.J .H. Thomas. 
16 •. Thi ..... . .' . 
~~~s in 1922 when the Government attempted to increase the expense 
~~t -. fOt" elections See D. :Butlcr, The Eleoto't"al Syst~m 1.0 Grpa.t Sil"l(>O", 1('14 .... ( • -
..... ~ Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1963),p.50.· . 
comprehensive resolution which the Executive Committee presented to the 
Annual Conference in 1925. (17) The resolution called for, amongst other 
things, a uniform 19.uO for all t i 1 
" electoral purposes so as 0 serve as a s ne e 
rl'anchi 
se for all purposes, applicable to men and women at 21 years of age 
and based upon the six months' residential qualification; the abolition of 
both th 
. e plural V.ote.&rrlthe existing inequalities affecting women as ~w~ll as the 
8i ' 
mplif1cation of registration work. The resolution also called for "the 
stl'engthA . ~nlng of the CorruJ,X and Illegal Practices Act with regard to bribery, 
vat'io1),s f' 
orms of intimidation and undue infll1ence, and the issue of 
electi 
on literature, by trading firms or societies representing vested 
1
nte
l'est a."(18) In addition the resolution wished to ensure that all 
vehicles ' ' ',' 
used for conveying voters to the poll were registered with the 
Retut-ni ' , , 
ng Officer who would be responsible for, apportioning them equally 
among th 
e candidates. The main point about these reforms, apart from the 
iSSue of 
proportional representation which requires separate treatment, is 
that they 
set out in clear form the major reforms to which the Labour Party 
~as and . 
remained committed from the nineteen-twenties onward and which it 
eVentua.ll 
y translated into legislation in the Representation of the People 
~t Of 1948.' ' 
, It Is true, of course, that the technical aspects of electoral la" We ' ,. . 
~ very largely dealt w1 th' by experts in that field but the principle 
or on 
e man, one vote, exercised by a rational voter in an atmosphere free 
trolll 
undue influence, remained the principle to which t~e Labour Party was 
COmmitt 
ed il1. general terms and that in attempting to achieve this aim the 
~arty "as i 
" n fact seeking to fashion social democracy according to the au: '", " .. . 
Prellla.c'U' f' . .. ~ 0 polit1cal power exercised through a legally Sovereign Parliament 
reSpo '. 
nSible to a politically sovereign and democratic electorate. 
~~---------------------------------------17. 
Similar resolutions had been passed at~.earlier 
L.P.A.C.R. 1922}p.233. r .. p.A.C.R. 192J,p.245. 
There were occasions when the demands of government outweighed the 
loeic of' d 
' emocracy and the Labour Party adopted a tactical policy which 
they later abandoned in the interests of power. Their attitude to the 
Re ... Elect· 10n of Ministers Bill was a case in point. The original Bill, to 
obViat th 
e e re~uirement that Ministers appointed to certain offices undergo 
bye-electi 
ons, was introduced in February 1919 (19) at the time when the 
tab . 
our Party was still smarting from its electoral defeat and society itself 
seemed to be on the ed€e of revolution. . Thus it was only natural that the 
Party ah 1 
ou d claim that the Government's action was based upon the fear of 
haVi ' 
ng to justify their policies to the country. It was, in the words of 
JOSiah W ' 
edgwood, who was soon to join the P.L.P., a struggle between 
"democrac ' 
',r y and efficiency. "(20) Although the Labour Party accepted the 
o:redit f 
Or the SUccess of an amendment to the original Bill ensuring that it 
am?lied, , 
only in the first nine months after a General Election, the Party 
1n tact' , ,,' 
did little overt work in the House where it was the Liberals who 
made th 
e ~lnning.(21) By 1926,however, it was the Labour Party whioh led 
the :pr t ' 
o est, notwithstanding the benefits which the Act had brought to the 
ti:rst L 
, ' abour Government, and which caused the N.E.C. to claim in its Report 
to the , ', 
1926 Conference that "they (i.e., the Government) can make whatever 
Ohange 
s they like without the electors in any oonstituency being given the 
°:P:P°rt ' , 
unity of' expressing their views."(22) Its ppposition was based less 
on Obed,i ," , - , ' 
ence to the maxim. "that the duty of the opposition is to oppose tl as 
011 the b " " " . , , 
. elief that it would reap the electoral benefit acoruing from the bye-
~-----~---------------------------------
'9. 
et.seq. (Committee steg~ 
electio . 
'. ns wh~ch could be held under the Act. (23) Yet the Party made no 
attempt t . 
. 0 re1ntroduce the old procedure when it was returned to office 
in . 
1929 and there is no reason to believe that they were a.eainst its 
abOlition in principle. It'~as the timing rather than the principle that 
lVas important. The Labour Party existed primarily to secure political 
POlVer" 
. , an object they were determined to achieve and use. In the event 
ot a c nt . 
o lict between the logic of democracy in the form of fre~uent 
bYe-elections 
and the use of power it was the latter which was to prove 
the mo~ . 
. . _e attractive proposition. / 
~lS 
.. _ _ ecuri t;y,: The Labour Party was always a strong advocate of 
mea ". --- - - - . - '-
SQ!'es deSigned to remove the insecurity attached to the profession of 
being-M 
embers of Parliament, a profession which had traditionally been the 
Pro'V'ince ~ 
0 4 the aristocratic and rich members of society. Consequently, 
early i 
n the life of the Counon Parliament they sought for increases in pay 
tor Mp, .. 
• • s and lent their constant and consistent support to efforts to 
remove th 
e spectre of personal corruption and financial deprivation from 
the li . 
Ves of Members of Parliament and, in so doing, to advance the idea of 
Parliament 
as working democratic insitution, fully representative of the 
nation. (24) 
The p '. , ~ent of Members had been instituted in 1911 when Members 
Qa1&..l.-i 
es had. been fixed at £4,00 per annum, of which, since 1912, £100 had 
been tt'e 
ated as expenses and thus freed from income tax. In December 1920 
a Select C 
Ommittee of the House of Commons renorted that in its view £400 
.. 
'-----~----------------~--------------~3. R C ~. 191, cc 1417 et.seq. 12 February 1926. The Bill went to a 
anding Committee. 
~. See L p. 
Cont-' .A.C.R. 1919, p.169. The Miners' Federation Special 
th erencein the.same year recommended substantial increases in 
'- The sa.laries of Federation M.P.' s. Daily Herald. 23 October 1919. _51;/;~~er was also raised in the House ... See H.C. Deb. 113, cc 
\Vas an inadequate "SllDl, but recommended that no increase be made. (25) The 
COIlllllitte 
e, however, did consider it advisable to recommend that the whole 
01' the £400 be t;reated as expenses and that first class travel facilities 
be ProVid ' 
ed for .all Members between London and their constituencies. In 
addition it recommended that all M.P.'s be granted free postage facilities 
for o1'fidQl letters. It refused to recommend that free travelling 
faciliti 
es be granted between Members' home and London. (26) 
In his evidence to the Select Committee,Adamson, as leader of the 
p.t P t 
• ~ Bated that in his view £1,100 per annum would be required to meet 
Members' i 
nCreased cost of living, although he would be prepared to settle 
fOr teoO.(21) Labour's two members on the Select Committee (J.H. Thomas 
and. Vern . 
on Hartshorn) made. it clear that the Party tavamrl increased salaries 
and. a.llllO t . 
S persuaded the Committee to accept that a subsistance allowance of 
£1 a. d 
ay be granted to needy Members during the sitting of Parliament. In 
the end. t 
he Committee decided against making any specific recommendations on 
this POint. (28) . 
The Government accepted the main recommendations of the Select 
COllUn1tt , 
ee s report, with the exception of that concerned with postages -
"hich it Considered to be too much open to abuse. Clynes, recently elected 
8.s le .. '" ~er of the P.L.P., wrote to the Prime Minister on behalf of the Labour 
llart : 
Y in which he expressed a great deal of concern about the proposed 
P:rOVi.Qio 
n of free railw~ facilities u~gine that they be extended to include 
j01lJ:'n 
. eye between London and a Members' home, or alternatively, that Members 
'----~--------------------~,-----------------<5. R ~~ort'~m the Select Committee on Membe~9' Exryenses, H.C. 125,(1920). 
,. .613,·para.14 p.iv •. ,... .... ..... '.' 
26. J 1I '. . .. 
b; • Thomas proposed an increase of salary to £600. This was defeated 
one vote. Ibid., p.ix. 
<7. Ib ~., Question' 90 and 91. 
<8. 'Ibtd 
.~., ··P.x. 
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be award. d 
e an open pass on all railw~s.(29) In addition, Clynes called 
to~ a greater part of the allowance to be free from inoome tax, indicating 
that if these Tloint s could be met ~ ~ agitation for the proposal for ~ree 
,Postag 
e might be dropped. It was these representations whioh, acoording 
to NeVill 
e Chamberlain, caused the Government to put the question before 
the Hou '.' 
se on a free vote.(30) 
In the deba.te whi.ch preceedl!'ld th~ vote Clynes painted out th9.t it 
lfaa im ' 
. POSsible for I.!!\bour mf.ftbers to visit their oonstituencies owine to 
the Cost i . 
n:volved while other Members, Sir Frederick Banbury, in particular, 
had easy, free and unrestricted access to travel facilities. Dan Irvinz 
chare.cte i . 
, r sed the conservative opposition to the proposal to provide for 
M,p. fS t < ravel as "aimed at the retention of tl'l..is House, as far as m~ be, 
ase. c' _ . ' 
preserve for the, JlllUl ti-millionaire and the landed aristocracy. "(31) 
He . 
argued stronely tha.t the House of Commons would not be fully represent&-
tive until SUch time as it recoenise,d the financial burden placed upon 
14embers Without ti their own resources. However, despite some Conserva ve 
~~t () t aboUt' attempts to secure travelling expenses was defeated. 32 
I>u.rine tabour's term of office in 1924 the Government took the 
°,Pport . 
unity to re-open the question of travelling expenses for Members. 
~~Uec -
onservative attempts to delay matters by referrine the question to 
a C0lllrni tt '. 
ee of the House the 'proposal was passed by a substantial majority.(33) 
In fUrth ' 
er discussions on the subject a small number of Labour Members 
su''pPOrt d' , ,. : 
e the prOvision of third-class facilities only, presumably for class-
'----
-----------------------------------------29. S ' 
ee tloYd Georze Papers. F.10/5/11. 27 April 1921. 
30. H C ~. 142,cc 1087/1154. 1 June 1921. 
31. ~., cc 1137. 
3~. 19"" 7 votes to 171. 
33 •.. ~ 172,cc 663/740. 10 April 1924. 
consCious reasons. However, on the underlyin~ motive of providing a 
secure b i ' 
as s for the individual Member to discharge his Parliamentary 
duties the Party was united in th t P li t jts determination to ensure a ar amen 
'lras' ." , 
open to all irrespective of their financial circumstances.(34) 
~I'\nt Pro '. .- an ,cedure: Although the reform of Parliamentary procedure 
did ..... - .......... . 
not become a major issue in the Labour Party until the 1930's it was 
OOnS:ide d 
. re on a number of occasions in the previous decadf3. In general, 
the :P t1; 
a yts View on the ques~ion was, in the first instance, responsive to 
events t 
ra her than the application of well-thoueht out princjples of reform. 
'!'hus lih . 
en the Government suggested new proposals (35) to refer all Bills 
other th' . 
r an the Finance and Appropriation Bills and small Bills of a non-
Contenti 
ous kind includine some of the Estimates to, Standing Committees, 
to incre '. " ' 
ase the number of Committees from 4 to 6, and, for one Session only, 
to redUce th 
e number of days for Supply from 20 to 12,(36) the Party 
responded . . 
in a very oonservative manner. Ignoring the Government's olaims 
that th " 
e new rules would save the time of the House,. accelerate the prosress 
or bu.Si 
ness and improve real opportunities for oriticism and discussion, the 
:P .t.:p .' 
• argued that the proposals would weaken the,oritioal opportunities of 
~~e ' . 
, and OpPosition Members.- Adamsonargued that a ohange in working 
ho'U.rs 
WOuld be a more useful reform. In Committee they unsuccessfully 
lIlo'V'ed th . . 
at all debates be published,.a motion which though defeated soon 
beca.m.e t . 
. , he normal practioe. (37) Despi te the extra burden that these changes 
-----------------------~---------------
!4. ~~l 1924 Labour Members supported a Bill introduoed by Lesl~e Hore-Mem~ha. '" limiting the giving of donations and .oontributions by a 
R C er to his oonstituency party. (Parliamentary Papers, 11i)7, and 
~. D~. 115, 00 1321/1333. 2 July 1924). 
35. RC' • ~ 112,oc 815 et.seg., co 983 et.seg., and 1213 et.seq., 18, 
... 20 February 1920. 
36 A' ". 
•. bandoned in debate. 
37 •. At t . .' '. -. . 
C . his time the Oouestion of the publication of debates in Standing 0mIDitt a _ . Chai:rm~ewa.s apparently pa!tof' the prerogative of the individual 
.. . '. .. 
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imposed upon Members, by the time of the Annual Conference in 1919 the 
P.L.P. wa.s able to 
report that "the new procedure has certainly resulted 
in facilitating the discussion of Bills in Conun:f:ttee ••• "(38) Traditionalism, 
howev 
er, was not confined to the P.L.P. The Times had argued that the 
chang . 
es were irrelevant to the general question of the efficiency of 
Parliament. (39) For the Times the answer to that question lay in the 
~Ption of more radical solutions such as devolution; a view shared by 
SOllle m b 
em ers of the Labour Party, but, as we shall see shortly, while such 
l'lroposed 
Solutions came and went the basic problems of reforming the existine 
procedure of Parliament 
remained. 
In ~e Aims of Labour, Arthur Henderson had. argued that reform of 
Pa;rli .. - - - -........ - -
ramentary procedure was not only necessary to deal "with pressing ~d 
lU:'gent u 
q estions of reform" but to prove that direct action and the dictator-
8hil'l Of th . 
e proletariat were unnecessary.(40) In other words reform of 
Pa;rliame 
ntary procedure was necessary to preserve Parliamentary government. 
let it Was t .-
no until 1922 that a resolution on the subject was broueht before 
the Part 
Y Conference. Indeed, until that time the emphasis had been upon 
the P Lp, 
• • • s need to master and use existing procedure rather than reform it. 
Like lIlost' -
parties the Labour Party was more attentive to the rights of 
Priva.te Me b 
m ers when in OppOSition then in Office. Even then the Part,r 
lIIeemed t 
o lack a. decisiveness on the issue. The resolution brought before 
the 1922 
COnference stated that "an amendment of Parliamentary procedure is 
lOll€ 
overdue," and instruoted the Executive Committee to co-operate with 
'---------------------------------------38. 
40 •.. 
~.A.C.R. 1 -;;.:.,;:;.:.~..!,;9t.!1:t.,,2., 1'.58 • 
...... .... 
Tim' -"-"'" . 
~o !!. 15 FebruA_r 1919. Phi1in Snowden expressed doubts about the ~ vernm t' --J • 20 F en s motives for introducing the changes. Labour Leader, 
ebruary .. 1919. .' .. _ .... .. . 
!~~nderson, ~.cit.pp.71/3. Cf. Phi1ip Snowden "If Parliamentary 
th ner,y could.be.improved so as to work more effectively much of 
Fa: diSsatiSfaction which now finds expression in denounciation of 
wouiiament as an institution and in advocating revolutionary methods 
Ma.cnd disappear." Labour and the New World, 1'.63. See also J.R. 
1920)na1d, A Polfcy.for.tha.La.bollr Party (London: Leonard Parsons, 
,P.167.·. " . .. . . . . . . . . . . . , ... 
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the P.t.P. "in reviewing the present machinery with a view to putting 
forward . 
SU€eestions for revision and bringing same before Parliament in 
the form of a Bill. "(41) In the following year the Transport Workers' 
fo:r:mal1 -. 
y moved a similar resolution, emphasising the need for the reform 
of Parliamentary procedure and stating that "in view of the experience in 
the Ho 
USe of Commons during the past few months, this Conference declares 
tha.t the time has arrived when a more modern method of business should be 
~bstituted for the medieval machinery of Government which was designed 
fo~ a different set of circumstances ••••• "(42) The resolution called on 
the Ex 
ecutiveCommittee to "deal seriously with this question." Yet 
little Was done 
and the issue remained one of relative unimportance, 
entergin", 
, .~ only in the wake of incidents in the House of Commons. (43) 
Th . 
e one exception to this general antipathy towards the question of 
Procedur 1 
a reform was the proposal of the I.L.P. to completely re-organise 
the stru 
cture of the House of Commons in accordance with the Bradford 
liesOluti 
ons. These resolutions _ so named bec~use they we~e first approved 
a.t the I Lp, 
• • • s Bradford Conference of 1914 - have traditionally been 
aeaooi t . 
a ad With Fred Jowett, their most prominent advocate, although they 
d.id. not in fact 
Parliament 
originate with him. Jowett proposed tha.t all 'Members of 
-
should be allocated to Committees resDonsible for the administration 
Of the v ... 
a.t ntu.n. 
arious Departments of State in a manner similar to that in operation 
1.Cipal level. Jowett, like the Webbs in their book on the Socialist Con. ... ~""onweal th 
. , diSliked and depreciated the necessity of the "Party Game" 
.Preferrin,c:p . . .~ instead to rely UDon the view that Parliament was, or should be, c .. . .. . 
°lllDoSed of 
. rationa.l people acting in the common interest. With the Webbs 
~ 
---------------------------------------41. Lp' ~~<1].~~, 1'.239. 42. t p' , . , ... , .. " ", 
~.C.R. 1Q2l, p.246. 
43. s .... . ...... . 
ee Note 1 .. 
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Jowett 
shared a common distaste for the concentration of power, through 
the V1hi ' 
ps, in the hands of the Government. In this sense the proposals 
ma.d.e by J 
owett were reactionary in that they evoked the "good old days" of 
the M b 
em er of Parliament exercising his independent judgement, although, 
of C01U's t " 
" e, he emergence of modern political parties had merely transferred 
the are 
a of deCiSion from the floor of the House or the various caucuses of 
Members h : ' 
, aVlng common interests, to the larger, more formally constituted 
and orQ'atli 
' c sed, Party meetings. In short, the proposals expressed discontent 
Ylith th' ' , 
, e Rouse ,of Commons' loss of legislative initiative and control. 
~ , , 
is loss of control was more keenly felt in the P.L.P. owine to its 
pre-Wardepend~nce upon the goodwill of the iiberal government. It was 
re1ntOl.'C o. , 
. ~ed by the revelations about the extent of Britain's treaty 
ObH"'ati ., 
y ona and subsequent involvement in the War. It is not without 
l3ienific " 
aQce that many of the Liberals who later joined the Labour Party 
demanded ' . 
, • greater control over foreien policy through the establishment of a 
FOl'eien ' , . " " , 
Affairs Committee by the Rouse of Commons. Arthur Ponsonby, for 
e~ampl' , ' 
, e, wrote a book along these lines; a book which represented the views 
~_ '" " '0 
'. ny .members of the Labour Party as well as those of dissident Liberals. (44) 
Aa a lIlemb ' , 
. er of the Union of Democratic Control alongside Ponsonby (and Ramsay 
MacnOnald) , . 
, . Renderson, who was by no means a pacifist, was undoubtably 
l'el>reSenting a popular Labou~ vi~w when he wrote, "we desi~e to bring the 
FOt-alsn 0" ' . ,., 
,frice mOre directly under the control of Parliament, and to give the 
lleOl>les t " . " .', 
representatives larger powers of criticism in regard to foreign policy."(49 
~. 
---------------------------------------
44. ~~"t'Ponsonby, Democra.cand D~lom~ : A'Pl~a for Po ~lar Control of ~ien POlin~ London: MethuenJ1915 •. See.also .Catherine A. Cline, 
;;t'Uits to Labour: Th~ British Ll\bour PaT 1 1 -1 1 (New York: 
racUse .University Press,. .1963 •..... ... . ...... " , 45. ~derson, Qp.cit., p.74. Cf. Sir Charles Trevelyan who called for 
!:le e SUbmission.of legisla.tion to Parliament to transfer from the 
. or ecutive to the House of Commons the right of making War, Peace and 
,socSanctioning Treaties with foreign powers." "If Labour Wins" ~taltBt Review, XX, No.106, July 1921, pp.11-20 (p.17). -
... 
~ . ~ . 
....... - .... 
~50 
:By '1 arge~.powelSof c~iticism', Hende~son undoubtably meant the setting up 
01' a "F O~eign Afrai~s Committee", and administ~ative changes and when the 
P~'PUblished a pamphlet on the 'Cont~l of Foreign Policy; (46) it incl~ded 
these i 
n a Wider p~og~amme of control, of open diplomacy, an extension of 
Pa.:rliam t 
en ary control over fo~eign policy and a reorganisation of the Foreign 
01'tice. 
The Parly argued that the House must be provided with "full, 
8tra.ighl:rorw~ and truthful answers to questions" and envisaged the statutory 
right 01' the Foreign Affairs Committee to "all information at all times, 
includi 
ne that 01' access to papers and documents, and ••••• when it considers 
itdesi 1-~aule, to hold public enquiries, to summon witnesses, and to examine 
thelll on 
oath. "(41) The Committee itself waa to be established on stmil~ 
lines to th ' 
ose existing in France, Germany and the U.S.A., and would be 
"el r 
" ected. annUally at the beginning of each session by proportional repre-
Selltatio . 
n, f~om the House of Commons, and consist of about thirty,membe~s."(48) 
1'he unde 1 
l' Ying motive was the need to ensure democratic control t~ueh the 
l:'einvesti . 
ng ~ Parliament 'of power Which it was by implication presumed 
once to h 
aVe POssessed. In the distribution of power the needs of democracy 
-ere P~e ' 
BUmed to be greater than the requirements of governmental action, 
ill Pra.cti . 
Ce it did not work out that way. . ,') 
It Was 
not the plan of the- Labour Party as a whole to abolish the 
Cabinet . , 
, fOr as Ramsay MacDonald, Jowett's most vigorous opponent in the 
debates 0 
n the question of Parliamentary reform, said,,"The Cabinet can be 
abOliShed i 
n wO:rd; it cannot be abolished in fact. "(49) MaoDonaldhad been 
'----~--------------------~~-------------46. 
41. 
48. 
49. 
Co t ' -
--n 1'01 of Forei~n Policy: La.bour's Pro,c;ramme (London: Labour Party,1921), 
~.'~' 'P:3: .. ' .. , .. '" .... , . c· .• c .••• " ~ •• "" 
Ib ~., P.4 •. 
Mem" . C oranduni on House of Commons Business presented to the Advisory 
rOmmlttee of the Labour Party on the Machinery of Government (1911) 
s eproduced in J .R. MacDonald, PR.rliament end Revolution ,pp. 1 05/116( 116). 
ea also Daily He~ald, 4 April.1925., .,.' 
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concerned to limit the Cabinet to the exercise of "their proper functions, 
i,e., powers and responsibilities."(50) He too, had viewed the appoinbnent 
ot Dep 
artmental Camd ttees rl th favour, in order to fully use the abilities 
ot Metnbe t .. 
ra, 0 instruct Parliament and make it a more business-like assembly 
and to r t 
es ore to the Executive and the Legislature their proper constitutional 
functions and inter-dependen.t relationships. The Canmittee, he thought, 
lIlight consult with Ministers rather than detemine departmental polioy. 
Whilst MacD 
onald vaunted the rights of private Members and deplored the use 
ot the Whips to oanpel Parli8lDentary support, his periods of' offioe as a 
tabour p 
rime Minis ter saw him adopt the traditional mode of Minis terial 
gavel'lllnent. In faot, no attempt was made to implement the Party's polioy 
Oll the 
.' r Control of foreign polioy apart fraa a motion insisting that treaties 
and other diplanatio arrangements require the consent of Parliament to be 
~~ . . 
ch fOllowed the path of predestined failure when disoussed in the 
liouae ot C 
anJnons on 11 March 1925. (51) By this' t:1me, however, the Labour 
.~~~ . . deserted ~ notion of Deparbnental Camnittee, although 
intellect 
Uals such as Harold Laski pronounoed their necessity to the proper 
tunCtioll' ~g ot Parliamentary Gover.nment.(52) 
Whilst by :i.925 the Labour Party as a whole had very largel.y deserted 
the idea . 
of Parliamentary oontrol by Canmittee it was in that year that the 
!.t.p h 
• eard the Reports of a Canmittee set up to enquire into and make 
----. ----------~-------------------------50, \8~_ ..... 
~ona.ld, loc.oit. Cf. his suggestions that Parliamentary Canmittees 
,attached to the great departments of State, espeoially to those of 
51 • 
('J or~gn J.ttairs and Finance, might be a oonvenient expedient."' . 
,.29C lisrn Atter the War, p.47. 
. ~. D~. 181, 00 1430 et.~eq •. , DI..lring the 'periOd of the first Labour 
b ernment Parliamentary Control of Foreign Policy had been approved 
t Y the P.L.P. but the Prime Minister had not been able to find a d83 
o or it. It was resolved "that representatives of the two National l{~ttees oo-operate.' with the P.L.P. in a deputation to the Prime 
N ster to try and secure a day in Parliament for CliSOUS8ion. It 
-.!l.O. Minutes .30 G.C. ot T.U.C. and E.C. of L.P. 26 June 192Jt.. 
~: . .i.;%i: Grammar or Politics (London: George JJ.len & Unwin, 1925), 
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recClnmendations as to what changes were desirable in the existing 
machinery of Parliamentar,y Government. Its members included Jowett, 
Clement Attlee, Willie Graham, Harold Laski and H.B. Lees-Smith. Fenner 
Broclcway, the C anmit tee , s Secretar,y, recorded that "At the first meeting 
there Was" . d general agreement that the House of Commons should be reorgan~se 
on the b . as~s of canmittees, but there was a sharp difference as to the 
funcU 
on of these committees •. Harold Laski, Lees-Smith and others held 
that th 
ey should be merely advisor,y and that responsibility should rest 
With the Minister and the Cabinet~ Jowett insisted that there must be 
respons 'bl ~ e committees, with detailed power to survey administration and 
to cons'd ~ er all legislation relating to the Department." (53) 
These two views remained irreconoilable and vere consequently embodied 
in tw 
o separate reports submitted by Jowett and Lees~ith, to the I.L.P. C r 
ont'erence 
of 1926, the latt.er in favour of adviSOr,y, the foim.er of 
More importantly, Jowett's Report envisaged a responsible, Canmi ttees. 
tundamental 
. reconstruction (rather than modification) of the relationship 
between th 
e Cabinet and Parliament.' In essenoe 'the Report reflected the 
"1 ew that the role of an individual Member and his rational conscience were 
ot gre t 
a er importance than that of strong effective centralised Government. 
It was' ' 
, J.n short, an exercise in the distribution of political power away 
trOln the Ob' 
a J.net and in favour'of the individual representative. The 
authors 
of the Second Report held' that "The driving force of a Cabinet, 
tal' In . 
ore responsible than hitherto to the will of the Party" was essential both 
to the 
introdUction of Socialism and the continuing educative role of the 
. liou.se of 0 
ctnrnons, arguing that, "If the life of a Government ceases to turn 
~ ~------------~~~~----~--~-------
A.. Fenne B L'f f Jew r rockway Socialism throu h Sixt Years: The 1 e 0 ~tt of Bradford. London: George AlIen & Unwin for the ~onal tabour Press, 1946), p.235. ' 
Upon the will et the House, the process of politics, beoause it will be 
buried beneath the technical and massed detail ot canmittee work, is not 
11ke~ to penetrate to the public outside.·(54) It was the necessity ot 
atrOPIN g ~ overnnent which oohvinced the authors of the Second Report or the 
inadVisability 'or responsible oanmittees. (55) 
The cont'lict was, therefore, basically one which was concerned with 
the Ve'l"U' h" . , • . • 
-" eart of the Parliamentary systanj l.t involved the detinitl.on of 
the 1'01 t 
e 0 Parliament in the political process. To Jowett the proposals 
gave It 
real control to Parliament of the whole work for which Parliament is 
aUPPOsed to be responsible •• (56) To his opponents it ditfUsed power to 
,sUOh an 
extent as to make decisive Sooialist government impossible. The 
tOnner relied upon the disinterested adherence of the individual members 
t r-
o the prinoiples of voting for issues on their merits whils t the latter 
reoogni d' . 
se the permanent nature of the Party system and its significance 
tor th ' 
e role of Parliament in the existing and the future Socialist society. 
It . " 
The adVi . " 
, sory system," they claimed, ·leaves the initiative always in the 
hands ~ the 
, se .. hem the Party in power can trust," and continued to insist 
that it kept ·the House of Ccamons as the pivot of Parliamentary Government ••• "(57) 
In the tinal .... .:, i 
-.o.-.a.ys s, although Jowett won the battle at the 1926 Party C ' 
onterence 
, the traditionalists won the war. 
On ' 
e ot the assertions made by the authors of the first I.L.P. Report 
an ~ar11 ' 
arnentary Refolm was that Devolution was not a sufficient remedy to 
-~t~' . 
e failure of the Parliamentary system, although Hane Rule might 
-----' ~J,' ~------------------------------------The R' . • 
--= etonn of Parliament (London: I.L.P.;' 1926), p.24. This pamphlet oan~~s both Reports. 
Ibid., P.2.5/6. 
55. 
~. M' " . , ' 
#ohester Guardian, 4 January 1924. Other expositions of Jowett's 
I ~aa 8.l'e to be found in his pamphlet Parliament or Palaver? (London:, ~ ~., 1926), passim., and his evidence to the Select Canmittee as 
o ~~.dure. See SpeCial Report tran the Seleot Canm1 ttee on Procedure 
, ...A.~ublio Business. H.C. 161, (1931), pp. 153/170. 
57. The R 
--.: efonn of Parliament, pp • .30/1. 
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Usefully follow from the instituting of a Committee form of government. (58) 
It had h . 
, Owever, been the most widespread and frequently advocated alternative 
structure f 
o government supported in the Labour Party since the war. In the 
main t 
, wo distineuishable forms of devolution were advocated, one concerned 
With deVOlution along indust~al lines and one along national lines. Whilst 
the latte 
r Was the more persistent of the two it was the former which appeared 
to be mOre im 
portent in the context of industrial unrest in the years 
innnediatel Y after the end of the war and which the Webbs tried to embody in 
their work HA C ( ) 
-- onstitution for the Socialist Commonweath of Great Britai~." 59 
k ' .. - " " ................. - ... - . . . .. . 
Cordine to G.D.H. Cole the Webb's Constitution for the Socialist 
~th 
". - of Great Britain was "in the m~n an attempt to influence the t'o!'ln~ti . - . - '. ' .. - '. . ... 
on of Labour opinion at a time when political and economic institutions 
alike Se 
r emed to be in the melting pot. "(60) It might quite fairly be added 
that th -
e Webb~' own political thought seems also to have been in the same 
IIlel ting pot. 
The presuppositions of the earlier Webbian works had been 
diSCQl'ded i . 
n favour of what can be seen in retrosDect as a ~~brid solution to t .. .....-r he P:robl . 
ems of the governance of society and the various suggestions which 
we:re bein c . 
e urrently advocated as panaceas to those questions. Cole's 
alla.l.ySis of t . 
he idea of a Social Parliament as an attempt "to meet the attacks 
ot' S 
YndicaJ.ists 
and Guild Socialists on orthodox Fabian Collectivism without 
'a.c~fici 
ng the ultimate sunremacy of the consumer in economio arfairs,"(61) 
f:luccinctl ~ • 
th Y tea the Webbs' intentions in broad teme. As for. the Webbs 
~maelves th . 
. !'!y declared theix- aim was partly to describe "such a reorganisa.tion 
"----~-----------------------------------Sa. !JU1.., PP.20/1. 
59. 
60. 
Sid,n . 
Of G;y. ~d Beatrice Webb, A Constitlltion for the Socialist Commonweath 
~ea Britain (London: Longmans .Green,1920}r .. - - ..... 
GDU··········· . .. . 
'!'he'w' Cole, "Beatrioe Webb as An Economist" in Margaret Cole~(Ed..), ~5e)b9 a~~ their W~~k (London: Frederick r~11er~1949bPp.267/282 
r ,. -h$1:'ea.tter .cited as"Beat-Mce Vlebb as an EconomHlt." See Note 2. 
G..D.lt. . .... - . , ............... , .... . 
Cole, ~~trice ~ebb as an Economist, p.275. 
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ot the principal institutions of our own country as might serve •••• to 
arrest the growing dissatisfaction with these institutions, especia~ 
with Parliamentary governnent •••• "(62) In other words they wished to 
conserve P li 
c ar amentary institutions. However, tile reorganised institutions 
they hoped to create could only work in "a free democracy inspired by the 
SPiritot·SOCial service •••• "(63) Thus the Webbs were not describing the 
Changes that 
were necessary to make Parliament more efficient within its 
eXisting enviro ...... ent but ( .) S ~~1 the ideal Parliament in the ideal Social1st tate. 
lIence th . 
el.r analysis of political democracy and their alternative society 
were relat d ( ) 
e only in so far as they fitted the Webbs' theme. 64 
The Webbs~ critique of political democracy was centred around the 
nature ot . 
c politl.cal representation. The nineteenth-century Socialists had 
equated d 
r enocracy with the possession ot the vote. The equality of voting power 
WOUld th 
, ~ had believed, secure the success of the Co11ectivist ide~ This 
idea t 
o an undivided denocracy was now rejected by the Webbs. They no longer 
accept 
ed the View that man's interests could be represented in one multi-
tuncti . 
onal 1nstitutionj "the democratio organisation of society must not be 
based 
eXClusively on the human being as such, but must spring fran at least 
th c 
:ree or f ( ) 
. ' OUr, as we think, separate and distinct foundations •••• " 65 The 
l.nc1ividual 
Could only be represented in relation to his role as a producer; 
as a c 
OUsumerj as a citizen with a political interest in defence, police and 
~~------------~------------------------62. 
63. 
64. 
65. 
Webb C 
I s, c_onstitution for the Socialist Canmonweal the p.97 
l!.g., p -356 
This . 
ot th J.s strongly supported by their labelling of Part I as "A Survey . 
Tan e Ground" and Part n as"The Co-operative Canmonweal th of 
by ~rrow." The first part deals with a political democracy warped .. . c., unde~ita1ist DictatorShip, the second with a new constitution working 
Ibid a Co-operative Canmonwealth. It was intended to be that way. 
-.::.:::.., Prefaoe, XViii. 
!bid I ~. , ntroduot1' on ii 
,xv • 
and jUstice. d . 
,an as a citizen w~th a social interest in the promotion and 
the maintenance of civilisation.(66) 
Political democracy had failed because it had relied on the false 
:prami ' '-, 
, ss that Parliament could represent man's total interests, an idea which 
the Webb 
s, following Cole and the Guild Socialists, considered to be invalid. 
Not onl 
y Was Parliament not made for the job that it shoul<! do, it did not 
eVen dts h '. . ..... 
. c a:t'ge those functions that it was alle$ed to be doing. Though 
theor ti '.' ...... . 
e ca11y Supreme Parliament was in fact the tool of a "Cabinet 
D' l.ctatot'shi " p Which, by destroying the old balance of the Constitution, had 
"rested all 
power in the Prime Minister, Cabinet, and Civil Service while at 
the Barn' . " 
e time reducing the legislature to an essentially negative role.(67) 
As . 
a },eSUlt "the elected representatives of the British Democracy are ••••• 
:practical. -", . 
1y limited to the function of mwcing and unmaking a government and 
ot' criti 
CiSing, obstruoting or amending any legislative projects brought 
f 0:t'w9.t'd. b 
. Y the Government ••••• "(68) Moreover, the existence of diSCiplined 
Parties h' '. ,.". , 
ad reduced even these functions to the realm of the theoretical. 
~et~l ' 
t Ut'e of the institutions of government, especially the House of Commons, 
o ada.nt t t .' ~ 0 he increaSing role of the State in society and to recognise the 
demand. . '. 
s 01' tunctional representation, had. further prevented the ~ expression of 
the ee . -. ' .. 
net's.l will of the community.(69) 
The Webb ' B Constitution was not, in their eyes, "a model constitution 
tot' an u 
" tOPian community"(70) but a practical consti~tion which incorporated 
stlgeesti 
, . ons that seem to accord with the trend of development towards a fully 
d,6Inoct' ti' 
a sed community."(71) Yet, it was clear, the Constitution itself was 
""-------------------------~-----------
68 
• 
69 
" 
70 
• 
71. 
. .. 
construoted on the assumption that the society within which it would 
Operate 1 WOU d be an ideal Socialist society. Thus while the Webbs 
critioised the w~ Parliament operated within a Ca,ita1ist society and 
made BUenoe t· 
o S 10ns for its modification such sue~estions were based on 
assum:nti ~ ons about society quite different from those used in their critical 
analysis. Thus in effect they ar~ed that Parliament was warped by a 
Capita1i 
SIn that was on the decline. In the future society Parliament would 
function as fo110-s. ~ The Webbs themselves never fully appreciated the 
Significance of the f-.t1 hi h assumptions which they made and it was this ~ ure w c 
made their f' 1na1 proposals so unrealistic. 
Their i 
ma n areument was that because "no one elected assemp1y can 
POssibl" " 
Y express the General Will of the inhabitants (of a community) on all 
8U.bJecta 
whatsoever"(72) appropriate institutions mllst be developed to 
ensure th t 
a provision is made for the representation of the democracies of 
ConSUmers, 
ProdUcers and the political and social aspects of citizenship. 4 . 
nUcleus l' 
or the Consumer Democracy already existed in the Co-operative 
1t . 
oV'entent ' 
and that for the producers' democracy in the Trade Union and 
Professi . 
ona1 organisation.(73) The distinct nature of the political and 
Bocial f' , 
Unctions of Citizenship, however, re~uired the separate representation 
of eaoh 
in two equal, co-ordinate National Assemblies _ the political and the 
Social. 
Parliaments. 
The POlitical Parliament, elected ona geographical basis in proportion 
to l\ 
ot'°PUl ti - " , 
a on, would have &lthority in Foreign Affairs, the government of the 
~P:l~e N t . .. 
, a ional Defence and Justice. Its Executive would consist of the 
n\l!nber 01' M 
inistries appropriate to the tasks t"o be performed, and would be 
COllect· . l~ely responsible to the Assembly for the policies adopted. The 
'-----~------------------------------------72. Tb 
--.!a.t p.126. 
73. lb' . 
-.Ja., Pp.104/S • 
. . . 
~58 
Webbra enVisaeed that t1:te type of election adopted and the probable existence 
or Standi"", Committees would result f th t b .~ in a closer control 0 e governmen y 
the POlitical Parliament and closer control of the latter by the people. 
The restri t' . .. 
c 10n of the Premier's right of dissolution and the professiona.l-
isa,tion of the" legislator's job would also serve to secure this end. Like 
its counte,..,.,,,,-,-, , -~~'v the Political Parliament would be limited by Statute, the 
final i t 
n el'pretation of which would lie, as in the United States, with the 
Courts. (74) 
The SOCial Parliament would control the social and economic activities 
of the nation, including the administration of existing public services such 
a.s health '" , 
, edUcation, transport, communications and mining, and would have 
:toeSnonSibility' ~o 'Fi' ~ r nance. There would be no Cabinet as in the Political 
Parliament_ i ' , 
, nstead the EOCecutive would consist of a number of Standing 
COlll!n1ttees 1 : 
a one the lines of the London County C0110cil local government 
lIIodel, 
inClUding a general purposes committee. Each Committee chairman 
WOUld b . ' 
. e indiVidually responsible for the policies adopted by his 
Con-'t 
""'11 tea. (75) 
The delegation of the administrative functionto the several bureaucracies 
W' , 
cUId eXcl d '. ' 
u e responsibility for the details of administration which would in 
a. . ~ case b ' 
a guided by the Social Parliament's general "power of the purse." 
'rhUs th ' , e si' ' 
oc al Parliament would control through a St~dine Committee, acting 
o ' n the ad. " 
, Vice of control departments (which were to be esta.blished to produce 
the " , 
facts and figures necessary for ratio~al decision) but would not 
~ .. i.ntieett .. e.... r. (76' ); 
". ~ It should be noted, however, that Price-Fixing was considered 
... 
"----
74. 
75. 
7~. 
~------------------------------------~., 1'1'.111/117. 
~'t 1'1'.117/121. 
, ........ , 
to be part of the control function. (77) The Social Parliament would be 
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elected for a fixed term of office and could only be dissolved earlier by 
a majority vote of its own members. 
The Webbs described the division of Parliament into two co-equal, 
Constituent parts· as "fund~ental.1I (78) It was fundamental to overcane 
of business (and) paralysis of' will," (79) that bedevilled the "magnitude 
the exis t; "'g ~ institution. They noted "the failure of' Parliament to cope 
With the Collective business d' '11 i t of the canmunity, and the dangerous J.SJ. us onmen 
With parI' loamentary institutions and even' with Democracy itself, which this 
failure (ha ) d caused," (80) and concluded that the division they described 
was nece 
ssary to pranote the proper kind of efficiency that would flow as 
the c 
onsequence of an easing of the burden on overworked legislators. In 
a broa.d 
r er context the distinct canplexity of the "political" and the "social" 
tasks' 
10 Society, representing as they did essentially separate functions, 
meant that "It J.'s 
only by cutting the business in two halves, according to 
its n t 
a ure,. and entrusting each to its own national assembly, with its own 
eJCecu ti"V'e that 
the load upon legislators and statesmen can be brought within 
a mana 
geable compass." (81) Finally, the Webbs insisted that such a division 
was a 
necessary part of Socialist development, for it was not s:imply tithe 
onl . 
y effective w~ of remedying the present congestion of Parliamentary 
b\.ls-l-
"-lleSs, but ( ) 
was also •••• an essential condition of' the progressive 
SU,bstituti 
on •••• of the community for the private capitalist." (82) 
~-------------------------------------77. Ib' ~., ~-339. "The price at which the products' of the national 
detUstrloes and services will pass into consumption or use will be 3t~~ined by the Social Parliament, on the recanmendation of its 
0Pin' long COOIlIlittee on Finance, according to the feelings and 
loons or,. the canmunity for the time being." 
78. l:b' . ~" P.l21. Cf. p.107 
79. Ibid 
. --"::':::", P.139. 
80. .,., ~" p. 131. 
81. lbid . 
. ~~, P.139. See pp. 
OC1a1 canplexes. 
136/138 for a discussion on the political 
~., p.ll1. 
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Although ~~reme within their own spheres the Political and Social 
Parliament . 
s would necessarily have to have certain relations with each 
other. 
For the p'Llr,pose of ironing out disrutes the machinery of joint 
Conter 
ences would be set up. On the question of finance the Social 
Parliam 
ent could only object to the level of, for example, National Defence 
eJCpenditure, it, could not oppose the details of such expenditure as that 
Xlroperl"tJ' b 1 
v e onged to the policy ma~ing ftIDction of the Political Parliament.(S3) 
Where i t 
n er-institutional conflict could not be resolved through joint 
COnfe 
rences then the issue concerned would be settled by an eegrezate vote 
of the ID . 
. embers of both Parliaments in joint session or, in the event of 
further de ... .:Il k ( ) 
. QU OC , by referendum or a double dissolution of both Parliament. S4 
,,..It Was on the question of conflict that the Webbs beean to come unstuck. 
lIe:rrn 
an Finer has argued that control over the segregate would effectively 
mean Cant ' 
rel OVer the details. Moreover, in joint sessions issues would be 
settled b 
y m~re relative numbers.(S5) Furthermore, the WebbB intended that 
elections; ., 
should be kent as far anart as nossible so as to ensure that the 
... ~. , 
lridest 0 ' , 
.P sSible representationWasgiven to the different opinions that exist 
within th ' 
e COmmunity at various times. Yet,quite frankly, the Webbs did not 
l'eally b . " 
elieve conflict would occur. They were after all dealinewith the 
l'atio . 
nal Socialist society not the sectional Capitalist society they knew at 
In that society there would be no political parties to advocate 
SQlfish i 
, nterests, and consequently irrational political conflict would a.1so 
di ".' " . ' 
e. '1'h 
. ay stunmarised their position a.s follows. 
-----.~ ---------------------------------------83. lb' 
85. 
. ~., 1'.125 • 
.. ,. .... 
19~., 1'1'.125/1. 
-- -!e:nan Finer, Re"J"es~nt"l.tive Government and a Parliament of !ndust 
a tud of the,Germ~n Fed~ral Economic Council Fabian Society and 
El eot-ge -.AlIen -&,Unwin,1923 "1' .. 21 .... The ,Webbs, .however, preferred 
quality of numbers between the Assemblies which made the problem 
even more acute. 
J.6l 
WWhen ••••• with the change in heart and the progress of 
socialisat10n, our civilisation has ceased to be pre-
dominantly capitalist in its basis, and when those who 
'live by ownin~' have sunk to a despised remnant, the 
cleavage of opinion will necessarily be different."(S6) 
The Position of legislator would change from that of a career for well-
-~~ t • .~ ama eurs representing the parties vested interests to that of a 
protessi 1 
ona vocation. Moreover, "those who pursue this vocration in the 
highest i' 
Bp rlt will find themselves relatively impartial as between the ideals 
ot ditt 
erent reformers, in all of which they will discern much that is good, 
and Will be concerned rather to discover how the particular projects of the 
idealist 
s and half-articulate desires of the electorate can be adjusted to the 
oil'cumst 
ances, in such a way as to be made, in a democratic COIDl'llunity, to work 
tor th 
e oommon benefit."(S7) In other words they would all be good rational 
indj,11idu. 
ala - ideal Fabians. Lest this judgement be thought too cynical the 
"ords ot 
one astute commentator on the Webbs Should be noted. 
"The Political Parliament was to retain all th$ present 
trappings, and so enable the young gentlemen from 
Oxford a.nd Cambridge to oontinue their Union debates 
in the traditional manner on foreign affairs a.nd other 
matters that Webb was not greatly interested in. Mean-
while the Social Parliament was to be an enlarged L.C.C. 
Lor all Encrland, where the graduates of the -London __ " -. 
SOhoOlo!.Economics would do the real business of 
gOVerning England."(SS) 
~ . 
is is not an altogether unfair desoription of Sydney Webbts ideas 
tho1.1eh B -
.. ea-trice may have harboured other thoughts. However, both ot them 
'9(el'e k 
een e~onents of the e~lareed local government idea and both were 
a.tbciou.s t 
o present a Fabian-style colleotivist conoept of the new Sooialist". 
. '9(or1d. thA'lr 
-" envisaged. It is really no, surprise that their Utopia. was a 
'---------------------------------------------86. s ' p:~e:. ~~~.Beatrioe Webb, ~~~~~i~~~~~~.~~~.~_S~~i~~~~~ .c~~~n~~~~~~, 
~cit. 
~ Ott: McBrier, "Sydney Webb and the London County Counoil" in 
1 garet Cole, The Webbs and thpir Work, rp.75/100 (pp.95/6). Italics 
'. n the original ..... _ .. " ......... " ..... . 
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b . 
ureaucratic dreamland, as a glance at Beatrice Webb's definition of her 
own general political outlook as "bourgeoise, bureaucratic and benevolent," 
shows. (89) 
Before discussing the 1mpact of the Webbs' ideas it should be noted 
that am .. -. 
ong other suggestions discussed and rejected in their book were the 
idea. of . 
a na.t~onal assembly of vocational representatives along the lines 
of Go "1 u~ d Socialism and regional devolution. The former was rejected as 
selfish i 
, rrelevant, unnecessary, undemocratic and 1mpracticable. (90) 
The 1 tt . 
a. er was opposed on the grounds that Great Britain was too homogeneous 
and cl 1 ' 
ose y integrated to be split up into Regions with the consequent ~~d 
iney" ' 
, 1table variations in the standards of public serVices that would be 
offered·
o 
• 
• An extension of local government powers they thought was quite 
SUf'!icient to deal with the problems cited by the regionai devolutionists. (91) 
MoreOY , . , .. ' 
er, geographical devolution failed to solve the basic problem of the 
inadequat . , 
e representation of the four-fold state of the individual. 
Yet the Socialist Canmonweal th was a monumental flop. It had no real 
in..- ' " , 
... luence '," 
on public or Labour opinion, although the intellectual environment 
W~nt . . 
o uns~pathetic. (92) In practical terms its proposals were deemed to be 
too art. ' . . , 
1ficia1. _ Moreover, it failed to reconcile the Utopian as'sunptions which 
\\Ie~e in 
effect, pre-conditions for the making of a successful Constitution, 
\\Iith th 
e fact that capitalism might not collapse. They failed entirely to 
allow for 
, or even to recognise, the possibility of Parliamentary changes 
~-------------------------------------------89. 8 . ,.' 
90. 
91, 
T~e ~esmond MacCarthy. "The Webbs As I Saw Them, '! in llargaret Co1e, 
~ ebbs and their Work, pp. 119/128 (126) 
Webbs C , .. 
, __ onstitution for the Socialist Commonwealth, Ibid., pp. 309/317. 
~. ~ Pp. 131/134 
!~i~ Snowden arso wrot~ in favour of the separation of industrial and 
re it1cal work, "to do this it may be necessary to create a subordinate 
l:'epresentative body, possibly elected on a somewhat different basis of 
W prlesentationto deal with industrial questions." Labour and the New ~, p.63. 
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under- the eXisting system, which is why their constitution lacked reality. 
Furth 
ennore, the Webbs were misled by their intellectual contacts into 
Ill' 
lsunderstanding the relevance of the issue of functional representation. 
Far fran being the central issue in political theory it was quite peripheral 
and ' 
. llldeed has proved to be" no more than a passing academic fad. The 
aSSUllPtion that Parliament should control the governnent was a reactionary 
lOok t 
o a non-existent "ideal" state~ while the notion that Parliament 
cOUld 
or should not interfere in economic affairs, though widespread, 
proV'ed to be part 1 of a trans1tCr.Y. phase. The Webbs were quite simp y 
out-Of-touCh·wl.'th the significance of political developments. 
Thi . 
s, Beatrice Webb would never admit. "No-one will like our 
cOnsti tut ' It l.on, she wrote, "we shall offend all sides and sections with some 
ef' oUr 
proposals •. But someone must begin to think' things out and our task' 
in life is 
to be pioneers in social engineering." ~93) She explained away 
the book"s lack of success by asserting that it was "too full of new ideas 
ana detau 
ed application to be a popular work." (94) The ideas, however, 
lVere not . 
new, they were mere~ the rephrased compromises of several old ones. 
One COnt 
emporary commentator intimated that other suggestions such as an 
:Econ ...... ' 
--l.c CounCil as C a Second Chamber, subservient to the House of ammana, 
lVere mUch ' 
better solutions to the existing situation. (95) Certainly, the 
idea of 
.' an industrial Parliament lasted longer, including among its many 
aQV'Ocat 
es Winston Churchill. (96) 
_______ I 
------------------------------------~----93. 
94. 
95. 
96. 
~~ Cole (Ed.) Beatrice Webb's Diaries 1912-1924 (London: Longnans . 
een, 1952), .p. 179. 11 May 1920. 
~id ~" p. 203. 1 January 1921. 
liel1nan F' 
. loner, On.cit., passim. 
l.S. Ch hi . P bl " Ran urc 11 "Parliamentary Government and the Economic ro em . ~s Lecture. 19 June 1930, reprinted in Thoughts and Adventures 
Suondon: Odhams Press 1947). See also Christopher Hollis Can Parliament ~ (London: World Affairs Book Club, 1950). It should be 
Corn embered, hcmever, that Churchill advocated a sub-Parliament 
. rat~OSed of technical~ qualified people and Hollis a third Chamber, . 
. er than the co-equal division envisaged by the Webbs. 
Regional devolution had a longer and far more respectable life inside 
the Labour p ... -I. 
a • .I.:IJy,boasting advocates as late as 1948. By 1920 it had been 
endo~sed b t . 
Y he most prominent Labour leaders. Ramsav'" MacDona1d, W. Adamson 
and J.R. C1ynes had all written favourable of the principle MacDona1d had 
deloa.red tha. It 
t Devolution is required in order that the citizen may keep in 
tou.ch with 
his Government and may feel, through a gradation of widening 
el.'Ou.ns 
.. , an identity with his Government. "(97) In 1919 Adamson had lieaded the 
Labour P -a~y section of an official Parliamentary delegation to Lloyd George 
~hich had asserted that devolution was HA solution of our national difficulties 
whioh all 
Sections of our people are beginning to recognise as absolutely 
necessary tt( 
• 98) In a two-day debate on Federal devolution in 1920 J.R. Clynes 
had. spoke i 
r n n favour of the advantages accruing to Parliamentary institutions, 
thl-Ough th . 
e appl1cabi1ity of the principle of devolution to the work of ;p ~Uament. (99) At grass-roots level, particularly in Scotland, many Labour 
SUpporters 
Were advocates of devolution. It is not without significance that 
the Illost 
active advocates of devolution came from Scotland or that they main-
tained. the! 
])a-nd. l( 
r beliefs in and out of season. Thomas Johnston, Jarnes Barr and 
!rkwood all fell into this category.(100) 
Yet th! . 
s is not to claim that there was complete unity on-the application 
01' the pr! _ 
nOiple of devolution. In resnonse to the success of the motion on 
-" 
Jledel:'al D 
eVOlution (101) the. Government set up a Conference on the question 
'---~----------------------~~----------97. J R ~e' Ma.cDonald, Pa-r1iament and Democracy (Manchester~ National Labour 
98 ss, 1920), Pp. 72/3 •.. , ........ " _ ..... _ 
• L1 ~d - - . Hou Geor~e Papers F/74/26/B. Report of a Joint Deputation from the ~,~sesOr.Parliament to the Prime Minister on Federal Devolution, 26 -~e 1918. -
99. ~~~~, Deb, 116 co 2088/92. 4 June 1919. Se. co 1873/1974,2063/2128 
Ann - e Whole debate. Also Forward 5 Anril 1919. Report of the 1st 
Not:al Meeting or the Scottish.Hom~Rul~~Association in 1921. See 
10 3. O. See 
.' H C' ~or e:x:a.mple, Willie Graham's speech to the House of Commons. 
101; ~,127, cc 2038/42. 
- ee Note 4. 
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. .' 
under the Chairmanship of the Speaker. Its Report was concerned not with the 
Principl i ' 
, e nvolved but "to consider what, if devolution is accepted, is the 
most P 
racticable w~ of putting it into operation. "(102) The Report put 
torw d 
a.r two a.l ternati ve schemes which differed as to the character end 
oompOsition of the sub-legislative 'bodies. The first, presented by the 
Speake ' 
r, came out in favour of grand councils, whereas a scheme advocated by 
~ " :. 
~ MacDonald wished to distinguish far more between the personnel of the 
local 
and central institutions through the setting-up of subordinate legis-
lath b ' 
e odies with separate elections. The majority of Labour Members of 
the C 
onference supported the Speaker's scheme "on the ground that it provides 
an i nn' '- . 
. ' ediate proposal tor securing a considerable measure of Devolution on 
Nati 
. ~nal lines and at the same time paves the way for the larger scheme of 
SUb " '. 
Ordinate Parliaments, which in our opinion can alone satisfy the national 
a~i . . , : '. 
rations ot both Scotland and Wales. "(103) They considered that the 
Speake , ' 
, r S scheme gave "a practical trial of the working of devolution by 
, :t'9sPOns1ble persons with P~litical 'experience."(104) In addltion,while 
they "',' .' 
approved ot the fundamental principle of MacDonald' s scheme (which Willie. 
~:t'a.h 
, am "as the only Labour member to completely support), they were "prepared 
in. the " 
meantime to accept the Speaker's tentative proposals in the event of 
its bei ." . 
, ne found impracticable 'to set up National Parliaments at an early 
date."(10S) In the event the argument was academic for as R.W.S. Pollard 
pOin.t~d ou.t the Report was not even discussed in Parliament - a fact which 
~rtf'erence on Devolutinn. Letter from Mr. Speaker to thf:t Prime Minister, 
Qid.. 698 .(1920) 1'.3. - - " , ... ,' 
ThiS., 1'.12. . 
......... 
Th1j.. t 1'.9. The phrase was that of the Speaker. 
105. . ... 
, !!?i.S,., p.1S. The other Labour Members were Charles Edwards and 
W ..T. Wilson. 
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he attributed to the unreadiness of public opinion. (106) 
During the 1920's the Scottish Members of the P.L.P. managed to 
introduce half-a-dozen Bills in favour of devolution, of which onlY two 
'Were diScussed in the Hous~" each in its turn being counted out. (107) 
The t' lorst on 9 May 1924, provoked such scenes of disorder when the Speaker 
tor reasons best known to himself, refused to accept "that the question be 
pu.t" t 
hat after a great deal et interruption he adjourned the House. (108) 
!n ret 
rospect the Speaker seems to have accepted his judgement was at fault, 
and 't 
. lo is clear that the Scottish Members were upset by his breaking an 
UnWr't 
lo ten agreement he had made with them. (109) As for the debate itself 
it Well established the need for a Scottish Parliament to deal with Scottish 
prOblems. "It is because this Parliament cannot devote the time to the 
'Wo:r\!:: " d 
, eclared George Buchanan, "and •••• because it has no knowledge of the 
problems ,. . 
- wloth which we are confronted" that a Scottish Parliament was 
nece . Ssary. (110) The P.L.P. generally supported the line and the Government 
c~e 0 t . 
u in its favour. (Ill) 
In the event the Government took note of the debate and Clynes drew 
Up a Memo 
randum on the question of devolution which he had indicated during 
the deb 
ate, should best be examined by a Canmittee. In his Memorandun to 
the Cabin ,-
et, however, Clynes doubted whether such a Canmittee could be set up 
1n "ie" ot 
the tailure of the Ullswater Canmittee and the attitude of the 
-------------------------------------------------106. Ro'be t ' :PUbl~ S~W. Pollard, Reconstruction Then and Now (London: Fabl.an 
107 catloons, Research Series, 98, 1944), p.37. 
• A Lib aJ. ' the D er . Bill received a majority, partlY though Labour support in 
1920 iVisl.on Lobbies, on Second Reading by 65 votes to 52 on 16 .April 
majo;.but failed to proceed because it had not received the prescribed 
et loty. li.C. Deb. 127, cc 2005 et.seq. See also H.C.Deb. 150, cc 1609 
108 • sect. 26 May 1922 for another Liberal Bill on Devolution. _ 
• RC D ~ ~. 173, cc 789 et.seq. The second occasion was on 13 May 1927 
1 ~. 206, co 865/878. 09. RC ~. 173, cc 871. It was unfortunate too for as the Labour Leader 
16 M ted out, the Bill "could not have gone farther this session" 
110 ay 1924. 
• ReD 111-~. 173, 00 794. 
• lb' ~., cc. 868/70. 
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TOries t 
awards proposals to set up a Select Canmittee to investigate the 
Situat· . ~on concerning the Poor Law and that of Ex-Ranker Officers. In 
addition Clynes thought that a Select Carmittee would have "serious 
disadvantages" 
so he advocated a Royal Carunission although it too was 
open to objections. (112) After discussion the Cabinet came out in favour 
or an in . qu~ry on the question but clid not seemingly set one up, instructing 
instead th P . 
. e rJ..rn.e Minister to see the labour and Liberal Hcme Rule groups 
r' 
J.rst. (U3) The proposed Ccmnittee in fact never got off the ground I 
lapsing in the wake of the Zinoviev Election of 1924. 
The various Bills designed to secure the devolutionary solution were 
based on the 
same general principles. There was to be a single chamber 
n~' . 
l.onal Parliament for Scotland with full rights to legislate:h local 
~W· . 
. rs, except where specifically prohibited. It would consist of 14-8 
lllelIlbe . '. 
rs representing the existing constituencies (two per constituency) 
returned by the 
existing electorate. Scottish representation in the 
lIoUse r 
. . 0 Ccnunons would continue until provision was made for devolution 
, in:re . 
llgland and Wales, or in later Bills, as soon as the Scottish Parliament 
-was c 
onstituted. Finance was to be the prerogative of the Scottish 
:p. 
arliament. In short, the Bills advocated Hcme Rule with accanmodation for 
geographiCal 
:imp era ti ves. 
Later experience seemed to confinn Scottish Labourites in their view of 
the 
necessity of the devolutionary solution but the Party as a whole seemed 
less in' 
terested. True, the Executive Ccmmittee resolved that the Machinery 
ot' c.o " 
'V'ernment Ccmnittee should be asked to consider the general question of 
de'V'ol' .. 
utl.on but ,it never reported. ,(114) Labour 'and the Nation came out in 
~~-----------------------------------------112 
• See QAB. 24/167. GP 324(24) and CP 329 (24) 
l13. ~. 23/4;8. 36(24)2 •. 
l14- ~ Minutes, Vol. 34, E.C. 5a 192415. 28 January 192.5. 
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tavour of " 
the creation of separate legislative assemblies in Scotland, Wales 
and England, with autoncmous powers in matters of local concern," (115) but 
the issu 
e was essentially regarded by the bulk of the Party as a minor matter. 
tabour' 
s Election manifesto repeated the pledge but the King's Speeches of 
1929 
and 1930 contained no reference to them. Al though there were some in the 
~ .t.]:> , 
• who Were in favour of the principle of devolution the Party never 
Pl'opo 
sed 11""thing ( 6) ~v of substance along these lines. 11 Significantly, 
a1thou h . 
g It Was the Scottish I.L.P. Members who were strongly in favour of 
dSV'Olut· 
lon they were more concerned with the major economic questions of the 
day than . 
wlth the political and administrative refonns to which Jowett had 
t~l 
Y established his particular views. 
The In . 
aln failure of the devolutionary solution to the problem of ~a.l'l·,~r 
lament Ws.s its ability to be' anything more than a temporary expedient. 
It lia 
s alWI!>1Ts 
-v overshadowed by what vere regarded as the pr:linary problems of 
eCOl1ani 
cs. It,was this sphere that numerous suggestions were made echoing 
the i7ebb' ' 
s ~O£ialist Cammonwealth.(117) Not all or these suggestions were by 
SOCialists. 
Churchill and Mosley, for exa'Ilp1ej although Mosley's ideas for 
t l!!oJ:' 
e Passive role for Parliament did have its sympathisers in the Party. ~hCltn.as It 
. ennedy was one who argued trbt Parliament's role should be as a more 
stticien ti ' -
strument for carrying out the policies, wishes and intentions of 
the c-
, o'V'ernrnent of the day. (118) The inability of the Second Labour Government 
"---- ' ' 
115 -------------------------------------------------
· t b 116' ~and the Nation (London: Labour Party, 1928), p.46 
• See ' ," 
C '. for example, the answers of tlacDonald and Kennedy to the Select t~lttee. H.C. 161, (1931), Questions 14, ~? ~~d 828. MaCDonald told 
s e N.E.C. in June 19.31 that he "was awaiting an opportune moment to 
. Q;t up a,Ccmmittee on the matter, but had trouble with respect to 
19~ting the tenns or reference of the Canmittee." N.E.C. Min~ 10, 
117" in, M • .348, 2.3 June 1931. " 
• ~eatrice \Vebb revised her old prOposals. See HA Refom Bill for '1932" ~ce.l Quarterl,z, U, (January~.rarch, 19.31). They had already 
. tecei~ed general support fram George Bernard Shaw: see his introduction 
. 1~ the 1930 Reprint or the Fabian tssa,ys (London: George .All en & Unwin, 
118 .31). 
• li ~, (1931), Questions 880-892. 
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to deal 't Wl h the economic problems of its day reinvigorated short-lived 
demands for devolution to a functional Parliament on the one hand and a 
decrea i 
se n the power of the Executive viz-a-viz the Private Member, whether 
by increasing his legislative iniative or introducing an element of participation 
in the f 
orm of legislative Committee, on the other. This last suggestion, 
hOWev 
er, ignored the hard pull of party ties and overstated the objectivity 
of Members' views. Such naivity was destroyed by the events of August 1931. 
The underlying motive behind the Labour Party's broad commitment to the 
deVOlutionary solution was the feeling that Parliament was declining in 
PUblic Prestige _ a simplistic view which reflected an interpretation of the 
"1der W 1 
or d rather than a recognition of the facts of British political life 
i n the 1920' s. In addition the three-party system which bedevilled any 
cont: ' .. 
l'1bution the Labour Government of 1924 and 1920-31 might have made towards 
the 'Us ' , 
e ot Parliament as an efficient instrument for the Executive's use only 
~~ . 
- anad the feeling that Parliament was useful only to those who wished 
to p 
:revent refom. "The procedure of the House," E.F. Wise told the Select 
CO~itt " 
ee of 1931, "has become aby-word ••••• in obstruction."(119) 
Obst:ru " 
ction by a Labour Opposition was one thing, opposition to a Labour 
GoVe:rrun 
entwas qUite another. The advent of the Second Labour Government 
and it 
S unfortunate relationship with the Liberals destroyed for all but the 
Ideali 
eta the notion that Parliament could be used by men of goodwill with 
littl ' 
e :reference to Party ties. If the origins of the quarrels over, 
Pl:'oced ~e in the 'Thirties are to be found in the political difficulties of 
, the S " 
econd Labour Government and the electoral disaster that followed it the, 
COlla. 
Psa of devolution as a worthwhile alternative was just as much a product 
otthose 
events. 
'---------------------------------------------------
!E~., Question 2202. Cf. J. Dnncan "Time Wasters at Westminster" 
!.orwal"d (Glas:;:ow),7 March 1931. , 
......... ,., - ... ,~. . ~ '. . . 
C·!2.men's Suffrooe: 
The history of the Franchise in the years following the first World 
War ha. b ' 
s e~n extensively traeed by David Butler in his book The Electo"'al 
~TI\i ,. . '. 
...0 ~reat Br1tain Slnee 1918 (120) but whereas Butler was concerned 
With 'i' ...... " ................ ' . . . 
he general process by which the Franchise was extended, the focus of 
this at ~u • u~ 1S primarily concerned with the attitude of the Labour Party to 
the e Qua,1iaation of the Franchise among men and women. The following 
P~es ~ill thus seek to trace the attitude of the Labour Party as seen in 
ita p 
arliamentary tactics, its arguments and consistency in the years 1919-
1928 d 
uring which it was a prominent exponent of the claims of women for the 
"ota. 
The conferment of the vote upon certain women over the age of 30b~ the 
Ue:prase t . . 
nation of the People Act 1918 had been as much a triumph for the 
tabour P 
arty as for the Feminists, for the P.L.P. was the only one of the 
three 
pre-.wa,r parties in Parliament that had consistently supported as a party 
the id 
ea of universal suffrage.(121) This is not to say that the fact that 
.0 . , , ~en had been given the vote can be attributed to the actions of the Labour 
:Part " ., .. 
if for the mai~ force of change had been the war, but the Labour Party did 
Play a . 
Slgnificant role in keeping the issue a live one.(122) 
The election debacle of 1918 produced not only the most unrepresentative 
:P . 8.rliament of the century it also pushed the Labour Party forward as the most 
l~~ , " 
if alternative government to the Coalition. Although the Parliamentary 
tab01.l 
r Party numbered only some 60 members - none of whom could be described 
"------------------------------------------------120 
• See F~otnote 16 above. 121 
• ~OAh not without some internal dispute. ConstanceRover~ Or.cit. 
12a. 46 167. '. _, . 
On the Second Reading of the Bill that finally assimilated the 
FranChise, Baldwin admitted that it was the war that knocked the 
... heart out of the opposition to women' s suffrage. H. C. Deb. 215 
cc 1474. 29 March 1928. 
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as intell tu 
ec al powerhouses - it was a party of honest endeavour and was 
SUPported by Labour oreanisations several millions strong. It claimed 
to be the Party of the masses of underprivileged people, to be on the side 
of just! -. 
ca and used every opportunity _ admittedly not always to the best 
ad~antaee - to state its particular case and its eeneral beliefs. 
One of the tactics used by the P.L.P., particularly on the issue of 
-omen's 
SUffrage, was to utilise Private Members' time in the House to put 
r Ot'VIa;ra, 
reformatory measures. This particular tactic had a double-edged 
effect. 
In the first place it brought the party welcome publicity on a 
lIIeasure lik 
ely to arouse general sympathy and secondly, helped to show 
indi~d 
Uals who were attracted to the Labour Party,particularly in the Liberal 
l>8.l'ty, tha.t 
there was some ground for common political allegience. r 
The P.L.P.' s awareness of the advantages was made clear by its 
intl.'oducti 
on, in the name of Ben Spoor, of the Women's Emancipation Bill 
lIlhich 130ueht to e~ualise the position of men and women as far as civil and 
jUdin' . ~\al apPOintments, the franchise and admission to the House of Lords were 
conce~",~ . 
. <;\,I.. . Wl.111am Mamson, the leader of the P.L.P., moving the Second 
~ead.i 
ne of the Bill in Spoor's absence, used the opportunity to state that the 
intl.'oducti 
.. on of the Bill by the Labour Party was "simply the natural seq,uence 
or all 
Our past work and past effo~s on behalf of the enfranchisement of the 
"olllen of 
the country. We have always contended that in o~er. to give fair 
and e1uitahle treatme~t to the women folk it was essential that the existine 
~estra.i . 
nts and disabilities should be removed."(123) It was a claim that was 
to Pro'V'ok . 
e some 8.nvury Liberal reactions, but for the moment Mamson continued 
uninterrupted to argue that the Bill was the 10e1ca1 outcome of the vast 
~~----------------------------------------'2 I 3,
1i.C. Deb. 114 6.0.1561.- -4 April 1919. 
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h . , 
c angesthat had recently taken place in society, of the response of women 
to th . 
. e needs of the state in war-time and of the measures already taken 
toward 
s securing the canpleteemancipation of women. (124) Mr. Lunn, 
second' ..,. 
. lng, noted the absence from the King's Speech of any reference to the 
Coalit . 
ion government's election manifesto's promise to equalise the 
franChise. '(125) The principles of the Bill he cla:imed were widely supported 
by wane ,; , : . 
n s orgamsations as well as the Labour Party; no new arrangements 
cOUld . 
or need be adduced in its favour. The situation where a wanan could 
sit in b 
ut not vote for Membership of the House at 21 was ludicrous. The 
eqUal' . 
l.sation of the franchise at 21 was essential to the e'stablishment of 
de.mocra . .... . . . , . 
ay, he added, and appealed to the government to allow the Bill a 
SeCond R . 
.. r- eading and make any changes it felt were necessary in Ccmmittee. 
The Bill found wide support fran all sides of' the House, most of the 
Contrib t' 
u loons bearing out Lunn' s contention that the principle of the measure 
"'as ge '. 
ne rally accepted. A number of Liberals took the Labour Party to task 
fo . 
r its 1 ' ' 
C allns that it was the champion of women's causes, while a number of 
Conserv . 
atives countered with the argument that as the Trade Unions did not 
apPly enUallo't·v as ~ 'J a principle, Wf\y should the State? This line of argument 
caused ' ..' , , 
So much confusion in the Labour ranks that the Conservatives' were quick 
to Use . .• " . -. ' ' 
lot again with greater effect on the Third Reading. Robert Young, 
for e 
Je8lnple, spent as much t:ime defending Trade Unions as he did defending 
. the p . 
rl.nciple of the Bill. (126) Moreover, the P.L.P.'s attack on the 
OpPonent' . 
s of the Bill and their delaying tactics, lacked co-ordination. 
Whereas y '.' . ' " ' , 
. oung was not prepared to admit that the Speaker's 'Conference 
"'as . 
a aQnpranise which ought to be . given 
-----
-------------------------------------------------
~C. Deb·.' l' J, cc l5t::1 /5 
- .&.£to. UI+I,. 
See Note 5. ' 
.!he. Deb. 114 ~c. 1595/8.' Young was a member for Newton, Lancs. 
173 
e1'aate1' time before . t t a proper assessment could be made of 1 s recommenda ion~ 
01' that the 1a.st cht:ln.oo. e's t -~ in the franchise were too recent to con emp1ate 
fu:t'the1' additions to the suffrage, another Labour l~mber, Captain A1bert 
Smith 
, gladly 'accepted the validity of these arguments.(127) Most Labour 
Mamb 
. e,1'a probably thought like Tom Ca.pe that, "if we have all made up our 
minds th t 
. a the principle of the Bill is right why should we de1~ any longer?", 
and Co 1 
nc uded with him that, "the Bill is receiving more opposition because 
its int 
roduction has fallen to the lot of the Labour Party than for any other 
1'eason."( 128) 
~ 
Dr. Addison, President of the Local Government Board, pointed out that 
no Gave ~nment Could be expeated to do everything at once. However, although 
he ' '. . " 
B.:t'SUed that the Bill was badly drafted and would constitutionally require 
a. Cane!, 1 .. . 
. a Election if passed into law,he recommended the House to give the Bill 
a Second R .. 
. ,eading on the understanding that the Government would seek to delete 
the Cl 
aUse extending the franchise to women and to put other clauses into an 
Qcceptabl . 
e shape. After the closure was successfully moved by .. 119 ,to 32 the 
~~R . .
eading was given without a discussion. Only one third of the member-
shi'!) 
- ot the P.L.P. managed to find their way into the division 10bbies.(129) 
Th .. 
e Government's inaction in Stadding Committee E to whic~ the ,Bill was 
:t'emitt . 
ed Was indication of i tsintention to kill the Bilt on Third Reading, 
an inte t 
n ion Soon confirmed by 1iajor Astor, Parliamentar,y Secretary to the 
~~"e ~ 
!' of Health, when he moved the Bills rejection on the grounds that it 
~a . 
a ,too badly drafted to be amended and that the government would redeem its 
electio " . 
, n pledges by bringing in a similar measure of its own but without the 
Q'U't1' 
aee Clause. He made it perfectly cle!U' that it was the timing not the 
................ 
~--------------------------------------------
.Thta., c.o. 15'76/8. Smith was Labour Member for Nelson. 
!b.g.,o:.o. 1610/11. 
!Q~., o.c. 1625/8. Eighteen members of the P.L.P. voted while two 
others acted as tellers. 
Pl'incipl . l' t . . 
e 0 he BJ.ll that was the pOJ.nt at issue, repeating the cla.im that 
the lat 
est compromise was too recent to be overthrown and reiterating the 
notion th t 
a the conventions of the constitution would requi~e such a change 
to be fall -. 
owed by a general election, which he rationalised as being bad for 
et1'ici . 
ency J.n government and public opinion in general. (130) By the time 
the Ma.' Jar had made his final substantive point that the coming enquiry on 
legisl ti--
a ve devolution could lead to a fuller wide-ranging discussion of the 
tranchi 
se question the House was clearly roused to anger and the P.t.P. was 
~resented ~ -w~th a golden opportunity to exploit the government's embarrassment 
tor PI' 
°paeanda purposes. 
Un1'ortu t 1 It ~" na e y, the P.t.P. failed to rise to the occasion. s spe~ers 
lllade all th 
'r e appropriate points; the government had not pressed its amendments 
in COmmit 
tee because of the strength of feeling in the House; the government 
had th 
e facilities to rectify any alleeed bad draftsmanship; if it was true 
that th 
ere was wide aereement on the principles of the Bill then the 
GO~ern ' 
ment's action was bBsed on expediency alone. Tom Shaw tried to polarise 
the is ' 
Sue by declaring "either the government intends to give these women 
'9'otes 
Or it doe~ not," but lack of co-ordinated P.t.P. effort made his speech 
SOund mOre like a virtuoso effort.(131) The tiberals, by comparison, 
b.tilis d -
e their Parliamentary experience to quietly lambast the Government for 
the '97 
ay in which it was attempting to circumvent the control of the House. 
Few L 
abour Members' speeches compared with that of George Thorne who riddled 
the Go - -'. -
vernment's case with holes.(132) No doubt part of this failure was due 
"----
'30 --------------------------------------------------
• K.c. De.2, 111, cc 1283. et.seg. 4 July 1"919. 131. Ibi 
--.[., Col. 1311/13. 
132. O' 'I" . 
n y Shaw and George Spencer, who, like Thorne, had served on the 
Standing Committee, contributed speeches of comparable quality and 
relevance. Thorne's speech is to be found in Ibid., cc. 1300/3, 
Spencer's in cc 1315/8. ~ 
.. 
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to lack f 
o experience on the part of the P.L.P. members, but the main reason 
tor it was, the fact that more than half of the P.L.P.' s contributors were 
detensi i 
ve n tone, concerned more to defend Trade Unions against the claim 
that th 
e forthcomine "Restoration of Pre-War Practices" Bill was unfair to 
lfOlllen th 
. an to advocate the principle of women's suffrage. This Conservative 
tactic 
was an obvious red-herring, a convenient excuse to vote aeainst women's 
suttra.ge, but only Tom Shaw seemed to recognise its intellectua.l weakness and 
POlitic 1 
a irrelevance. "If women are entitled to the vote," he asked, "why 
ShoU.ld. th . 
e a.lleged inequalities of Trade Unions prevent them from having 
it1"(133) 
. Moreover, the P.L.P. attack was blunted by its contradictory tone. 
Shaw olaimed that the Labour Party did not want (though they would welcome) an 
e1ectio 
n While Ben Spoor claimed that current industrial unrest demanded one. 
:B'u.~he:r:m 
ore, the cogent argument that the measure was needed to head off direct 
~~ . 
and. restore the people's faith in Parliamentary demooracy was used only 
once.(134) Overall the P.L.P.'s contradiction to the debate was an 
indisti 
neuished failure, out of which only Tom Shaw and George Spencer could 
be p 
roud. of ther efforts. Ironically, too, it contained one of the best 
e~ressi 
ons ot the La.bour Party's commitment to women's suffra,ge by Jack Jones 
~~ . - -
9l:' l,)l:'essure from hostile government back-benchers deolared, 
''We of the Labour Party stand for the fullest possible 
expression of political rights, apart from sex, for 
equali ty of opportunity, the right to govern, and the 
right to take part in the election of Governments, 
because we cannot expect to have any kind of real 
government if we divorce a great mass of people from 
the pOssibility of taking part in the eleotion of the 
Government. "(135) 
'----133. ::-------...:.----------------!l?g., cc 1311. 
'34. . ... 
By Sl,)encer, Ib1.d., co 1315/6. 
'35. ~., cc 1296. _ Jones was .the Member for Silvertown. _ 
. , 
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Despite the Government's refusal to take off the whips the Bill was 
given a Thi 
rd Reading by a combination of Conservative defectors, Liberal 
i ndiVidll als, h ( ) 13,1f-l\-dozen nl".tionl3,lists and 34 Members of the P.t.P. 136 
The Victory was, 
of the Bill into law. 
of course, meA-nine1 p.ss in tel"r'1s of sec'.'tT1!'1.;! the re.sseee 
Within three weeks the Go~,e'!'nment had :Introduced its 
Own 13i] 1 i 
. nto the House of Lords, conte,inine all but the suffraee clause and 
h!ld . dere'ded the original P.L.P. Bill without disc'Jss:l-on. ~1e extension of 
the surf 
rage was deferred, at least until the next session. 
On 27 Febrtl.ary 1920, Mr. T.W. Grundy, Labour Member for Rother Valley, 
moved th ' 
-e Second Reading of a Bill which soueht to equalise the franchise 
betlVee 
n men and women, abolish plural votine, enfranchise those under 21 who 
ha.d be . 
. ' r' en gl.ven a vote as servicemen in 1918 but had lost it on'demobilisation, 
and to 'b 
a oUsh the registration requirement for the university franchise.(137) 
The Bill 
, which was supported by Renderson, Clynes, Adamson,Spoor and Shaw 
(01ear1 . 
. Y it was an official Labour Bill), contained a number of new and lastin,z 
idea 
. S regarding the Le,bour Party's' view of women' s suffr~e. Firstly, 
ell!l)he.si . 
"', S was placed on the abolition of the existine franchise and its 
l.'en1ace .. 
... ment by one based on residential qualifications alone. The basis of 
the electoral qualification was to be changed and extended not merely 
eqU.alia .. ' _ 
ed. The second point is that the 'extension of the franchise was 
linked . 
wtth other issues of franchise reform. Women's mlffrage was no lOQ3er 
an end it 
self, but part of a wider process of reform. This fact is reflected 
in the kind 
of resolutions placed before and approved by the Labour Party 
Annual C ' ' . . 
onference. In 1921, for example, a res~lution was passed advocating 
thee"·' 
qu.alisation of the franchise between men and women but by 1925 the 
e . 
qU.ivalent 
resolution called for general reforms in Parliamentary and local 
'--
'36. ~I-b-i------~--~~~~~--~~~--------------------
~., co 1343/6. 
" 3 ... 
1. .!h.c. Dary •. 125, cc 2067 et. seq. 
l77 
gOvernment .... electoral law. It called for:-
"A single franchise for all purposes, Parliamentary 
and local government, applicable equally to men and 
wanen at the age of 21 years, based on the existing 
six months' "residential qualification thus abolishing 
plural voting and the so-called 'business' vote, and removing 
the present inequalities affecting wanen, simplifying 
registration work and securing one register for all 
elections." 
Other proposals included the strengthening of the Corrupt and Illegal 
Practices Act with regard to bribery, various fonns of ,int:imidation and 
undue infl 
uence, the issue interests, the registratioru· of all vehicles used 
tor the 
, Conveyance of voters to the poll with the Returning Officer not 
later than 72 hours be""'ore tm t J. the opening of the polling, and the enac en 
ot legal 
' prOVisions making ~t the duty of the Returning Officer to 
apPOrtion .vehicles ( ) equally among the Candidates, irrespective of party. 138 
Clearly such changes were of fundamental importance, identifying the 
Labour p , 
arty With a whole series of refonns designed to secure a unifonn 
de.n . 
ocratic Pranchise P ree 1 -=_P Th d J. J. fran externa monetar,y ~uluences. ey ensure 
that 
the realisation of one aim would be followed by the pursuit of the 
reali . 
sation of 
tOr 
others. Consequently" they proved to be a great :impetus 
retOlln -
. • On the floor of the House, however, theY,were to prove a 
hindrance in 
,that they provided opponents of the female suffrage with a reaqy~ade 
eJtcuse 
tor Opposing the :aill on grounds other than anti-feminism. Though 
not alw ~s apparent at first this tactic became standard practice for opponents 
ot t 
eInale SUP-age 
J..L.I: as tjme went an. 
In 1920, however, Mr. Grundy successfully moved the Second Reading of ' 
hl.sB:Ul 
.in the House of Canmons with little difficulty! Unlike Mr. Adamson, 
the 
PreVious year, Mr. Grundy did not base the claims for female suffrage on 
'----
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• ~. ~P.A.C.R. 1925, p.291 and L.P.A.C.R. 1921, p.2ll. Sjmilar 
C esolutions on the same subject were passeQ at the Annual 
onterences of 1927, 1931 and 1933. 
their f 
e fort in the war but as a right per se. Tom Myers cogently added 
to G.l:'u.n~ •• ' ~ s case "on the ground of equality, simple justice and social 
progres th -
S e case is definite and clear for this Bill to eo forna!'d." (139) 
It is n t' 
o clear whether Myers meant this sentence to apply to the whole Bill 
~~w , ( 
omen s ~lffrage alone, for he, like other P.L.P. speakers other than 
the I'IlOV ) , 
er made no reference to the abolition of the business qualification 
"hich 
seemed in effect' to be an appendage waiting to be used as a bareaining-
COunter. 
A couple of Labour speakers (Robert Young and Morgan-Jones) did 
lIla1te ref 
erence to the disenfranchised ex-servicemen" but most P.L.P. 
Contl'ib 
utions were concerned primarily with female suffrage. The arguments 
th t 
a. were put forward against female suffrage (women were tooemotive to vote 
at 21· t 
, 0 enfranchise more women than men would give women greater opporttUlities 
th~ In ' 
en whom they oould then outvote on various issues), were once again 
su.perbl 
Y answered by Tom Shall' who argued that his experienoe and commonsense 
Elhowed th 
e ridiculous nature of such claims. Will Carter, careering off on 
a well"used tangent, made the usual reference to the Parliamentary standpoint 
or the Labo,,- Party, 
....... declarine, "I am supporting this because I am a 
COnstit t 
u ionalist. I believe in the constitution. I am not one of those 
"Who g . ., 
o about preaching anarchy and advocating all sorts of new ideas."(140) 
Neither 
apparently was Dr. Addison who told the House that the Government 
"WOUld 
allow a free vote whilst retaining the right to bring forward those 
a.rnendnte . t 
n s they considered necessary and that he personally would vote in . 
t's.Vo 
Ul:' ot the Bill.· The closure was moved by 122 to 38, the Second Reading 
Pa.SSed. witho"t ( ) '~ a discussion and the Bill sent to Standing Commitee. 141 
'''---.. 
139. --------------------------~C.·Deb~ 125 cc 2082. 
140. 
.Th.g. , . 00 2120. 
141. -i6 Memb'ers of the P.L.P. and 2 Tellers were present at the count, 
.e., two-thirds of the total P.L.P. strength in the House, and _ 
one-third of the 124 Members in the division, (inoluding tellers).' 
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In Standing Committee the Government and its supporters, led by Sir 
Frederick B anbu-~t utilised every available procedural device to obstruct 
and. limit the scope of the Bill. Amendments to limit the Bill to the 
equalisation of women over 30 was defeated 21 to 13, while another amendment 
setting th 
e age at 25 was defeated 15 to 6. The Committee then decided to 
adjourn discussion of the Bill as it had no hope of passage into law (the 
G.o\1ernme t' 
n S support of this course of action made that quite clear).(142) 
JOh ' 
n R. Clynes for the Labour Party raised the matter by Private Notice 
Qu.eetio b 
n ut was unable to eet Bonar Law to admit it w'!\:s the Government's 
POlicy ,to kill the Bill ( 
. its attitude in Committee had been more hostile than 
on the .p, ~400r of the Rouse) and indeed was met by the claim that it was the 
~ill's . 
SUpporters' own fault for not turning up to the Committee's meetings.(143) 
AJ.th~ueh 
the Bill was considered by the Committee early in 1~, it was as good 
as dead 
and shortly afterwards Mr. Grundy surrendered to the forces of 
inaction. (144) The only result of the Bill was the introduction of a one-01 . . 
ause Act enfranchising what few ex-servicemen under 21 that there were.(145) 
Its eft' , 
ect Was only minimal but the passage of the Bill did indicate that 
8.nolllalie . 
S could be eradicated by bringing them to the attention of the Government. 
Fa!' th ' 
e next three years the Labour Party introduced and supported 
l'Ilea~res' ' '. 
COnfering .the ,franchise. Uo Labour Bills were read on Second Reading 
bu.t both . 
Lord Robert Cecil and Isaac Foot introduced Biils under the 10 minute 
:t'u.l e Wh' ~ch the Labour Party supported, without any legislative result.(146) 
'---~--------------------------------------------
'42 
• 
143. 
Parliamentary Papers 1920, VIII, 1'.411 • 
R C -~ • Deb. 128,cc 516/9. The P.L.P. however did not have the 15 Members 
ecessary,to prevent the adjournment taking place. 
'44, See Note 6. 
10 and 11 Geo.5. ch.15. 
'45. 
'4 
6, ~5'C' Deb •. 151,cc 1286 (Cecil), 
AD!'!l 1923. 
8 l~h 1922. H.C. Deb.163, cc 469 (Foot) 
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The advent of the first Labour government, however, raised distinct hopes 
that a r 
ranchise Bill would be proposed, not simply as a Private Members Bill 
'Ni th gOvernment iVhatever hopes did support, but as a Government ;: mea'3ure. 
eJd.st 
Were dashed by the absence of any reference in the King's Speech to the 
equ.a1is ti 
a. on of the franchise, despite its recent confirmation in Labours' 
election .. 
manifesto. (141) Consequently, it was a ?rivate Member, W.M. Adamson, 
"ho n:t'o 
, Posed a Bill reducing the age of enfranchisement to 21, based solely on 
J::'eside 
nCe qualifications (except for the university franchise) - thus 
abolishi""" the ' .~ business vote'. The Bill also soueht to abolish registration 
toJ::' 'Univ-
ersity franchis~and to remove certain other disqualifications.(148) 
lrO'Ti 
'. ng the Second Readine of the Bill, Adamson reminded the House of its 
lll.'evio 
. r 1.1.a diScussions on female suffrage, the favou-rable conclusions that they 
had. l.'e h 
a.c ed and of.' the fact t~at all Labour, Liberal and 90T'19 60 Conservative 
~embe,..s 
. were pledced t~ the equal f~nchise. He made it perfectly clear 
that he 
Was not prepared t~ jeopardise the el).ualisation of the franchise, 
~iCh w . 
as the main purpose of the Bill, by pushine the other proposals too 
taJ::' 
• Re Was prepared to leave such matters to. the sense of the House and 
conclU.d 
ed by appealing to the Government to provide the necessary facilities 
tl) en" 
sure the passaee of the Bill. Miss Jewson,(149) seconding, pointed out 
tha.t t 
he Compromise of 1918 had been temporarily accepted by women's 
o~Za.niaations and would have been ended if the Coalition had fulfilled its 
&lectio 
n pledges by allowing legislative facilities for the measures passed 
in. th 
e R011se in 1919/20/22 and 23 •... Women who were a.dversley effected by 
eConomic 
COnditions should have the right to have control over the system 
."--.. 
--~----------~-------------------------------
'47. 
"Labour stands for eauality between man and woman, e~ual rolitical 
and leeal rights .... :" Craig, Qn.cit., p.23. 
~c. Deo •. 110,oc 85get.seq. 29 'F~b~lary 1924. 
~., 863/6 • 
. . . 
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that affected them". Expressing the view that there was widespread support 
1'01.' the B' J.11 she voiced her "shock and disapPointment tf that the Government 
had. not talc 
en the matter up officially and pleaded that the Bill should 
:receiVe full facilities. 
'rh 
e weakness of Labour's case was in presenting a complex Bill, for 
both the Government and the Orposition seized on this to declare that while 
they We 
l.'e in favour of the Bill they could not officially support it because 
El e'V'el.'a,l f 
. 0 its measures were so contentious. The Duchess of Atholl who 
mOVed a . 
n amendment to refer the question to an all-party Conference along the lines 
ot1ha.t of 1918 argued that the Bill, despite the press build-uPI was not merely, 
01.' e Ven mainly, concerned with women's suffrage but was designed to tfdrastically 
and,.. l.'adically" alter the whole electoral basis of Government. Several other 
spea.k:el.' . 
a accused the Labour Party of attempting to secure illegitimate 
electo 
l.'a1 changes in the'guise of a women's suffrage Bill and for that reason 
declined to SUpport the Bill. For the Government the Under Secretary at the 
RomeDena~ . ~ ·~~ment Rhys Davies,(150) argued that the return of the parties to 
thet 
1.' Old Political allegiences made an agreement along the lines of 1918 
1nl''' 
:t'l.'actical..le • 
• 1) " The CJ.overnment was in favour of the Bill but he refused to 
" gi'V'e an,. i . 
, . ." ndication now as to what'the attitude of the Government would be 
it' the Bill is sent to a"Committee upstairs."(151) Questioned further on 
the matt 
er by Ben Turner, Davies replied, "Every Member realises that the 
G.o'V'e:rnment is in a minority, and it will be a question for the House itself 
!l.a to th 
e exigiencesof Parliamentary time."(152) Evidently the~ 
'---~----------------------------~--------------
'50 
• Memb~r for Westhouehton. 
151 ~ 
• ~~., cc 884. In aCcordance with the Cabinet's decision of 28 
,ebl'Uary 1924. CAB 23147.17(24)16. 
152. ~. 170,cc.885. 
l8~ 
Governm 
. ent was feeling its w~. Davies' answers)however, did not mlffice 
to calm L 
abour fears and it was left to John R. Clynes(153) to point out 
that if th . 
e B~ll had been a simple matter of women's suffraee then there 
wOUld h . 
ave been little difficulty getting it through the House, though he 
did 
not e~lain why, if this were the case, the Government did not introduce 
the mea 
SUre itself. He did s~, however, that the Government's weak 
P9.l.'liam t 
. en ary position had influenced its thinking on the matter. ~e have 
not the 
• same power for closure," he declared "that has been possessed by 
othe:r Go '.
, vernments which have had a majority behind them. We are more in 
the ha.~d 
S of the House than any other Government has been. As far as I 
'U.Qdel'sta d 
n the procedure and practice of this House, if I had made a 
declarati 
r on ••••• that we will take over this Bill, make it Ottr own and take 
fUll res 
ponsibility for it in its later stages, !t would probably be killed 
tbi ' 
s atternoon."(154) If the whole Bill had been adopted that may well have 
been the ' 
case put if female suffrage alone had been advanced, even with 
Changes i ,
n he basis upon which qualification was to be allowed, the fact 
that it 
Was a Government Bill would hardly have affected the decision of the 
ROuse. 
The reasons for the Governmentts refusal to propose a Franchise Bil~ 
in the Cl 
ircumstances of 1924, ~elfects a deeree of insecurity upon its part. 
trnt'Ortu.n t 
a ely, this political insecurity occasionally conveys itself as 
POlitic 
a1 cOwardice. Members of the first Labour government were not 
€ene:rall' " , 
Y noted for 'their vigorous leadership and frequently they sought the 
~as" l' 
oT, e th ' 
'., e least controversial, way out of any issue, particularly when U ' 
, in-volv d 
, e the party's relations with the Liberals. This is clearly seen 
in th . , 
"', e Contrastine manner in which they deal t with Mamson' s Bill and the 
, :,-. 
~3 
• L~o;r~dtb-~.~~~----------~--~------~-------------------
, 54 -I:'.r:~ vy Seal in the first Labour Government. 
, • ~ •• 170,cc 927. 
l83 
Liberal P.R. Eill wh:i.ch was due to be read on 2 May 1924. Adamson's Ei11, 
So far 
as it was concerned with the principle of women's sltffrage, was 
'llidely sUp-norted in the House. M t had ~ All sections of the Labour ovemen 
been connn· t ' .. ~ ted to the prinCiple since the party's inception at the turn of 
the cent 
uxy. Despite this, the first Labour government hesitated in 
introd i 
ne ng the measure and, indeed, gave the matter very little consideration 
i n Cabinet. Its ar~xrnents in defence of its actions were weak, its tactics 
POOl' and it s 
support somewhat less than who1e-hearted and doematic. By 
cOIllDa.:ri ' 
son the P.R. Bill received inordinate attention from the Cabinet. 
Arth\i:r 11 ' 
enderson submitted a memorandum to the Cabinet pointing out that 
sOllle 80 L "', . 
abour M.P.'s had expressed themselves in favour of the principle, 
"hicn h 
r ad wide support in the Labour Movement. (155) MacDonald read a letter 
tl'OIll As ' ' 
quith emphasising the importance of the measure from the Liberal point 
ot View , ,; , 
• The Cabinet decided by a considerable majority to recommend to the 
p.t 11 
• • sU!Jport for the Second Readine of the Bill in the House. (156) 
!cconnnod ~ . 
ating the Liberals was held to be more important than adhering to 
eZali.t 
arian prinCiples for, despite Henderson's assertions, P.R. did not have 
a deep ho "" , 
Id upon the P.L.P. or the rest of the Labour Movement. The Cabinet's 
&.d.Vice wa " , 
s rejected by the P.L.P. which insisted on a free vote, and then 
J:ll'oceeded t -', , ' , 
o help vote the measure down, and within two years P.R. had been 
otficial ' 
ly condemned by Party Conference. The least the first Labour 
Go~el'nme . 
nt Could have done was to have arraneed support for P.R. as a means of 
sec\tri 
ng the equalisation of the franchise. But that was not their way. 
~ey h .' 
ad inSisted on followine the moderate rather tha.n the Socialist wa.y and' 
1I0111en, s ,", .' \ . 
SUffrage w~s just another casualty of weak.leadership. Political 
-
'------------~-----------------------------------155. CA ~166/275. 
'56 
, • .Q.@ 23/48. 29(24)5.' 1 May 1924. 
t. 
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ideals were not i f H 
re n orced by political courage. Arther enderson 
admitted the P.t.P.'s tactical error when he said in a similar debate 
twelve 
months later, "It was repeatedly stated (in 1924) tha.t if ••••• 
(the nrol"lG) -, 
. .. J.' eer of the Bill had contented himself with a single Clauffi to 
bring b . ~ out equality of political rights there would have been a more 
friendl d" 
y ~sposition towards the Bill than was shown in the Committee -
thOUgh 
- •• ••• the disposition of the Committee, as a whole, was not a1to~ether 
Unfriendl 
y ••••• We have respond.ed to the appea.1s made to us on the last 
occasio 
n and have restricted the Bill on this occasion to the one principle 
of Dla.cin.oo men ~ and women on an equality before the law so far as the 
franChise is ( 
concerned." 157) 
. r Unfortunately, this admission of error was twelve mon.ths too] ate, 
althoull'h 
'" one susrects that i.ts recoenition occured Much earlier. However, 
Until th 
, e tntroduction of the Conservative Government's Bill in 1928 the 
p.t.P I 
• s tactics were to press in Parliament for equal suffraee alone. 
Adam I .' 
son s Bill meanwhile continued on its nrocedura1 wa,y to Standing 
COllllni tt -' ... 
ee A where, after a short period of open e~d then secret bargainin3 
!damson f 
ollowine a course of action encouraeed by the GovernMent,succeeded i . -
n Securi 
ng Conservative promises to accept an e~ual franchise at the see of 
21 t 
, houeh all the other clauses were lost. Unfortunately, Conservative 
idea.s of . .. 
what constituted a promise conflicted with those of the P.t.P. 
and the Bil . 
1 was subjected to a number of delaying and sometimes ridiculous 
a.mendment s ( 158 , 
• One amendment giving the vote to the wives of business voters 
~~----------------------------------------'57. 
'58 
• 
~ D~:2..; 180 cc 1487/8. In the 1924 ParliamentarY Report it was 
ated that "In Committee it wa.s soon ma.de evident that if all' the ~~oViSions of the Bill were adhered to, it would never eet through, 
f d eVentually it was aereed to confine the Bill to equality in the 
r.anchise." L.P.A.C.R. 1924, p.103. 
S .... .... 
C ee Butler, OT).cit., pp.23/4 and Standln;,,; Cormnittee R~nort9 1924. 
c 490 et.se,}..- . See Note 7. 
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Was a.cce"r)ted~' ( ) 
.. • • ..L.I4.&.A..1.1" a. dlovision thus doubling the business vote at a stroke • 
The Bill 
.' was eventually reported out of COmMittee on 19 June 1924 but was 
not dis '. 
cussed by the House during the summer and duly disappeared with the 
first t b 
a Ot~ Government, in the wake of the Campbell case and the Zioviev 
latte~ 1 . 
- e action of that year.(159) 
Back in opposition the La1)our Party once again took up the fi~ht for an 
El . ~'.1.a.l franchise when Mr. Whitelw, Labour Member for Bl~don, introduced a. 
Bill whi h 
.. c Sought to extend the vote to women on the same te~s as men.(160) 
Its Se' .. 
cond Reading on 20 February 1925 was to prove a momentmls occasion for 
it········ 
. was on this Bill that the Government effectively, if unwittingly and 
reluctantly, committed itself to the principle of female suffraee at 21. 
Mo'li 
ne the Second Readin~, Mr. Whiteley invoked Ba.ldwin's :pledee, denied that 
altel.'ations in the' franchise t· d l' d \..-necessi tated a general elec loon an c aJ.II"e tHat 
all that Was at issue were the details not the principle of women's 
SUffl.'age.(161) Joynson-Hicks for the Government a~eed with Whiteley's 
Sentim t' '.
en s but moved an amendment.declinine to give such a. measure a. Second 
neadine . 
'so early in a. Parliament, involving as it would a. General Election 
With its disrUptive consequences and recording its opinion "that 
SCheme 
of franchise reform should be brou.ght before this House at 
op . 
J;lc>l.'tunity within the life-time of the present Parliament."(162) 
a considered 
a suitable 
The P.t.P.,however, had organised its case quite well. They submitted 
that t 
here was no real constitutional precedent demanding that changes in the 
tl'a.t'lchi . 
. se necessitated a. general' election and refurbished Whiteley' Bother 
:Points.' . . . '. . 
Axthur Hendersonforcibly argued that the Bill should be given a 
~ 1 '" ------------------------
59. i::~ ~9~ent f 01 teOmmi tt ed to the· nie/'Sure (CAB: 23 be. 45 (24) 330 .... 
160 
..!h9. D~. 180,cc. 1419 et. seq. 
161 
. • 1,gc.Cit. See Note 8. 
16<. .. .. 
1h..C. Deb.: 180, oc. 1496. 
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. ,.,. 
Second Reading but its date of opera.tion be postponed until the next general 
election. In the meantime a Conference, presided over by the Speaker, 
COUld deal with other related questions such as redistribution, election 
eJCpen.di t .. 
ure, COrrtlpt practices and, if necessary, methods of voting. The 
Only oth 
er conclusion Henderson thoueht could be drawn from the Government's 
actions was that it inten'ded to kill t i i t b' the Bill on h S occas on so as 0 r1Q3 
in 9, similar mea.sure later in the 
eJrtendi 
ng the franchise to women. 
Session in order to obtain the credit for 
There is little doubt that this was one of the Government's reasons for 
adoPting the tactics it did, but, unfortunately, Joynson-Hicks was not 
Pt'e:p9,'t'ed t 
o make such a damaging admission. Instead he claimed that the Bill 
coU.ld, . 
-r not be passed without an accompanying measure of redistribution.(163) 
The Go 
vemment, he declared, did intend to carry out the Prime Minister's 
l'ledge it 
whin the life-time of the present Parliament but that pledge should 
be C9,l"t'i 
ed out by inter-party agreement secured through the medium of a 
SDe~e t ' , 
't' S Conference to be set up in 1926. Under pressure Joynson-Hicks 
eJCpand d ' 
e his Views by saying that "no difference will take place in the ages 
at "hie " , ,. , 
,h men and,women will go to the poll at the next election," and, 
qU.esti 
oned further, admitted that it would be virtually impossible to raise the 
~e ot' ' 
male SUffraee to 25 - a common Conservative ba.ckbench idea.(164) 
Th ," , 
e implications of Joynson-Hi~ks' rema"t'ks were not, hovlever, fully 
e.PPt'eci"'t d ' ~,e on the Labour benches. Ramsay MacDonald was one of the several 
ta.bo1.l.:r 11' , . 
embers who pressed for an explicitydeclaration by the Home Secretary 
on. t . 
he nuestion H i -"- d t d 
.. of aee, which Joynson- icks on .. everJ occas on re.l.use 0 o. 
~-------------------------------------------------------------163 ' 
,. The 1928 Act, of course, was passed without any such accompanying measure. 
164" " 
. • .1h£... Deb',' 180. cc. 1504. 
-
, , 
B:o'IVe'ler 
'~. Me~Donald: ••••••• It is no use the Government 
askine for an agreement on this subject if its own 
mind is so ••••• open, regardine matters which we 
regard as absolutely essential to a democratic 
franchise ••••• we s~all not yield one single shadow 
of an inch on a j>ri vileee which democracy ha.s gained 
by years of agitation. So essential is this to the 
democratic position that it would be a waste of time 
and a farce for two or three people to go into cons-
ultation with a principle like this left open ••••• 
My hone Friend behind me, in an unguarded moment, 
expressed satisfaction at an interruption made by the 
Home Secretary when he said, "It is all open'! 
Sir W. Joynson-Hicks : 
Mr. MacDonald 
Sir W. Jaynson-Hicks 
,Mr. l.lacDonald 
I have never said it is goi~ 
to be 25. 
Has he said it is going to be 
21? 
No. 
Then it may be anything and 
thirty is open as both these 
ages ••••• " (165) 
, unwittingly or not, Joynson-Hicks had committed himself as a 
POlitical realist, as Pethick-Lawrence had shrewdly noted; 
"he is not quite sure whether the age should be fixed 
at 21 for men and women~ Re did not s~ that but 
that is the inference from his remarks ••••• lf that be 
so, I do suegest to hone Members opposite ••••• that, 
as a matter of fact they cannot seriously contemplate 
taking votes aw~ from men at the present time. They 
m~ think ••••• that it would be a good thine to do, 
but ••••• I do not believe they will be able to do so. 
Therefore, I suggest to them that ••••• the position 
which the Government are taking up on the principle 
cannot really be differentiated from that which is 
put forward in this Bill." (166) , 
W.M. !damson, however, was not so convinced and recalled moves by 
COnae 
t'Vative beck-benchers in the previous Parliament to raise the votine 
see on his Bill to 25. ,". Most of the other P.L.P. contributors were content-
to attack 
the Government's party political motives, though virtually no-one 
on. t· 
he Labour side attacked the claim that agener~l election would be 
-............. ~----------~---------------------------------
1P1!., cc. 1558/9. 
!Q~., cc 1529. See Note 9. 
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:reqUired if the B-Ill were passed, d . t it xt· b C t· • esp~ e s e ens~ve use y onserva ~ve 
back-benche 
ra. It was all to no avail: the Government comfortably carried 
the In" 
-uendment by 220 to 153. 
The Labour Party kept. the issue alive throughout the next eiehteen 
mOnths.' Th 
e Party Conference passed favourable resolutions. Labour 
journal 
. S/referred particularly in 1926, to the failure of the Home Secreta~J 
to Call a Conference . . ( 6 ) and the P.L.P. raised the matter in the House 1 7 
thoUgh 
no Bills were debated" on the issue and whenever women's groups 
:P:rotested th .. 
at the Home Secretary was beine slothful in the discharge of his 
d,l.lties th 
e Party gave the groups its support. The omission of any reference 
to the 
SUbject in the King's Speech of 1927 brouehtaSharp reaction from the 
l\t.p. 
In the debate on the Address three members of Labour's leadership, 
1ta:cnon Id . 
a , Thomas and Snowden all referred to the matter, pointing out 
as:pecial1y that the' time was now very short before the next election was due 
and, aCe i 
us nZ the Government of attempting to eo back on its promises.(168) 
On 8M . 
arch 1927 a number 'Of prominent Labour women were members of the Equal 
POliti . . .-
cal Rights Camraign delegation which visited 10 Downing Street, where 
:Bald,wi . . 
. n promised them a statement before Easter. The well-informed 
D011tical columnist of the Times reported that the Cabinet was split. In 
:r .. . 
act a number of Cabinet rebels led by Churchill were' are'tling that they 
ShOUld 
repudiate the "unauthorised" pledges .given by Joynson-IUcks in 1925. 
~~1 ..... 
n the Equal Franchise Committee of the Cabinet and then in the Cabinet; 
itself they 
argued against the adoption of an equal franchise. It was 
~ ----~------------~~~~~-----------167. 
168 
• 
But not excessively. Only 7 questions (out of a total of 14) were 
~sk.ed by the P.L.P. in 1927 on the question of women's suffrage • 
. ost of the others were from Liberal Members. ._ 
.[.C. 'Dp.h. 202.cc 21/2 1,!acDon'ald; ·~c 130/1, Thoma.s; cc 253, Sno'19'den; see 
also cc 42,Pethick-Lawrence. On the 11 Feb~lary 1927 the P.L.P. had 
introduced its own bill designed to "assimilate the Parliamentary 
franchise for men end women, and to reduce the qnalifyine age for the 
Un:i.versity a.nd local eovernment franchises for women." (cc. 440). 
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kn01ll1 
, or assumed., that the Speaker would not preside over 8JlY Conferenoe 
,on the matter but this did not prevent Cabinet die-bards fran advocating 
8uoh h' . 
, so e:nes as a voting age qualification r£ 25 so that they oould have 
roan t" . 
or manoevre and oon~ession at sane future date. On 12 April 1927 
the Cabinet deoid~d atter a ~u1l discussion not to call a Conferenoe but 
to int ;, .' 
roduoe a Bill extending the tranohise to wanen over 21 on the same 
tenna ' ,; , 
as men. Churchill plaoed his dissent on reoord.(169) 
- . - . 
During the period' :immediately preoeding . the finai deoision runour md 
:Lt '. , 
that Baldwin was sounding-out the Labour Party on the idea of a Conferenoe 
~aK ' - ',' .. ,. " . - .. 
. acDonald indioated that he had been approaohed..(l70) The Manohester 
Q.u ' , .~ reported on 14 April 1927 that the P.L.P. had refused nine days' 
earlier to partioipate in a Conference. Unfortunately, there is little 
,dOoUnentary eVide~oe to back up these olaims ~d ~e is forced to the 
conol """, .,' 
usion that Baldwin was merely oheoking out his options rather than 
~ti .", . , , 
oUsl,y proposing that the Conference be held. (171) 
The Bill 'was tm'ally introduoed in Ma.r6h 1928 (172) to a wann weloane 
tran the ~.L.P. which ~ediately ohanged it~ -single-objective" tactics 
"h:loh had prevailed' sfuce 192~ to the br~d~rissue ~ eq~ising, rather 
than s:impl,y assimilating, the fr~~hise. The ne~ franchise, Snowden pointed 
OUt~ lIoUld be based on two irreoonoUabl~ princ~ple~ - p~rs~alit; and property-
'It . . 
,- he deolared "you are going to ha.v~ manhood and wananhood as the basis of 
Your t . . , .' - , 
ranch1se, you have no logical justification for maintaining inyoor e1eczto:r:al 
----~-----------------------------------------------------------169 QAB . 
. • -- • 23/5lt. 26/27)4.. 12 April 1927 and CAB. 23/9OE. 
170 . 
• See Note 10 
• • 
171.Uost Tor.y Pa~ty oppo~ition ~pp~ars to hav~ been assumed. rather than 
ptroved, that is, it was generalJ..y held that the Tories cUd not want 
he measure but saw its politioal neoessity. There was little 
POsitive proof for. this &ssunption •.. 
112 T 
• 2lhe Representation ot the People (Equal Franchise) Bill: R.O. Deb. 
. 5, 00 1359. et.seq., Second Reading, 29 March 1928. 
system a qualification of a diffJ~ent character •••• if equality is what 
th .' 
e Government are aiming at then there cannot be equality so long as a 
ftstma . 
ss of the electors are able to exercise two votes." (173) The 
notion of . .. .~ 
. unlo versi ty representation was an anachronism, It i t is archaic, 
and 1ik th 
e e plural vote should find no place in a democratic constitution. It (174) 
lie said th " ' 
at the P.L.P., would bring amendments forward in Canmittee on 
these m tt ' 
a ers. Arthur Henderson, winding up for the P.L.P., indicated its 
lllisg ' in ' 
loV gs over the effect of the increased franchise upon election 
e~penses and said they would propose that the scale he reduced by Id. frOll ' 
7d. to'6d. in the case of counties and 6d to 5d for boroughs. He also 
raised the general question of currupt practices in relation to the use 
ot moto~ cars 
at elections, which he hoped would have to be registered (", 
With th . , 
e Returning Officer. Now that the Government was clear~ canmitted 
t " 
o the principle of equality between the sexes in the exercise of the vote 
a.t 21 
, the P.L.P., felt free to reintroduce its other refonnatory measures 
'lfhiC::h ha . 
d been reserved, for tactical ~easons, for this very occasion. 
" 
The main provisions' of the Bill were for the assimilation 'of the 
ParI: ' ", , 
loaInentary and local franchises for men and wanen and a' clause allowing 
'If ' 
crnen to vot e 
on their husband's business qual,ifications. Sir Willi8lll 
J'OYnson H' 
- locks spent mos t of his time trying to convince his own Party's 
die_hard 
, s that the 'ten":year' experimental period of cOllpranise alleged~ 
initiated .;.., , " ' ~4 1918 had been successful~ concluded, thus justifying the full 
ass" ' 
,l.In101ation of the franchi~e between the sexes on the basis of residential 
and bu' . 
Sl.ness qualifications. 
, " 
Wcmen should be able to vote in the Universities, 
on pa.Ylnent of the registration fee, on equal -tenns with men. Those who could 
qu.al' I' 
l.ty on all three grounds would have a maxinium of two votes - 'though on~ 
_______________________ l~~ ________________________ ___ 
l73 •. 
.!Pg., cc. 1373/4. 
,. 
'l.74. 
-, '19c. ci t. 
-
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l~ ( 
o 420,000 out of 26 million) of the new electorate would be plural voters. 
A special provision would be made for a register of all voters to be prepared 
in t' . llUe to beccmeoperative on 1 May 1929, atterwhich eighteen months would 
elapse before a new register would be canpiled, which would after that be 
e'V'ery 12 months. 
The OPPosition to the principles of the Bill came fram the die-hards 
who pro . 
posed an amendment rejecting a measure which regrettably gave women 
. a lrlajority in the electorate and unfortunately contained no provision for . 
cQnprehensive franchise reform or redistribution. They argued for a number 
ot cha 
nges ranging from the disenfranchisement of recipients of poor 
reliet to raising the voting age to 25. 
The P.L.P's strategy was three-fold. In the first place it supported 
the GoV' 
ernnent on female suffrage while attacking the timing of the measure 
and 't ~ S failure to take other necessary refonns into account. Secondly, it 
usea th 
e opportunity to ~core propaganda points against the Government for 
its . 
past OPPOSition to the principle and present opposition to Labour's 
deta,' . ~ls of refonn. Finally, it spent sane time attacking the die-bards' 
Philosophy • The P.L.P's general line of attack has been noted above. 
1'h . 
ey Were content to assert that the measure promised equality but did 
not pro i 
V' de it, 'though they_were well aware that the Government was 
assiInU 
ating, not equalising, the franchise. For the rest of the time they 
aSserted 
the correctness of the Labour Party's beliefs. The Party,. 
aCCord' ~g to Snowden, had "fram its inception •••• been united, unanimous 
and -hol . 
. e-hearted in its support of the political equality' of the sexes."(175) 
~a~ . . '. 
. ed why the Prime Minister had not called a conference as he had 
PrClnised •. Arthur Henderson took a slightly different view. For him 
the E' ~ll was, a logical, fair and honest interpretation of the Prime k . L • 
:i.niste , . . 
r s pledge but he was critical of the fact that the 
',---
17 -------------------------------------------
5. lQ.~., cc 1371. 
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Bill ha.d not been. introduced at ..,'" earl~er ~~ 4 staee of the present Parliamen.t. 
Indeed h 
, ad the Home Secretary seen fit to accept the Equal Suffr~e Bill in 
1925 m~i 
, ne it ron-operative until that forthcoming General Election., 
CJ!testion 
S such as redistribution could have been the subject of an official 
COllllnisSion, but the time had now passed. The measure was a. reinforcement of 
democra.c 
Y at a time when democracy versus dictatorship was a burning issue. 
~eR 
ouse should trust democracy. 
The die-hards were particularly vilified by two Labour women M.P.'s. 
Ellen Wi1kinson attacked the ludicrous examples used by Colonel Applin to 
buttress hi 
s case. The Colonel had pictured a woman Chancellor of the 
~heoue 
.. r receivine disturbing news about her child and drew images of the 
dil':'e eff 
ects this would have on the Budget speech she was in the middle of 
deliveri . n~. 1tlss Wilkinson could not see that the effect on a woman Chancellor 
'lVOu'ld. b 
e much different from that on a male Chancellor. . She could not see 
~ sense i . 
. n the fact that a woman could not vote for the House, although she 
oou.ld. sit in it. Margaret Bondfield made a particularly incisive contribution 
to the Debate. Using the rhetoric of conservatism she argued that the vote 
""s an 
oPPortunity and an ebligation rather than a right or a privilege. The 
Pl':'actic ' 
a1 eXperience of those who saw the economic effects of "society at first 
ha.nd. ~a 
d.e them more appreciative of their obligations than those who by their 
9..'tiiifici 
al existence in the. Universities were divorced from reality but never-
theless . 
entitled to vote. She saw no problem raised by the problems of 
intelm.a.ti 
onal affairs and argued that they should have the opportunity to vote 
as hUln 
an beloes, not as a female sectional group. She recoenised that the 
13t11 "as 
not based on the principle of equality but on the assimilation of 
e~sti. . .. 
nz fancy franchises. Prophetically she ended by saying, "we whall not 
oOllle to the ? 
end of the wtory until we have the simple single franchise conferred 
on lllen 
. and. women, not on the ground of sex ••••• {or) property, but on the ground 
19J 
of th . e~r common humani~J."(176) 
Baldwin ended the GovernmentS contribution to the Debate by explaining 
that th 
ere had been no conference because the Sreaker had declined to preside 
at an Y stlch meeting. As there was no ~uarrel between the Parties on the 
qU.estio ' 
, n of female suffrage anyw~ nothing would be gained by holding one. 
By 387 votes to 10 the Amendment was defeated and the Bill remitted to 
Connn ' 
, ittee. (177) 
At the Committee stage the Government accepted, without overt o~position, 
a.1'l • 
tnstruction empowering the Committee to insert provisions in the Bill 
l'e1atiM' t 
. '" 0 the maximum sca.le of election ex,penses. Di,9C1JSsion of tre general 
lhertts of' 
, :plu!'al votine and the question of' Un:tversi ty re:n:·esf'.ntetion were both 
~)J ed ' " 
, O'\lt bt ol'der by the Chairman. The P.LP., therefore, concentrated its 
ef{o~ " ' 
, S on attack1.ne the prov:isions rather than the principles of the Bill. ]I , 
01l:t.' aUesti 
.. . ons were discussed; the votine aee, the provision of plural voti~ 
fO:t' c ' 
9l.'tain categories of women, the resistration arre,nse'l'l'!ents Rnd. the scaIe 
'Th 
e die-hards attempted to raJse the a,ge for votin,g to 25, "the aze of 
1':'es" ~Jonsibil '" 
" ity and I'rudence" on the grounds that this was a, popular prbpdSal 
lIh:tCh se - ',,',' : , '. 
nsibly reco.:!nised that people were too yoUl13, immature and uninterested 
in ", '~Olitics at 21. Several Labour Members emphasised the contrast between the 
11.1" , 
e...style of' the leisured classes whose education continued well beyond the 
ace 0'1' m . ' , 
aJority and th~t of the working-class who had already experienced seven 
;YeS,l:'13 
,0f employment at that age. The former may still be on the edse of 
chil " 
,dhood but the latter were often married with families of their own. "Our 
~------------------------~----------------------------------
'76 •. ~id' 
--., cc 1418,' 
, 77. . . . ;, ~o:t' what it is worth, 3 of the 12 die-hards (incllldins tellers) were 
efeated (Boyd-Carpenter very hee,vily at Coventry) in the 1929 ;enel."9.l Election; 1 (Sir William Bull) did not sta.nd but his successor 
ba.Sdefeated; 5 were returned with reduced majorities; 2 did not stand 
ut their &lCCeSSors were elected and one, Sir Cha.rles Oman, was ' 
returned at Oxford University with an in~re~sed majority. 
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Young , 
pecple have learned fram bitter experience •••• that they are 
(envelo' d) ." 
pe Ln economic conditions imposed upon them qy. the system of 
g~ernment of the country •••• (they) have demonstrated their keen 
intere t in 
s sOcial and political questions." Sooial and environmental 
Ii it f' e re 
nces were fundamental. I~e represent almost •••• a different kind 
of civU' . 
1sat1on altogether," claimed Margaret Bondfield.(178) 
"Yet although the P.L.P. was full of inveotive about the baok-bench 
"llleli 
iaevaJ. theorists" they could not match the destructive skill of the Hane 
Secre tary •. 
He wrote off opponents Df the Bill's provisions as reactionaries 
Who re 
presented a minority opinion, that would ensure their re-election to 
the llouse. 
Joynson-Hicks' intervention was a good example of the assertion of 
~a~liamen ' 
tary conventions over the overt political divisions. These 
convent· " ' 
, l.ons had an inhibiting effeot on the P.L.P. who could not matoh the 
sneers of' ' , ' 
the Bane Secretary against his own backbenchers. The .Amendment 
\Vas d f' 
e eated by 359 to 16. 
~he P.t.P. then attempted to delete the paragraph in the Bill which 
enabled ' 
, SPoUses of voters with business qualifications to vote twice at 
Gene:ral EJ.' " 
ections. ConfeSSing a desire to abolish all fonns of plural voting, ~ " , , 
s BOndf'ield argued th8.t th~s particular fancy franchise, which carried no 
liignit 
, ~,was designed solely to pezpetuate existing anomalies and privileges 
tOl' a 
, ve~ small number of voters. Pethick-Lawrence antioipated a Government 
c1a.~ tha ' " 
" t the deletion of" the C~.use would be depriving sane wanen,of a vote b" ' 
.1 POint. . 
, ,1ng out that the "only right we shall be taking away from (them) •••• 
:is th 
e very thin right of having two votes or .more in by-elections." (179) · 
'--------~------------------------~-------------178. 
lbg. D~. 216, cc. 236. 
~., cc. 270. 
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Under th .' 
e cJ.rcumstances;;this was justifiable. The Government did not 
agree and, indeed, did not even refrain from using the argument, 
S' V ' J.r • Henderson: 
Mr. Pethick-Lawrence: 
" ••••• if we accept the Amendment 
we disenfranchise a large number 
\ of women voters amounting to about 
130,000." 
"You only take awa;y from them 
the second vote." 
Sir V. Henderson: '~e deprive them of the choice of 
elootion which they now have and 
that, in a sense, is a disen-
franchisement. "(180) 
Sfr ViVi ' 
an restated his position a little later with a slightly different 
eJnllha.sis, 
;~o omit (this) paragraph would be interfering with the 
J.ghts of those women, (who already possessed the double q~aJ.ification) and it would be going beyond the terms ~t the Bill itself in so far as assimilation is concerned. 
Wit~OUld also be a definite breach in the existing law 
G regard to plural voting, and for those reasons the 
oVernment cannot accept the Amendment."(181) 
Clear1 ' 
y the Government had no intention of equalising the franchise. Moreover, 
they 
made a most telling point against the P.L.P. by pointing out that the 
cla.use . 
as J.t stood was substantially the same as that accepted by the Labour 
Party l' ' 
n 1924 when its Bill was discussed in Committee." More was to be ma.de 
~t~ , 
S POint on the Third Reading, though the P.L.P." apparently made no attempt 
to Co 
me up with a convincing answer for its reversal of tactics. The Amendment 
-a.s 1 
ost by 70 votes, 114 of the 138 dissidents being members of the P.L.P. 
EhyS Davies then moved another amendment designed to limit the validity 
01' th 
e first register to a period of six months only, instead of the eighteen. 
1ll0nths . 
ProVlded for in the Eil1. All succeeding registers would revert 
to th . ' 
e eXisting twelve month period. Eighteen m~nths, argued Davies, 
,'----.--, 
180 ~., • cc. 275. 
181 ... 
• ~., cc. 278. 
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"as IllUch t 
00 long a time for a register to be in force. Indeed, it had 
been onl 
y comparatively recently that the annual re~ister was introduced.(182) 
POt' the Government .it was claimed that the cost (£600,OcQ) and the erlent of 
the new f 
en ranchisement (~~.) made acceptance of the Amendment impossible. 
The Labo ' . 
ur response was vociferous and hostile. Refusal to accept the 
Amendme t 
, n Would disenfranchise migratory ~ahour forces, any mistakes would 
l'esult in effectual disenfranchisement for those missed off the list as far as the 
OOIn:i.n,Oo G 
.;;. eneral Election was concerned. A couple of M.P. 's on the Labour side 
bla.med th 
e Government for not introducing the Bill ea~lier and areued that 
t~,OOO ~ . 
Was a trifle comnared to the benefits of the Bill. "The 
... 
Pel'form 
ance of a citizen's function of voting oueht to weigh more heavily 
'Ifi th Us th -
an ao-called economy," claimed S.P. Viant.(183) The extent of 
p.t p , , 
• • pressure caused the Government to respond with a promise to consider 
the pOi t 
n a raised but the,y would give no definite as~~ance that they could 
qo anyth 
ing po si ti ve to alleviate the problems which the Labour Members had. 
hiehlighted. In the event nothing was done about the problems which had 
been. 
raised. 
The final issue to be raised w~ the new clause, proposed by the P.L.P., 
l'ed . UCi~ the maximum scale of election expenses from 7d. and~5d. to 5d. and 4d. 
1'01' Counties 
and Boroughs respectively. The crux of the Labour Party's case 
"as th t 
a the increase in the total electorate would provide an additional 
b'Ul'den . . 
on candidates by raising the level of expenditure allowable under the 
Act. 
This, argued Arthur Henderson, would be inimical to the interests of 
democr 11' . '
acy: ~f you are going to ca:rry out democracy logically you oueht to be 
able t . 
. 0 ma~e it as easy as possible for candidates to be returned to this 
'------------------------------------------------182. cS ' 
Thg., cc 290/2. Under the ',E'conciny Misce11ane.ous Provisions Act, 1926. 
183. - , .. 
I9!1., cc. 229; Viant was M.P. for Willesden West. 
' .. 
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. " 
Rouse with 
out any poverty bar. tI( 184) Other P.L.P. spealcers did not add 
to Rend , 
erson s claims but spent their time making acrimonious comments 
about b ib -
r ery and corruption on the Conservative side and defendine the 
La.bour p 
arty against charges that they were controlled by the Trade Unions. 
Art er 
a weekend adjournment, Joynson-Hicks announced that the Government 
~as divided on the question and had decided to leave the matter to a free 
"Iote of the Rouse. ShOUld the new clause be approved it would be open to 
a.ny a.men~ent brought forward by the Rouse. The Commons immediately 
approved th' 
e Clause by 220 to 71 with the P.L.P. voting solidly in its favour. 
Sir John Simon .. ",' then":: .. moved that the amount for Counties be .. reduced 
still furth " 
er to 5d. (much to the Home Secretar,y's disma¥). The P.L.P. lent 
1:8 Sl.'tIlport to the Liberal Amendment, defending itself against charges of 
'M h 
ac iavellian' conduct by claiming the right to change its mind in the lieht 
or n -
eWeVidence. Snowden's advocacy of the P.L.P.'s case was most 
unc 0 nVi 
nCing, even though he pointed out that 5d. was still way above the 
a"leraee 
eJrpenditure incurred by P.L.P. candidates. The Government voted the 
ll.Inendm 
. ent down by 215 to 111 (the latter including 81 Members of the P.L.P.). 
Conservat~ve Members then moved an amendment to leave the borough 
lIleJc' 1mum at its original figure of 5d. The Government abstained from inter-
"Ieninoo Cl 
Q against or for the amendment in the division lobbies. Arthur 
lleMe 
rson did Claim that the Labour Party was in favour of a figure of 4!d. 
l:'a.th 
er than 4d. but had been persuaded that 4!d. would be too difficult to 
apPly i . . 
n practice. They were opposed to the amendment and would like to see 
it With . drawn in favour of an amendment insertinz 4~.·' In response to 
!tender , 
son. s plea the Rome Secretar.1 said that the ,P.L.P. appeared to be changing 
its llli ~ 
nd, Whereas he stood exactly where he had at the beginning of the, Debate. 
~---------~--~--~------------------------------184. Tht.Q.., cc. 304. 
-.. 
The free t 
vo e saw the amendment approved by 181 votes to 173 with Labour's 
"Big Ft Ve" lead.1' nno 
. .~ the P.L.P. into the 'No' lobby. 
The t -ques ion was broueht up n.gain on the Third Re?din~ when Thom1.s 
R:enneay moved that 4-_M. be insA-'-ed for 5"'. N nts ~ e d t 
_ _ t:L ;J. 0 ne~'T ar,(~lunp. •. wvr. 'lse 0 
def~nd t 
- he cha.nee and the amendment was heavily defe1.ted by the Government, 
21 4 to 100. It was small COMfort to the P.L.P. that informed opinion was 
tn Ber 
eement with their claims. (185) 
At the Report stage the P.L.P. also a.ttempted to abolish plural votine 
onl . 
y to find itself hoist with its O\vn petard. The P.L.P. started badly 
\'Tith 
a. less than forceful speech from PhUip Snowden who aeain claimed that 
x>htral v ti ' . ' 
o ne Was "inconsistent with the democratic basis of this measure."(186) 
'!he Rom S' . 
r e ecretary retorted that only 400,000 voters were involved, that the 
Bill . 
was deSigned to assimilate not to equalise the franchise and that when 
the P L 
• .p. had introduced its Bill in 1924 it had been quite willine to accept 
an arnendm 
ant incorporating the principle they were now opposi~. Snowien 
Dl'otested' . 
that the amendment had been accepted reluctantly to save the Bill 
b ' u.t was . 
sarcastically met by the retort that his courage was greater in 
°X>x>osit ion than in office. W.M. Adamson,proposer of the 1924 Bill, said 
that " 
atter consultation with the Conservatives they had concluded that the Bill 
-"ou.la be 'defeated if . , they resisted the amendment and had accordingly accepted 
i
t
.(1S7) !damson'was in effect recognising that the mixine up of several 
~--------------------------~---------------185. 
The ~onomist, for examule, noted "if the old ratio of 7:5 between the 
eJepensas -of ·a rural and"" u:rban constituency was :tair then 4~. is a 
generous figure for the latter and 5d. too high." 12 May 1928" pp. 972. 
217.cc. 57. 
~e rutthenticity of !damson's remarks, it seems to me, should dispel 
aVid Butler's doubts as toV whether the Labour Party's action in 1924 
"'as not due to inadvertance: The P.t.P.' s error had been tactical 
not procedural. Butler, ou.cit. p.34 143. 
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lIlea.S\tres in one suffrage Bill had been a tactical error. It was left to 
a. Conserv ti 
'c a ve back-bencher, Sir Frank Meyer, to ask, "It is common 
knowler1 ~ th ~e at the Labour and Liberal ~arties were in the majority, and as 
lOrl€ as the -. ( ) y aereed, were able to have their w~ ••••• How was it ••••• 
(theref) . 
ore that (the Labour Party) was not able to get (its) own waJ and 
slim . ' . 
inate plural voting?'t A~parently, there was no attempt to ,reach 
aereement . 
on the question. The debate ~etered out with P.L.P. charges 
that the ' 
only constituencies to be seriously benefitted would be the 
Conserv t 
a ive-dominated central business constituencies. The amendment was 
d.efea.ted b'U' 216 
v to 78 and the Bill received a silent Third Readine. 
Thus the Bill went to the Lords where theP.L.P.'s handful of Peers 
Sl.l.DDOrted it 
. . By the time the Bill became law however, more urgent ~roblems r 
"ere 
pressing the Labour Party and its attention was concentrated elsewhere. 
'I'hro1leho t . , , 
u the ten-year period the P.L.P.'s tactics and varying stances had 
&el'V'ed. t 
o Confirm the nO''1er of the Executive over the Leg:islature when the 
i'Ol:'!n.er w ' .. , 
as in the possession of a strongly-led party. 1928 was less of a 
trt1.Unnh ' . ~ for the Labour Party than for Joynson-Hicks the Conservative Rome 
SeCl:'eta:t"l 
Y. The P.L.P.'s attitude to female suffrage was consistent, 'though 
ita t' , 
actics were not •. : Female suffraee, however, was the first of several 
lneasU,l:' 
es adVocated by the Labour Party to fully equalise the franchise; it was 
~b '.., 
El a.nother twenty years before their remaining objectives were achieved. 
v 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
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CHAPTER FOUR - NOTES 
~UCh as Maxtont s famous "murder" scene which according to J. Paton 
ad been carefully planned and deliberately concerted in advance as 
; demonstration of p.rotest against the futile palaver in Parliament, ~ton, .Qp.cit., p. 163 and J. Scanlon, op.cit., pp 52/3. (for details ~ the "1'IIurder Scene" and its political consequences see J. McNair, 
_ames Maxton the Beloved Rebel (London: George A11en & Unwin, 1953), ~~. 118/126. In a later incident involving David Kirkwood, it was , 
f~scovere~ t~t Standing Order 18, under which he ha~ been suspended 
cxn serv~ce l.n the House, had been left inccmplete l.n 1902. It was ~~nded the following year, see H.C. Deb. '181, cc 708/14; 1139/42 £kC. Deb. 193, 1991-2006. 
T~e Webbs' book was produced in response to a request frcm the Secretary ~ the International Socialist Bureau (M. Cami11e Huysmans) that all ~~stit~ent bodies should furnish reports upon "the socia1isation of 
b ustr~es and services and upon the constitution that should be adopted 
pY any nation desirous of organising its life upon Socialist principles," 
reface to A Constitution for the Socialist Commonwealth, p.v. 
~~n;s SUpported a Bill "to provide for the relief of the Parliament of 
S e nited Kingdcm by establishing subordinate Parliaments in England, ecot1a~d and Wales by making provision with regard to the exercise of sxec~t~ve or judioial authority and for other matters related thereto.~ 
ee ar1iamentary Papers 1921, i. 593. " , ' 
The t ' 
e enns of the resolution were as fo11ows:- "That with a view to ~~b1ing the Imperial Parliament to devote more attention to the general 
G erests of the United Kingdan and in collaboration with the other 
novernments of the Empire, to matters of common Lnperia1 concern, this s~~e is of the opinion that the time has ccme for the creation of 
end ordinate Legislatures, within the United Kingdom, and that to this 
lllalt the Government, without prejudice to any proposals it may have to 
bo~ with, regard to Ireland, should forthwith appoint a Parliamentar,y 
" to consider and report _ 
1. ~pon a measure 'of Federal Devolution, applicable to England, 
i • ';' ~cot1and and Ireland, defined in its general outlines by existing 
differences in law and administration between the,three countries; 
2. Upon the extent to which these diff~rences are app1i~able, to 
Welsh conditions and requirements; and" ," , 
3. Up th ." " on e.financial aspects and requirements of the measure. 
See .[.0. D~. 116, cc. 1873-1974 and 2063-2129. 3 and 4 .June 1919. 
~ '
of ~~ct the Coalition Manifesto had stated that, "It will be the duty 
as b e new Government to remove all existing inequalities of the law, 
int etween men and wcmen." ~ot surprisingly 'this was popularly . 
Goverpreted to mean equal political rights. As we shall see the . . 
J!' VI erllnent had scmething different in mind. For the Manifesto see (chiS• Craig (Ed.) British General Election Manifestos 1 18-1 66 •. ' 
Lunnchester: Political Reference Publications, 1970 , pp. 2-4. 
Was Member for Rothwe11 in Yorkshire. 
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leant'a. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
Amongst the. proposals'made by those forces were amendments to 1:imit 
the franchise to women between the ages of 23 and 75, to prohibit 
Ul'l!narried wcmen not paying rent the vote and to disqualify aliens 
for five years subsequent to the date of naturalisation. One 
~cce7sfu1 amendment.extended the vote to a husband by virtue of 
s Wife's qualification. The Labour Members did not oppose it, 
although why is not clear. 
One amendment was designed to give tw~ votes to those over thirty-five 
~ears of age (not 40 as suggested by Butler). Another, postponing 
he operation of the Bill until the expiring of the ten-year 
agreement, i.e., 1928, deserves special mention as an example of the ~:fective use cf.,myth in politics. During the Second Reading of the 
l.U Sir Wi11iam Bull had c1a.futed that the vote had been conferred 
UPon wcmen in 1918 on the general, unwritten, understanding that there 
WOuld be no more agitation for further reform for a period of ten 
'~ear~. Sir Wi11iam's vague generalisations were, of course, pure .abr1.cation~ desperately designed to resist the inevitable by" ~t:oducing new bargaining-coun~ers •. Its effect was tremendous for ,as 
b aV1.d Butler had noted, "Before this deqate, no reference to it can 
a7 traced. After it, the question of women's suffrage was never 
l.Scussed without sane reference to the subject. At first, only 
the opponents of equal franchise used it as an argument, but before ~ong its advocates while denying that any such agreement was binding, 
'legan to refer to it as an historical fact." Butler, gp.cit.',p.22. 
fts falsehood, which Butler implicitly demonstrates, is very evident 
, ran the Speaker's undisputed comment that the age limit was fixed at 
30 Simply to prevent the number of women electors out numbering the 
:en• (H.C. Deb. 114, cc. 1612). Sir Wi11iam's true' colours, of course, 
ere proved by his place arnongs t the 12 die-ha:f<ds who opposed female 
, SUffrage to the very end. 
" 
Although the Conservative Election Manifesto had not contained any ~::er~nce to Wanen' s suffrage, Ba1dwin had publicly pledged that "The 
1.0n1st Party are in favour of equal political rights for men and , 
wQnen and desire that the question 'of the extension of the franchise 
,should, if Possible, be settled by agreement. With this in view, they ~ould, if returned to power, propose that the matter be referred to a 
C°nf:rence of all political parties on the lin~s of the U11s~ate~ 
~1.ttee." (Times' 18 October 19240 Quoted in Butler, op.C1.t., p.24) 
'rh' ' - ' , l.s Was also felt by Conservative hard-liners (SUCh as Churchill) who 
argued that Joynson-Hicks had gone beyond his, Cabinet instructions or, 
a(s one unid'entified Cabinet Member claimed, had never received any. 
See Butler, op.cit., p.30 n.2). In fact the Cabinet had discussed ,the 
qUestion as ,a matter of importance two days before the Second Reading 
, and had instructed the Hane Secretary'to state that the Government 
, intended to'give effect to Ba1dwin's pledge later in the life of the 
6resent Parliament by proposing a Conference of all political parties • 
..:@... 23/42. 9 (25)11. Unfortunately, fram the die-hards' point of view, 
•••• /cont' d. 
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/conttd. 
Note 9 cont' d. 
Joynson-Hicks did not leave the Government's intentions 
in the realms of political rhetoric (as did. the 1918 
Manifesto) which would have given them the opportunity 
for further delay, but interpreted it in such a WB3 as 
to effectively prevent then frOll . retracting their pranises 
contained in Baldwint 8 pledge. The attitude of' the 
die-hards suggests in fact that they were seeking to 
rationalise their own position, for not one of' then 
raised the matter in the Cabinet after the events of 
20 Februa~ 1925 until the issue was finally considered 
in 1927. How could they when Baldwin had fully supported 
Joynson-Hicks in the Debate? (H.C. Deb. lSO, cc. 1561). 
They might be annoyed at conceeding 80 much without a 
struggle but their arguments needed time to be fonnulated. 
Daily Mail 20 April 1928. This appears to be confinned 
~ by a reference in Tan J ones' Diaries. K. Middlemas (Ed.,) 
1...an Jones: Whitehall Diary II, 1926-30~ (London: Oxford 
University Press, 1969), p.98. On 5 April 1927 the 
National Joint Council issued a statement calling upon 
the Government "to introduce legislation forthwith to 
confer the franchise on wanen on the same tenns as now 
applying to men." N.E .C. Minutes, Vol. 42, 1926/7, . 
N.J.C.6. - G.C. and E.C.G. M.45. T~es 6 April 1927. 
The statement declared that "no useful purpose would 
be served by the reference (of equal franchise) to a 
Conference at this late stage •••• • 
CHAPTER FM 
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. Altho1.l.eh the question of P.R. was one whi.ch occupied some of the 
ener9'i 
"" es of the Labour Party throuehout the decade of three !,arty politics 
ite greateat impact on the Party occured in the Second Labour Government's 
Period of Offi 
ce. The question of the equa.1isation of the franchise had 
al.rea~ b 
een settled but that of fair representation was brol\Bht to a head 
by the L 
abour Government's dependence on Liberal support. Thus, whilst 
the 
general context of the 'twenties is applicable to both women's suffr~ge 
andPn t 
• ., he chronoloeical development of the 'latter reCluires detailed 
e~e:m.ina.ti 
on in order to relate it to the crisis of 1931 and the effect of 
tha.t cri 
sis on the LB,bour Party and its attitude to Parliamentary Government. 
r The issue of proportional representation is important not only as an 
e~6.lnJ!le 
of the changes that take place in political fashions but as the major 
ca.u.se Of 
friction between the Laboltr and Libera.l parties durine the period when 
both'N . 
ere contenders for the leadership of "proeressive" political opinion. 
Indeed . '
, 1t has been frequently claimed that ":'\ Labour's attitude to P.R. was 
dicta.ted 
by the a.dvantae~inherent in the adoption or rejection of P.R. as a 
ne" lUeth 
od of voting. 'In this respect the Labour Party has been depicted 
S~ly aa an OP~Ortunist party which committed itself to P.R.vwhen it was 
itself -Unde~represented but changed its view as the existine electoral system 
beea.n t 
o work in its favour. As a eeneral thesis this view hB,S a ereat deal 
Of " 1 
, a idity and, indeed, many in the Labour Movenent expressed themselves in 
these t 
erms, but it' fails to accurately describe the Labour Party view on the 
~~~ , - . 
n Of P.R. The bulk of Labour support for P.R. was based on an 
emot .. tonal . ' . 
'. ,ldea of political justice ~ few Labour members supported P.R. as a 
lUa.tter 0 ' 
f Principle. Moreover, in the Labour Party there were individuals 
"'hOse In! ' , , ' ' 
nde were chanzed by events and who saw in the collapse of the Liberal 
II 
arty th 
e achievement of those ends which they had previously sOl~ht through 
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the i t 
n roduction of P.R. and other procedural devices. Thus while it m~ 
be tru. ° 
e that the Labour Party, on the assumption that they were about to 
~PDlant the Liberals, could use the P.R. issue to rationalise their views, 
there Wer i -. 
e w thin the Party as a whole several currents of interacting 
OPinion which united in opposition to the Liberal Party's sudden adoption 
ot P R i 
'. n 1923/4 as the means of their salvation - an obverse reaction whioh 
too m 
any historians, particularly Liberal historians, have overlooked. 
Moreover t 
,. he Labour Party's adherence to P.R. was effectively ended by 
1926 at the latest and their promotion of any variety of change in the 
elector 1 
a system later than this date, especially that assooiated with the 
a1te:r:natt-~vote, was a measure of their continuing politioal weakness rather 
than th ' ~ e~r overall electoral strength. 
P.R. had. been widely approved of in the Labour Party, both before and 
dllt'i ne th 
e war, as a means of securi.ne greater representation for the Labour 
"iew,point. W.O. Anderson spoke for many I.L.P. Members when he wrote, 
"It ParI' 
, lamentary government is to continue the parties in Parliament must 
C01'1'es"O ~ond to their strength in the constituenoies."(1) Philip Snowden,was 
"s . 
most passionate advocate, Ramsa.y MacDonald its roost consistent opponent. 
~e fot'ln. ' 
er r.egarded it as, "the subordination of the individuality of the 
Candid t . -
a. e and the exaltation of party and party prinoiples, "(2) whe't"eas the' 
le.ttet' di 
smissed it as "an·elaborate set of paper perfections of beautiful 
bl.l.t i 
ntang1ble delicacy."(3) These positions were more or less maintained 
'-----------~----~~------------------------
"Th 
e Election and After", Ll3.bollo't" Lel3.tier, 9 January 1919. 
2. ~ 101 cc 1688 30 J~u~ '1918. Of. footnote 4 below. 
ee Note 1. ' 
3, J.R. 'lJr"''''Donoald (Will' i & N t 1909) D.154:4"", , The Socialist oM~~e~en~ London: ems ~rgs. e, • 
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until 1921 when MacDonald appeared to accept the inevitability of P.R. 
"Pr 
, oportional Representation, with all its deficiencies, alone seems to 
e.fford a . pract1cal working scheme, and the political parties will have to 
be lett to work out for themselves the various electoral problems which this 
lIlethod will present to them. "(4) But this pessimism (MacDonald still 
thou.eht ParlioTnent would be worse ) rt d it 
.... " off under P.R. was as sho -live as 
Vias Wid 
espread in the Party. Its origins lay in the massive victory secured 
by LloYd G 
aorge in the Coupon Election and the weakness of the 60 strong 
p.t P i 
'. n a Parliament containing nearly 500 Government su~porters. The 
etfect of the election was to raise considerable doubts in the Labo'l.1x Movement 
as to the efficacy.. of the political method and in this respect P.R. was as 
. II1U.ch an attemnt 
r K to restore the creditability of the political method~ as it was 
an end in it 
self. To MacDonald, in particular, the restoration of Parliament 
to its ri.oo ~htful place as the critical, constructive,body checking, if not 
COnt't'Oll1 
ng, the Executive, was the dominating motive behind his readiness to 
ConSider P.R. 
as a teChnique to be used in the modem political world, although 
his ~e I 
. ~ elusiveness arouses caution. 
This is not to deny that P.R. was capable of standing on its own merits. 
!t had b " 
een unaminously approved by the war-time Speakers' Conference; it was 
l:'eaaonabl 
y well supported in nolitical circles and it was constantly advocated 
b • Y the hbh 
y ly-proficient P.R. Society. Moreover, as David Butler points out) 
l:'ero~ 
seemed inevitable if only for the' fact that "the survival of the 
eJeistin 
g system (durin3 the debates on the Representation of the,People Bill 
in 1911 
and 1918) plainly expressed not so much an endorsement of its merits 
as a f '" 
ailure t () Su h d' t 
,-----. °a..gree 'upon the remedy for its faults." 5 c. 1sa,ereemen 
4. SO~tali • 
P.244 59!'!. Critical e,n1 Constrnctive 
5. :Butler' See Note 2. . . . . . . .. . ..... 
, .Qrl.cii·, p.39. 
(London: Casssll, Rev.Ed.,1924») 
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~~ fi . con ned to the Liberal and Conservative Part1es. In the Commons 
debate on Whether the Lords' P.R. Amendment to a House of Commons free vote 
in favour of the A. V. as o!lDOsed to P. R. should be accepted, Snowden o!lenly 
-. attacked Adamson's 
rather than P.R. 
view that the Labour Party was committed to the A.V. 
Few Labour Members held Snowden's strone convictions on 
P.R. as a whOle (a point frequently overlooked by historians) and on this 
occasion Ad 
amson, li!acDonald, Thomas and Henderson all voted in favour of the 
A'V.(6) 
The intellectual claims of P.R. as o:pposed to that of the A. V. we·r:-p. 
st!'eoroth 
.... ened M a result of the 1918 Election ann the Party g,uickly became 
id.entifi 
. en with a policy of P.R. which it never properly discussed or accepted 
but h 
r W ieh tOok the fo~ of a fashionable remedy _ along with the Direct 
Al'!t"l 
-on - for the ills perpetrated by the "hard-faced" men of the Coupon 
Parliament. (7) 
its lead. 
If the Labour Movement was committed whole-heartedly to P.R. 
ers in the Rouse of Commons rarely declared their colours. ThllS when 
Sir 'I'h. 
omas Bramsdon's P.R.Bill was debated'in the House of Commons on 8 April 
1921 anI 
Y one P.L.P. member snoke in its favour while 15 others followed him 
into the .. 
Lobbies where 87 Members were outvoted by 186 opponents, 4 of whom 
belon"" d . -~e to the P.L.P. If the Labour Party wa.s aea..i.nst the prevai.ling system. 
it Was not 
necessarily in favour of the P.R. solution. 
The debate itself was a rehearsal of things to come with the advocates 
or P R 
••. C1a.imine that it would mea.n snalier but truer reI'resents,tion which would 
tn t 
" urn facilitate a stronger democracy in which individuals were chosen for th.e:!, "." . 
r personal i hi h qua.li ties, rather than their pa;rty lines - an analys. s w c 
"""-----~----------------------------------6. R. C. !:lAb 1 / ' ~ 01,oc 1592 et.seg. for debate: co 1686 9 for Snowden s 
ention. cr. Wertheirner, o,.cit., pp. 85/6. 
7. s ee Not 3 - .... - -
e • 
struck at the heart of Labour representation. (8) The one Labour MeMher 
in f ' 
avou!', Robert You.ne, declared that "the present system is not an 
,enCOUl"aeement to constitutional action outside. We are now in the position," 
he said It f f" .. 
, 0 ~nding outse1ves called upon to say whether we are prepared to 
ll1.ake this House thoroughly representative of the people as a whole. tt He 
"'ent on - "it will be admi tted~ •••• the.t this House has in the past times been 
e,nd is t d' . ~ largely not representative of the p~op1e as a whole. tt The 
ana~~~ 't~ 'direct industrial action was to make the composition of the House 
Ita t 
" rue!' reflection of the opinion of people outside. "(9) 
Among the 16 Labour Members who supported P.R. i~ the Lobbies ,were 
J. R. Cl" ()' , 
vnes. 10 W. Graham and Arthur Henderson, while 4 Labour Members opposed 
the III 
r ea~tre. However, support for Bramsden's Bill by Arthur Henderson and 
J.R. Cl ' 
ynes did not mean acceptance of the principle by the Movement. Half 
the P.t.P. had not even bothered to vote and at the Annual Conference that 
ifea:r " , 
a resolution advocating P.R. proposed by the Workers' Union was defeated 
~thout di"' , () SC11SS10n by the immediate use of the "previous question. It 11 
The result of the General Election of 1922 had very little influence on 
th~ P t P , 
• • • s attitude. Many of the new members were favourable to P.R. or 
sOllle oth 
er change in the electoral system as a means of securing greater 
:POlitic -
a1 jUstice for Labour and almost all of these ERlpported a permissive 
Bill 
, intl:'Od.uced into the House of Commons on 23 February 1923, a110wine local 
~ ------~--~~----------~-------------8 •. l{ C 
, ~. 140,. cc.613 et.seq. ,Cf. Footnote 2 above. The Bill provided S~rtthe election of Members for constituencies with 3,5, or 7 re)~r~ , al~ atives (the arrangement which the Lords had rejected in 1917 made 
fOl~wa~ce for redistribution and was to come into operation at the 
o~nns Genera.l Election. " ..., ,'. ' 
9. !bid / ~' cc. 645 8. Member for Newton 1918-31 and 1935-51. Young, like 
wen, remained a life-long advocate of P.R. The italics are mine. 
10. Cl ','~ Ynea Was a Vice-President of the P.R. Society during the 'Twenties and ()~a jOint author with John Simon and L.S. Amery of ·'P.R.: The comrlement 
, ~anchis9 RefoI"ITI" (London: P.R. Pamphlet, 52, July 1922). 
". t 
' ~A.c. R. 1921, ,.211 • 
. . .. . ... .... 
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authorities the option of using P~R.' A number of these enthusiasts, such 
as JO 
l.!nrny Maxton, were later to change their minds because of the actual 
e~erience of the working of P.R. under the provisions of the Scottish 
EdUcation .Acts. In this light, Willie Graham, who remained a consistent 
Supporter of P.R. acted as a seer when he said, 
"Many Members who favour proportional representation 
would not be:n~arly so enthusiastic in their support 
if it could be said of the existing system of election 
that provided in any case for the representation of 
minorities in the bodies elected." (12) 
The Bill, though defeated 169 to 157, secured 72 votes in its favour 
f'x-an . 
the Labour Party and only 11 in opposition. (13) A number were young 
ld.~ I 
• S securing their "wild ca. tsll ° and a large section consisted of the 
I.t.~ hi ' 
r 0, w ch at this time was still in favour of ,the canplete re-organisation 
of' t 
he system along the lines of the Bradford resolution, and as Willie 
~ " 
l'&.ha!n admitted the Party was very much divided on the issue. (14) :' 
i 
Most Labour M.P.'s, however, were simply following the fashion in their 
sUpport for P.R. ,Few of them really distinguished between P.R. and the A.V. 
lnci el.thoUgh Butler is right in asserting that "the argllllents and the voting 
1nthi 
s diVision see, to a large extent, to have paralleled members' 
SYlnPa thi' 
es on the larger question," (15) this gives no indication of the 
~tpl _ 
• • s attitude to P.R. on the national soale. CertainlY there is no 
l'eaSQ 
n to believe that a Labour Gpvernment would support any suohmeasure 
Of' it 
S Own volition. In faot, when it came to a straight 
'------------------------------------------------12. 
4. 
15. 
.!:hC. Deb. 160, co. 1454. 
.. 
~ot 69 as suggested by Butler, -op.oit., p.43. The minority was 
led" by George Lansbury and Stephen Walsh •. 
!bC. Deb. 160, cc. 1452. 
Butler, loc.oit. The Econanist concluded that the Labour Party 
was "more likely to find time for a measure of proportional 
;EJ.epresentation than for a Bill for the transferable vote.~ •• N 
ectoral Reform" 12 January 1924. 
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Olash between politics and P.R. the P.L.P. placed politics first and foremost. 
The d·.~ lV4sions that Graham referred to were made very evident in the followioe 
month when Over a hundred Members of the P.L.P. voted in favour of an 
Utern ti .. 
a ve Vote Bill which was being introduced under the~.minute rule.(16) 
The pro·Lobby was led by the 'Big 5' (Clynes, Henderson, Snowden, MacDonald 
and Th ) -
omas while Willie Graham led the half-a-dozen P.L.P. dissidents into 
the Vi - . 
ctorious 'No' lobby. The vote was indicative of the desire for changes 
held b . 
Y the Labour Party as well as of the P.L.P.'s willingness to support any 
measure of chan"e ( ) ~ P.R. or A.V •• 
The conflict between the two :parties was brought to a head after the 
"Protecti " 
, on election of 1923 and the period of the first Labour GovenL~ent. 
It is i .. . 
r mportant to note that the most recent histories of the period have been 
~tten b . 
Y pro-Liberal historians rather than by historians of the Labour 
p 
arty a.nd that as a conseq,uence the Labour Party has been depicted as an 
u.n~l:'a.ter 
ul Party which used the statesman-like Liberals to secure themselves 
in :Power d . 
an then responded by doing everything possible to secure-the down-
ta.ll of t . . . 
he Liberals.(~Trevor Wilson, for example, referring to the failure. 
~~n . 
rst Labour Government blandly stated that "for this the overwhelming 
1:' -
eaponsibility lay with Labour. Req,uirine active Liberal support to retain 
Office L b - -
t a OUr res~onded not by conciliatine or even ignoring the Liberals, 
bu.t by s . 
eeking to pulverise them~"(18) Ramsay :MacDonald, in particular, was 
sinel d 
e Ottt for his "hysterical" attitude towards the Liberals. "At no time," 
------- . 
---------------------------------------
18 
• 
J!.c.u~~~ 161, cc 501.et.seq. 1 March 1923. 
For Exam . 
'9' pIe, Trever Wilaon (Ed.) The Political Di~ries of C.P. Scott 
and'·'928 (London: Collins,1910),hereafter.cited asScott's.Diaries .. 
a.1 the same authors The Downfall of the Liberl\l Party, op.ci t., See 
So Roy Douglas, The.HistoTY-of the.Libe~al Pa~~'lon.cit~ ... 
Wilson D ..•............. 
Dj t ownfall of the Libe~al Part ~, -Pp. 441 8~.. • ...... ' .. 
and Scott's 
, .... 
~ll 
Commented Wilson, "did he make a practice of informing the Liberal leaders 
about . government bTtsiness, end his studied offensiveness towards them. made 
th""~r t  of kee1')in~ htm in t"ffioe peculiarly diff:i.cult.(19) In this 
wii~ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .... . . .. . .. 
on is merely representing what Vivian Phi11ips had saj.d years earlier. 
"Our peo,le became increasingly restive and this was 
intensified. by the Government's attitude to them in 
the constituencies. On the platform in the country 
not only was there no acknowledgement .of the fact. that 
it was largely through our support that they were able 
to maintain themselves as a Government, but there was 
a constant stream of i1l-na~2red criticism and frequently 
of abuse of the Liberal Party."(20) 
Few of these criticisms in fact stand up to careful analysis. The 
lIlain POint about the Liberal and Labour Parties was the fact that both were 
claimi ne to lead the proeressive, democratic section of the nation and that 
th; t b . 
a ~lr Party was clearly winning the battle. It w~s true that in 
J) 
ecember 1923 their vote was little more than that of the Liberals but Liberal 
SU:onort ~ was already in the process of beiOS eaten away by the democrats on 
the t 
eft and reactionaries on the Rieht - a pd.arisation of Qpinion which the 
tabou!, P",-L 
. ~'~y attempted to master. The possibility of a Labour Government 
Bimnl . 
.. 'Y hastened this process which had already cau.sed bitter exchanees between 
l:'a.nk· 
and file of both Parties in the 1922 Parliament. Indeed, as Dr. Douglas 
noted 
, after the 1922 Election for the Liberal Party it was a. matter of "how 
to au. 
rv!ve ••••• in the face of the challenge from Labour."(21) A battle from 
~hlch . 
many across the whole political spectrum expected only one victor.(22) 
~e bit 
tern.ess of this fight to the death ruled out the possibility of a Lib-
"'--- . 
~-----------------------------~------.~-~-
W11son, Downfall of the Idberal Party, -Loe,cit.· Italics Mine. 
<0. V' - . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . .... - . . .. - .... ' .-~Vian Phillips: My;- Days and, Wa.ys (London: PtUlans & Wilson 1943~p.104. 
e book was privately circulated. Phillips w~s the Liberal Whip in 1924. 
DOuelas , o~.cit., p.165. 
See, for ~;~;ieJ Amery's letter to Geoffrey Dawson quoted by M. Cowlihg, 
~cit 3'-' 
-----.', p ...... 
. "' ..... 
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tab Coalition although the NRt:lon advocated the formation of a Labour 
Go ..... . 
vernment dependent upon Liberal mlpport followed by a Liberal Government 
dependent upon Labour support. (23) It was a bitterness exacerbated by the 
lIlistrust which followed what the Labour Party considered to be the sham 
unity the Liberals had managed to effect shortly before the 1923 Election which 
left Lloyd George pretending rather ludicrously that he could chanee overnight 
f:t'om th 
e leader of the reactionary Anti-Socialist bloc to the leader of 
" P:t'oeressive" opinion.(24) The hysterical entics of'the Rothermere Press, 
aid . 
ed and abetted by right-wing Liberals, and the loose-Churchillian talk of 
an Anti-SOcialist Coalition only served to increase the mistrust with which 
the t Wo wines of the Capitalist Party (Conservative and Liberal) were viewed 
t:t'om th 
r e Labour ranks. (25) , ' The attempt by contemporaries, apparently shared 
by Douelas, to confuse a straightforward constitutional situation only 
i1':t'it 
ated a La.bour Movement so close to power.(26) 
I . 
n snch a situation the Labour response was bound to be as arrogant as 
~~ . 
the Liberals was pathetic.' Labour was the second largest ,party in 
an. established "pecking" order _ the Liberals were third. If the Liberals 
SQpn . ~orted the Conservatives they would stay in office otherwise it would be 
tabOUr's t . 
urn. The only chance for the Liberals to gain office was to secure 
a Short 
administra.tion for Labour followed by a Liberal Party picking up the 
'--------------------~----------------------~--23. 
24. 
25. 
26. 
"The Sequal to the Election," 1 December 1923. 
,;W~ -h~ve not forgotten 'his (Lloyd Georee's) abortive arrangements with' 
Lord Beaverbrook on the eve of the last General Election for the . 
formation of a centre group ••••• " New Leader 2 May 1924. Lloyd George's 
lllanOevres can be seen in Cowling, on.cit .. ,Ch.XII. During his most anti-
tabour period he accused the Labour Party of being no different from a 
C°Illlnu.nist Party. Times 31 March 1920.' 
See Note 4. 
See Note 5. 
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Piece~ before going to the electorate.(21) ~e Liberals did not want a 
qUick dissolution; what they wanted was to prove that Socialism did not 
~ork but Liberalism did, whether as the formal Government or as the power 
behi d 
n the t~~one; hence their great boasting about their independent ffi~pport 
for L 
a abour Government following Liberal policies.(2S) 
The real weakness of the anti-Labour case is, however, summed up in the 
itau . ~ phrase of Wilson IS - "their task of keeping them in office. "(29) A. ' '< •••• 
SqUith and his party did not view this as their task for as the Nation noted 
on 3 M 
a.y Asquith had claimed that the-<J, like the Conservatives, were not 
€Oine t ". ( o compromise in any direction (the) unfettered freedom of the Liberal 
Party.). " Their support of the L~bou~ Government was conditional, based 
uPon th 
• e principle of Stlpporting issues on their merit. '. As long as this was 
the Ca.s 
e the Labour and Liberal Parties were not allies and the truth was that 
"Liber 1 
< a. S have not a leg to stand on in claiming to be treated as allies 
aeS.inst 
a. common enemy."(30) 
Moreover, the tactics of running candidates in previously uncontested 
lIes.ta 1I 
a.a not limited to the Labour Party. Wi1son, for example, complained 
ths.t th 
e Conservatives were elected to the Liberal seat at Oxford City on a 
~inOrit < 
Y vote (31) whereas he nee1ects to mention that it was Liberal inter-
"entio 
n in Rolland-with-Boston that cost the Labour Party the seat on 31 July 
1924.(32) Clearly, independence in the country was accepted by all parties 
lfhateve 
'---:rthei:r pretentions to alliances. 
<7. ~~~.a.n examination of this as a Liberal strategy see Ibid., pp.S6/1 and 
~: 15 December 1923 pp. 422 and 426: Mancheste't" Gua:rdian 22 December 
n t 3 •. For a Labour view or the doctrine that a MacDonaldministry could' ~d be followed by a dissolution see H.J'. Laski; "The Position of Parties' ~he Right of Dissolution" (London: Fabian Tract, 210, 1924). 
See Note 6. . 
Wilso D n, -.9wnfA.ll of the Libe~a.l Party, p.268. 
ilL iberalfsm' , , . 'd 'L ''\.: . "'N 't'.r . , , '3 "n..;,; 1924 an auour, q, J.on, AUG,l • 
Wilson, ~wnfall of the Liberal P~~y, p~. 269/10. 
~~e Lymari;The 'First 'Labol,lr'GOvernmerit, 1'.249. The New Le~der had accepted 
\'Vh e logic of .the.situation .commenting, ''We can contemplate ·no arra.ngement 
\'VhiCh Would debar us from contesting Liberal seats and we make no complaints 
en Liberals apply the same 103ic to us." 2 May 1924. 
However, if Lib-Lab relations were poor before the advent of the Lahour 
GOV'el.'nm 
ant they could only have been worsened by the events that followed. 
The 1922 Labour Party Conference had :passed a resolution opposing "any alliance 
Or electo,,",_al arr~n.O'. eluent .', th C t -~ W~ any section of the Liberal or onserva ive 
Parties. "(33) Such opposition was likely to be altered by the Liberal 
decisio 
n not to fight Burnley which they could hardly expect Renderson to lose, 
hOwever bad his ( ) 
electoral record. 34 The real irritation in Lib-Lab relat1,ons 
came t 
no from a Laho\tr Party which maintained its independent stance, des~ite 
its mi 
nOl.'ity :position in the Commons, but from the Liberals "Tho seemed to 
believe that 
their oualified sunnort for the P.L.P. entitled them to be treated . . .. 
as allies, i 
n complete contradiction of their professed independence. To 
their Coat th 
r .. e Liberals had found themselves in a void, divided betw'een their 
left an 
, d right winss, near to, but completely without power. The ":patient 
()~en" as L 
loyd Geo!.'Ce called his pa.~ty in an intem:porate sreech were tired of 
" . 
,fetch:i.ne 
and ce.~in.:" for an unerateful eoverrnnent. They clearly wanted some 
l'e\yS,!'d. f' 
or shouldering the burden and the.t reward, so it appeared, was for the 
tabour Go 
vernnent to surport the Electoral Reform Ei11 - a P.R. measure 
intl'Od1.tc d 
e by a Liberal back-benoher.(35) 
The Labour Government was far more accommodating'to the Libera.l Party 
on this . 
iSSue than is generally admitted in Liberal circles. Despite the 
tibel'S.l .. 
ultimatum that their future support for the Government mieht depend 
on. its 
response to the P.R. Bill the Labour Government responded favourably 
'---
--------------------------------------~.C. R. ,1Q?2 ,p. 210. The resolution was moved by Robert Wi11i!"J!l~. 
salao ,John V/heatly in Fo'!"Wam (Gla~,1'ow) 8 Decembe't' 1923. 
!!!,son, Downfal'l-,of tl)~ Libe~l PI'I: ... ty, p.'267. There was no reason to 
Sltfunte that ,the Liberals would h(lve sained the Sea.t, o~ have obtained 
a'r ficient votes to have 1eonardised Labour's hold upon i~. PoliticallYI C w • Rom Oll~se, it wOl1ld have been unwise to have a.ttempted to defea.t the 
1 e Secretary one of whose tasks wa.s to ensure the passo...:e or favourable e~isl8.tion to the Liberal cause. 
See Note 7. ,. 
2l~. 
to A 
squithts letter askin~ that the Bill be given facilities to pass into 
~w. (36) Before the Cabinet Meeting on 1 May 1924 Henderson had circulated. 
"In my opinion it is essential for the Government to 
attitude than it has done hitherto on the question of 
a memorandum stating 
take a. more definite 
EQectoral Reform. Over SO Members of the Labour Party committed themselves 
d~f' t ~telv in favo,1"t' of pro,ortionali-epresentt\t:ton at the General Election 
'- . andt .-----. - .. . ... .-
he Annual Conference has also expressed itself in the same direction."(31) 
A.t th 
e meetine MacDonald concluded by emphasising the strength of Liberal 
teelin~a that the Bill '~ should receive considerable Government support, giving 
little indication of a desire to "pulverise" the Liberals by rejecting a Bill 
which. h . 
e must have found personally distasteful. In fact the Cabinet decided 
to ' 
}a.oetthe P.L.P. on the same night at 1.30.p.m. and by a ,consid.erable majority: 
to l' 
ecomnend to the Party that the Bill should receive a Second Readine.(3S) 
'!'he Go . 
vernmentts position was, therefore, one of at the least, benevolent 
neutrality. Unforllmately, for the Liberals the Labour rank and file incensed 
by th .. 
El Liberal ultimatum was distinctly hostile. The P.L.P. meetirl;3 turned 
d0"n th 
e Cabinetts proposal and left the Bill to a free vote thereby expressing 
theil:' Contempt ~or Liberal politicising. The Labour M~~ had spoken for 
llla.ny .. . .. . - .. 
in the Labour Movel!lent when it said in response to Lloyd'Georeets outburst, 
"It i -
, S for the Liberal Party to decide whether it will work with the Labour 
CoV'Ell:'run 
ent or aeainst it, not for the La.bour Government to make up its mind 
"heth.El 
r it Will work with the Liberal Party or against it. "(39) 
~---------------------------------------36. 
See Note s. 
37. ~241166/cP.215 (24).29 April 1924. Italics IUne. Hendersonts paper 
~ave a concise survey of the situation since191S~ See footnote 7, 
3 oWever, for a basis of a different interpretation. 8. ", .... ~ 23/4~.29(24)5. 1 lfuy 1924, Italics in th~ Orir.ina~. It is not clear 
thether the probable hostility oftheP.L.P.rank-and~file was taken . 
nto account by the Cabinet. 
~e ~b01Xt" M~1a~ine, Vol~III, No.1. (~,1924), p.24. Cf.(Ibid., 11, No.11, ~h-1924). --"A-laree section of Liberals hsve apparently.set themselves 
to discredit and break up the Ministry by systematic mischief." Members 
~r the P.L.P. felt resentment aeainst Liberal claims that they controlled ,,~e Ministry. See also speech by J. Toole, M •. P. for Salford (Ml'\nchp.ster:, 
~a.rdia.t}, 12 February 1924.) ., - . - - -
2l6~ 
The Governm.ent' s duty was to govern the countr'J not to be governed by 
the Liberals. ~~ch resentment, under the circumstances,was understandable 
and indeed partly accounts for the resolution which Ernest Eevin r~orosed to 
the 1 -925 Conference advocating that the Labour Party sho1..1.ld never a.~ain ta'l<e 
ottic 
e as a minority eover~~ent.(40) 
The Debate on the Second Readine of Rendall's Eill brou2:ht the party 
l>°l:i.ti cat issues to the floor of the House.(41) Rendall introrolcing the Eill 
to e~end P.R. as the system of representation generally took a detached line 
disc1J.s • 
. Slog only the general principles involved and the justice of his case. 
ne1:'be t 1:' Morrison was bound by no such inhibitions. Seconding the Duchess 
01' A.thOll' s motion of rejection liorrison reminded the Liberals of their more 
tha.n a 
. r pparent haste (in the light of the previous election re~llt) to have 
the :e' 111 hurried through and noted too their attempted use of threats to secure 
ita 
Pa.ssaee. He rightly argued that the Labour Par~J had not settled its 
attit d 
u. e on the <!uestion (and in this his analysis had. more validity than 'that of 
nende1:' .) " . 
son and recalled from pre-war days "some exciting Debates on the subject 
betwe 
en the present Prime Minister and the Chancellor of the Exchequer, the 
l:'esu'lt 
or Which was that the Prime Minister converted me •• : •• aeainst proportional 
l:'ep 
1:'esentation. The Partv nolicy has not been very c~. 'There have been 
~iou.s deCiSions _ some in i~;~~r'~r'proportional representation and in other 
ca.ses th 
e very convenient expedient of the 'Previous Question' has been resorted 
to 
• l!!. recent yearscertainlYt no definite decision had been ma<te." (42) 
"----------------------------------------------40, "T!! is Conference is of ouinion that in view of the experience of the 
recent Labour Government: it is unadvisable that the Labour Party should 
~ain accept office whilst havinz a minority of Members in ,the House of 
o~ons." L.P.A.C.R. 1925,p.244. This is not to say that governing the 
~Ou.ntl"l.! and .beiO,{J .governed by the Liberals are mutually exclusive just 
hat the two were rezarded as such by the Labour Party as a whole. 
~.D~. 112, cc. 1981et.seq. Butler, op.cit., p.44. describes the 
debate as "the best that the system of votinz ever provoked after 1918." 
1h.9 •• Deb.172, cc 2016 Italics Mine. Morrison wa.s a prominent member of' 
the Anti-P.R. Committee •. Soma .details a.bout the Parliamentary Anti-P.R. 
:ampaign can be foun4-" in the papers of Sir William Bull which are. deposited 
1n the House of Lords Record Office. 
Morrison was, as usual, correct, no official decision had been, or in fact 
'«oUId be: taken for a couple of years and until that time the matter was one 
of hi 1 
a and error with P.R. gainin$ a supe"!:'ficial hold in some places while 
in others, such as London 'and Scotland, the LfI.bour Movement had finally come 
out against P.R. 1Iorrison went on, "the case from a party point of view is 
st:rOl'1.ooe t ' , .~, for proportional representation in the interests of Liberalism, and 
th . 
at probably accounts for the decision come to during the recent crisis~ (43) 
ProPortional 
,- representation," he declared, "is a philosophy which is not 
u.nnatu.ral to small new parties stru$eline to eet a footing on the electoral 
field. It is also perfectly natural to decaying political parties, who are 
doollled t 
o extinction in the course of time, and who can only retain thei"!:' 
DOSiti • 
r on by elevating the power of the minority and subjecting the power of 
the 1Il . 
aJori ty. "(44) Clearly, lforrison thotlght that the Labour Party had grown 
ou.t Of its inr' "''''tile ~4 attraction to P.R. which as an institutional device was 
inefficiont ~ , ineffective and served only to secure the representation of 
s~eci 1 . 
" a interests, the aggregation of minorities and to perpetuate the coalition 
tnentality and with it "dishonesty in Parli~entary tactics. "(45) 
J " 
or Morrison, and the majority of the Labour lv!ovem:ent, this ran counter 
to th . ' 
eJ.r view about government. "I believe," said Morrison, ,"that Gove"!:'nment 
OUght t ' 
o be strong, so strone that it can make concessions to minorities and 
!!teat th~i'" points of .. ..few. ~ Y. It is all very well to say that the present system 
is a. d 
ictatorship and a tyranny. It is not ••••• Public opinion, if it is 
~--------------------------------------43. 
44. 
45. 
!!.:.C.Deb. 172, 00.2017. 
.t2.u.., cc. 2022. ' ef. He~a:n Finer The 'Case !J'ainst Pronorttooc!.l ~'n"t'esente.tion (London: Fabian Society,. Fabian Tra.ct,211, .1924, .p.3. 
See Note 9. 
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intelligent, if it is energetic, can always bring pressure to bear upon 
Go~ernments and can get things done." (46) The power of Parliamentary 
Go~ernrnent was making itself felt. 
The I.L.P's representatives took a number of views; G.D. Hardie 
Claiming that P.R. without a change in the Cabinet system was a half-hearted 
measure while J. Maxton tore the heart out of Liberal pretentions with a 
'lVeU-t:iJned interruption of Asquith, who had been illustrating that in the 
1906 Election 368,000 votes had secured the return of 60 Liberals while 12 
Con 
servatives required 235,000 votes to find them seats in the House. "Can 
anyone justify that?" he asked. ."Each Conservative on the average represented 
19 000 . 
, votes and each Liberal Member represented 6,000. That is a case in 
'lVhi 
. ch the Liberal party got an unfair advantage fron the loading of the dice." 
"Mr. Potts: Which you did not complain of. 
Mr. Asquith: We made the best of it. 
Mr. Maxton: So will we." (47) 
Arthur Hend~rson, speaking for the Government, admitted their unhappiness 
\lrith the 
eXisting situation, canmenting that it might have evoked a different 
response if the Bill had been concerned with the A. V. whilst twitting them 
tor th . 
e1r demands on the Government. The Bill was defeated 238:144 with the 
tabour P . 
arty split 90:28 against. (48) The Cabinet Members who voted were 
4-2 . 
• J.n faVour of the Bill. (49) It is quite clear that the rank-and-file 
l'esPond 
ed out of resentment against the attitude of the Liberals, an attitude 
Cl'it· 
1cised by their own journal The Nation, (sO) and which in the following 
~-----------------------------------------------46. 
47. 
. ~. 
49. 
. 50. 
~ 
lhQ.. Deb. 172, cc. 202l. Cf. Econanist "Those who believe that we must 
get baCk to the two party system naturally regard electoral refozm as of ~~ight importance." "The Riddle of. the Political Triangle," Econanis t, 
th October 1924, p.599. Cf. Manchester Guardian 2 May 1924. If Of course 
e introduction of P.R. 'would mean the perpetuation of the three 
Party system •••• " -
E: . 
-iQ. D~. 172, cc. 2025. Italics mine • 
Wilson has it91:28. The total strength of the P.L.P. was 192. 
~ ~avour: C.P. Trevelyan; F.W. Jowett; P.Snowden and J.H. Thanas. t:1nst : J. Wheatley and S. Webb. MacDonald later made it clear 
t he was not an advocate of P.R. . 
"The Temper of Liberalism" Nation, 10 May 1924. See Note 10. 
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"eeks Was still f1.1..rther criticised by Liberal M.P.'s. The cha~e of opinion 
in th L 
.e abour Movement was a genuine cha~e undoubtably encortraged. but not 
caUsed, by the sight of the evident decline of the Lib8rals in the fieht for 
~l~val. The Liberal t~tics clearly seemed to indicate their concern along 
these 11 
nee and their sudden conversion to P.R., mentioned by Morrison, wa.s 
fu!'th ... ~r eVidence of their aeitated state of mind. What justification the 
tab .. 
Our Party had for adherine to a chanee in the electoral system, and the 
A..V w 
• as by no means a dead issue in the Party, had been destroyed as far as 
!I.n w . 
•. as concerned by the events of April and May 1924. The collapse of the 
tj,beral P"-'-y 
""':\.0 in "Red Letter" election was merely the coup de ,~Me. 
The issue was more or less decided in the Labour Pa;ty at 'the Annual 
CO~terence in 1926. In 1925 the Executive had set up a Committee of Inquiry 
in . 
!'esponse to two motions at the Party Conference on the subject of electoral 
l:'Elfol:'!n 
. ~ one advocating P.R. and the other condemning it and calling instead 
fo!, th' . . 
e seCond ballot. (51 ) At an N. E. C. meeting on 23 June 1926 "considerable 
discus i ' 
S on took place with regard to the proposal that theNl~ of Government 
COnnn1 t .. . 
tee's Report on Electoral Reform should include Proportional Representation. 
~e S ~ 
eCretary reported that opinion on this matter was so divided that he thought 
it eh r 
oUld be left an open question. resolved. That the Advisto~.! Committee be 
itl.fol:'!n 
ed that the Executive Committee propose, at 'the forthcoming Annual 
Co . 
tl.ference, to introduce a motion disagreeinewith Proportional Representation."(52) 
On 9 October 1926 '8. Reporl on Proportional Representation was presented 
f!'om th . 
e AdVisory Committee on the Machinery of Government expressing no opinions -
~ ----------------------~----------~----~~ 51. 
5~. 
~A.C.R. 1925,1'. 292~ An article on P.R. by &ail.sford in the New LAader hilstrec08nisi~ that the Liberals were usine ~ P.R. to save them from. e~t1nction saw it as a device for controlling the Cabinet. 9 May 1924. 
~.C. Minutes 39. E.C. 11 1925/26. Min;276."': 23 JUne 192'.' Italics in 
the original. ' 
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on the merits of the case, and suggesti n3 that the subject should be 
enquired into further during the ensuing yea:r, but the N.E.C. resol;v.p.,d to 
~eSister its opposition to P.R.(53) At the 1926 Annual Conference the 
delezates heard Ezer.ton Wake announce that the inquiry had not, in fact, 
been d 
un ertaken but that the N.E.C. had concluded "that it was their duty 
in th . t 
e J.n erests of the Pa.rty to pass the resolution which was 
oPPOsed to Proportional Representation. "(54) The resolution condemning 
P.R., and by implication favouring the A. V., was passed. 
"The Conference affirms that, while Electoral Reform is needed to 
l.'emedy th e existinz defects, the proposals of the Proportional Representation 
SOCiety, involving large constituencies and numerous representatives for each 
con t . 
S ituency are not in the best interest of d~ocratic government and ot~ht 
t
r 
o be 0PDosed."(55) None of this prevented Philip Snowden from continuing to 
~~OCate P.R. though few shared his enthusiasm.(56) By 1926, therefore, the 
t'il.' t 
S real settled position of the Labour Party on the question of P.R. and 
the A 
• V. had. been achieved. 
The Labour Party, of course, still believed in reform along the lines of 
the A.V. In one of the few debates on the subject in the House of Commons a 
Libe 1 l.'a Member, Mr. Wiezins, introduced a motion advocating changes in the 
elect 
oral machinery of the country arguing that A.V. was the most likely system 
to 
SUcceed but proposing that the whole matter be referred to a non-political 
Cant' 
erence. Thomas Johnson (Labour's only partiCipant in the debate) expre~sed 
the ~ew of many Scottish Members of the Labour Movement when he declared 
~-----------------------~----------------------53. 
54. 
55. 
~E.C. Minutes, 40, E.C. 14 1925/26. Min. 380. 9 October 1926.. 
,hP.A.C.R. 1926,1" 240 and p.273. . . . 
~c;ciit;It'sh6uld be pointed out the question had been constantly reviewed 
by.the,N.E.c. In 1919, for example, MacDonald, W.T. Wilson, Jowett and 
Webb were approached with a view to' preparing a Memorandum on the question 
to~ future discussion. N.E.C. Mtnutes,16, 3 April 1919. However, on 
eve~ occasion the matter reached the N.E.C. the divisions on the question 
~roved to be irreconcilable. 56. .. 
S(ee Reynolds News, 3 April 1921.- Criticism of Snowden is in Forward 
Q!.as~0V1-),9April 1921, 
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him 1 Se f in favour o~ some alternative to the existirl3 system but not P.R. 
~hich, in the case of the Local Authorities in Scotland/had worked against 
Illinority vieWpoints.(51) The Motion was lost by 205 votes to 41 - 8 of the 
llIin . .. 
ority belonging to the Labour Party. (58) By the time the second Labour 
Govern 
ment Wa,.q elected in 1929 the position was clearly established that the 
tabo'U.l' ,., 
.. arty favoured some reform, not P.R., Md that if rersuad.ed it would 
int . 
rOduce reformatory measures. The inconclusive result of the 1929 election 
Illade it certain that the life of the Lahou.r Government would depend very 
lar"'el 
o y on its willineness to consider changes in the electoral system. 
According to David Butler, "one of the main problems of the historj.an 
of' th·· S 
e econd Labour Government is to discover what action the Liberals took 
to,. e:lCa.ct the fullest return for 'their support in the division lobbies."(59~ 
llQtler h 
ad little doubt that some bargain did exist although he was never able 
to Co 1 
ne usively prove the point. Recent evidence of Cabinet· deliberations, 
howev -
er, has clarified the issues involved and while it is clear that a formal 
b 
areain as such was not agreed upon, the co-operation between the two parties 
at 
an early st~e in the life of the Second Labour Government was sufficient. 
to de i . Senate Liberal support for Labour as beine exactive. 
It has already been shown that the Party leadership and" some rank-and-file 
lllelllbe:t'shiT'l ~ of the P.L.P. su~norted the idea of electoral reform along the lines 
.... 
on th 
e alternative vote -and that the Party as a whole was not unfavourable to 
the 
question of reform. The result of the 1929 election may have modified the 
~--------------------------------------------57. 
Se. 
1L...c.ne.h.. 215,cc. 1248 et.seq. 28 March 1928. (1213) Cf. "Proportional 
. ~e:p:resentation in Scotland" Socialist Review Vol. 16,No.90, (July-
ep~ember)1919/pp. 225/8. ' . 
~o inCluding Arthur Henderson and 2 Labour Members (S.P. Viant and 
. ·J.~~Baker) who had approved P.R. in 1924, while on the other side 
5 P.L.P. Members who voted for P.R. in 1924 voted against it on the t 
Liberal Motion. The terms of the motion read, "That this House considers ~he present method of Parliamentary election unsatisfactory, and is of 
he o,inion that such changes in the electoral machinery of the cOtmtry 
sho1lld be made as will enable the 'T)olitical opinions of the voters to be 
l' ~l '" . 
. e~ ected in the comrosition of the House of Commons." . 
nutl~r, 0 it 58 n.e ., p •• 
222 
notions of the more uncommitted members of the Government aeainst further 
l.'efol.'lll of a system that was working in favour of the Labour Party, but in 
eene:ral it can be aSSltmed that the reference in the King's Speech to 
Dl.'oposals "to institute an' examination of the experiences of the election 
eo that the worlcine of the laws relating to :parliamentary elections may be 
b:roueht into confomity with the new conditions (of complete adult suffrl'l,~e)It(60) 
"as a reflection of genuine Labour conce~ to reform the system alon~ the lines 
or the A.v. (61) 
The Lab01U' Part·',!, however, was not only concerned with the met"1cd of 
'9'otinO' 
'" used in th~ electoral system but with a nn!:lber of othe1:' questions whjch 
it h ,,,t • ~ raIsed for some ten years or more and which had been constantly 
9.l'tic1l1ated as demands to be placed baror an all-Party Speake:r/s' Conference. 
r 
'1'h'ls when the inquiry referred to in the Kine's Speech was set up in July 
'
929 (62) it was given wide and undefined terms of reference within it which 
it 
was to work. The attitude adopted by the Labour Party representatives on 
th.~ Ull () .. . 
swater Conference, 63 was perfectly consistent with what had gone 
beto:re. Althoueh not in favour of the A. V. per se the Party was prepared to 
if it was accom,anied by a number of other reforms, most of which 
hl\d. heen advocated by the Party in the past. (64) 
1. A reduction of expense maxima by 1d. per elector. 
2. Pllblication of Political Party Accounts and the 
limitation of election expenditure by Parties in 
addition to that which appeared in the Election 
Returns of Candidates and Agents. 
3. Le~alisation of Sreci{ers' expenses subject to the 
conditions laid out in 2. 
"------------------------------------------------60 • 
6, 
• 
RC' ' . ~ .Deb.229, cc.49. 
~9.CDonald 'lu.ickly put his o!,position to P.R. on recoro. Manchestt".;.! 
6~ ...:.~~, 5 June 1929. - .... - .... 
• !4Q..:nl'!h ;229, cc. 881. Not 10 June as stated by David Butler, .QI2.~. 
P.59. The Session did not begin until 25 June 1929. 
See Uote 11. 
~nference on E1l;!cto!'~l R~form: Letter from V:i.~collnt UIIswe.ter to the ~ 
~ntster,.Cmc'l-. 3636,(1930) ParlitUnentaryPapers 1929730,xiii, ~~~ .Cf.. . 
}i1a:rion .Ph111ipsH.C.Deb. 241, cc.1135 and the Clynes ?Jemora.ndum·-.·~' (see 
Footnote 84 below). 
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4. Restrictine the use of cars to convey reople 
to the Poll. 
5. Abolition of all plu:t'al votins and the Business 
Premises and University Franchises. 
6. Reintroduction of half-yearly registers. 
1. Reduction of the quota of votes required to save 
a candidate's deposit from one-eighth to one-tenth. 
8. The division of two-member constituencies into 
single membered seats. 
9. Simplification of the petition procewlre. 
All these preconditions of Labour Party acceptance of the A.V. were 
COns! t Sent with the Party's previous arguments. Attempts to reduce ele~tion 
e~enditure were made, with only partial success, during the Second Readine 
~r the Representation of the People (Equal Franchise) Bill in 1928.(65) 
ReV'i . 810n of the Co~pt Practices Act was a. frequent Labour demand throughout 
th9 'twenties.(66) The abolition of plural voting was one of the provisions 
ot th 
e Dre-war Reform Bill and was constantly repeated as a demand during the 
,,~ 
OUS debates on the extension of the franchise to women. The occasion of 
the )C"t 
e ension of the University franchise to the University at Reading in 1928 
had' S~en a Split in the Party with MacDonald, C.P. Trevelyan, Sidney Webb and 
70th . . 
er Members ~t,portinz the 10Sic of an unjust system while 41 others led 
by To J 
m ohnston and W.M. Adamson registered the P.t.P.'s opposition to the 
Princ! 1 P e involved. The Bill was passed by 90 votes to 45.(67) In 1925, 
Peth!ck-Lawrence had proposed a Bill under the ten-minute rule banning the 
Part 
Y Use of cars and making the Returning Officer responsible for getting 
the ,'. infirm" ' .. to the poll. (68) . Although defeated by 212 to 122 the Bill 
~~------------~----~-----------------------------~~ 65 0 
66. 
67. 
68 
• 
. . . 
~. 
See Chapter 4. t PS(!8S 196/8. 
See Note 12. 
~C.D~. 218,oc. 1364 et.seq. 15 June 1928. Jtarny ~~on spoke in the 
ebate but was nrevented by his own laziness from votin3 in the division 
With the dissid~nts. 
f£.D~. 182, cc. 443/8, 25 March 1925. This issue had been raised by 
(he Scottish Advisory Council which had sent a resolution to the N.B.C. 7 May 1921, Vol.11 N'. BC. lIins.) eroressine the opinion that vehicles con'l'~'i . " '" ~v ne voters to the poll should be prohibited. 
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'Nas onl f y O~ally opposed on the floor of the House. Finally, as has 
ahAad b 
. Y ean noted, the Labour Party vigorously OP:Dosed the abolition of 
half.yearly re~isters under the Economy (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act in 
1926 ( -. 
and, in fact, was to reintroduce them in 1945) on the grounds that 
deSPite a reduction in the qualifying period to three months, an annual 
~egister would disenfranchise many of the mobile poor - most of whom allegedly 
Voted Labo,.n.'. (69) 
Moreover, the Party was consistent in its opposition to compulsory 
"otil'l,Q' .~ and, in view of the Party Conference in 1926, to P.R. as well.(70) 
Thu.s L d 
or Ullswatex-'s complaint that "the main pUl"p0se of the comnittee -
ll.am 1 -
e y some zeneral aereement as to the amendment of our electoral laws -
~ad failed, as no agreement had been reached or was likely to be reached,"(71) 
'Nas d Ue not to the Labour Par~J's insistence on its demands but on the use 
that 
'Nas being made of the Committee by the Conservative Party to advocate 
a selective system of P.R. in which they hardly believed and with the sole 
. intention of Go Ph S ' ti embarrassing the Labour vernment. ilip nowden s asser on 
that th 
e Labour Members "deliberately set themselves to make the Conference 
ab0rti n( 
Ve 72).is more an example of his commitment to P.R. than of his 
detach . 
ed judzement. David Butler supports Snowden to the extent of, claiming 
, that It -
the conditions upon which th~r were prepared to c0nsider the alternative 
"ote . 
'Nere wholly irrelevant to the question" and attributes part of this to the 
" . . DJ:'ess . . , '. 
. lire from above" which forced the Labour delegates "to countenance 
diSCUSsion of 
a reform which almost all of them disliked."(73) What Butler 
'----------------------------------------------~---69. 
70. 
71. 
72. 
The cost of nrenarin3 two registers (half of which was borne by the local ~l~hority and h~lf by the Government) had been a frequent cause of Tory 
y.iscontent. .' . " ' 
l~Donald excluded compulsory voting from discussi~n: See H.C.Deb.230, 
cc. 1285: 24 July 1929. A Bill on the ~lbject had been defeated by 158 
~otes to 74.(23 June 1920) with those members of the P.L.P. who bothered 
o vote Opposing the measure. See Chapter 3 footnote 
c ... ' 
...l!1!:l1., 36360, 'Passi.m. 
~11ip'Snowderi; -Alitcbio~ranhy,lI,p~88G~It is a moot point as to who was 
eSDonsible fo~ the breakdown. From the Labour Party' s point of view the 
COincidence of their principles and political advantage was fortunate. 
Eutler, o~.ci~., p.62. 
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fail t 
!3 0 realise,of course, is that the "cond.itions" laid down by the Labour 
Part Y were part and parcel of a broad perspectiv~ of electo~al reform which 
he b 
, Y concentratin3 solely on systems of votin~, has overl:::>oked. MO"t'eover, 
the N 'H' C 
''''' • Minutes c1enr1y reveal that the Labour de1eeates were told by the 
N.E.C. to stick to the nine points, so Butler's claim that "there A.!'pea.:rs to 
ha"e b 
een a. tllc-a-wa"t' between the anti-Liberal fee1ine in tl'le r~nk-o,nd-:f.':ne 
Of the no:rtv nn'" tl -I-
.. ,,0. u. the desi.re of the le~.d el'S to stay on. enod terms vd ,1 "he 
Li.bfl"'O,lt::< () .~ "" •••••• " 74 is a figment of a vivid :i.maeinat:ton. The Lab011l' P!3:r't~" s 
DaSH! . 
on far from be:il".,3 "ellui vocal If was the loe:tca1 one of dema.nding all the 
.'I'efo 
- ~s that it had previously wanted e,nd whi.ch were necessa.ry to eQualise 
thA f ~ :t'a~chise alone si1l"ple rrinci:,les of electo!:'al justice. (75) 
. r The Collapse of the Conference brotl.:;ht to a he!'l.d the erowi~ conflict 
that .
ad been developinc between the Labour and Liberal Parties. Earlier in 
th.~ 'J 
eat- Lloyd Geol',;e had in effect demanded a meaSt'tre of electora.1 reform as 
a. COndit ion for Liberal support (76) and 8.9 Snow'den records discussions took 
1l1.ace i . 
n S~Dtenber 1930.(77) Recent evidence has more or less confirmed 
SnO"'de , 
n S VerR:ion of eve~ts.(78) At the Cabinet meeti~ the week after the 
e\"entr 1" 
. U meetins MacDonald stressed the real possibility of a. Lj.beral/Tory 
alliance 
, the effects of Liberal non-cooperation in the House of Commons on 
'-------------------------------------------------74. Tb' ~., 1'.62. See Also n.m.c. Jvf:inlltp.R .Vo1.55. E.C.9 1929/1930 M.407 
75. 
77. 
,78 
• 
~.' 
'I'h0.M~ 1930). There was some division in the Executive on the subject. 
e policy was approved by 11 votes to 6. ..' 
~~ fait-ness to Butler it should be pointed out that Visc~nt Ullswater 
mealf had taken the view that some of the nuestions raised by the Parties We ~.
C ~e outside the purview of the Conference. See Butler or.cit., p.61. and 
~glQf. .. 
~;21 'JanuarY 1930. An undated document in the Lloyd Geors;e Papers 
oould appear to refer to the pre-meeting discussions in the Liberal Perty t,i .this SUb. ject or possib\y represent the Liberal agenda for discussion. 
~d Geo~1e Parers (G/84/11). 
~~O'11deri; ·Aut6b{o'*~a"'h~r,II, 883/5. The Secretf.10te (below) seems to refer 
this meeti03.whichapparently took place on 19 September 1930. 
~)' ;~1Qs.56(30) 13. 25 September 1930 end Secret Note CAB 23!QO.B. (Fol.1S/ 
If the Government could not agree to some reform based on proportional ~:l?'t'esentation or the alternative vote, the Liberal ,Party did not see how 
ey Could cont1ri.~· support." CAB 23/90.B.Folio 22. 
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the Government, and the fact that cOJTlJ"!itment to a m~asu.re of reform would 
take two years to complete _ a. point that Lloyd Georee had put to MacDonald 
dUt'ine their conversations. MacDonald, of course, emphMised that durine 
this period the Government would be able to pursue its Pe,rliamentA.r'J prosramne 
and th . 
e electoral situat10n mi~ht improve. The Cabinet au.thorised Ma.cDonald 
and Snowden to attempt to reach an aereement with the Liberals though any 
conclusions they reached would be implicityly subject to its acceptance by 
the Laboux Executive and Party Conference. 
The extent to which this Lib/Lab understanding can be called a. bargain 
has b 
eeu treated so judiciou.sly by David Butler that little more need be said 
about it.(79) Two points should, however, be made. In the first place a 
e:neral agreement was formally entered into between the Liberal and Labour 
P8J:i; 
Y under which the Government should consult the former before the 
intt'oduction of l~eislation into Parliament.(SO)· Secondly, as we shall see, 
the Liberals were informed of the changes that took place in the ::SUI followinS 
~Si . 
ntroduction in "dummy" form in December 1930. Furthermore, when the 
ttbera.ls effectively'maneled the TradeDisplitea and,Trade :Uni,oris ~ ::Sill in 
F'eb ru~J 1931 the Cabinet decided that "at that time it would be politically 
d.esh \. ' 
a.ule for the Government to fulfil its pledges to the letter."(S1) All 
this 
seems to sueeest that the "bargain" was a general understandine rather 
tha.n 
a. specific deal, an understanding geared to the needs of political survival 
~ith Which the Labour Government found itself confronted. As David :Butler 
a""CCin t 
c ly put it, "The Labour Party would certainly not have sponsored the 
SJ.tern . ative vote for its own sake."(S2) 
"----------------------------------------------79. 
See also below footnote 102 • 
. 8<. 
Butler, o~.cit., p.66. 
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The result of the discussions between Liberal and Labour leaders were 
tooinconclusi ve by the time of the Kjne' s Speech in October 1930 and the 
SUbject was only va.guely broached in the oration from the throne with the 
WO"'ds It· ( ) 
- a rneaSU't'9 of Electoral Reform will be submitted to you." 83 Durine 
the n """" 
. e ..... " three months, however, the subject was discussed in depth by the 
C~inet, which appears to have taken its own decisions quite independent of 
OffiCial Liberal pressure, although obviously they must have borne it in mind. 
In. a 
menorandltm on the proposed Electoral Reform Bill the Home Secretary 
restated the position of the Labour ParbJ "that some of them were prepared to 
ac ......... . 
ceDt (the A.V.) on condition that other reforms were adopted at the same 
time. "(84) With thU in mind Clynes submitted "that if the Bill is to deal 
a.: all with the system of electins Members of Parliament it must be on the 
linea r 
o SUbstituting the alternative vote for the existing system." 
Antici patiQ3 Conservative opposition to the unscientific basis of the A.V. 
~stem d / an as a political device for Lib Lab use against the Conservative~, 
C1l'n 
es pointed out that the A.V. was recommended by the Royal Commission of 
1910 and Was operative in Australia, though the circloostances of each was 
different 
now. He mi~ht, . of course, have added that the Labour Party had 
int . 
redUced an A.V. Bill into the Commons in 1911 or have referred to the 
impliCit 
resolution in favour of the A.V. passed at the Party Conference of 
1926 
• 
What, however, is important is the fact that the alternative vote was to 
be e.c . 
companied bv a number of other reforms in accordance with !Jaoour's ate.ted 
.. 
~aitio . ... .. 
. . ~n q,t the Ullswate't" Confe":'ence and, unless Clynes was deliberately out to 
A -' •••••• \tee ei . . . . . . . .. . - .•. .,....... - . -
Ve future historians, the obvious conclusion must be that Snowden's 
"----------------------------------------------83. ~.De~ 244,cc.1. 
84. 
.£..A.'B 24: 217: 407 (30) -. 4 Decen,ber .. _ 1930. Italics Mine. 
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inte'l'1'\ -~retation of the adoption of the alternative vote by the Labour Party 
as beine implicitly at the behest of the Liberals should be discotUlted in 
favour of the view that the Labour Government used the A. V. as a means of 
a~ -Ul'ing the passa~e - or so they hoped - of the Trades Disputes and Trade 
Unions ]ill. In Clynes' opinion the legalisation of speakers' travelline 
e~ -
ensas, if included in candidates elections returns, the reduction of the 
ql~ota f 
, ° votes reTlired to save a candidates - deposit (with the possible 
eJC;ce'l)ti 
, on of the City of London) would meet very little opposition. The 
other 
reforms advocated by Clynes however were expected to be opposed in 
V~ine deerees~(85) In the case of the provisions re~ardine motor cars 
C1Ynes had decided to wait until discussion of a motion proposed by a Labour 
Member 'U 
r ' ~r. Toole, due for consideration on 10 December, had been completed.(86) 
~~ , 
e Cabinet Meetins on 10 December 1930 it was decided that Clynes should have 
the ]i1 -
1 drafted without waitine for the Cabinet decision on the alternative 
Vote 
and the other proposals mentioned in the Memorandum.(87) 
Two days later Clynes submi t'ted a further Memorandum which discussed the 
thl'ee 
. main forms of the alternative vote (that devised by Professor Nanson, 
~emt . 
e hod recommended by the Royal Commission of 1910 and the proposals made 
b~ Lord. Craigmyle to the recent electoral conference) before'cominz to the 
cOncl 
usion that the latter: which the Liberals were expectin~ would be in the 
:Bill" ~ Was the most suitable method to adopt.(88) The memorandum and one 
~ ------~~~--------~----~--------~----85. ~eduction of election expe~ses: publication of political parties' accounts ~ 
~ed es,ecially at pressure groups); restriction on the use of.motor cars 
a elections and abolition of plural voting, business premises and -
university ~ualifications; two registers and the alteration and simplific-~ti~n of the petition procedure~ An excellent discussion of the Electoral 
f eform Bill in 3eneral and the P.R./A.V. debate in particular is to be 
Nound in H.J. Laski: WWhy Electoral Reform was wanted: An analysis of the 
86 evr]ill," Labour Ma,zazine, Vol. IX, (1930/1) pp.439/443. 
• ~e motion was withdrawn by Toole after assurances by the Government that 
87. e SUbject would be included in the Bill. 
8a ~ 23/65.72(30)3. 10 December 1930. 
• ~ 23/2;'/419. (30). 12 December 1930. ItA-lics Mine. This document provides 
! full description of each system. Clynes accepte~ that all forms of the 
.V. Were inaccu~ate. 
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SUbmitted by William Adamson, Secretary of State for Scotland, stating the 
ca.se f t Or he inclusion of adeQ.uate l)olline facilities for remote islands, 
incl . 
udin: where necessary a later date of polUn~, were 'both considered in 
the Cabinet on 17 December. Another memorandum from CIynes considered by the 
l!I
eetit'.\g was concerned to have the Cabinet agree to the "long title" of the 
:g'l 
• 1 1 so that it could be introduced into the House before Christmas in 
acCordance with MacDonald's announcement.(89) On the 18 December the P.t.P. 
f:\ereed ~t -
, w~ h the exce~tion of twenty dissidents. presumably the I.L.P. gro~p~ 
Co . 
n.aented to adopt the Bill - though there was evtdently ve~J little entl:usia.ffill 
fOr tb 
e measure-on the principle of thi'! A.V. which the 1'T.E.C. hed rassed. the 
On 19 DpceM'ber the Bill ViaS introc1uceti in dllrnny form. 
It "a~ "to 
r amenti the Law relatin~ to Parliamenta~J elections and electors by 
:t'e'lUi't'i.~ such elpctions to be on the principle of the alternative vote and 
in th . 
at COnnection nakins provision with respect to the division of two-me~ber 
COnstituencies, . abolishinz universtt~r constituencies, and the business premises 
~Ualiti . 
cation fo~ re~istration, facilitating the recordinz of their votes by 
elect 
Ors Who change their residences, enabling the holdin~ of the poll to be 
Dost ' 
poned in those portions of a constituency which are separated from the 
lllai.'11· .. 
. and, maktn~ provision with res,ect to s::?eakers at election meetirl3s, 
l'eeu.latl· _. 
.... nZ th~ use of vehicles at elections and reducirl3 the maximu.m scale of 
e1er>t1 ~ On expenses; and to restrict the puryoses for which the funds of 
DOlit' ' . ~Oal organisations may be applied; and for other purroses conse~uential 
1J.r)on th ~ e matters aforesaid. tt(91) 
~-----------------------------------------------89. Jhg.nep. 245, cc. 2393, 4 December 1930. See Note 13. 
meeting can be found in N.E.C. Minutes,. 57,li:~C~'4~18 Deoember 
cc. 1631. 
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The only glaring omission was the half-yearly register although a 
number of other provisions, including one dealing with absent voters, were 
el' , . 
lInJ.nated by the Cabinet during the drafting stage. It is important to 
note, however, that the ~ill still notdisoussed in great detail by the 
Cabinet and that be ond the "long title" there was little of substance 
that Could be called a Bill, primarily because of technical difficulties in 
drafting. The Bill was only completed in first draft on the 16 Deoember 
1930, revised by 30 Deoember 1930, and then discussed with the Liberals on 
5 January 1931 _ discussions which were deemed by the Cabinet to be livery 
desirable." 
Apart fram the Liberals the reaction to the Bill had been to say the 
least lUk: 
, ewann. The Conservatives pledged themselves to total opposition 
to th: . 
e B~l1 While it was not clear that the P.L.P. would support the Bill 
With 
anything more than apathetic resignation. The Cabinet, however, had 
stu 
1 not ccmpleted their deliberations on the Bill. Following discussions 
With th' 
. e Liberals, it was agreed that a small body of the Cabinet (92) 
ShoUld 
review the situation, which they did, subnitting a memorandum stating 
"0 llr View is that if it is essential to reduce the scope of the Bill and to 
lessen its 
controversial character for reasons of Parliamentary time, sane, if 
not all 
of the following four Clauses could be dropped, as fram the Labour 
POint ' 
of V1ew they are the least important and valuable."(93) The clauses 
in'lOl"Ved ' Were the provision for facilitating voting for electors who changed 
their 
reSidence during the currenoy of a register; the clause dealing with the 
Postpon 
ement of polls on remote islands; the authorisation of the employment of 
sPeaker 
. s at public meetings held for pranoting or procuring the election of a 
------------------------------------------------92. Cl 
.}"nes, Henderson, Shaw and Kennedy. 
93. CAB 
l:'9-wt(21Z/432, (30) Italics Mine. At the Cabinet Meeting of 6 January 
th3l 1t was deemed that it was essential •••• to reduce the scope of ~ e Bill and lessen its controversial character for reasons of 
arliamentary time •••• " CAB 23/66. 1(31)1. 
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Oandidate and the cl~lse dealine with the proposal to restrict expenditure 
by Political oreanisations in connection with elections. The ~roup 
recognised that dropping these clauses might be politically embarrassine. 
Elmb -. 
arrassine or not the Cabinet aereed to omit three of the four clauses, 
retain' t ' lne he one dealinz with remote islands,and took the final decision to 
abolish the business clause rather than allowing a dual franchise to be 
restricted by limitations on the number of votes to be exercised to a single 
one onl y and the alternative vote was specifically drawn up to restrict the 
"ote t o two candidates. The Cabinet also decided to exempt the City of 
to --. 
ndon from the abolition of the bl1siness premises vote althot~h those who 
e:1!:eJ:'C' ',' leed their vote there would not have a second vote. The group were also 
ask d . . . 
r e to look into the question of limi tine end preventing "the use of such new 
Illeth d ' 
. 0 s as broadcastine of political meetings and 'talkie' films, except so far 
as included in candidates expenses" but it was decided later that the aprlication 
ot ' , . , 
~lcb a limitation would be too complex to follow through.(94) 
On 22 January 1931 the Representation of the People Bill was withdrawn 
and, the Re:;;>resentation of the People (No.2) Bill introduced the followine 
d~t(95) with the alte~ations a~reed to included or omitted as the case required. 
~e Second Readine took pl~ce on 2 and 3 February(96) when Clyn~ssaid that 
tt ~as the duty of a Government to acce,t the responsibility of introducing 
mea. 
aures upon which the Ullswater Committee had failed to agree. Re fr~kly 
s.cc .' 
epted that "the proposals mentioned in the original title but ~eleted from 
the Bill, mizht have been found to give rise to oonsiderable oontroversy and 
"aUld. " oertainly have t~{en up more Parliamentary time than we oould possibly 
"-----------------------------------------------------94 • .QA] 23/~. 2(31)7. 14 January 1931. 
95. / / J!.C.Deb. 247, oc. 344 6 and 509 10. 
96 
. . Not 24 February as stated by Butler, OD.cit., p.69. H.C. Deb. 247, 
00. 1467. et. seq. . . , ... 
afford" and he denied allegations that it was the Libel'.'als who had forced 
the Ch~nl?'es. (97) T C t '~ he proposals concernine the amendment of the orrup 
Practices Act were to be found in "I.abonr and the Nlltion" in which the party 
11 
reserved to itself the rteht to promote legislation to secure a more fitting 
llOlitical instrument to implement the rarty's programrne."(98) The alternative 
l'ote Was not a perfect method of election but a "fair and reasonable" way of 
seou.r' log a representative Parliament. Plural votiU3 was castigated as "the 
SYmbol of Wealth', of good fortune, of position (and) of vested interests. "(99) 
A1)art f 
• rom the harmless exception of the City of London the Government intended 
to b 
a oUeh a.ll forms of plural franchises. Vehicles to be used at elections 
'*'ere to be the reSPOnei.b~lity of the Returning Officers who should have the 
DOWer to "allot whatever vehicles or motor cars (that) are piaced at his 
di;1?osal ~n an equitable and a fair and reasonable basis."(100) 
The weakness of the Government's case was highliehted immediately by the 
~1?onents of the Bill. It was irrelevant to the economic situation, the 
llleasu. 
re was not wanted by the Labour Movement, university representation had 
Drol'ed it s worth and no "b h f th .t h " longer represented the closed oroue s, 0 _e rJ.c I 
cleSDite the abolition of the business vote the City of London, "the very centre 
ot bu. ' 91ness representation" had been excluded. Conservatives in particular 
l:'efe l.'red to the allezed deal with the Liberals and the party politica.l motives 
that Were inVOlved. The P.L.P. representatives took different lines within a 
bl:'oa.d, 
framework of agreement with the principles of the Bill; few joined 
~h U.r Renderson Jnr. in full-fledged support of the meamtre. Sir Ernest 
13el'l.nett 
, Who had been a Labour Party representative on th~ U1lswate~ Committee, 
~~--------------------------~----------------
. 97. Th 
e Liberals had in fact agreed to the changes even if they did not 
initiate them. 
96. 
liJJ.Dn. 247, c,c. 1469/70. 
,99. !b ~., cc. 1413. 
'0 -'" ? !bid ~., cc. 1418 • 
. . . 
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SPoke in favour of the alternative vote whilst attacking the University 
tl'anchise. (101) Mr. Lang, Member for Oldham, thought the Bill gave the 
~portunity to halt the decline of Parliament, expressed doubts about the 
Pl'acticabUity of the clause concerning motor vehicles and thought the 
abOlition. of university ~ranchises was a mistake. Few Labour Members 
shared the latter conviction, while front Bench spokesmen emphasised the 
e:lCtension of democracy under the Bill, MaC:Cona1d going out of his way to 
state that P.R. was too representative of minority interests rather than 
Ill&. j ori ty rule. A m.unber of speakers, including Marion Phi11ips and Jimmy 
Ma:lCton, preferred no changes to be made because they were either unnecessary 
01' (in Maxton t oS case) irrelevant to the pressing problem of unemployment, 
01' the more fundamental problems of a Parliamentary machinery which stifled 
Ill' 
. rlnority opinion. Cecil Wilson, (102) an executive Member of the P.R. Society, 
ad"{ocated P.R. as the only solution, quoting an old article by:MacDonald, to 
back 't ~ up. Mr.Wilson abstained fram voting but the second Reading received 
a 295:230 majority. 
Any understanding that might have existed between the Labour and Liberal 
~al'ties Was effective~ destroyed by the Liberals' effective destruction of the 
'rl'adeDisputes and Trade Unions Bill late in February 1931. More than anything 
thi 
S action by the Liberal Party completely alienated backbench Labour Party 
~in' -10n and produced the kind of disaffection that the Conservative Press· 
had previously conjured out of their imagination. The Cabinet, however, was 
ill no Position to do much about the situation. If they were to drop the Electoral 
ltei'orm Bill the charges of a bargain would have been substantiated and the 
chan . 
ces of Liberal co-operation on other, more :important, measure could have been 
'---------------------------------------------------------101 •.. 
lPid., cc. 1523/4. 
Member for Sheffield Attercliffe. See his letter in the T~es, 15 
. January 1931. Mr.WUson remained an active member of the P.R. 
Society throughout the 'thirties. See Times,lO November 1933 
and Manchester Guardian, 12 September 1936. 
fa.ta,l1y r~du.ced. As a. re 9".1 1 t the Ce,binet declded after a short disC1.1Ssion 
of' the situation, "th2.t ~t this sta,c:e it woulc. be J:loltticaJJ.y dee:i.r~.ble for 
the Go',e:r.nreent to fulfil it~ ';i~d~~; . to the l~tter. n( 103.) 
Thu.s on 3 Ma:r-ch i,:acDon~Jd mov",d th:?t discussion of the B1.ll be limi.ted 
to 1':I.ve d13,:rs in CO!:1T'1i ttee and th:r:'ee (1 04) dl?~rs for the Rerort sta,3e and third 
l'eMil\? D 
- espi te vieorous orrosi tion l.!acDonald t s case aeainst unnecessa~J 
l'e:pitit· J.on of the are'ments at all the st?~ees remained unazl'~I"ed, and in the 
end the offer of an extra day at the Cop.1Jni ttee staee was accepted a,s a 
S1.tT'fic· 
- lent Governmental response to the demands made. 
The 101'1--3 process of discussi9n be£::an on 4 March with a refusal by the 
Sneak 
" er to a.ccert instructions which would have dea.l t with the redistribution 
Of seat 
S and Proportional reDresentation. The latter instruction was a 
r • 
DOliti 1 
-Ca move initiated by the Conservatives but the former W8.1'3 introd.uced 
by G. R~rnes, a Labour Member, who had tried to raise the issue- - with little 
S1.tcce 
S!3 ... during the Sedond Readi~. (106) The Liberals then moved an amendment 
lIh' 
J..ch Wou.ld have applied the alterna.tive vote to Northern Ireland - a provision 
"'hi ch h 
ad been dropped from the Bill after representations from the Northern 
1:1'a1 
and Gove:rf'l.ment. Cl!rnes resisted the amendment on grounds of political 
eJ:::pedi . 
ency. It was not wanted by those concerned and was not worth the trouble 
that Wou.ld be ( ) • caused by its-inclusion in the Bill. 107 The Home Secretar.y s 
a:p:Paal for the amendment not to be ~ressed was successful. On the wider issue 
. .. 
~-----------------------------------------------103 • 
.£.,AB 23/65 15(31)10. 25 February 1931. It13,l:tcs Mtne. See Also f.note 81 above. 
104. 
Not two days as sta.ted by Butler, op.cit., p.71. 
105. . 
-!:C.De£,: 249, cc.' 229 et.seq • 
..!!..:C .Deb •. 2-17 
--__~ T' cc. 1701. 
~lYnes lJ.sed the cu.rious a.r~unent that the Unionists in Northern Ireland 
ad majorities so great that the a.pplication of the alternative vote 
wou.ld make no difference to the situation. H.C.Deb. 249. cc. 442/3. 
2.35 
of' the a.1 ternati vs vote the Government t s a.ppea.l for sup~ort wa.s not well 
l'eceived, for althouGh Sir Ernest Bennett and Mr. Mueeerid39 areued in fa,vour 
of'th 1 
e a ternative vote those Labour Mer.Jbers who spoke in the debate attacked 
the Government t s line. '·CoIDm!'.nder Kenworthy attacked the alternative vote in 
a. manner which implied that he accepted the baxoeain theory and apparently 
abate. . 
l.ned from votine in the lobbies. John Beckett was fa.r more forthright 
on behalf of the I.L.P., ttThe Labour Party do not want (this Bill) and it is 
So most astonishing thine that a Labour Government in defiance of their mm 
DOlicy 
• • • '. are/going to rut on the Whips in sU];ll'ort of a Measure which ••••• 
is br h 
°ue t in Qgainst their own judeement."(10S) For the Government Clynes 
argued that the alternative vote was a politically just solution to an unjust 
. SitUation. Unlike P.R. the cha,nee was not a big one and thu~ it re~uired no 
n[ 
andate from the electorate, but it ~ vital to the Bill and could not, 
theref' 
ore, be the sDbiect of a. free vote. "Our purpose is to enla.:ree the , ... 
1ibe~. ~ "J of the, individual elector and in no sense to lessen the freedom or the 
:tight 
of any candidate or any party."(109) The clause was passed but with 
the I.L.p. 
contingent: and John Bromley votine against with some 27 others 
absent!" 
ne themselves. 
0' 
n 5 l~rch the division of double member constituencies, except the City 
or LOnd 
on and University constituencies, proved to~be 'lUUltroversial and it was 
a~proved without a division atter a discussion which centred on the question of 
secu'r1 
ne imPartiality in the drawinz of the bounde.ries. This was followed by 
a livel 
y debate on the abolition of the business vote on the Clause which 
abOliSh 
' ed the business vote, other than in the. Cl ty of London, and provided that 
'----
108 ~----~--------~--~----------~-------------------
, '0 
• ~., cc 484/5. Cf. Fenner Brockway "The L~our Party is s::;,endine hours 
o~'an Electoral Reform Bill for which.there is no enthusiasm and the 
Central nurnose of which - the Alternative Vote - it would reject if it w l;' ... 
d ere honest with itself. Everyone knows that the Bill is only a. tactlcaJ. 
eVice to tie the Liber~ to the Government. "New TJeMer, 20 Ma.rch 1931. 
9. .!!:..C.Deb. 249, cc.533. 
no person should vote at a eeneral election in more than one constituency. 
The clau.se was widely resented in the Labour Party and B.n amendment was 
lIloved b Oli Y ver Baldwin to remove th~ City's exernrtion from the abolition 
ot the bUSiness vote, an'exemption which Clynes h~A justified on the grounds 
that With out the business vote the City could not be preserved as a constituency. 
The disSidents, in which the I.L.P. played a prominent role, were not 
l'art . icularly concerned to maintain this blatant piece of sentimentality which 
h~d b 
aan il10zically inserted into a Bill allegedly desiened to regularise the 
l'atio 1 
na Workine procedures of the democratic principle. The City, they 
argued 
, was an a~e~hronism; finance could claim no special place; the exemption 
"a.s t ou of place in a democratic Bill. Clynes argued that the preservation of 
the Cit Y Was the lesser of two evils,(110) the inclusion of which in the Bill, 
-r 
tho11oo1.. i 
""""·l ne'luitable, was harmless. The pa11ci ty of the Home Secretary's argument 
"a.s 
meaSured by the size and quality of the 206 dissidents who entered the 'No' 
lObbies. Althou.,eh the Government voted aeainst the amendment a number of 
junior M' . ~nisters led by Clement Att1ee, Tom .Tohnston and Rl~h Dalton supported 
1
t
.(111) The embarrassment that this caused Ma.cDonald and Clynes, who had 
been i 
even freedom to determine points which might arise reeardine free votes,(112) 
t, 
o:t'oed the Cabinet to decide to eet Arthur Henderson to make it cle9.r that a 
fl'ee _ 
. vote on the Goverr~ent side meant abstention or support of the Government's 
:POl.icy. The vote on the. whole clause took the fom of a straieht party 
diViSion, though there had been very little discussion of the merits of plural 
"ot1 
. ne ~r se. 
'-------------------------------------110 
• 
11~. 
Pre~'mahly the preservation of the bu~iness vote on the one hand and the 
destruction of the City as a constituency on the other. 
Chancellor of the Duchy or Lancaster: Under Secretary of State at the 
Scottish Orfice and Under Secretar,y of State at the Foreien Office, 
respectively. 
~AB. 23 66. 16(31)4. 4 March 1931. See also N.E.C. Minutes,58,E.C.a 
930 1.M.262, 10 March 1931. 
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The abolition of the University constituenciAs was considered in 
COnnnittee on 16 March w:hen an amend.rnent to the relevant clause was moved 
e~empting its application to Queen's University Belfast on the erounds that 
~is A. 
would affect the Irish po1itj.ca1 settlement which had been exempted 
from all the other c1a.uses under the Bill. The Government claimed that the 
University Was not represented in Parliament at the time of the settlement 
a.nd. that with only a 3,300 e1ectora.te it was too small to be represented. 
To !lla,'k 
e an exem,tion in Northern Ireland would be indefensible and would not 
be an interference in the internal affairs of Northern Ireland. The 
Arnendrne t . 
n Was na..-1'TOwly defeated by 178 to 168, with one Labour Member, Major 
Chl.1J:'ch 
- voting in favour. On the C1a.use itself Lord Hugh Ceci1 moved its 
rejecti ( 
r on on the grounds that the principle it represented equalitarian 
democ ) 
- racy was a fallacy. The system was not chosen by the people exercising 
thei 
r electoral rights but for the ~eop1e who legitimised the process by the 
!lerr 
Ol'mance of the public function of voting. 
Representation in the count~r was not based on democracy but on 
OOIll!nunities in which the few led and the many obeyed. The University, as a 
c°lllInun 
, . ity, ou.eht to have the right of representation in Parliament. They were 
obVio 
Us leaders in' thou:ht and action. He waS supported by Major Church who 
~eued. th 
at a university education entitled individuals to special representation 
1n th 
e House. 
}'!ove ment 
Universi~.r education had long been an id.ea1 of the Labour 
as the contributions of Tawney and Cole had'il1ustrated. The modern 
lln1vers't 
b ~ ieg were no 1003er upper-class preserves; the freedom of party enjoyed 
'Y the U i 
n Verai ty Member should be maintained. He appealed to the Government 
to all .-
. 0", a free vote on the issue and to let graduates keep their privileges LO 
the U . 
ni've!'sibr constituencies.(113) 
'---- " 
~e weeks preceding the discussion in Parliament had been thick with 
he activities of a strong retentionist lobby. See Butler, or.ott., P·74. . 
Clynes took Ceeil to task on his theory that srecial interests rather 
than lOCalities should be represented _ which is what Cecil mepnt in essence. 
Clynes: "The mere possession of a degree does not disti~'""Uish 
a man from his fellows. As education beeomes more 
widespread the ar~nnents for se~arate representation 
of universities become less and less plmlsible. If 
university representation is to be retained, it would be 
eq,ually sensible snd f9.ir to e-ive reyrr.esentation to the 
~rellt professional interests snch as l?w, Medicine ••••• 
and even to trade unions ••••• " 
An Ron. Member: "They are represented at the present time!" 
Clynes: KYes, trade unions have representation, but they are 
represented throueh the ordinary :!!rocedure of !"orular 
election."(114) 
The Le,bo1Jr CMe W(;,.9 based on the necessity of elections as a rr(')v~l'1~ ,:;r.-ollnd 
to!, J?otential membe1"S. The ~mti.-democr~tic n'1tu.re of s:,ecia1 franohiF.les, the 
't'~atio . ( 
nary nature of the franchtse and its elector.-ate imp1yine the class M.as 
in th . 
e ~Jstem) were unacceptable and it was, C1ynes pointed out, foolish to 
131~est that Unive-rsity Member.-s were the only Members of rare intellectual 
d.istinction. (115) Tactically thts was an error because as MacNeill Wet 1" 
e.cid.) 
:y COTlmented, "Nobody proved, or indeed, attempted to prove the justice of 
S,
11o
'Vina a. man or woman to vote because they had a. University de3Tee."(116) 
It '?1 ' 
as the principle not the theory built '-'-pon that p:1I:c:4ie to which the Labour 
Pe.:t'1; ~ y "'as o:!!:!:,osed. Th~ Gov~:mr.tent was defe'3.ted by 4 votes (211 to 213) with 
2 t b 
a. Our Members (Major Church and Josiah Wed3ewood) votine with the Opposition, 
~hil ~ 20 other Laboul." Membe-r:-s were absent unpaired. The 20 Members were after-
~a~ .. . 
S'llbject to a sood deal of criticism as were the Liberals who had been evenly 
!li'lid 
ed. on the i89u.e. The Dq.i.ly He1"ltld decl~xed, "Few people in the Labour 
l~()"A . . . . . .. . .. , 
-Tnent will fail to deplore the defeat of the Government on the issue of 
"-4.----------------.:....----------
!kC.Deh. 249, cc. 1144/5. 
"5. l..~~i_t. Cf. Greenwood, "men of unq,uestioned intellectual eminence have 
been.refused representation in Parliament by university ~raduates." 
cc. 1802 • 
. " 6. ,!or'Ward. (Glasn;ow),28 March 1931. 
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'University representation in the Cormnons. It is an issue on which th~ 
tabour Party should have been unaniMous. "(117) Rumours that the Government 
miGht drop the Bill were quickly stifled with the Government's announcement 
that .. 
it would proceed with the Bill after the Easter recess.(11~) The 
same day the Ca.binet was infomed. that the Opposition Parties would apparently 
not Challenge them if they refused to accept the conselluences of that defeat(119) 
but in the following month decided not to reopen the issue. 
The Clause providing for the postponement of polls in remote islands was 
carried without a division. The clause dealing with the restriction on cars 
"as not . 
so u.n~versally approved.. The Clause provided that no-one should be 
d:t'iven t 
o the poll except by a resident member of his family, or in a car 
vOhl.nt . 
r ar11y put at the disposal of the retu-~iU3 officer and under his orders. 
The cl 
ause Was not affected by Toole's motion in the House of Commons on 
10 n 
ecember 1930, the subject had been one which had been put forward by 
ta.bour M ~bers at the Ullswater Conference and had been a lonc-standi~ 
el'iev . 
ance of the Le.bou:r Movement. Clynes, hmvever, had grave doubts about the 
lll'acti 
cality of the Clause and had written in his earlier Memorandum to the 
Ca.binet "that ~n no circumstances would it be right to impose upon the returnine 
offic . 
er the duty of allocating the vehicles put at their dis?osal."(120) His 
cOll . '-e~es had ove~ru1ed him but must have felt uneasy as the weakness of the 
Cl 
aUSe Was effectively exposed by their ironic opponents.(121) The underlyine 
lrea.'kne 
Ss of the Clause as drafted was that it was a party clause aimed at 
~---------------------------------~----~----
"7. ~:lbT Herald, 18 March 1931 • 
... .. ~ ~ ,.. . 
!:.C.Deb: '249, cc. 2038. 18 March 1931. 
£!B. ?3!66. 18(31)5, 18 March 1931. 
QAB. ?A!217!428. 16 December 1930. 
For the debate see H.C.Deb. 251, co.985 et.seq. 22 April 1931. 
.2JtP 
attacking the superior vehicle carryinc capacity of the Cons9l:'Vatives. The 
GQvernment's intention, however, was to equalise the franchise not to attack 
the T . 
ory party re1:.' se and in this vein Stafford Cripps commented durine the 
deb .. ' .. - - -. 
ate, "there clearly is a. case made out for some method - it may not be the 
:Pt-ecis . 
. e method laid down in this Clause - of arri vine at a faire1:.' use of 
cat'a"(122) while Clynes, conceded that the Clause was perhaps not the "last 
WO"'d i 
- n perfect draftsmanship ••••• "(123) and agreed that it was not incapable 
of 
a.mendment. The point was that the Government had "endeavoured to equalise 
the 1.' 
ace between the poorer voters and the rich, and to diminish the force of 
the lIe 8opon of wea.l th whinh owners of money now have l\.~ainst poor candidates in 
Pat'liementary elections."(124) The debate collapsed into a series of amend-
lIlenta i . 
r ' n ~~Jine deerees of acceptability, before t~e guillotine fell and the 
lll.'inc1nl . ~ e of limiti~~ the use of cars was approved by 263 votes to 229. 
The following d~ the Clause reducill3 the maximum scale of election 
e~enses from 5d. to 4d. per elector in the borouehs and from 6d. to 5d. in 
cO"llntie '. . 
s Was consldered by the Committee. A number of variations were offered 
lrith . 
Jimmy traxton offerinz 2d. and 3d. as the required am01.1.nts necessary to 
. !It-event th 
e lavish expenditure desiened to influence voters aw~ from their 
better 
or more rationa.l judgement. Marion Phillips thoueht 'the suesestions 
19.1.\dable but impracticable. She noted that the average expenses or all 
ca.n.did t 
tabou 
a es in the Enelishand Welsh counties were 3.14d. and 3.29d., that of 
1.' Candidates 1.91d. and 2.15d. and that of ConsA"t'vatives 4.7d. and 4.53d. 
~eaD 
... ectively. 
"It is perfectly clear, that on the avera,ee," she concluded, 
'"'--. 
122. -------.:....------~:------------.Th.~., cc.1006. 
123. . ... Thi~, cc. 1 043. 
~c.ctt. elynes mieht have noticed that in Oldham the parties had ~reed.to ban all cars during elections: a roint made on seve"t'al 
cCaaions by Mr. La~. H.C.Deb. 246, co. 459. Cf. H.C.Deb. 252, 
cc. 2240. ' 
"CO 
nservativecandldates can fight their elections within the figures 
Stl,geest ed by thi s Bill." ( 1 25) It would do those who spent more no harm 
to redu.ce their eX',Dendi tu"t'e, nor would it incu.r them in any hardship. All 
Onnositi >, ~... on a.r~ent was to no avail when C1ynes pointed out that in the 
'929 election oh1y 162 candidates had exceeded the pro,osed new rate and of 
th~se 
. only 80 were successft.tl. (126) A number of other Labour Members felt 
that Mexton' s proposed limit was s~t too low, although T. Lewis (Southampton) 
did . 
SUpport his amendment. The amendment,however, was not called 'and it was 
the C 
onservative amendment that was discussed in detail and defeated 258 to 
68. Following the approval without a division of the Clause itself a number 
or Co 
nseluential amendments to the Bill were proposed. A number of new 
C1au 
r ses were ruled out of order. Three were proposed by Mr. Cecil Wi1son, 
desiened to combine the Enelish University constituencies into one retUrning 
seven . 
members, the Oxbridge constituencies into one and to apply the principle 
or :P.R. (Single'1.'ntlsferable Vote) to the City of London. Another Clause, 
l?l'onosed b" C f L d ' ~ y Oliver Baldwin, would have reduced the ity 0 on on s 
l'eDl'esentation in the Commons from two to one. 
In the discussion that took place on the rules to be adopted in applying 
th ..'-
€I alternative vote system a Conservative, Sir Hilton Youne, moved that the 
SYste - ( m ,advocated by Professor Nanson be adopted. 121) The Government spokes-
~an l'eCognised the wea~ness of the A.V. and the loeic of the Nanson system but 
still d' tsmissed the latter as impracticable while Sir Stafford Cripps reminded 
'------------------------------------------------------
'25. 
127. 
E:C.D~b. 251, cc. 1195.' 
2 Labour, 60 Conservative and 18 Liberals. Butler appears to have 
miSinteroreted what Clynes said. See Butler, o,.cit., p.11 and Cf. 
lL.C. D"'lh. 251, cc .1204. '. , , 
~C.Deh •. 252, cc.1013. et.se~. 'Clynes had already rejected Nanson's. 
Scheme at the draftitl3 st'l,,Ze of the Bill. 
.242 
Sir Rilton that he had himself doubted the practicability of the Nanson 
SYstem as recently 
"as ironic, if not 
as 4 March. Conservative support for the amendment 
sarcastic, and it was easily defeated by 242 votes to 
158. An amendment proposed by Herbert Sa.rrru.el to allow the use of as many 
preferences as there were candidates found :Mr. Wilson's support and W<3,S 
:read' I 
1 y accepted by the Home Secreta~J, rrruch to the chagrin of the 
conservatives who forced a fruitless diviston on the issue. Other Conservative 
amendments seem to have been blocking devices a1 thml[;h one which would have 
post1'l ~.oned the countine of .the votes until the day after the election gained 
the 
SUpport of l.ir. Tinker, Labour l!ember for Leigh, who declared, tllf I were 
free ! Would vot e for the Amendment. tI ( 128) He was not free, however, and 
jOined the Rome Secretary in opposition to the amendment, thou.gh Clynes did 
r 
Pl'OIlli 
se to give the question further consideration before the Report Staee. 
!proposal to count second preferences as half a vote found favour with Georee 
Stl'au 
. ss and Commander Kenworthy who abstained as a. mark of their views while 
Chuter Ede . 
expressed similar sentiments but still voted to defea.t the amend-
Illent 
• 
The R9Ilort Sta..~e was less eventful :pa.rtJ.v ,. because the Government had 
accepted defea~ on the University Clause and ha,i :put dmm a backbench attemr>t 
to 
resu.rrect the issue.(129)' The Government did, however, introduce a new 
~lause ~.f"~c.:tryj-.ne. that no. one could vote more than once in a eenel.'al electio., 
and. .........• 
the debate it invoked was one between th.e advanta . zes of plural votine and 
the l'Ihi 
.;' losophy of one man, one vote. The su_~erio:!:' votin~ streneth of the 
le.tt", ... 
c,- Won th d A Cons0~vative pro:,09a,1 to allow can~id8.tes four C.9,l'~ 
- e 8;:/. 
P"'l:' 
. :Polline distr1.ct wa~ al~o 1.'ejeoted thoueh durin:! the debate ].u-. McKinley 
s~()k ... 
·6 fo!, m~n~r ranl<:-o.nd-file meT'lbel"~ of the P.t.P. when he said that the~' we1.'e 
.. 
"---~--------------------------------------------------
'<8 • 
'?-9. . ... 
Th1.i., cc.1991. et. setl. 20 },!~~ 1931. C 6,"R '?3/61. 28(31 )9.13 May 1931, 
and .19(31)9 10 M~T 1931. 
It 
not 0DP.osed to supplyi rl3 reasonable !:leans of conveyance to peo,le 'Pho other-
"is~ c t ( ) ~ anno get to th~ roll bl'lcause of ase or infirmity" 130 Oth~r Leb01.U' 
1f~ h 
-.ID el'S spoke in favour of an anendment in Clynes' name which provided for one 
Ca!' fo 
r each candidate for ever.J thousand electors in the constituency in the 
coU.nties and half that number in the boroushsj an arnend.'!1ent which was fino.lly 
accepted by the House. A Liberal amendment excludinS some 54 constitu.encies 
ot mOre than 400 s1uare miles in area from the operation of the clause was 
aCcepted. 
The Third Readip~ (131) was a repetition of most of what had eone before. 
Sil:' m... ~~nest Bennett reiterated the value of the alternative vote. S.F. Perry 
COn-f'e ~ Ssed a preference for P.R. and re~retted the retention of \U1iversity 
l'ell"'es t ' 
,r - en ation, indicating a readiness to talce up the challe~e that the Lords 
lllic..'1.t make on the Bill _ the possibility of which had been indicated in an 
intern 
:perate Churchillian outburst. Chuter Ede sneered at the Conservatives' 
~ tive love of P.R.(132) while another L~po\tr Member lOOKed forward to an 
early deletion of the clause whi~h had continued the a~omaly of university 
l'en!'e 
.. sentetion. The Government's performance was well rounded off by :Mr. Short 
"ho lllade many effective points e~ainst the plu=a1 vote. (133) The Bill was 
!lassed b y a najority of 50 and went to the Lords. 
The Lords' response was' at first neutral and then hostile as the 
Cons.::. -
-rvative peers systematically tore the heart out of the Bill in Committee.(134) 
~~'----------------------------------------------------------130 
• .!bC.Dab. 252, cC.2275. 
131 
• ..[.C.n~b. 253, cc.43. et.seq. 
'3~ ., 
• The Conservatives were willing to apply it to the laree boroushs where 
it ,would affect the Labour pp.~y but not to. the cO\U1ties where it could 
have rebounded acainst themselves. 
!1:.t.a., cc.161. 
See Butler, o~.cit., 1'1'.80/2. 
Cl . 
¥nes submitted a memorandum (135) asking wheth8r the Cabinet wished to 
Dress the issue with the House of Lo~ds before the Summer adjournment but 
the Cabinet refused to do so,(136) despite C1ynes~ optimistic claims that 
h~ could reac!1 an aereement with their Lordships. The events of k~st, 
l7hich d 
estroyed the Lebo1..lr Government, effectively killed P.R. as an issue 
in the Labour Pa~J, while the election of September destroyed forever the 
tibe1.'al threat to Labo"'" and w{th it p t ~ • _ the need of a Labour arty thirs ins 
for Office to be interested in the death throes of a party that he,d forced 
u':Pon it issues it had not welcomed. 
In many ways the views of the Par1ianl(~ntaT"J Le.bour Part-<J in the 'T-nenties 
on the SUbject of Parliament and its prestiee were fashioned by the personality 
~nd outlook of its leader Rams~ Ma.cDon,a1d. Ma.cDona,ld IS atti tllde hsd always 
been 
conservative in his criticism of Par1iement. "He believed in House of 
Comm 
ons methods; he had a complete mastery of procedure there and a reverance 
fo:!:, the ancient complicated ritual. "(137) If the Party did not share 
}'!acnonald t s reve-rance fo~ the pr~cedllre they accepted his mMtery of procedure 
a.s u.nique~ With the solid exception of the I.L.P. < Members no attempt' was inade 
to u " 
Se Parlia.Illentary proced,.,re to the Party' sadvantaze and certainly not in a 
llla.nne 1 . 1.' ikely to provoke their allies and opponents into reta11iation acrainst 
them i . 
. n the Hou.se. 
'1'h.e Pa.:rli-amenta::r,J situation created by the General Election of 1929, 
~~l ' 
eft Labour within twenty seats ofa majority but still dependent on 
the L1 bera1s for the implementation of ,01icies the prestiee of Parliament wss 
ine'r1tably bound to decline in the eyes of the various factions withinth~ 
I>a.:t>ty. 
,Tru.e, the House was regarded ,. as th<e main platform for pub1icisins 
~~----------------~-------------------------------
135. Q.A"R ?4/22?/178. (31). 17 July 1931 and CAB ?3167~ ,39(31)3, 20 July 1931. 
'36 
• 8.'R 23/6~ 39(31 )3. a:>Ju1y 1931. It was eene:r.ally eX!;lected that the· < .. 
Parliament Act would be used. "Notes of the Week" Econ.om1.st 18 July 1931. 
137. lIa.!"J '''gnes Hamilton "Ramsay ~Dona1dtf Atlantio Monthly, 161, (April, 
19381pp. 452/62(453). 
Labour's ideals and policies but it was seen, on occasion with regr~t, as 
an" institution more suited to the prevention of progress. In the opinion 
of the I.L.P. it was geneztU],ymade for gradualists. Yet the LL.P. dominated 
the~eft Win3 of the P.t-.P., havine failed to convince their colleac.."'Ues not 
to accept office whilst in a minority, embarked upon a policy of reasoned 
amendments and deliberate obstruction which itself reduced the~estiee of 
l?~liament as an efficient worldns body rather than an ineffective "talking-
shop." I 
. n asserting the right to remain free of Party discipline the I.L.P. 
Were e~e~erbatine the de-emphasis on legislatUres that was al~eady in existence. 
The SOUl.'Ces of this de-emphasis were manifold. The Rise of Fascism in 
Italy 
and to a lesserJextentto hostile nature of the Soviet regime towa~s 
.. , 
l?arli ' 
a.mentary GoverP~ent stressed the advantages strong Government had in 
..,. { -' '"" , 
e:X:ecU.ti 
ve power. The elitist structure ,of the P~y and the political 
structUl.'e in Great Britain reinforced the weakness of a reformation from 
below. f 
, or with the possible exception of devolution, most Labour Ministers 
~ere . 
. concerned with problems of 'political and personal executive power rather 
than i 
nCreasing the prestige of Parliament. Indeed amongst the solid trade 
'Ul'tton 
rank-and-file there were no doubts expressed as to the future viability 
ot" Pa~liamentary institutions in the furtherance of Socialism. John Scurr, 
tor e~a.mple, writine in April 1930 declared, "Ramsa~ MacDonald, typifies the 
democr",,,y. B t t t tim ,~ om of the people, over-cau ious in em,eramen, some es 
t'aili . ' . 
ne because ha has waited too long, yet surely advancing towards better, 
thines. Under such men in the future Parliament will not decline in 
~:t'estieej it will be enhanced."(13S) Earlier in the same article Scurr 
had enolled the art of compromise 8..1'1d denounced extremism - OswaldMosley 
\IT ,-
as SUch an extremist. Shortly after his narro~defeat at the Labour Party 
,"",--",: 
--------------~--------------------------------------
" ~ J.Scurr, The Prestige of Parliament, T.G.W.U. RenoTd April 1930, p.264. 
.Annual Co~erence Yosley asserted that the basic econanic problems of the 
country could not be overcane by the existing system of Parliamentar.r 
~o~ernment and suggested that Nit was necessary to free the Executive fiDn 
. the procedlU"e which wa~ bringing the work of an,y Governnent to a stand-
IStUl." (139) In early December the Mosley Manifesto was issued to the 
Press. (140) Its signatories declared that, nit is jmpossib1e to meet the 
~ . 
onomic crisis with a 19th century Parliamentary machine. While the 
POWer to change the Government must, of course, be retained by Pa.r1ianent, 
'Viae powers to deal with the present econanio crisis must be vested in the 
~o~ernnent of the day for the (emergency) period subject only to the 
general control of Parliament •••• .An emergency Cabinet of not more than 
r 5l4inisters, without portfolio, should be invested with power to carry 
tbr h 0Ug an emergency policy. The nonnal Cabinet of department chiefs should 
be retained for less frequent meetings to deal with nonnal business. 11 CUJ.) 
The Manifesto's attack an Parliament as it stood in effeot represented 
an . 
a.ttaok on MacDona1disn in the Party's attitude to Parliament. rn it can . 
be . 
seen the seeds of Cripps' Socialist League proposals in their wildest 
tonn, (l42) although the link between thEm is explicable mainly in the 
Person ot Haro1d Laski whose penchant for plagarism was almostunequa11ed in 
the -&nnals of the ~te1leotua1 Left. Yet the results of this reaction to 
~arli!.... . 
... uentary oonservatism, or perhaps conservation might be a more appropriate 
tellu to use, were in the short-run almost neg1igib1e~ for the Party's attitude 
k 
-------------------------~--------------~-----------------------139 T' 
• _lIne..!, 10 October 1930. 
l4o • ..Q:Qserver, 7 December 19.30: Times and Guardian, 8 DeoEmber 1930. 
Manifesto was signed by 17 Members of the P.L.P. and J...J. Cook. 
141 M . 
,. Osley Manifesto, Ibid. 
42. Two ot the signatories (John Strachey and .Aneurin Bevan) became 
strong supporters ot Cripps in the 'thirties. . 
The 
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to Parliamentary reform was dominated by the most basic of all political 
instincts, that of survival, to which all other problems must take second 
Place. It Was when that battle was feared lost that distinctly Labour 
l'ef'o""'" ., ~U1S were formulated and it is to the course of that battle we now turn. 
The experience of the Second Labour Government was as bitter and 
f'l'Ustrat' lng as that of its predecessor in 1924 and for many of the same 
l'easans• It was, in the first place, a minority Government, dependent for 
its Parliamenta~ majorities upon a Liberal Party which by January 1931 was, 
because of its own internal divisions, becoming increasingly unreliable. 
In Feb . . l'Uary and :March of that year a divided Liberal Party had effectively 
destroyed the Trade Disputes and Trade Unions Bill and helped prevent the 
abOlition of the University franchise in the Representation of the People 
Bill. LlOyd George' s openly-declared policy was to discredit the Labour 
l?al:'ty , 
Wl.thout discrediting its Liberal Parliamentary supporters. The antics 
Ofthet' . -l.bera1 Party were, however, of secondary ~portance compared with the House 
of t . 
ords Whose destructive activities culminated in the destruction of Treve1yan's 
EdUcation Bill and the savaging of the Representation of the People (No. 2) 
13 ill. 
However, if the external difficulties of the Government led to the 
1:'esi 
gl'lation of Treve1yan his letter to MacDonald made it clear that its internal 
ditt, 
l.cUl. ties would prove to be its undoing. (143) MacDonald l'ru1 begun badly, 
a1ient; '"'g the ( ~l C1yuesiders by the omission of Wheat1ey the most conspicuous 
success f ) 
o the 1924 Goverrment from the Cabinet; indicating to many his 
a:Il'el'Si 
on to critical opinions. His opening speech to the House of Cammons 
In\Vhi 
. ch he talked of Parliament acting as a Council of State convinced the 
'-----143. -"A--~-------------------------------------------------------------
A.i. ter some t:ime I have realised that I an very much out of 
sYmpathy with the general method of Government policy. In the 
present disastrous condition of trade it seems to me that .the 
crisis requires big Socialist measures as the only hope rather 
than piecemeal and ineffective economies." 
left-Wine, and after the events of 1931 many others too, that UacDonald had 
Sold his principles for the privile~es of office.(144) The fact that 131 
Labou!.' M.P. 's voted a.:;ainst the Gov~rnment du!.'inz its term of office is 
'indicative of the extent "of this belief as well as the poor quality of leader-
Ship exercised by }~~Donali and his colleagues.(145) 
The quality of the Gove~ent leadership wasveclcened still further by 
the individuals appointed to vital offices. J .H. Thomas was made Lo~d PriV'J 
Seal with special res!'onsibility for Unemployment and Philip Snowden Chancellor 
of the Excheg,uer. Thomas' power in the Labour Movement had originally been 
based on his connection with the National Union of Railw~vmen of which he was 
a. at'l 
1 1 prominent member until the events of 1931.(146) His political skill 
was essentially that of a trade union neeotiator; his political views were 
r -
deCidedly conservative, his social graces positively endearing. It was not 
in h' la nature to challenge authority, as the 1926 General Strike had shown,' 
and in the Cabinet of 1929-31 Snowden represented the authority to which Thomas 
deferred. When Thomas' more abie subordinates gave their general support to 
l!osle , Y s schemes for economic reform it was sufficient for lI!acDonald that once 
'l.ho . . Inas had. raised the question of resignation it was Mosley who was to eo. 
'!!he old leadership, despite its painfully clenr inadequacies, was preserved 
a.nd the dominance of the Treasury maintained t'b.roueh the personality of PM.lip 
Snowd 
. en whose role in precipatatine the economic crisis of At~st 1931 was a 
c't\tcial one. 
~----------------------------------------------------------------
'44, 
"I wonder how far it is :!?ossible, without in MY way abandoninc our Party 
POSitions, to consider ourselves more as a Council of State and less as 
arrayed reeiments facip~ each other in battle? ••• so far as we are 
concerned co-operation will be welcomed ••••• so that by putting our ideas 
into a common pool we can brine out ••••• legislation and administration ' 
that will be of mlbstantial benefit for the nation as a whole." H.C.Dp.b. 
229,· cc. 64/5. 
Cross, 0".cit o,p,256. tiThe Pa.rty has been greatly disturbed during this 
Parliament by a erowing lack of discipline which has seriously hampered 
its work." L.P.A.C.R. 1931, p.93. 
Thomas remained Po11t1cai·Secretar.y of the National Union of Railwaymen 
havine been granted secondment to the Government for its period of office. 
Shortly after the events of 24 August the N.U.R. Executive held that the 
secondment had ended with the resi~nation of.. the SeCail. Labour Government. 
Snowden had long been recarded., without too much reason, as the Labour 
Party'S ex,ert on finance.(147) As Chancellor in the First Labour Gove~1ment 
he had llroved his orthodoxy to the Trea~~ry and but for his Socialist rhetoric, 
acid tCl'lgue and dislike of speculative ventures, would have made a first rate 
me~hant banker. It was not in Snowden's nature to change the institutions 
1n which he worked or to question the passive role of Government in a capital-
ist world. His economic policies, with the exception of Free Trade, were 
identical ~th those f hi t if t d hi t1 k th t f 
".J. 0 s mos voc ermIS opponen s an s ou 00 • a 0 
a nineteenth century liberal. For whilst Snowden ,,'as willing to attribute the 
hi"'h 1 ~ evel of unemployment to the evils of Capit~lism he would not consider 
the aT\T\I' ~~ ~cation of Socialism as a practical cure and, indeed, held most strongly 
;he View that any alternative methods to those 'tried and trusted by the Treasllr,1 
"ere t au omatically wrong. Thus the maintainance of the Gold Standard, the 
Ilalanced. Budcet and Free Trade became to SnO\vden articles of fat th rather than 
J;lolic Y choices. To him, and in all fairness to many of his generation, the 
~Sley Memorandum, the Liberal "Yellow Book" and the T.U.C. were all advocating 
llot Un 
S ply new, but positively dangerous, doctrines. 
Thus it was with clear deliberation that Snowden.began the chain of events 
th t --
a led to his joining MacDonald 1n the national Government when late in 
Janu.a . 
"r7 1931 he a.u.thorised the Treasury to submit an alarmist memorandum to the 
~oYa.l C OInmission on Unemployment Insurance. Snowden was determined to secure 
the Vi 
ctory of "sound finance" against these new doctrines and to persuade his 
Dart..r th 
v -at the only w~ to deal with the prospective Budget deficit that was 
tOl'ec t . 
as for the cOming financial year was in accordance with these princi.rles 
a.lld that 
such a·victory would necessitate economy in the public sector. He 
Elet out 
"to create an atmosphere of public anxiety over the Budgetary situationnO~ 
'---141.:------------------------
C1S\'!ton writing in 1926 made reference to the fact tha.t Snowden had worked 
in the Inland Revenue. Clayton, or.cit., p.174. 
'48. Cross, or.cit ., p.263.0n pp.262/3 Cross deals with the theoretical 
alternatives.open to Snowden. 
in order to win the Labour Party from the unsound 1'oliey of governr.tental 
interferenoe in the market economy tha.t its hieh level of public expenditure 
had Committed it to. The history of events between January and Au...,~st 1931 
can be seen very largely'in terms of the financial orthodoxy and political 
tactios of Philip Snowden a-za.inst the political instincts and 1'rejudices of 
the LabOu.r Movement's oreans and centres of influence. 
The Treasury Memorandum, which had warned of the' instability of the 
British finanCial system should State borrowing' be continued on the existing 
~ast Scale, had been issued with Snowden's full ~~pport but without the 
Cabin t' 
e s prior approval - a fact of '7hioh Webb complained. By his unilateral 
actio S n nowden had committed the Cabinet to an implied fundamental policy 
cha,nO' • 
",9 Wl.thout discussion. r . 
RaVine effeotively secured the support of the Cabinet for his policy 
Snowd 
en attempted to prepare the P.L,P. for the cha~e of emphasis. On 11 
ll'ebru 
ary,he took the oppo~~nity raised by a Conservative censure motion to 
aJ;lP"'al t ' 
" 0 the Labour Party to support the principle of equality. Speakins on 
tht:~ Li 
. beral a~endment to appoint an independent CommitteeSnowden told the 
Rou.ae that the country was fa.cine a fina.ncial crisis, decle.rin.~ "this iea 
l?!'oblem which no rt b t th d th H f C 
- one pa, y can solve, u e count~r an e ouse 0 ommons 
tnu.st 
realise the gravity of the position. Instead of Darty bickering, which 
lie 
can resume later, we must unite in a common effort to tw<e effective measures 
to o~ 
ercome our temporary difficulties and to restore our former prosperity."(149) 
In e; ~DroVina the setting up of the inquiry by a massive majority the House, and -
inde d 
e the bulk of the P.L.P. (only 21 Labour M.P. I S opposed the motion) 
~DliCitlY assented to Snowden's appeal. 
The Committee, which was set uD under the ChairmanshiD of Sir Geor~e ~!ay, 
!'Q()' 
entIy retired Secretary of the Prudential Assurance Company, whose financial" 
''''"'--
------------------------------------------------------
'49. &C.Deb. 248, cc.449. 11 Feb:r,,,e,ry 1931. 
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!l1.1
alifications were, and remain, obscure, consisted of an e<lual number of 
reDresentatives of all th~ee Parties. As Colin Cross notes, "Snowden and 
the Labour Party took the unusual step of chareing an all-rarty committee 
with Consideration of the central work of government. The May Committee 
Was not, like a Royal Commission, a more or less expert fact-finding inquir,y 
into a Specified problem. It was a highly political body chareed with 
l!lalc1nl7 .~ recommendations on major policy. And Lab011r's own representatives on 
it were in a minority. "(150) It could be ar~~ed that the Government was 
:t'esto i 
r ne real power to the House of Commons by allowins it to share in the 
POlic" 1 ,,-ma.cin~ process but the impact·· of the pre-concei ved economic ideolo3ies 
on th 
. e content of the RaDort, ideolo.1ies date-rmined by part~t constderatiol1S, , . 
l'ebu.tt 
ed such a claL",_ If the Hay Committee reI'rest'nted anythi.ng it wa.s the 
tna.b'I' 
1. l.ty of the l"0Utidal e,utho:!:'ity in the State to exercise its full e~ecl1tive 
DOlVer Wi t.h. t d 
.• /)'\.1. stri.ct reference to t:!-te economic context within whtch it o:,err>h~ • 
Cle'l", t ~-.-,y 00 I!rrt~h could be re'ld into a sitt'ation in which the main per90n~.li tieg 
11l~re led.' by ~sycholosicalrathe~ than 'econ6mic reg.sons to adopt the posture 
th~y di_1 
adopt but the wa1.",[ling of Parliementa~" insti tutio!l.s by , its economic 
Ell'l1fi ron.'T\~nt vras clea.rly implied in the Government's actions • 
. , 
Snowd.en was not delibe:!:'ately !,lanni~ the downfe,ll of the L~,bou.r Govem.ment 
bltt he Was deter.nined to see- that the principles of sO\1.nd f:l.nR-nee 'Would succeed 
9.l'l.d. h 
is polioies implemented even at the cost of alienati03 a eoodly section of 
his 1> a.~J. Even at this. e1~ly staee Snowden' s outlook was no different from 
that 
of Neville Chamberlain and the events of A~~st can be seen as the measure 
ll.ot 
Of e. nove to th~ Rie;ht by Snowden or MacDonald, but on the stability of their 
~on:s e~tive position. That that ~osition eould lead to friction with the 
,". ~ . 
~.t 1> . 
• • Was seen 8.t a. party meetins a. few da~!s later where his pro:::?osals were 
"----------------------------------------------------
'50 
• Cross, o:r.cit., 1'.266 • 
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attacked and a.. statement he mad.e th?,t he had no ir.tention of reducir10 
1.t'1em 1 . ~p °J~ent benefit was delibe~ately leruced to the press.(151) HOiVeve~, 
the implications of Snowd.en' s manoeuvres were aprarently not fully understood 
ana. th.e crisis which developed later found the Pe..rty incapable of meeti~ the 
Cha.11e . 
- nze w1th a united front. In :particular, it sho1.lld be remembe~ed that 
snOWden, -ho wos both 
"..., sick and old had more or less decided to Quit the 
Chancell 
' orship in favour of the House of Lords and a. less active politics.l life, 
and. w 
as already reeardirl3 his tenure of 11 Downin.:; Street: as a tem!,ora.ry 
n.e"e i 
v ss ~J in view of what he regarded as a erowine national crisis which it 
1:'90""'r 0. h 
... 1oU. e is skill to avoid. As Colin Cross :puts it, Snowden thought that 
"I:t!be . 
" qU1t, some weaker Chancellor ••••• might precipitate the deluee. Not 
on). . 
y the Labour Party, but the count!'1J it8elf' would fall into utter disaster. 
r . 
Only th 
-.e Iron Chancellor Snowden could hold the Government to the principles 
Of So . 
UnO. finance. Since it was to be the last bie job he ever exrected to 
Pe't'fo 
rm in !'olitics, he want~d to perform it well. He had nothi~~ to eain 
f't'om 
a'plau.se, nothiU;3 to lose from attack. "(152) 
There was little, however, that could be done until the l~ Com~ittee 
PJ:todUoed it s report and with this in mind Snowden IS bud.eet was deaiened to be 
a. eton' 
.. "'ea, measure. Meanwhile the ineredients of the finanoial crj.sis were 
!ilJOWl 
. Y preDared. In May the Credit Anstalt Bank in Vienna collapsed, producine 
lJa.nie i 
n investin.:; circles and precipitatinz the withdrawal of vast S1111S; from 
Cent:r 
a1 Eluropean banks. Two substantial German banks collapsed under the 
et't't'I,i 
-n and Suspended payments, thus tying up a ereat de~l of money lent by 
tand 
on bankers who themselves were under severe pressure to p~r on demand the 
"-------------------------------------------------------
MUch to Snowden' s annoyance, .!l>.Mi., p. 267. Some of Snowden IS far-seeine 
opponents were determined not ,to-be presented with a f~1t RC0oMnli. 
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sho:rt ... term loans they had borro",ed. The b?nkers' policy of borrowine sho!:'t 
and lendine 10n3 which had been t!1e s1..1bject of criticism for some while, we,s 
hiehliehted by the Mac!vBllem Cormnittee (153) and indeed was senerally accel'ted 
as Contributine to the origins of the crisis, (154) bu,t in July 1931 such 
ctit iciem was academic to British bankers, they were concerned with their own 
protection which they identified with the stability of the pound sterline. 
They felt that such stability could only be afforded by Governmental' action and 
in PD..w.. ~~1cular in the reduction of public expenditure. They had useful allies; 
the G . rego~J Commission had re~orted in the previous month that the Unemployment 
1J'u.nd should be balanced by reductions both in benefits and the period over which 
they could be received. 
r 
Within a $hort space of time the problems raised by the irresponsible 
tina,n . 
- olal policy of the British bankiU3 comnru.nity was submerzed in a welter of 
conun t 
en directed aeainst the,tlirresponsibly high level" of public expenditure. 
Snowd 
en was one of the first to concur with such comment.(155) His motives 
in s ' , 
o doine was to restrict the policy-o,tionsoren to backbenchers by creatine 
e. lllajority opinion, especially in "resronsible" circles, in favour of retrench-
ll'ten.t 
• In the face of such outside press~~e, supported by key individuals in 
t'
he hCislature, the backbench H.P. w~s helpless. Havine received a copy of 
~M ' ' ~ Report; shortly after it ha.d delivered its findinzs on 24 July Snowden 
delib 
erately delayed its publication until the day Parliament rose in order 
to p 
revent the possibility of it beios discussed by elements of the P.L.P. 
hostile to his c8,se.(156) It was an abuse of Parliament and a demonstration 
"---
, 53'-&-e-"'-o-rt-o-r-t-h-e-C-Om-T"l-i-t-, t-,e-e-o-n-Fi-. n-a-n-c-e-a-n-d"-T-n-d-n-.~-t-'r"'-,r-. -C-m-n-d-.-3-S-9-7.-( 1-9-3-1-)----
'54. .A '~ew appurlaed; 'for "example; 'by 'the 'T~G.YT .U. Record, See September, 1931 m.e 
'55. 
'56 
• 
A cam~aien for retrenchment in Governmerit'experiditure had be~~n, with 
the full ~l~rort of the City of London, in January. See Times,31 
January 1931. . . 
In all fairness to Snowden it Sh0111d be noted that the delay was welcomed • 
The Pa:roliamentary correspondent of the Fo'!"W~rd (GlASo;O\V), for example, 
wrote, "It is a good sign that the Report will not be .published until the 
dSlf Parliament rises. There will thus be ample time for the nation to 
Consider its terms before Parliament can take action." 1 Al~st 1931. 
2.54 
of th . 
e power of th~ Executive over the leGislature that did. not eo unnoticed • 
. 
Mo~eover, not content with preventi~ discussion in the House,Snowden, after 
Pl'ior arraneem~nt with Neville Chamb~rlain, particiytated in a short debate j.n 
whi"h h d . 
" e eclared "No Government, and espec1ally a Government like ours, which 
does n t . 
o Command a majority in the HotlSe of Commons ••••• could take the full 
responsibility of submitting to the House of Commons proposals for a reduction 
of eJCpenditllre of a drastic character ••••• The responsibility for ca~Jing out 
any recommendations that will be made must be shared by the House of Commons 
as a. Whole. It (1.51) The declaration was less a statement of fact as of intent; 
Sn ' 
oWden having already decided to ~lbstitute discussions amo03 leaders in 
Place of that of consultation between Members of Parliament. Viscount Samuel 
noted, itA few d~s before the adjournment of Parliament, the Chancellor of the 
~ , 
hequer, asked me to come and see him. He gave me three advance copies of 
the Eo 
onomy Report, and said that he would very ~lch like to know what would 
be the general attitude of the Liberal Party towards it. It would be plain 
that . 
no Government could ca:rry out dra.stic economies without the support of the 
~hole Rouse of Commons. The Committee was really the child of the House 
itself and he felt that all Parties should co-operate in a~ measures that mizht 
reSUlt from its recommendations."(15S) Snowdents claim tha.t the Committee was 
~the Child t l' liti 1 rt . 
. of the House itself': in general ignored the fac 0 po ca pa. J.es 
and i . 
n Pa.rticular ignored the fact that the Re~ort was divided on party lines. 
Snowden gave Opposition leaders in effect an assurance that any proposals 
'--------------------------------------------------------~\--1
57. !!:C.DQb. 255, cc.2512/3 30 July 1931 ... 
'58 
• .!.~llel Parers, File No.A1S(3). Samu.el used this information at a 
meeting of the Advisory Committee of the Liberal Party held on 29 
Janul:I.r'J 1931 •... In a letter dated 5 AUvmJ.st SnoyV'den did indicate that 
the Parties should consider thines se~aratelYt but it is clear that 
he did not mean that the rank-and-file should be consulted. A1S(1). 
255 
which we~e to be made would be submitted to them for their prio~ approval; 
an assurance which effectively removed ~olicy options from the Cabinet to 
the p tv ~., leaders. The adjournment of the House just as the MI'l;j' Report was 
'!)1.1.oli -. ~ shed only heizhtened the inevitability of the inter-rarly talks at 
lea.de~ l..' sfl~D level tha.t led to the collarse of the Lab01.~.r Government and 
~inished the possibility of the l~eislature playinG any constructive role 
in th 
e proceedings. 
'!'he future course of events durinz AU~'lJ_st were not as clear, however, as 
can be seen in retrospect. The Cabinet, having discussed briefly the May 
Report, refe~ed it to a special Cabinet ~Jonomy Committee, consistine of 
1!ac:Oonald, Snowd.en, Rendereon, Thomas and Graham and set 25 Auzust as the date 
tot' it . 
r B f1rst meeting. Ministers, with the exception of Snowden, then dis!"ers~d 
tOt'th 
air holidays. (159) 
'!'he May Report wa9, in fact, the ma.jority report of its anti-Soc:i.alist 
~embe:t's.(160) "The False Economy Report," E.F. Wise called it.(161) Its 
conel 
uSions were deliberately desiened to shock the Government into action by 
Painti ne the bla.ckest picture !"ossible, even to the extent of including in its 
clai1'l1 th 
at the prospective Btldeet deficit for 1932/3 would be £120 million, the 
tSo tni' 
llion of the Sinking Ftmd.. In order to meet this deficit the~r sl3.id 
that 
the Government should raise extra taxation to the tune of £24millim and 
C1):!; it 
s e~enditure by £96 million, some £66 million o~ which should come from 
the U nemplo~~ent Inmlrance Fund by a variety of measUres, including a 2q% reduction 
in U 
nem:ployment benefit. Their report was less a list of re~uired economies th~~ ~ 
e. statement of the belief t}1at !lnblic ex:-endi tt1re wa9 aga.inst their conce,tion 
'---. ~--------------------------------------------------~ 
MacDonald. had warned the C3bi:'l~t ttt~ll3,t t"ere m1.,::ht be em~'r'zen.cies to be' 
de3.lt with." CA~ 23/h7.40(31)10. 30 July 1931. 
COtnnittee o~ National Expendit111~e Rero't't, C1'1nfl. ~q?(), (1931). 
~w t,e!:vler, 7 Auzust 1931. 
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of d. ~mocracy to which the majority referred very briefly at the end of their 
Report •. ( 162) 
. The mtnol'ity Re:;,:>ort which was si~ned by the two LabouT' Memhe~s, Chl? .. ~les 
tath 
. e.rt and Arthur Pn2:h, att~.cked t'te majority's conclusions on the··grounds. that 
"'\Vh t 
, a. .they regard as 'undesiT'able' (::;:mblic expenditure) we view as consistent 
Yrith the ri,!l..t ( 6 ) 
-...fl and proper course of democratic eoverrnnent and pro[p:-ess," 1 3 
and. Wen.t on to state their fim belief in the necessi t~r of public exrendU1ll'e 
as eo means by which social injustices could be remedj.ed. . However, their 
diesel' 
eement w~s not limited to tr..e philosorhical differences with their 
COlle9.e'.'tes. They went on to o.eny the necessity of cuts in 'l'tne~rloyment benefit, 
cOndem 
, '''-0. the deflationaT"J poliCies of recent years and to accuse the rne.jority of 
cont'U.si~ Cause ID th e.ffect. Moreover, they areued, even if sacrifices we"t'e 
I" 
t'equired then they should be demanded from all sections of the cOll'lJ':'lUn::tty not 
just f 
rom the unemployed and those who were dependent upon the Government for 
theil' • 
. l.ncome. 
The importence of the Ltlnori ty view was that it was one which found ereat 
s'''lll. 
,; :Pe.thy in the T.U.C. and the Labour Movement in eeneral; both Pueh and Lathan 
~e~e ' 
Prominent in the two wi03S of the Party, and it was fu.ndamentally at odds 
llith ' 
the whole basis of the Majority's recommendations and, ·,'the"t'efore, with the 
'lfiews of Philip Snowden.' 1110reover, in the follo'Winz weeks the sentiments of 
the H 
,ovement were to be based on these propositions while the Cabinet was in the 
P:t'oces.- ( ) , ~ of considering a total alien viewpoint. 164· The reason why the 
~----------------~------------------------------
2l;1ntt .3920, Majority Re::?ort. Paras. 513/4. 
!P:l1.. ,Minor! ty Report Para.5.· Cf. Pa.ra.1.· "Public expenditure ha.s BmI'le 
jUstification when it rests primarily upon the.necessi~J for re-adjustine 
the use of the national income in such manner as to transfer expendi~~re 
from less essential or desirable channels into those which are desiened 
to mitizate social injustices, or those which improve the economic 
structure of the na.tion." 
See Note 14. 
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Ma.J' it 
.or y Report was successful was because its views coincided with those of 
Ma.cDonald and. Snowden whose perce;tions of their own roles as euardians of the 
"national interest" were instrumental in their seeking the impleme'1tation of 
that Report and its philoso,:?hy irrespective of the implications for the IJabour 
Pa.:t:'ty. 
,The effect of the May Report in the financial world was little short of 
dtsastrous. Fo110winc hard upon the two increases in Bank .Rate which took 
Place late in July it served to increase speculation about the stability of the 
IJou.nd sterling. The £5D-mi11ion credit which had been borrowed from Uew York 
and Paris was ~uick1y bei03 used up and Snowden, who had remained in London, 
Cont t 
ac ed MacDona1d at his Scottish home on 8 Aueust to advise him to return 
to t 
,. ondon immediately. 
Ma.cDonald returned to London on 11 Av.gust, immediately informed the King 
of'the Situation and toeether with Snowden went into Conference with 
l'eT)t'e ' ~ sentatives of the Bank of England. They told MacDona.1d Md Snowden that 
"~e ' 
, cause of the trouble was not financial, but political, and 1e~ in the 
COtn:nl t 
.. e e want of confidence in His Majesty's Government, tI end. that "the remedy 
\'la-a i 
n the hands of the Government a10ne,"(165) an analysis which neither the 
~!' , 
me Ilnister and the Chancellor of the Exchequer cha11enged~ Snowden had 
lone i 
' S nee surrendered his independence of thoughtto advocate the Treasury line 
and like Ma.cDon~ld, "it wa.s not in his nature to oppose a Kins's Private 
Sect' ' , . -
eta,r.J and two. bankers if he could ~na.ny,way avoidit."(166) Neither 
demu ~ed from the Bankers' sugzestion that the facts should be ,laid before the 
l.e~ c.:; ". " 
e1:'s of the Opposition parties, a 9'1J.eeestion which compromised the La.bour 
Cab! ," " '. , ~et by restrictin~ the area of disagreement and ran,ze of policy options 
~----------------------------------------------------
See K. Fei1i nz, The Li_f~ of Nevi11e CharnbeT.'lain (London:;' MacMil1an, 1946), 
1l.191. - .. - ... ,' ...... '.'.'" ," ' .. , ... " 
Francis Williams, A PA.ttem or. Rulers (London: LOf\;."'lllMS .1965) p.109: 
Wllliams' brll1iantbut,controversia,1 interpretation of MacDonald' ",. 
(pr.61-134) should be contrasted with Bassett's Ma.cDona,ld interpretation 
or the events of August 1931. R. Bassett, Nlnetee,n Thirty One: Politi.ca1, 
£!'isia (London: Ma.clU11M,1958). ..,'.,. -'" ;,.'", ... , ... - - .. 
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open to them. There is little doubt ihat Snowden intended this to happen 
in order to ensure that the Cabinet and tm P.L.P. followed the general 
Qireotion, if not the speoifio details, of his eoonomio poliqy.(167) 
Snowden's taotios were later oritioised by the Labour Part,y as evidenoe 
of his Willingness to oo-operate with Opposition leaders rather than with his 
own Party (implied in his assurances to Parliament on 30 July) and of his 
preoonoeived intention to help fonn a "national government" in order to enaot 
8.n eoonanio polioy whioh the predeeding ten days must have indioated would not 
have had the support of the Party as a whole. (168)· It is not without 
Signifioanoe that Baldwin' s aide, J .C.C. Davidson rang the Conservative leader 
"to tell him that the Goverrment was breaking up. and that in his opinion, "it 
.- .. a.s a.J.rnost oertain that there would be an attenpt to fonn a Governnent of All 
the Talents to rescue the Labour Party fran its dilemma. "(169) The idea of 
Ita. N' 
a.tional governnent of scme sort had been disoussed in high politioal oircles 
for sane time" to the extent that Le Temps of 12 A.ugust could state oategorioally 
that "It is oarmon knowledge that Mr. MaoDonald hopes to reorganise his 
Q.overnnent al the basis of a coalition with the Conservatives and Liberals. u(l70) 
.SUOh knOWledge was canmon, not to the publio at large, but to what might be 
Qe.J.led the political Establislment. The working of this Establis.l:ment is 
1ll.uatrated :in Davidson's -oomment that "M.a.cDonald's Private Secretary, Usher, 
leept lne olosely intonned of the situation and was very gloany about the 
'--------------------------------------------------------------------
Oross, gp.oit., p.283., provides a sympathetio view of Snowden's motives,· 
fron which it is diffioult to dissent other than to remark that his 
fears were not simply exaggerated but almost hysterioal and that 
Snowden's ~steria inoreased as the possibility of his being defeated 
.:tn Cabinet got oloser. 
168. See Note 15. 
170. 
R.R. James, Memoirs of a Conservative: J.C.C. Davidson's Memoirs a.nd 
~apers 1910-37, (London: Weidenfeld & Nioolson, 1969),p.365. 
Despi te the failings of this book so vigorously highlighted by A..J.P. 
Taylor :in his review in the Observer 31 August 1969 , there is litUe 
reason to doubt the authentioi'tiY: or reliability of these passages. 
QUoted in R. Sidelsky, Politicians and the Sl~p (London: Madfillan, 
1967) , p.354. See Note 16. 
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Drospects of the Government survivine the crisis. He felt th9.t only Snowden 
and Thomas could really b~ relied upon to see the situation through, 
'!)e.:rt· 
... lCularly if the con-ect solution to the crisis was a cut in unem]!loyment 
insurance. "(171) Th -. t I f th i t fl f i . t 1 it· e con re 0 e n er ow 0 deas was Vl 1:1,. n 9U3,Zes l.n~ 
to the Kin~ thp..t ti I t b th 1 d d i bJ d it '~ - a na ona eove~~en was 0 popu ar en es ~a .e, an. , 
is N'ic 1 '. 
o son's calculated ienorance of this aspect of political communication 
that -
makes his s1.:te3estion that Samuel's advice to the King was an importa.nt 
facto!' in determininz the outcome of the crisis seem rather dubious. (172) 
Atter :11, if the Editor of the Times could rine up the King's Private Secreta~ 
a.nd respectfully su.e~est, with e,ppa~ent success, that the K:in:; adopt the course 
01' t 
a.c ion advocated by the TiT'lP!'J, then clearly p:rivat~ communication within the 
El . 
rstabliShment played a vital role in creatinz that consensUs in hie-h political 
circles which was instrurn.enta.l in securing the downfall of the Le.bour Govemmen.t 
a.nd the triul'!lph of roll tical a.nd economic orthortoxy. (113) 
When the Cahinet Economy Co~ittee met on Wednesd~r 12 A11zust, Snowden be.:an 
b~ i .' nformi~ its members that the prosrective deficit was not the t120-million 
bllt £1 
. 70-million and told the~ that he waS proposin~ to raise half the amount 
l.'e01li 
.. red by n~w taxation ~md half by economies.. "This was," wrote Co11n Cross, 
ne. • . 
, cOnsidera.ble retreat from the May recommendation, "(174) it retreat 30ve~ned by 
the 
need to gain wider S1.l!'port in the Labour Party. Unfortunately Snowden 
~l.'esented the Committee with his Min~~ demands and left himself no room for 
'-----------------------------------------------------
'7, . 
'7~. 
J81'J.es, l,!enoir'9 of ~< Conse!"V9.t i ve, loe.cit. 
lI. Nicolson, Kin~ Gl'>c!'.1~ the Fifth: Ris L1 fp I'.nd Reinon (London: Con~ta.ble I 
1952),p.461 • . .8ee>Note.11 ... '."'~"" -.... . .. , ..... 
J~E. \'Trench, Geo£,f~7" D".~~l"\n ?!'1 0".,.. T5.meci (Lonnon: TIutcldnson t1955), 
D.291. See also .!..::tch:olel.Foot 1.13 .r.eView .of .Ra.ssett' s nool( in th~ 'F}vr>ni !'\"; 
g"'.rvl9",ti, 3 July 1958. . ..... . 
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rll!'th~,.. "n . . th It ~ t 
... - ..... <nceSS10n~ SI) .:?- eV0r:: revl?rsa. , e"l:,e~t~,lly in !,~S:'0C 0,.' he cut 
in u.ne!rlDlo~'Ill9nt benefj.t, was re~'3.med a,s a :::crso'1R.l defeat for Snowden, and 
in Snowd.en' s mind, for th~ nation. 
'!'he m.ain featu.:!"e of' the econ()r.1~r llro!,osa.ls w~1ich Sno"1'den put to t~e 
Eoonotny COt'1~ittee w:?s a 10 rer cent cut in unemrloyment benefit. This was half 
the am . 
. o'llnt pro:?osed by the Uavr COJ!1mi ttee but was still in contr~di6tion of 
Sn,Owde , 
n s decla~ation I'!ade to a P.L.P. meeti~ the I'T'evious FebrnD..X"J that he hl1o. 
no inte;tion of reducin.:; unempl.oym9nt benefit. ~1e intransigent st~port which 
SnOWd 
. en gave to this pro!,osal, as opposed to alternative of a 1q% tariff, as a 
"'l:>,. of 
"\) secu.ri!'.,3 the confidence of forei:n bankers w:?s in fe.ct the unbrid:eable 
ea., in '1/)1 i" 
... - ~y that could not be overcome either in CO!!1J'llHt'?e or 1.n the full 
Cabinet 
• 
r 
The CO!nTIi ttee aereed. to apply economy to the unemrloyment fund but to 
limit its inCidence to restrictions in the amO\Lnt of transitione~ benefit end 
b~ llla.k:i ne certain administrative changes. i1ei ther Henderson nor Gra-ham would 
COl"JIli t 
thense1ves to ma..1tine positive pro,osa1s to the full Cabinet and the 
concl 
usions of the Economy Conrrnittee were the tentative S'.10~estions only. 
On 13 Au&"Ust MacDonald and Snowden had. what Mowat has called a "rather 
Dl:'ellJ.at ( "U~e" 115) meeting with the Conservative and Liberal leaders to inform them 
01' th-' 
,9 eeneral situation. The importance of this meetin.: however was that it 
Its t 
, El th~ :pattern for the future: consultations vlhich comrromised the Cabinet's 
d.eciSions 
, and which were. attended and reported on by two ministers only, l!acDonald 
!l.n.d. SnOVTd.en. "(116) Uoreover, the manner in which the Government's case was 
l):r-e -, 
~~ Sented. both a.t this and subsequent meetinzs, seriously wea.-l{ened the Cabinet's" 
!?OSition. (117) 
~---------------------~-------------------------------
'75. -
. C.L. Mowat, :S1"it~in Between the W!3.r'S 1;18-40 (London: Methuen,1955), p.3s6. 
See Footnote 181. Note 16 Below. Samuel P!3.~P~S A16/1 Memorandum entitled 
"Course of Events 20-23 Au...,"'Ust." 
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On Wednesday 19 Aueust the full Cabinet was told of the Economy 
C()mmitte~' S S1J.:r.vey !?nd spent the whole day considering its im~lic",tions. 
! ~ 
revenue tariff was arrroved by 16 votes to 5, Snowden leadin.:; the mi.nori ty, 
but Was clrorred when it was decided that the minority WB,S too lar~e. MacDona,ld 
U"d:'b Ql tably dro,red the tariff question to accorrl1'llodate Snowden' upon whose 
StlpJ!ort on the other questions he could rely. :&J the tirre the Cabinet adjourned 
.,-
at 10.30.p •m• they had agreed to economies amounting to €56-million, consistin~ 
llIainl ' Y of rf'ldllctions in the pay of public e!l1ployees and cuts in the road-buildinz 
Drot!ramme. ( 178) 
The . fOllO\;i~ day MacDonald and' Snowden, with their Cabinet colleflv~es' 
kno'I'Tl rI ro -e~e, met opposition leaders to outline the ~eneral situation. They 
~nrOl'l!led the Conservat1-ves and Liberals th~.t the Budeet deficiency would be 
~~ . .' . 
--mllHon in!'ltead. of the £120-million predicted by May and eave the impressi.on 
th9.t the Cabinet ha1 ~reed to economies amountin.:; ·to £78-million, a.lthoueh of 
eau.,.. . ~eeJ only €56-million had been 8ereed upon. (179) Chamberlain, strongly 
~PPOrted by Samuel, immediately stated that a reduction in unemplo~~ent benefit 
and 
eCOnomies RTJlotmti~ to the £96-million recommend~d by May were essential' 
ecano i 
m c measures and recorded that "In effect the P.M. and Snowden gave us to 
'Und.e 
rstand that they quite aereed, the latter sayi~e that if you took into 
~C01.tnt both the fall in the cost of livin~ and the rise in benefits, the 
'Unell'l 1 P oyed were 3&,~ better off than in 1924."(180) The validity of Williama' 
~ ~----------------------------------------------------
The relevant Cabinet Minute 1-3/67. 41(31)1 discussing CP 203(31) recorded 
that it beo8ma olear "that while the Cabinet were prepared, thoueh with 
relucta..'1ce, to accer>t as a temrorary mea.su:re tollretthe present emer,eency 
certain of the economies set out in CP 203(31) the Cabinet were not 
Prepared to enterta.in the main recommendations of the May Committee in 
'l'ee!3.rd. to Unemployment Insurance, includi~ the pro]!osal (rejected by 
the Cabinet Committee) for a reduction.of benefits ••••• " , 
.§.!:1.rn.H~lP?TlArs A78h. "Th~ Government's repre sent 9.ti ve~ sta.ted the economies 
on the Budeet which they we1'e abo"t to rrroTlose to the Cp.bi.net. The total 
al:lounlm.io £78.5" Italics M1.ne •. 
Feilin.:;, op.cit.p;192. Baasett, who stronely defends MacDonald and Snowden 
throuehout,ma~es no co~ment unon the prqptuty of Sno~den's actions. Bassett 
.2;I.ci.t. tP.87. Cf. Samuel A78fr!5. "The Ministers mllde it quite clear that they 
persona.lly did not eXDect us to come to any othe~onclusion, and let it ba 
(rlite a1'Pe.rf'lnt that i~dividu~.lly they entirely B3reed with us." See also 
Footenote 1900 
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aSsertion that MacDonald and Snowden "assumed from the sta.~ the role not of 
:re:!)resentatives of the Cabinet but of reporters of its obduracy, "(181) is 
aderJ,uately attested. by Ch~lllberlain' s record of' eve~ts. The ''1illinzness of' 
both the Pr5.me Minister "a.nd the Chancellor of the Exche<luer to seree with the 
~Olicy options presented by the Opposition leaders wl1ilst refusinc to accommodate 
the Claims of' their political colle8v""Ues in Cabinet is unparalleled in Labour 
Par~ history and f'ormed the political foundations of the constitutional crisis 
that f'ollowed. 
The o,~osition leaders did not commit themselves toa final verdiot on 
the £18-million "a,:rreed" economies but intimated that they would go aw8'3 and 
ConSult with their assooiates as to whether they cotud su,port the Government's 
_ Ill:'Qer 9.IlU:le. 
-r 
While the Opposition leaders were still at Downin~ Street MacDonald and 
SnO~den met representatives of' the P.L.P. Consultative Committee who were told 
that the Opposition leaders were insistine on a. out :tn unemployment benefit. 
t.n reply the Consultative Committee said that the P.L.P. would not accept such 
e. demnnd. - Increa9i 08ly, l.!acDonald and Snowden found that their economic 
l'emedies, others were dismissed as ignorant or irrelevant, were those advocated 
b~ their POli~ical opponents. The crtlcial point was reach then they Illet the. 
~.U.C. at 3.p.m. on the saJ'!'leaftemoon. 
Snowden had no particular desire to meet the T.U.C. who he contemptuously 
l'eoo -~~ded as economic ignora~tses, and at his insistence the meeti03 was 
Off' ~Cially between the Cabinet Economy Committee, the T.U.C. General Council 
-and the Labour Pa.rty National Executive. (182). Reluctantly Sno\,rden gave the 
~~-------------------------------------------------------------18, 
, F. V{illie .. T1lQ, A Pattern ef Rnlp.1."g, r:p.11~. See Note 18. 
The Minutes of the meeting are recorded in the N.E.C. 'Minutes, Vol.60. 
Snovrden-indtcated to the meetinz "not the definite decisions of the 
Cabinet, but matters they had been considering as possible economies ••• " 
20 AU-3Ust 1931. 
briefest details of his economy plans, refusing even to give details of new 
taxation but giving the jropression that there would be no reduction in 
unemployment benefit. The ana~sis which Snowden presented to the General 
CounCil was brusquely re'jected by the Ci trine/Bevin axis which diagnosed the 
fundamental problem as being financial not political in origin. In their 
'riew the 't ' t b d th Id t d d b t exl.S lllg currency sys em ase on e go s an ar was a out 0 
break down. In the four-and-a-half hours following Snowden' s departure frcm 
Transport House 4 G C il d' at p.m. the eneral ounc 1scussed in great detail 
a1tel'n t' . 
a 1ve measures to those proposed by the Chancellor. At 9.30 p.m. they 
presented three proposals to the Cabinet Econ~ Committee; the replacement 
Of the unemployment insurance scheme by a graduated levy upon the whole 
canrnuni ty based upon the capaci tJr to pay; a new tax upon all fixed 
interest-bearing securities' and other unearned incc:me; the suspension of ',the 
S· . 
lnking Fund for the National Debt. A revenue tariff was not presented for a 
~ari t 
e Y of reasons, although it had a great deal of support on the General 
CouncU• (183) 
The General Council's proposals failed to convince Snowden whose 
fundamental views were too divorced fram those of the T.U.C. to be overcane by 
ana' , Ppropriate fonn of words. ''Mr. Snowden said that if sterling went, the whole 
~~. . 
national financial structure would collapse, and there would be m amparison 
betw 
een the present depression and the chaos and ruin'that would 'face us:in ihat 
e~e t 
1'1.. There would be millions more unemployed and canplete industrial collapse." 
I~ 
• Bevin disputed this statement." (184) A further exchange between Citrine 
"------------------------------------------------------l83. 
For full details' of the events see Bassett, op.cit. ~ pp.86/98 and 
Bullock, op.cit., pp. ).J30/9 who also includes a sunrnary of the T.U.C. t S 
alternative econanic thinking. See also Lord Citrine: Men and Work, 
~ AutobiographY. (London: Hutchinson, 1964), pp.281/6. 
Bullock, op.cit., p.484. It can of course be argued that given the 
economic environment of 1931, Snowden was right even if, in the post-
. Kenyesian light of the 1970' Si his analysis was inadequate. If the 
tyPe of thinking represented by Snowden had outlived its utility in 
practical tenns, however, then the alleged calamity was' inevitable; as 
the subsequent devaluation proved. It is, howeve~, very difficult 
to accept the view that the National Government had prevented a worse 
Situation fran occuring. " 
and Thanas reinforces this point. "Hr. J .H. Thanas asked what the General 
C . ' 
ouncil would actually do in the desperate situation which confronted the 
G-ov.ernment at the present time. Mr. Ci trine said that the Council were not 
conVinced ,that the situation was quite so desperate as was alleged. There 
were enonnous resources in the country." (185) 
So much was made at the time of alleged T.U.C. dictation on the question 
that it is important to quote the Cabinet records of the meeting. 
"The Cabinet received from the Chancellor of the Exchequer 
an account of the meeting which had taken place the previous 
day between the Cabinet Committee •••• and a Canmi ttee of the 
General Council of the Trades Union Congress. The meeting 
had been a friendly one, and Mr. Citrine, who acted as spokes-
man for the Canmittee, pointed out that in the view of the 
General Council,theGovernment had been mistaken in their 
method of approaching the problem. Although through his '1 
statement and in the subsequent discussion, it appeared that 
r the members of the General Council had no real appreciation 
of the seriousness of the situation; the statements made, 
appeared to be based on a pre-crisis mentality, and the 
objections raised to the proposals were those which members 
of the Cabinet themselves would have taken had the 
circumstances been quite non-nal." 
The record continues:-
"The Chancellor of the Exchequer added that he had replied 
to the points raised at some length but it must be realised 
that the ,Trades Union General Council were not prepared to 
accept the scheme of economics which had been prepared by 
the Governnent." (186) . ,.,. 
There' ~s little hint of 'dictation' in this record. Certainly none that can 
b ' 
e eqUated with the suggestion of one commentator that those who did not agree 
W' ~th Snowden had thought more in ter.ms of the interests of the Trades Union 
Congree than the nation. (187) Indeed, MacDona1d had immediately seen the 
'--------------------------------------------------------------
l85 • .Th.~., p.485. A view endorsed by Lloyd George in a Memorandum to 
3~ue1. Samuel Papers,A78/12. . 
1 ' ' 86. 2..AB. 23/67. 43(31)1. 21 August 1931 •. ' 
l87. I. Co1vin. "A Royal Weekend" Atlantic Monthly, Vol. 149, (April ,1932) , 
Pp. 501/8. Perhaps Colvin should not be taken too seriously in view 
of the fact that he actually suggested that the T.U.C. "controlled 
the Socialist Party in the House of Commons and nothing could be done 
Without their approval." (p.504). 
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the 'l'El 
. ~presentatives of the Bank of En~land after the meetine with the Tr~e 
tJnions 
, a fact clearly indicatli:ng where the sonrce of any alle~ed 'dictation' 
lay. 
The meetine with the T.U.C. served to pola.rise a.nd :I.solate the o1:"thodox 
econolIlic views of the Chancellor and Ma.cDonald. It also had the effect of 
inrluencine Henderson to take up his final position of implacable opposition 
to those views. As Bullock notes "(he) did not speak at all, but no man 
~l.'esent wa.s more impressed by wha.t he heard. "(188) What impressed Henderson 
was the implication that accommodation with the Opposition leaders could only 
be achieved at the cost of alienating the vital snpport of the Trade Unions. 
This, he COncluded, was too high a price to pay. The question was not one 
or Trade Union dictation but of Onnosition dictation to the Labour Governm8nt 
r -. 
to tOll 
0,", !,olicies vrhich would split open the :Movement and benefit the financial 
establishment and their political allies. 
On Friday 21 A~~st, the Cabinet, reinforced by Henderson's resolute 
°DPosi t . . ~on to further economy, substantially reaffirmeQ its position, havine 
l:'efus .:I e,~ to accept a 10.% cut in unemployment benefits and sett line for £56-million 
~o~h of econornies.(189) At 5.p.m. with the aJreement of the Cabinet, the 
~.' 
lIIle Minister and Snowden saw the Onnosition leaders to inform them of the 
. ... ... 
llOSition. Chamberlain, . in- particular, was shocked to learn that the proposed 
economies totalled on t56.million instead of the t18-million he had expected 
or th 
.e £96-million he thol~ht was desirable while Snowden made no attempt to 
htd . 
El his dis~reement with his collea~les on the issue.(190) After a. four 
"-~--------------------------------------------------------18e 
. . 
'89. 
Bllllock, o").cit., p.484. Cf.!>~489. Cf. Snowden's A!ltobio":l'~TlhYJIIJ 958 • 
See also Henderson's comment, "that it would be no ·use going on unless 
'Re Carried out' own people with us." H.C.Dab. 256, cc.33. 
~AB 23/67. 43(31)2. See Note 19. 
'90 
• Feil:f.U3, oJ'l.ci~., 1'.192. See Note 20. 
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hou ' 
!l'a adjournment Chamber1a.in, whose conduct thro1J.~hout was motivated by 
his Party'S advanta,ze, which he conveniently described as the national 
interest, returned with the other leaders to tell MacDonald th9.t if these 
were the final proposals of the Government then they would not get throueh 
the E: OUse of Commons; that they anticipated that before then the financial 
cra.sh would come; that they considered it to be MacDonald I s duty to a.void 
it and that they "were ready to give him any support in (their) power for 
that Ilurpose either with his present, or in a reconstructed eovernme'1t."(191) 
This Ilaasaee, more than any other, effectively disposes of the theory t~t 
Sir Rerbe~ SO"""" el' s t t t K . tt1 th h 
.!.-" " ... ,,,.... suezes ion 0 he lng was 11. e more a.n pure c a.nce' 
and. qUite readily explains why Ma.cDonald on the one hand and Henderson on the 
other ( ) 
were not s1lrprised by the events of 24 Aueust. 192 
r 
On the mornil13 of Saturd~ 22 Aueust 1.1a.cDona1d and Sno,",den made one last 
"-n su.c "'" cessfu1 attempt to persuade the Cabinet to support their policy of a 1v;,'o 
red.Uction in unemployment benefit c1aimine that they had found that it was 
absol t U ely impossible to reach arry aereement on the proposals which the Cabinet 
had. authorised him to lay before (the Opposition and the representatives of the 
!lank 
of' Eneland). He went on to a.ssure "the Cabinet in the most empha.tic terms 
that th ,0 
ere was no ground whatever for the 8~estion that the present crisis is 
i\'l 
a.ny resrect due to a conspiracy on the :part of' the Banks, all of whom were 
lnOst ' an~tous to render assistance to the Government ••••• The representatives of 
the B 
ank of England, however, 'had made it qnite clear that if the economies 
~~ested represented the Government's final word, the scheme would:be of no, 
'1alu I 
a While the Party leaders had made it clea~ that if the crisis occured 
th .. .... 
e SOle res,onsibi1ity must rest with the Goverr~~ent, and in the most correct 
~~-----------------------------------------------------------
Fei1in~, loc.cit. See Note 21. 
See Note 22. 
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llO~sible fashion they had sllC3ested that His Maj esty should be consulted." (193) 
Irenderson, by nm7 fully convinced of the political impropriety of such a policy, 
accUsed MacDonald and Snowden of continuine negotiations when no sHch 
nep-oti .. 
.... ations were viable. The Cabinet had, in his opinion, declared its 
Collective will and the only cou"Cse left open to it was to take its :pro:posals 
to the floor of the House of Commons or resign. Nei ther MacDonald nor Snmvden 
Seemed prepared to do this and at their insistence and with Thomas' support the 
Cabi t ne empowered them to enquire of the Opposition leaders the hYTlothetical 
into 
rmation as to whether, if the Cabinet were to a~ree to add the ten per cent 
Unemployment cut to the existine t56-million pro~rRmme on the understandin~ that 
the Co 
vernment were seekin3 information and in no way committed to the pro,osal, 
they ~ . would be willing to accept it as satisfactory.(194) 
Atter receivin~ a not discouraging reply to the effect that if the Bankers 
fOUnd it accer-table the politicians would not demur' the' hY].1othesis was 
Put to the Bank 'of E03land who as expected consulted New York and received a 
l:'e))l' 
• y that a full answer could be expected the followi~ day. Consequently, 
the C 
abinet arransed to meet a~ain at 7.p.m. on &lnday 23 Au~st to hear New 
'101:'k' 
, s reply, haviIl3 heard from Snowden and lJacDonald that they had "derived 
the i lllDression that (if) the bankina interests ,vere ready to re.:!ard the 
lll:'ol\o i -'. ( ) 
ol' s tions as ade1uate and satisfaatorY the Party leaders would acce,t it ... 1t 195 
On th9 follorlnz momiU.:! the Xinc, who had returned overnieht from Balmoral, 
tall ' o~incr a telephone message by lfucDonald made durin3 the Cabinet meetine, sent 
tal' Ma.cDonald who advised him "to acC!uaint himself with the views of the Leaders 
'-------------------------------------------------------
~AB 23/67.44(31). 
JI.C.Deb.256,cc.33/4. Henderson had stron.:; gr01mds fortaki03 this view 
eS,Ilecially as the Prime Minister "had found it fI))soll1t~l~r impossible to 
reach any a.~reernent on the pro,09a1s whi.ch the Cabinet had al1,thorised 
him to lay before (the ~!,osi tion and the :Ba.nk of England)." .cAB 23/67 
44(31 )1. Ital:tc9 lan o • ' .. ' 
'95, ....QA13 23/61.45(31); '22 'Au-.."'Ust 1931. 
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ef the C ( ) O~se1'."'Tative and Libe"r'al Pllrties on the sitnatio"1." 196, 
little indication frcm the av~.i1ahle evin.ence to sho'., that lhcDo'1aln tnt~nden. 
to do anythin~ but resi.~" should tl1e c()r:T'1'!lnic~tion fL'om N0W Y(\!'k ?":"(i~Te S'.1CC~Sf'l-
~l""""O:ct rt b 
... ~ ... 9, Y 13alclwin, served only to retnforce these beliefs by a:7:::e'3.l5n~ to 
Ite.CDon.ald t 9 vanity, patriotism and inn'J..te social conserv!J.tism. 
When t!'te Cabinet met ~.t 7 r.m. the ea~erly a,.,a,ited re:,ly had not arrived 
. and 
r the me~tin.: adjo'J.rned afte!:" tr.ree-quarters of (I.n hour until the tele~r3n1.~ 
The re;,ly which the Cabinet heard. at 9.10.:!:'.m. 
stt;>,ted. that, until Parliament had met and acted, there could be no r:uest1.on of 
e. lo~ ... tem loan, but that it mizht be :possible to arrap..ze a s!'tort-term cred.i t 
~~ .. .. . 
.. between ,Z100 to 'z150-mil1ion. The stinc, however, lay in the t~d.l, which 
:t'aa,d., 
"Are we rizht in aSSU!!lin: that the economy programme 
unde!:" consideration will have the since!:"e a~,rova1 and 
support of the Ba'1k of ~le.nd a.nd Ci t!, zenerally i· and· 
thus ~o a 10~Z wa~towards restoring internal confidence 
in Great Britain? Of course, Oll!' ability to do any-
thing de?ends on the res~onse of rublic opinion -
particularly in Great Britain, to the Government's 
w..nouncement of the pr03r3r.l1!le." (199). . >. 
To the moderate "waverers" these last two sentences constituted a. clear 
~---------------------------------------------------------------196 
• 
197. 
198 
• 
CAB 23/67 .46(31) ... >23Au~l.st1931 • 
See Note 23. 
W111iar'lS, A Patte"l"n of' Rt)lE"1'~f 1'.109. Cf. Davidson I s assessment of 
Hs.cDon?ld especially his belief that lJ€IJ)Donald did not know ho':"1 to be 
lO~Tal. Je.mes, Memob'~ of a Co",~ervat-tve, p.372 •. 
199. ~AB 23/67.46(31)1; 'A;;~~di~~ '·23 'At~tst 1931. 
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and unacceptable dEmand that the Goverrment's policy should coni'onn to the 
diotates of outside bodies, a dEmand upon which the Cabinet was clearly 
sensitive. The result sounded to those outside the Cabinet Roan like 
pandemonium and the final two groups" took up their respective positions when 
MaoDo 1 " 
na d in a long speech appealed for an acceptance of the 10 per cent cut.(200) 
V~oDonald's narrow 10:9 victo~ (excluding his own vote) was insufficient 
to secure the acceptance of the measure as the minority were prepared to press 
thei 
r dissidence to the point of resignation. There was little else 
l{acDonald could do but ask for the resignation of the Cabinet, convey the 
POsition to the King and request that a Conference of the Part,y Leaders be 
held. (201) At the Palace MacDonald was told that he was the only man 
capable of leading the nation through the crisis and was asked to reconsider 
'his POs ·t· " ~ ~on, although he did not mention this when he reported back to 
the Cabin"et. (202)" 
Reginald Bassett asserts that the Cabinet must have known that the 
tr~artite Conference of leaders which MacDonald had advised the King to 
ca! " 
1 Was in fact called for the purpose of fonning a new Goverrmen t. If this 
had . . " 
:tn fact been the case, however, the King would not have needed to 
rn~e hi -
s appeal to the resigning MacDonald~ Moreover, MacD~ld would have, 
a " 
s a~atter of course, reported the King's remarks back to his Cabinet 
COlleagues, whi~h, in fact, he failed to do. Furthennore, MacDonald 
~as at this stage, still only primius inter pares, the representative 
Of " """"""" 
the Labour Party not as an individual though whether the King 
~derstood the real nature of MacDonald's 
'-----" --------------------------------------------------200. See Note 24. 
20
1. MCacDonald "irironned the Cabinet that he proposed to acquaint 
the King) at once with the situation that had arisen and to 
advise lrlm to hold a conference with Mr. Baldwin, Sir. H. Samuel 
and himself on the following morning. The Cabinet agreed to the 
proposal and also authorised the Prime Minister to infonn His 
Majesty that all Cabinet Ministers had placed their resignations 
in the Prime Minister's hands. " CAB 23/67. 46()1)1. 
202 
• £!B 23/67. 46(31)1. 
,-( . 
: '-' 
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POsition is o:pen to doubt.(203) Tbq flna,l :point to remember is that the 
llIidn.i~ht a~ival at Downin.;; Street of Baldwin, Chamberlain and Srunu.el, fdle,~edly 
u.nknown even to Phili:!) Snowden, m'?de it clear that 1.!acDonald wa~ [lctin~ without 
th' 
e :pe!'!nission and knowlde~e of his collee..::!t'.es. (204) It waq perha.ps this 
\Vhich made Sidney ':Vebb write to his wife on the mornin2' of 24 Al)~m3t th?t "a.ll 
the.t is now dou.btful is the ch~."'?ct"lr of the Goverr"..ment that succeeds us (as 
!l h~.ve all alo~ s:reculated:)';(205)' 
It Was this also which c~lsed Hendetson to co~plain that MacDonald was 
abOl.lt to refltru.cture the Government nnde:!." his own leadership and with TOr'J and 
Lib 
eral su.pport. (206) What he.d rrreviousl:r been common knowledze ba:::;ed on 
llIutual 
s11spicion and mistrust was (].'lite readily confirmed in the minds of the 
tab 
r Ou'r le!?Aership. When; therefore, Ma.cDonald confronted his collea~es . with 
the f it 
-! a/~("om')1:t the reaction was one of shocked S1..U'prise, not at Mac Don aId 's 
actt ......... - . ~ ~ 
.on in rejecting his collea~:ues but at the flamboyant ma.nner in which that 
~e' . 
Jection wa.s :!."e!'l.dily delivered. (201) Refe:r.ri.oz to that mO:!'fli~' s audience 
"ith th e lCin.z MacDonald said "it wa.s quite clear tha.t no useful purpose would 
be Se . 
'!'Veri by consid.eration of arxy question other than that of savin,! the count!."J 
t:t'om financial collapse. The proposal was that Ris Majesty would invite 
CI'I~ i 
- i9. n individuale,as individu1.\.ls, to take upon their shoulders the burden 
or - '-
Cal'rYine on the Government, and W!!.'. Baldwin and :Mr. Rerberl Sa.r!n..1.el had stated 
that th ' ' 
ay were prepared to act accordinzly." The Prime Minister then sta.ted. 
that h' 
eproposed to tender to Ris Majesty the resienation of the Gov~rnment. 
:n~ h~d .. ' , 
not faileod to rres~nt the c'!',se 8,o;ain~t hi~ n~:"t1c1"~tion in the rrropo"lPd. -
............... 
-------------------------------------------------------------
S~e Dalton, o~.cit., p.211 n.1. 
In fact the Cabinet had agreed that the Prime Minister should inform the 
~osition Leaders of the nature of the mesg~e from New Yo:!."k.CAB:2~/6i, 
~v\31)1. 
Q;uote<i:Baggett, op.cit., p.148. Italics i.n t~e o""i,,;in"l.1. 
See Dalton, on.cit.,p.211. 
See Note 25. 
... • • ~ • • •• ... ~ a 
I 
~btrati('ln, but in the vie\v of the gravity of th-= si tuatio'1. h~ had felt that 
.. ~ . th ......... . 
ere "'as no other course o::::,en to him than to assist in th~ fO!."lllaUon of a. 
National Government on a. comprehensive basis and for the rurpose of me~tine the 
!Jl'eaent () ., 
, " emergency. 208 MacDonald t s assertion, italicised above, is the only 
l'eco'rd, of his a.lleged stance of in1e:'lEmdence on the question.. 
,That the res!"onse of the Labour r.fov~r1ent to the formation of the National 
GOV'e~ ... ment s~ould be determined very lar,:ely by the Trade Unions led by Citrine 
and. BeVin was both natural anti convenient. It was natural in so far as the 
Cenel'a~ Council was the only influential body of oI'inion which h~ offered a real 
al te't'n t. 
a. lve to the policy of retrencPJllent that had so divided the Labour C'..ov9't"runent 
a.nd. it Was convenient because of the extent to which some ex-Ministers had been 
cOlllInitt 
r ed to the policies now advocated by the National Government. (209) Moreover, 
haV'i OS Watched helplessly while the Government, which was allegedly representine 
thei 
r interests,had. bent over backwards to accommodate what they regarded as the 
V'ested. 
economic interests of ca~italism, both Citrine and Bevin were dete~ined 
that their party should follow their I'olicy of social and economic change. In 
~s~ , ' 
~J were not alone, having widespread support among the ex-Cabinet Ministers 
and. the p. L.P., a..'1d it was in conjunction with Henderson that Ci trine announced 
on th 
e afternoon of 24 Au...""Ust a Joint Meetjne of the three bodies of the LI?,bour 
~ , , '. 
<l!oV'em -' . 
ant (i.e., the'Genera.l Council of the Trades Union Con,:;ress, the Na.tional 
~eCU.ti . ~e of the Labour Party and the Consultative Committee of the P.L.P.) was 
to b " 
e held the followin: Wednesday (26 August). Citrine, who was s~eru{ine for 
the t -" '''. " . 
~ade union movement, did not~ejud~e the decision of the meetine althoueh 
his '" 
decla;ration that "our su!'port of the Government ceased with the resicnation 
~-~-----------------------------------------<013 
• ~~ 23/67.47(31)1~ .24 AUGUst 1931 • 
See Note 26. 
It3.UcS mine. 
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ot the Cabinet," made the outccme certain. (210) According to Bassett, 
C1trine attached great importance to a decision by the General Council and 
National Executive and showed apparent indifference to the Parliamentary 
Party. (2ll) This Observation, however, ccmpletely misses the point. The 
-, 
qUestion was one of policy upon which the Joint Body was the authoritative 
bOdy lritbin the I.e.bour Party, given the resignation of the Government. The 
Parliamentary Party was, and _ still is, an autonanous body wb.:iDh generally acts 
in &Joordance with the decisions passed by the authoritative Party bodies. 
rher 
e Was no attempt to by-pass the P.L.P .... , many manbers of which 'Were out of 
tondcn While Parliament was in recess, and it did, in faot, meet on 28 August 
'hen it caU'1rmed the :immediate stand taken by the Joint body. (212) Moreover, 
the d . 
egree of consultation between the General Council, the N.E.C. and the 
~onSul.tative Canm1ttee of the P.L.P. was far greater than that afforded the 
latt ' 
er by MaoDonald and Snowden during the negotiations of the previous week. 
l:ndeed, lienderson had canplained in Cabinet, as others were to canplain in the 
CClnInons, that the Prime Minister and Chancellor had shown oanplete indifference 
to the Wishes of the P.L.P. in their clear haste to accanmodate the Opposition 
lead 
el'S, the Banking fraternity and forei8}1 opinion. (213) 
The apparent volte faoe of the ex-Cabinet mEmbers of the I.e.bour Government 
l,tas a " 
victory both for the Trade Union Movem~nt and majority opinion with the 
l?art 
Y. This is not to deny that there were members of the Labour Party who did 
llot 
8Ylnpathise with llaoDonald - nor· is to dispute the faot that same thought 
'------------------------------------------------------<l0. 
211. 
212. 
T' 
_llnes, 25 August 1931.' 
Bassett~ gp.oit., p.170. 
The Joint Meeting did not order the P.L.P. to fom the offioial 
Parliamentar,y Opposition it merely reoommended that it should do so. 
~P.A.C.R. 1931, p.4. and N.E.D. Minutes, Vol. 60, G.C., E.C. and 
C.C. 26/27 August 1931 (1930/31. Mina. 15,16, and E.C. 12 1930/31, 
26/27 August 1931. M.436 and 437.) The resolution to the Joint . 
Meeting was proposed by Arthur Henderson, each oonstituent boqy 
having met separately and expressed s:imilar sentiments. 
See footnote 167ahove. 
the,..<=> w" S f 
. ~ c, a. need or t~~ fomation of a.. NA-tionlll Govern."1ent. Wh.':lt it does 
mea.", is that fe'v ,.,ere satisned t'h"l.t t'l-te P,..:i.T'le Minister had raid eJie11.,,,,-te 
~et.'Pa!'d. t ' 
" , ,0, or han. even consid.'~red, the "n,:"tior13.1" need but ha.d been cuided 
by In O"t'e personal notives of vanity and pride. Bassett records, for examrle, 
that Sir James Sexton told the COU1Jnons that he rcrson.'1,l1y had beeYl in favour 
ot the formation of a national Government but 
Clear 
and unambi:ruous rider; "I was in favour of t!1e formation of a natlonal 
COVe __ _ 
""'''Ient, but I "'!lS not in favour of the method. by whi.ch that Government was 
b!'o1.lght about."(214) S13TIon's position W9,S no different froT'l that of Hender}'lon 
~ho had tOld. the HO'}.se a.. '.'teek earlie't', on 8 September, that he was not teJd.n~ 
e~ception to the fact of the National Government which he preferred to call the 
",new Gov 
e"t'nment but to "the manner of its fomation." The Trc.des Union COrl,32'ess 
tOOk: the lead but the Pa.rty willin,zly follo'l'1ed. 
The main featu.re of the Trade Union ca.1"J.~ai;rn was its characterisation of 
the . . 
new Government as the creature of international fine,nee. (215) The Joint 
l'!e.nifesto issued the day after the joint meeti~ went out of its way to attack 
th6sR "f ' ( ) 
. ~ O't'Ces in finance and politics which made demands which no Labou,r 
ao' . 
. V9rnment could accept," sentiments which Dalton coined at the P.t.P. Meetine 
on the 28th in the phrase, "The First Labour Government had been destroyed by a 
'aedtetter' and the Seeond'by a.. 'Banker"s Order'."(216) At the T.U.C. early 
in. S". .. . '. 
'·,Dtember Arthur Rayd~ cave a. lons speech alo03 these lines decla.ri~: 
'----------------------------------------------------21 4. 
<15. 
See footnote 207, Note 25 above. 
AcCOrdinG to Dalton, the DailY ~e~ald chaneed its prepared moderate 
editorial to one of hostileopposit10nto the National Gove!.'nIDent's 
polic!T in :resIJonse'to direct presS'tl,re from Bevin. Dalton, ~.~it.,r.274 • 
. ' . 
~i.1.., J:;l.218. Cf. F(')"!"\vam (G'~~~-::ow), itA Labou.r Govern.ment has been bullied 
and .battered out by .the .}.!oneylende"t's _ and the I.iberals have joined with the 
TOries in deolarill3 tha.t the Govern.!Ilent must caIJitulate." 29 AUo"'1.lst 1931. 
See also Dail'\r Here,ld, 25 All.;."'1.l.st 1931. 
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"Political and fina~cial influences of a sinister character, 
workinz behind the scenes, have taken advanta3e of the 
difficul ties a-risiru froM the policy 1'urS'lled by prj.va.te 
ba.n.1dne interests, which are not subject to any puhli.c control, 
to dictate to the British Government and peo~le a fundamental 
chanee i~ nat~o"1al polic~r. Secret fO:t'ces ha,ve broken the 
Labour Government. These same forces have created a new 
Gove~~ent without the authori~J of Parliament or the people 
by met~odg equiva.lent to dictatorship ••••• These recent events 
have revealed the existence of an imperious intern.R.tional 
financial combination possessi.~ the powe-r to brine even a 
Co'.:tntrJ like ours, wealthy, solvent and l'roductive, to its 
knees, e,nd to threaten it wi t"l financial rllin unless it agreed. 
to chanee its l'olicy and curtail its social e:x:penditure. 
Political parties, with the exception of our own, have come 
und.er the dominance of finance along with the Government of 
the day. The Lehour Gov9mment was destroyed by it. It has 
broueht about a financiers' revolution more rtlth1ess and 
complete than a milite.ry dictatorship could accom:!;llish •••••••• It 
"It is a matter of the gravest significance that behind the 
scenes, where the destruction of the Labour Gove:mment was 
planned, the one inescapable demand which the Labour Cabinet 
was re~uired to'meet was the reduction of unemployment benefits. 
No other prol'osal, no alternative plan, that the LabotL"t' Cabinet 
could have formulated would have been accepted as an alternative 
to this demand."(217) 
The truth of the last two sentences is undeniable but the conclusions which 
ha\7e b 
sen drawn from it are untenable, for as Miliband points out,it was less 
that the Bankers dictated terms to the Government rather tha.n the fact "that 
the Labour Government had. surrendered all freedom of ini tiati ve to the Opposition 
leaders, to the Treasury officials, a~d finally to the goodwill of American 
finance. "(218) Moreover, ~the difference bet\veen the natural desire of the 
bankers to safeguard their money and the appearance of dictation is a ver.: slim 
~at a borrower regards as 'dictation' can appear as 'condittons' in the 
eyes of the lender. "(219) The :real fault lay in the nature of the banki.ng 
'--------------------------~------------------------------<17. ~u.C. Reporl.1931, 1'1'.66/9. Cf. Vlillie Graham in the Honse of. Commons, 
"It was because of. an outside insistence upon that sl'ecific pOint, which 
we refused to accept, that the late Government broke." H.C.Deb.256,cc.316. 
Miliband, PfU'lia:rnentaT" Son'i.ali!'lTll, p.175. Hend.erson iT'lI'licit1y conceeded 
this point""TH .. C .. Deb.256rcc .. 37!8) .. Cf. N~w StA.tesrna"1 29 Au~st 1931,"Onoe 
the Government h~d determined to maintainSterl1nz .at pa.:t'ity the Methods 
by which it should do so we-re necessarily dictated by the banks." . 
Cross, op.cit.p.284. Cf. l,!acDona1d's reply to <1uestions in the House of 
Commons,. .21 .September 1931. K.C.Deb.256 ,cc.1272/3. 
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'OliCies of the Cit~r of London and the fact that those policiAS could be 
cond.U.cted jealously inde::?endent of governmental control until such time es 
a. crisis set in. The irres~onsible short borrowin3, 1003 lendinG policies 
of the City were a root ··cause of the cris:i.s and its unjustified ani unjusti-
tie,ble demands that the Government should stand the reBul tent losses by 
~edUcinz its expenditure brou~ht the 1931 Crisis to a head. The obvious 
SOlution of Government direction of finance was beyond the intellectual ,asp 
of 
most politicians. (220) It was the defeat of 1931 that ealva.nised the 
La.bo' 
ut' Pa;rty into a re-appraisal. of the situa.tion. What should be remembered, 
ho"., , 
eVer, is the fact that whilst the Party as a whole effectually rejected the 
"13 . 
, ankers Ramp"(221) explanation of 1931, the Left-Win~ of the Party, partic1.l.l~,rly 
th -
r e intellectual Left-Wine led by Laski a.nd Strachey, used it as a funda.mente,l 
Dart of their interpretation and a11e~ed predictions of events. Thus while 
~ , 
Olllas JOhnston who had been an early exponent of the Bankers Ranp theo!",! 
c01lld write in 1934 that, "really there wa.s no Baru{ers' plot; that is, there 
"'9, . 
a no deliberately conceived, no consciously designed manipulation of the 
llton 
ey Market with the object of achieving a. political end in the destrl1ction 
Of 
e. TJabo'l1:'- GoverrtJnent. Neverlhele~st it i9 trl1e that the day-to-day :ro1ic~r 
or the Government he.d to be trimmed, curtailed, a.nd amended, because of 
deci i -. 
a ons taken in the City by erou~s of the Government's bitter.po1itical 
Qnemiea. "(222) The Left was not so persuaded. 
They sa.w in the 1931 Crisis the destruction of the old consensus of 
!l01it1c~1 life which had been ba.sed on an, a3reement abo'nt the fundamental 
-.......... 220----------------------------------------------------------
• An early advocate of such control which became ve~ popular after the 
events of Au,z'tl.st 1931 was G.D.H. Co1e. See itA Socialist View" F..('.2..-I'!OTT1i~t, 
17 October 1931. 1'.697. 
Francis Wil1iams attributes the phrase to Tom Darlow. See his Nothi"l"': So 
.§,ir!\n,":9! An Autob1,o,,:ra"r)h~r (London: Cass.l1, 1970) ,1'.101. . .. . ..... 
Tom -Johristciri; 'Tlie 'Ffri"."'c{p1""l "1"d t~e Nation (London: Methuen, 1934),:,.193. 
JOhnston nonethelessrecraried .theassurances sot~ht by the forei,:n ba.nks 
as bein~ dictatort'll.1J2.ii., p.199. For his cOIT'.ments at the time see 
!o~ve"""<i (Glas,:~'.'!), 5 Sel'temb~r 1931. 
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tenets of the constitution, and the willincness of c3.l'itA.lisr.:J. to nestro:r 
democracy in an ~tta~~tto ~resetva its economic ~rivil~~es. 
1931, in effect, as the fnlfilm~nt of the :Marxist cri ti'lue of tll"~ futility 
or Social Democrac~t and ·'the Pf'.rlirunenta""-,,,' "'rocess. 
- .. . 
ltoV'etlent 
, meanwhile, had moved on to the task of "89curin3 a Parli8l1'lentfl,!'y 
majortty. 
If the "Bankers' Ram,' had been discounted a.~ a r'3alisti~ !lfl:rt of the 
ideolo3Y of the La.bour Party at e.n early sta~e in the 'Thirties, the notion 
that Ma.CDonald had n!llotted" the downfa.ll of the Lebour Goverru'len-': continued 
1J.na'bated. fo:", r> t s"" " () 
_ ,,~'!'e8, de!).l b!1~er. ~ ~.(lne~r .,ehb s 'Record" 2?3 W?"S bese"! on the 
beHl'lf th3t l\~~"Dont>l~ hp.,d ... nlf'."'._n .. ~d th -' 0''''' .t ~ • do ,...""..:1 ~ Phili 
-'"",", ... ',l _ ..• _ • ., .t:! "n .. _,- e'J..80'.1e, a v'.ew fll'1, ,!,,-,"".1. l'Y ., 
Sno"rd '90.. (2211 ) • 
r r. Shortly arte"!' l.!n.cDon?ld ::I ~efe0tj on a mU'1ber of small 1.!')cj dents, 
n"'eV'i ~.. Ol'l.sly fO'!','Jotten b:t discre'3t or o:,rortunist !,ol1.ticians, were ~iven new 
Si'::niftce,r.,ce by the crisis wh:!.c~ c'J2~:tnated in the fO""'!'1?,tion of the H?,t:!onal 
COV'0rn!1l0nt on 24 A't'Iv""Ust.' MacDon:::>.ld· s "Connci1 of St1.te" s,::>eech( 225) "'as pl1~erly 
evi1~nce of tM.s plot ~md there is no d.ollbt that the increasin,:; 
the Government to solve ~', 'u,nem:;loYJ:1ent did lead l!ac1)!')l'lald to 
~n.CO'.~(:>..::e tho1'~hts of a National GoV~:"'nment - thOt\:;hts wh:tch he confided. to 
"'hat 'N" ' 
- eV'ille Ch~Jllbe!':'lain called. "lenky v~gselg" and '\'Tl-dch rpflected to some 
-. 
of ma!1Y of his O',V'1 elderl~', middle-of-the-road colle'l,:;ues' 
Hj.s shy n,?ture, hisille~itL~H>.te birth, reinforced by the ciie!"l-
e.ti 
on of T.ost sectors of the party durin.:! the life of the Second Labo'lr Govern~e!"lt, 
"---------------------------------------"-.. ----.. ~,~,--------
«3. S. Webb, "'Jhat Ha'1 ..... ened in 1931: A Record" Politic."!') c;'?;t't~r~', Ill, i, 
(Ja..'lU:!"'t":l-1!arch,1932), 1-17. 
See foot note 141 above. 
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1ncreased MacDonald' s isolation and s usoeptibili ty to the calls of 
11 
statesmanship." His vanity and snobbery were notorious and his dependence 
Upon the inner-workings of' the Establishnent reinforoed his selt-induced 
:Unportanoe in the eyes Of the nation. He was the leader of "respeotable" 
Soc' 1a.lism, he was the' one man who oould lead all sections of the nation in 
its t:bne of orisis and even should his colleagues tail to discharge their 
dut . 
'1 :in this respeot he would not flinoh. Yet tor all the apparent evidence 
there is no proof' that MaoDanald' s aotion was anything but the sinoere response 
ot a Jnan Whose life and ways disposed hlm to think that he was greater than 
hie party. 
Apart fran one or two extreme elements in the Party there were tew 
l'Iho thOUght MacDonald had deliberately banned his party. All seotions fran 
,. 
~ton on the Lef't to Ben Turner ot the Right stated their belief' in 
llaoD 
onald's sinoemty.(226) But as LasId wrote in the Daily Herald on 29'" 
AUgust, t'No one •••• doubts that UaoDonald and those who have gone over with him 
to reaction have aoted fron the highest motives; their sinoerity is not in 
qUe t ' ~ ion. What is at stake is their sagaoity...... Henderson's early oall tor 
llo re . 
crllninations was re-echoed by Stanley Hurst at the 1931 Conference, the 
l ' 
atter however, prophetically added the warnjng; "We are familiar with the taotios 
ana .methods of Mr. MaoDonald' s new friends, and we need not b. astonished it they 
tOUch new low levels of' degraded eleot1oneering. tt (227) Yet the truth of'the matter 
1s that the Labour Party ~ astonished by the level of degraded ~leotioneering 
'---
-----------------------------------------------------------------
<27. 
Maxton wrote in the New Leader, -He did what he believed right. 
Accusations trcm the Labour Movement about treachery appear to 
me to be quite out ot plaoe." 4- September 1931. For Tuiner's 
CClnInents and those of seTeral others see Bassett, r..cit., p.204. 
CUrine' 8 oonsidered view is in Men and Work, p.28 • 
1..P.A.0 .R. 1~31, p.158. Henderson' s oall is to be found in ,. 
li.e. Deb. 25 , 00.25. et. "It was 1918 all over again" Mary Agnes 
:aamrr ton, Remembering MY Good Friends, p.24O. . 
to which the NationAl GovernTT}~nt nesoended and in whtch 1.1MD('I~aJd and Snowden 
took 1") ....&. • 
. ... a.l:1.1cularly offensive lines. 11(3,cDonald. cestro~red his sinceod t~r by Ms 
equation ot mode-r-ate Labour policies with that of ll"assive infl~otion while 
Snowd t " " en S Bolshevism run mad" SJ!eech remains the most cynicl'lJ rermdiat5.on of 
a 1ifet~ work ever broadcast. (228) Its il"'pe.ct was still felt yea-rs later.(229) 
Yet if the antics of MacDonald and Snowden destrnyed their since~ity their 
"'illi cness to rarticirate in a General ~ection, despite olaims that" no such 
COUT.lO ~ n election would be foucht, had provided enoueh evidence to S11Jeest that 
the', h d 
,j a both reco,::nised that the:r we-r-e prisoners of a To'!"'! :re~ime and '''1e-r9 
t'i"'ht, 
.... -. 1n3 to rreserve their othel':"\'7ise inten9.1:>le positions. As Hender$on put 
it i h 
n is adoption speech at Burnl9"! on 13 October, tt ••••• Mr. MacDonald, by 
Consentinoo to this 1 ti itt' h' If t b .:I b hi lit 1 r ...... ' e ec on, wa.s pe!".m. 1n~ .1mse 0 e use,l. y s e- o~ 
Obno 
.. ", nents to smite his life-Ion,: rolitioal friends. "(230) ~ei..r political 
jUdeement had been gravely at fault and their claim that they were enterine the 
electi 
on as one part of a broad but distinct political front was clearly both 
1.t~l'e~edented and untenable. The National Government was, as Llo:rd Geor:e had 
stated. "a mere TorJ ramp." The national el!lersency, in so far as it existed, 
had. b ' 
een ruthlessly exploited by the Tory' PaTty, aided ann abetted. by UacDonald 
and S 
nowden, they were now ab~lt to reap th~ whirlwind in what the M~ncheAte~ 
~ descrIbed as "the shortest, straneest and most fraudulent election 
C ..•• 
!l1n:Pa.i.~n f d ti " Tb. _ 0 mo ern Mes.. e 1931 election like the 1931 Crisis was a. victory 
to~ th . ~e Conservative Pa~ty.(231) 
See Note 27. 
See, "Bevin" Crirps and Mosley", Trihune, 19 February 1937. 
~m~g 14 October 1931. J .C.C.Davidson recorded on 17 September 1931, "It 
is -cle!.\!' that Rrlmsay feels that he has no follmvins and that unless he can 
eat tozether a eraup of personal supporters he would be reearded as nothing 
bltt an adjunct to the TorJ Party, a,eainst which he has fOU0ht consistently." 
James, Mel!loi..J"q of ~. Con!'le~at:f.ve.p.375. On 5 Sertember, J.ll. Thomas . 
arrarently.had.visionsoo£smashin3 the Socialist Pa-r-ty. I2!i.r.376. . 
M.an~heste'!' Gu"' .... di..~"', 28 October 1931. Cf. "Labour has no' cause to be ashamed 
o£ .its -de£eat .... It -was beaten not by trllth and in fair areument but by 
infamous lies, erotes~ue misrepresentation, intim~dation, vile abuse and 
appeals to fear." T.G.W.U. Reco~d,(November 193~, p.99. 
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From th~ Labour Pa:'l:'t~r !,oint of view the Election, of which Ma.cD0Ntld h~d 
'RS,J:'ned his former Cabinet collea.:;ues at their final m~etin2, was inevitable 
and the iI!'.mediate !lreSS'1.re made to':1ards this end by p"1?ominent Cons~rva.tives 
Only increased their sus~icions. The failure of the N~tional Gove~nent to 
maintain the cold standard not only increased the demands of Conservatives for 
a. General Election but destroyed the 1:2:ison d' ~tJ'e of the coalition. It was 
MacDonald's refusal to re-enter t~e Labour fold after that event and his 
d' . 
l.SPOsition to call instead for an elention which led' to his eventu~l e"'S?ulsion 
from the Party. MacDonald rev! talised by an aI"peg,l from tne Kinz for the 
Continuation of the National Gove~nment, had no intention of retQ~nine to the 
La.bour Part~T and his hopes of doin~ so were illusol"J. (232) The situation 
lihich th 
,e Labour Party had predicted would come. about had come about and 
rF ~cDQ~ald, d' t t f . t f t C ti 
., nee ~~ 0 jus i y the continued e~s ence 0 he oali on, once 
~ain turned to t~e shrewdest eXDonent of a national politics for I"arty 
ad:lfa.nta.::;e, Neville Chamberlain.' Chamberlain offered MacDonald the '1uaint and 
nab, 
e sU3.::;estion that the separate elements of the Government should go to the 
COllnt 
ry as a united body but with se,arate manifestos - a m\Z:estion which was 
a.s POlitically convenient as it was ludicrously transparent; it was most 
effective. The electora.te returned not a National but a Conservative Government, 
th ,~ 'tfast majority of the increased Conservative vote comin~ from the Liberals, 
'thoU.!'".h 
_ it is clear that Ma.cDonald received a. grea.t deal of Labour sUr'port. 
'l1h.e ereatest disparity, however, was in Parliament where the Conservatives hnd 
a cOmfortable majority _ a fact Philip Snowden attrj_buted to Labour's refusal 
to 
accept P.R. (233) 
~-----------------------------------------------------
See Uote 28. 
Snowden, A1'tobio~r'1nh;y, II, p.889. Cf. ~onomist 31 October 1931, ;pp. 795 
and 802 •. The Conservative vote increased.by·3~322,272 and the Liberal 
a~tI·~a.sedb.Y·.3 J106 JI06. 
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A third interpretation of the events of the 1931 election which led 
to a good deal of dispute and debate concerned the role of the Monarch 
~eorge V. Though popularly associated with, and developed by, Harold Laski's 
~e Crisis and the Constitution (234) the clain that the King had strained, if 
not flaunted the Constitution, the theory, like much of Laski's work in the 
'Thi . rt~es, was first put forward by someone else. The person in this case was 
Leonard Woolf whose contribution to a Political Quarterly symposium on the 
Crisis was entitled A Constitutional Revolution. (235) Woolf argued that 
"the action of the King and the Prime Minister may have been technically 
cOnstitutional, but if the Crown and the head of a party Government act as 
they did, a fair and honest working of a democratic system on the model 
of the British Constitution is impossible."(236) This in Woolf's opinion, 
.- "as because 
" •••• the whole of our political system, in so far as it 
is democratic, rests upon the party system. The Prime 
Minister is not Prime Minister because he is an individual, 
but because he can count on the support of a party •••• 
(Therefore) when Mr. MacDonald found that he wishes to 
pursue a policy which was solidly opposed by practically 
the whole of his party, he should on democratic principles, 
have told the King that he could not carry on the Government 
and have resigned. It was quite open to him to tell the King 
that he was prepared to support as an individual any Government 
fonned to carry out that policy or take office in it as an 
individual. But that is not what happened. Mr. MadDonald 
was induoed •••• to form a National Government which meant a 
Government of all parties. If Mr. Baldwin entered the 
Government as leader of the Conservative Party and Sir H.Samuel 
as acting leader of the Liberal Party what was Mr. MacDonald's 
position? It was that of leader of the Labour Party. Even to 
state the bare facts is almost equivalent to stating baldly 
that the thing was a fraud. It is said that the King personally 
induced Mr. MacDonald to do this. If so, he was doing sanething 
Which may prove highly dangerous to the Crown. For, in effect, 
he was making an individual Prime Minister though he had no . 
support for his Government in t~e House of Commons •••• " 
'----------------------------------------------------------------234. ~J. Laski, The Crisis and the Constitution: 1 1 and After (London, 
L. & V. Woolf at the Hogarth Press and the Fabian Society. passim. 
235 W 
• (oolt "A Constitutional Revolution," Political Quarterly, II, 4, 
October/becember,193l), pp. 475/7. 
236. Thg., p. 476. 
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The whole thing was in Woolf's opinion an ominous and dangerous constitutional 
revolution which may have set the precedent which "might be developed so that 
the Crown could be used to break down the democratic system of party 
goverrment and to intr~duce •••• a system not material~ different fram 
that of a dictatorship." (237) 
This view, dismissed by Reginald Bassett, as "hysterical. nonsense~ 
reo ' e~ved support fram academic quarters same years later, and has far 
lIlore validity than supporters of MacDonald or the National Government 
have been prepared to admit. (238) On the advice of the Pr:ime Minister 
the inVitation from the Monarch was to the Party leaders as representatives 
ot' their parties, not to individual members of the House of Canmons and it 
. ,'was , therefore, plainly inappropriate and untenable that the leaders of 
POlitical parties should, in that capacity, cla~ that they were fonning 
a. Go 
vernment composed of individuals. Furthennore the emptiness of the 
" gOvernment by individuals" case was proved by Baldwin's insistence six 
Weeks later that he could not hold his Party's demands for an eiection in 
Check. Clearly since the development of the Party systen it was ~possible 
to Pretend that the Monarch had the right to choose any individual M.P. , 
hOWe .~ 
Ver eminent, as Prime Minister if the bulk of his support in the 
BOUse did not cane fram the Party of which he was the head. Bassett's 
cla~ .... 
""1 that MacDonald' s majority in the Cabinet, and the backing of ~portant 
Call . 
eagues and supporters in the LaboUr Party, entitled him to special 
Cons 'Cl ~ eration are futile campared to the attitude of the P.L.P. and the 
tna' . ~Sputable fact that the only Parliamentary support he obtaine~ fram his 
oWn l?arty was a mere bakers dozen •. That IiracDonald enjoyed the support of 
------------------------------------------------------237. !pid !.' 476/7. Cf. Laski, The Crisis and the Constitution, passim. 
G.C. Moodie, "The Monarch and the S~lection of a Pr:ime Minister: 
A Re-examination of the Crisis of 1931." Political Studies, V, No.l 
(1957), 1-20. 
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the other two parties is of comrlete consti tl1tiooe.l i r,..elevance. lil'3.cDonald 
~aa not the Conservative Party leader or the chief personality amonsst the 
Liberals when he went to the Pal~ce, he was the representative of the larcest 
Darty in the House of Commons and to pretend differently is to ignor~ reality. 
This was implici t;Ly' recoenised by Bassett when he wrote that "MacDonald of 
coU.rse, Was fully aware that his decision wouln invol~Te his' deposition as 
leader of the Labour Party. This was, indeed, senerally and immediately 
:t'ecOenised. n(239) If that was, in fact, true - and there is no reason to doubt 
that it wa'3 _ MacDonald' s presence at the Pala.ce as the representative of the 
Labour Movement was totally ine,ppropria.te. Certainly he shou.ld he.ve been 
D!'esent but so should a mainstream. spokesman. . Neither can it be claimed that 
t, D lac onald was there as Prime Minister. Re was Prime Minister but he was there r 
in the ce.pac1ty of Parly leader and Bassett aeain i!!l:!,)licitly acce:!,)ted this when 
in CritiCisinc Rerbert Morrison he wrote, "If 1>ia.cDol'lald had. ceased to possess 
l.'e'r) ' . 
.• resentative parliamenta~J value when he fo:t"!lled the National Government, he 
~~y . ( ) 
. soon reac~uired it, and did so in un,recedented de.:;ree," 240 B.'1. admission 
"hieh ei ves credence to Laski' s comparison of the King's choice of ?!!acDonald 
~ith that of Pitt by George III in 1783 in that both were chosen des~ite the 
t'es") t 
.. ec ive Parliamenta:!,~r situations and eained such political leeitimacy as they 
had f 
rem rmbselj,uent elections. 
This ar~el'lt was, .in fp,et, the kemel of ThA C1"1.si9 _!.'I.nd t}'lA Const.i tnti2.'l. 
1] ... " . .,.. .. - ..... 
nfortunately, Laski's work was characteristically,inaccurate on Vital points 
to the extent that Bassett wa.s able to tear holes in the conclusions th:lot LaskL 
'------------------------------------------------------------
<39 
• .Bass~tt, o").oit., ::;>.401. Not le$.st by MacDon:l.ld who cle.inio.d,· "I-have 
credentials .of: .even hieher authority. Mycr~dentie,ls '::"1"e thos'3 ef 
POSitive duty as I conceive it and I obe~r them irrespeotive of COnS9'lUenOp.s." 
1111.&., 179. . 
B"19sett, o"'.cit., :,.370. Cf. "111". MacDonald at the best could not hope to 
h~ve the SU'I')')o"::'t of more than a mere handful of L8.bou't' l!embers." Snowden, 
!.Ut.obio::r'l'!")h:r,..II, p.959. 
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dre\'!' from them. Laski's main contention was that the Ki~ h3.d acted 
unConstitutionally, not as other critics(Woolf, Jennin~EI and later Morrison) 
Contend.ed. ';n ac d. wit\. b-~ dvi 
... .co:t' ance ~l c::w. ace. Unfortunately his arguJ'lent '\'Tas 
centred less on the constitutional propriety of the Kin~ts action which he 
was to d.evelop in later pan~hlets into the expression of the will of Ca~italist 
COnS!'irators, rather than the political legitimacy of MacDon9.1d' s action. Not 
that Bassett' El criticism wa9 of a hi.,3her quality. In defendil13 MacDonR.ld' s 
acceptance of the post of Prime Uiniater in the new National Government Bassett 
Wt'ote, "It 'Vould. have been quite futile for him to have consulted the Labour 
C -
abinet as a whole. What he did was to consult his 1eoo.il10 Elu!,!,orters in that 
dh'd 
. 1 ed.Cabinet; and without their acreement it is difficult to see how he could 
~a'V'e Cone fo"!"Ward. "(241) Yet MacDona1d had. not made his acceptance of this 
n -e" Dost condi tio!lal upon the surrort of any of his colleagues, a'1d the obvious 
conclu.sion i th t th i t th t h d S d d Th s -a _ e-re s no ree.son 0 surrose a .a now en an. omp"s 
l'efU.sed to join the new Government MacDon~ld would not have gone forward. alone. 
1'h . 
eir support had. indeed been valuable in predisposin,3 MacDona1d to following 
the QOurse of action which he did, in fact, follow but the decision to lead the 
~ational Gove~nment was MacDonald's alone. 
Criticism of thp. Kins's action did not persist although vague references 
to it and the other interpr~tations of 1931 still rersisted for many years 
atterwards. The im!,ort3.nt roint to remember about 1931 is that it catalysed 
th 
e doubts held in parts of the Labour Movement concemins the viability of the 
'Use f 
o Parliamenta-ry methods in the transition to Socialism and cleared the path-
to:t' tt... e' . " F '" 
!l vieorous neo-lliarxist policies of the Left-Win-: in the Thirties. or 
~~~~-------------------------------------------------------
Ba.ssett, Ih1d., ,.399. 
the bUlk of the Laboux Party, and especially its Ip.8..dp.rship, 1931 was re,:arded 
a.s a sethacl,: but no more than a setback, in the m&;:roh tmvard. '3 a Socialist 
Britain. (242.) 
Was s1.1ch optimism justified in view of the fact that Parliament h9.d. been 
So clea!.'ly ienored in the decisions the.t were taken :tn AUG11.st 1931? The Left 
"as to answer in the negative but ma.instream members of the Labour Party disacreed. 
What 1931 . did, as far as the Labour Party as a whole was concerned, w~s to set 
th . 
e Parliamentary process in its context. It hiehlighted the l:tmitfl.tions of 
Parliament. It did not deny the potentia.lities of Parliament, or subtract 
f:t'olll the belief that the main <Iu,a.li ty requi!.'ed to utilise those potentia.1i ties 
"as will-po~e!.' and direction. 
,r 
. , 
~-----------------------------------'~-'---------------
" - p See, for 9xo.mple, Ernest Bevin,Socialists have nothin.:; to Fear, !.G.W.1!. 
~()o:rd, (Nov~mber ,1931), Il:;<112!3. Cf. "Lab011r has lost only seats in 
ParliaMent .... '.It ha.s lost nothi03 that it.co.nnot re3ain."_ (R. Tracey), 
,Thid .• , 1".104. " ' 
1. 
2. 
3. 
5. 
285, 
CHAPTER FIVE - NOTES 
See also'Snowden, Labour and the New World "A system of 
proportional representation is essential to make Parliament 
representative at the general will." Op.oit., p.66., and 
"The adoption of a system of proportional representation 
would relieve members of Parliament fran the temptation to 
concede the demands of sections-or classes of the electorate 
through fear of los:ing votes, when the demands themselves 
could not be justified on their merits." Ibid • .t p.lo6. 
Cf. Socialism Atter the War. "I have •••• never been attracted 
by the prospects held out by the advocates of Proportional 
, Representation and their peculiar views of minorities. But 
if the tyranny of unifozmi 1:iY and conf6nnity cannot be broken 
by the :intelligence of constituencies,let us have the evil of 
Proportional Representation, with a ohance, that a few odaments 
of independents with Parliamentary ability may be returned to 
break dOlVll the iron r:ing of party obedience." .oit., p.49. 
Cf. his view in the Socialist Review, No.lll Deoember 1922). 
"The changes in election problems that have followed the last 
extension of the franchise seem. to me to have strengthened the 
case for the adoption of scme soharie like Proportional 
Representation, but we should be under no delusions as to its 
effect upon the fonnation of majority governments." p.242., 
In 1911 the Labour Party had introduced a Refonn Bill :in.to the 
House of Canmons. The Bill had advocated amongst other things, 
the alt.emativ8 vote, adult suffrage, quarterly registers, 
quinquennial Parliaments and the abolition of plural vot:ing. See 
Chapter 1 note 18 above. In the debate referred to in note 2 
Ramsay MacDonald, Arthur Henderson, J.H. Thanas and W. Adamson 
all v~ed against P.R. Although the T. U.O ~ and Labour Party did 
adopt pro-P.R. resolutions (e.g., T.U.C. 1917 p.94., 1918 p.306, 
1919 pp 65/6 and 1922 p.449) they did so without cebate, dissent 
or division. , 
The Labour Magazine,- n, No.4. (August, 1923) referring to Philip 
Snowden' s Socialist resolution in the House of Commons po:in.ted og,t 
that it ·canpelled the members of the House of Ccmnons to declare 
their attitude towards the Labour Party's general scheme of 
fundamental changes in the present' econanic system of society. It 
placed Tories and Liberals in one lobby and a united Labour Party 
, in the other. It provided striking oonfonnation of Mr. MacDonald's 
declaration that • there are only two parties in politics today, . the 
Capital~st Party and the Labour and Socialist Part~'" p.169.. , 
Douglas asserts that "it was -at 'least as reasonable· to ,> invite a Party, 
With 158K.P.·s and Front Benoh full of experienoed ex-Ministers to 
cons ti tute King' s Governnent as to invite the Labour Party , albeit 
with 33 more K.P.·s but with hardly anyone who had had Ministerial 
eXperienoe and not many were capable of it." Douglas, op.cit., p.174. 
Even if it was as "reasonable" a course at, action as Douglas suggests, 
lVOuld h8.ve been both a oonstitutionally unwise and politically 
disadvantageous course of action for the Konarch to, have adopted: for' 
the King's Governnent was chosen for its oapaci ty to canmend ' 
sUpport :in. the Hous e ,of Canmons, not on the. adminis tra tive qualities 
. ' ... ~/continued ' 
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6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
of its Members. Neither Baldwin nor Asquith had any doubt that 
MacDonald was second in line and the assertion by the Liberals 
that an alliance with the Tories was out of the question (See 
Liberal Magazine, XXXI, 363, December 1923, p.706) and Asquith's 
speech of 18 December 1923 also precluded an anti-Socialist 
alliance though Churchill wanted one. See Jame~Churchill. op.cit. 
p.151. Cf. "The top Liberal leaders, though individually impressive, 
made an ill-assorted team." R. Lyman, The First Labour Government, 
~ (London: Chapman &: Hall, 1957), p.51. 
See Wilson, Downfall of the Liberal Partl p.270 for reference to 
the Liberals seeking to bring the Goverrment to order. "The 
possession of so many platfonn planks in common with the Liberals 
made it •••• essential that consultation with the Liberal 
leaders and whips should be frequent and frank. "Labour.'s:First Term," 
Economist 19 April 1924, p. 817. See also Liberal MagaZine, (May,1924) 
and MacDonald's comments to C.P. Scott: Scott's Diaries, p.460. 
In the Liberal Magazine's ItNotes of the Month" for January 1924 the 
Liberals had asserted, "Upon what sort of electoral authority •••• 
can the Labour Party take office? It can do so only as a Free 
Trade Goverrment pursuing lines of policy upon which the Labour 
Party and the Liberal Party are substantially agreed. 1t (p.4.) 
For the views of sane right-wing Liberals, see ~., p.267. 
Lloyd George's speech is to be found in the Times 16 April 1924. 
See also Liberal Magazine, (May, 1924), pp 269/ff for a second 
speech on the same subject. Wilson displays a great deal of 
willing naivette in his coverage of the Liberals'views on P.R. 
His only observation on the conveniently timed report of the 
Party Committee and the meeting of the Liberal Party in the House 
is to say , "As It h'appened, a P. R. .bill introduced by a Liberal as 
a private measure was due for its second reading later that week. 
Op.cit., p. 273. Italics mine. This conveniently ignores the 
obvious connection between the three events and the clear conclusion 
that the Liberals' conversion to P.R. was an indication of their 
fight for survival as a meaningful political force represented in 
the HOuse of Cammons. It was not until 1922 that the Independent 
Liberal :Manifesto came out in favour of P.R. Lloyd George had 
opposed it vigorously while in office. 
Asquithhad written to MacDonald expressing the Liberal view that the 
P.R. Bill "should receive official Government support and have the 
facilities tor passing into law this Session, which only the 
Goverrment can furnish." Asquith went on to say that a favourable 
Cabinet announcement "would greatly ease the situation both inside 
the House and in the constituencies, without in any wal canpranising 
the independence of either side, or the vigorous propaganda of our 
respective Parties." CAB 23/48.'27(24)5. Italics mine. 1 May 1924. 
Cf. John Scurr, "A government dependent upon Parliament must have a 
majorit~ehind it if it is to function. If there is any virtue in 
P.R. it means that there will be a multiplicity ot parties, and we 
may expect a succession of minority governments •••• D~nocracy would 
be rendered useless •••• Instead ot our policy being determined by 
the broad principle which a particular party in the ~tate stands for. 
it will be decided by an agreanent between a number ot minority 
groups. Our present system has detects, but' a Goverrment can 
function. Under P.R. it would became a tarce." Socialist Review 
Vol. 24, no. 134 (December,1926), p.19S. 
?87 
/Contd. 
10, 
11. 
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"The Liberal Part~' cut an.,vthin:;: but a. creditablA figure over P.R. l~st 
week. They so rrana3ed the affair as to crel'!te a widespread impression. 
that the Government Sh01l1d su-i)..,ort Mr. Rend~ll' El Bill as the nrice of 
kee!,in~ it in office." Cf. F~~Rm (Gl9.s.'":ow), "The fRet :is th;'t 'P.R.' 
was t·u.rrted down b.reel:' because ·wewIlre ·dared by the Liberals to db' other 
than suprort it. And, secondly, upon its merHs or demerits." 10 May 
1924. As the M9".~heqt.:>r Gua~dtan commented: "The rank-and-file of the 
Labour Party undoubtedly.vote~.in.a sta.te of indienation about the 
Stl.pposed Liberal thre'3,t." 3 };!a.y 1924. 
Lord U11s""'ater hai, as 1h'. Speaker Lowther, presided over the Conferel1ce 
in 1917. Labour p}1d the Nati.nn had called for the abolition of 1)lu1:'8.1 
'V'otin,z, :'. le~islation a~~rinstc·or~.1!'t rn.'pctices at elections and· the 
abolition of rractices wh'ich conferred s,ecial political adv9..'1ta,]eg nron 
Wealth. 
In 1922 the Government Chief iVhi.!' wrote to the N.E.C. expressine the vip-w 
that it was desirable to promote the passage of an Acreei Bill to a~end 
the R~resentation·of.the People Act, in ord9r to prohibit the interference 
of intereste:rou:?s in Par1i.~.ment1XY elections by Brecial rublicity methods 
with the object of secu:dn3 the return ot one candiclate but with thei~ 
e~enses not bein.::: s~O\'rn in the official return. The N.E.C. had sent a 
1'e,ly apI'rovi~ the !,r:i.nciple and asking that a. similar aJreed measure 
d~.inc vrith the use of vehicles at elections also be sent. See N. B.C. l1i.n')te9~ Vol. 24, 24 June 1922. 
, . 
MacDonald 'was ;el'ly1ne to' a. '~uestionby Samuel. c!t.'B 23/h~. 73(30)4. 17' 
Dece~ber 1930 and CA~ 2~/?17JA~8 16 Decemher 1930. On 17 December the 
N.E.C. came out in favour of the A.V. by 16 votes to 3, havinz been told 
that "there ?ras no definite arrangement or pact with the Liberals but 
conversa.tions had. taken -olace from time to time in thecollrse of which 
Electoral Refom had bee; discussed." Jowett's persistence in dissent 
:pre'V'ented an atte!1lI't to secur.e W'l8.llimi ty. '!IT t B.f'!. l!i '1J1tl'!S, 57, E.C. 4 1930/31 
M.122. " ' .. ' "', 
Renee IIenders~n' s stater'lent to the ROTJ_se of Cor.unons on 8 SAptember that the 
problem was "a~nroached too rnlch in a s~irtt of undiluted and unrelieved 
:peSsimism." R.C:Deb.256,cc.38. Cf. A. Bullock o:,.~~t., r.~90. and M. Cole, 
Ed •. li?atrice Web'\)' s D:I.~"':i.p.s 192'1--1932 (London: Lon~a.'1s '. Green" 1956),:1.282. 
23 Au.,:r.lst, 1931, The Ti!!le9, on 10A1.l~lst, considered that MY suZ,::estion of 
a Natio'1al Govemmenthad been rule~ out "by'the hostile attitude already .. 
adopted tovTa:t'ds the (May) Rerort by considerable sections of the LabO'ur 
:tI(!o'V'ement." See for exaTlple, editorials in the Da.n~, He"'"ld rm,d ?o'::'\i;!",m 
Q.111'~""()",,)/8 AU,;llst 1931 and New Lel1~p.rlsc~m~le~ts7 Au,::ust 1931 •..... 
Not on1; was th~ Labo'.l!" Press universall:r ho'stile but Memhers of the P.L.P. 
had also exY'lressed th~ir diSl"!uiet ov~r the "''''C'I'0sq,ls. Chuter Bd'?, by no, 
means an extremist/had writt;n to t~e Chai~an of the P.L.P. Consultative 
CO:Tl1'!ittee, of which he was a m9mber t that "Any attel"lI-'t to iMrlement those 
• ~ ••• /continued 
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28f.? 
( 15. '". • •• reccmmendations must provoke the mos t serious crisis the cent' d). party has yet faced, and I sincerely hope •••• that before we 
are committed to any course of action the Cabinet's 
recommendations m~ be submitted to the Parliamentary Party in 
such a fonn as 'will enable an effective discussion to take place 
and a clear vote to be taken on each issue that may be raised. I' 
H.C. Deb. 256, cc. 62. 8 September 1931. Discussion was the 
last thing that Snowden wanted. Note also Dalton' s canplaint 
that Chamberlain was given preference over the Members of the 
P.L.P. Ibid., cc. 789, 15 September 1931. 
16. The p:z.evious fortnight had seen Baldwin, Simon and Viscount Grey 
17. 
18. 
all publicly cane out in favour ot co-operation to reduce public 
expenditure (see Times 6 and 8 August) while a leading article in 
the Times on 1 August had referred to "su~estions that all parties 
should agree to a political moratorium while sane ad hoc coalition 
carries out drastic economies." Fenner Brockw~ had prophetically 
written in an article entitled, "Towards a 'National' Government" 
New Leader ~ July 1931. 
Nicolsonapparently regards ot little importance the letter to the 
King fran his Private Secretar.y Sir Clive Wigram on 11 July 1931 
Which read, "it is quite possible that Your Majesty might be asked 
to approve ot a National Government." The text of the letter 
suggests that the ba.sis for Wigram' s warning was the City and in 
particular the Governor of the Bank of England. ~., p. 449 
. ct. the remark attributed (poat 24 August) to J .H. Thomas in 
H. Dalton, Call Back Yesterda': Memoirs 188 -19 1 (London: 
Frederick Muller, 1953, p.2 1. and Chamberlain's record of a 
conversation with MacDonald on 6 July 1931 (Feiling, op.cit., p.189). 
Cf. I. Jennings, Cabinet Goverrunent (London: Cambridge University 
Press, Second Edition, 1951) p.41. "the evidence seems to suggest 
that, they (MacDonald and Snowden) did not (represent the Government) 
and that they were using the Opposition leaders to force their own 
policy on the Cabinet. 11 This is exactly what MacDonald and SnowJen 
were doing. Bassett'sleak criticism that, "It would have been at 
least as plausible •••• to suggest that the Opposition leaders were 
using MacDonald and Snowden for that purpose" (Bassett, op.cit., . 
p. 387) only serves to illustrate, in the light of Chamberlain's 
deSire, "to secure a measure of relief •••• through a Socialist. . 
Government," . (Feiling op.cit., p.19l) the degree of consensus that 
existed between the Party leaders on this~uestion. A letter tran 
Chamberlain to his sister in which he wrote that, "The only way in ' 
which the econcmy figures could be raised was by cutting the dole 
and it once we could fasten that on the Labour Party they would be 
~rrevocablY' split," makes Chamberlain's motives transparently clear. 
,Quoted in R.K. Middlemas and J. Barnes, Baldwin: A BiographY (London: 
Weidenfeld &: Nicolson 1969), p.625. Italics mine. In the tinal 
analysis it was because MacDonald could agree on policy with -' 
Chamberlain rather than Henderson that the National Governnent was 
tonned. The Graham Memorandun . (Passtield Papers, IV, 26:2.5) reoords 
that it was suggested on one occasion that all the members of the 
Cabinet Committee met with the Bankers' representatives but -that 
idea was not encouraged by the Prime Minister or the Chancellor of 
the Exchequer. There was sane remark to the. eftect that these 
Bankers were not accustaned to meetings with politicians: and that 
it might be easier if' they put the case to the' head of the Government 
and to the Chancellor of the Exchequer as the Minister immediately 
responsible. " 
19. 
20. 
~ ... 
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Duri03 the meeti~ l.facDonald conyeyed to the Ce,bit'let the view of the 
Bank of England that, "it was ••••• essential, :;:D.-rticularl:r fron the 
point of view of the forei3n int~rests concerned, that very substantial 
economiefl could be effected on Unem1')lovment insurance. In no ()t.}l'~r "'<:I"r 
would forei~n confidence be restored. ,," C.t"R 23/67. 43(31 )~-~'3 I'1in·~·. 
The Sl..'tcceedinz minute records that "the Cabinet were almost equally 
divided on the 'luestion of whether there should be a reductlon of 10 :!!er 
cent o~ no redu.ction at all." 
tf':lhen l'1e asked vrhat woul,i hannen if thiA announcem"mt failed to restore 
forei:n cO'1fidence ••••• SnoVld~~ re:;?lied 'the de111;3e'.". Cf. Cro8s,o!, .• cit., 
p. 292. 1,!acDonald in fact com~lained to the Cabinet that, fiAt the. 
Oreni03 discllssion with the Leaders of 1'olitical 1'ariies, economies of 
the order of near £84-millio~ had been envisl3.:eo. hut these economies h~/l 
now been zreatl:r reduced by decl sions with which he re"r'sonall:r WA,S not in 
t"vereef!\ent." CA'q ~~/6q 44(31)3. 22 AU",,">'Ust 1931. In his record Samuel 
indicated that ooth MacDonald and SnO'.'vden mad.e this clear. "We had come 
prepared ,try ~ive a zeneral a:;?I'roval to the economies proposed, ,providerl 
that a red1Jction \'tas made in the unemr>loyment scales. At the outset, 
however, the Ministers informed us th~t they had not been able to obtain 
the consq~t of the Cabinet even to the 1'ro1'08o.ls on the Unem,loJ~ent Fund 
Which they had s!'ecified on the previous d9\Y. If St'!J'l1'lel Pa:;,ers A78/7 r.4. 
Davidson commented, "ChaTTlberlain, I am sl't.:1:'e, had his· eye on the 
Chancellorshi:;? of the Exche~uer, and San Hoare also was a man of unlimited 
l'lersono.l ambition. Al thoUCh 'ihe, put the national interest first they - !:'.nd 
some other leadine Cons~rvatives - had thou~ht a good deal about what 
rosi tion8 they would have in a National Gove:rnment ••••• " Jrunes, l'~emoir~ of 
.Qf a C(,)l'I~e1"Vative, p.368 • . Cf. Cha.1'Jlberlain' s own view that "Truly ,the. 
Con~~~at1ve.Party is a wonderful embodiment of eood sense, ra.triotism and 
honesty." F,:dlin,e, on.cit., 1'.195. Sa.muel and the Tories told Ma"Donald 
that "\'1e re~I3;l"ded it ·as his d'lty either to present more adeC!uate rro!,>osals, 
Or to,place his resi~nation in the Kine's hands." Sa..'l111el PH:,ers A 78/7,p.6. 
At the Cabinet meeti~ 'on 22 AUCllst Snowden h?d declared, somewhat 
emotiona.lly and, in vie...., of later events, prophetically, th~,t "so far as 
he was c01"lcerned he h?d no d011bt whatsoever, if he was compelled to choose 
bet"reen retainin~· the Labour Movement in its r"!'esent form. a1"ld reduci~ the 
standard of livin3 of the workmen by 50% which would be the effect of 
de~artine from the eold st~,ndard where his dnty would lie. rt CAB 23/67 
44(31)3. Cf. Henderson's'adoDtion speech at Burnley, "the possibility of 
a. National Government had been in Mr. MacDonald' s mind for m9.t".y months, 
and had. even been the su.bject of conversation withont its havinz once been 
brou.zhtbefore any official I!leetin~ of the Lab01..l.r Party. If Ti~f 14 Octobe! 
1931. The F,conoMist had. considered MacDonald's defection arossibility. 
"Will Hr. MacDonald stake his poli ti"al future on an a:!!peal·· to the count~J 
on co-oneration with othe-ro ne.rlies aO'ainst strong cnrrents of feeline in 
his own?" .. "Dern.ocr~y and &:onomy" 15; August ,1931,· r.299. 
Nicolson recorded that UacDo<nald wamed the King of the likely resi3nations 
of Henderson and Gra.hal!1 from the Cabinet in the event of the "success" of 
t~e telegram to New York, a1"ld that "it would not be rossible for him to 
carr:r on the adJ'llinistration without .their assistance." Nicolson, o").ctt., 
P.460/1. The Cabinet Minutes record "If the MS'.ver from New York was . 
•••• • /continued 
( . 23. oent'd. ) 
26. 
2i. 
favourable the Prime Minister's proposed to see the leaders of 
the Opposition Parties again and to discuss with them the 
parliamentar,y situation. It the answer fran New York was 
unfavourable it"was not proposed to have any further meetings 
with the Party leaders." . (4.5(31). 
"He most sincerely hoped that the Cabinet woula now accept the 
proposals as a whole.' It, however, the Cabinet were unable to 
accept them, then it was clear that the loan which was essential 
to avert the crisis would not be forthcaning anQ it was unthinkable 
that the Government could remain in office and prevent sane Qther 
Administration being given the opportunity of deciding that the 
money should be'found." The situation was grave and 'he admitted, 
"that the proposals as a whole represented the negation of .... 
everything that the Labour Party stood for, and yet he was:' . 
absolutely satisfied that it was necessary in the national interests, 
to implement them it -the country was to be secured. He then pointed 
out that, it ,on this question there were a~ important resignations 
the Government as a whole must resign." ,CAB 23/67. 46,(3l}1. 23 August 
1931. . 
~.C. Deb.2.56, c~ 733. 1.5 September 1931. Bassett's use of his 
material on this occasion is open to serious objection. His cl~ 
that Sexton's speech was "evidence of the reluctance withwhibh 
Labour Members were adhering to the Opposition" is patently false. 
Bassett, gp.cit., p.232. Henderson declared that he did not take 
exception to the-formation of the National Government but to " •••• 
the manner of its fonnation and what led :Uninediately tQ the 
fo~ation of the Government." H.C. Deb. 256, 00. 29. 8 September 1931. 
Bassett spent sane time discussing the supposed embarrassment of the 
ex-Ministers caused by the Labour Party's apparent volte-fac~. It 
should, however, be noted that such embarrassment was not particularly 
aoute within the Labour Party itself. At the Annual Conference the 
Chainnan said, "I am not conoerned whether this so-oalled indispensable 
demand was put forward by international finanoiers, by British bankers 
or by the leaders of the other parties. What I do .~ •••• is that in 
refusing tu acede to these demands the ex..;Ministers of the Labour i 
Government aid what the whole Labour and Trade Union and Labour 
Movement expected •••• " L.P.A.C.R. 1231, p.~56. 
The speech is reproduced in full in Bassett, op.eit., (Appendix VIII) 
pp. 44419. Beatrioe Webb described it as"a model of lucidity, delivered 
with oonviction •••• admirably planned and phrased." Cole, 
Beatrice Webb's Diaries 1 26- 2 p.293, 18 October 1931. Whereas 
Forward Glas 0'91 , called it a "shameless apostasy and treachery to the 
principles publicly espoused for a life-time." 24 October 1931. In 
Labour's Election Appeal (1929), to whichSnowden had presumably 
Subscribed, it was cla.imed that 
••••• /c:ontinued 
27. 
(oonta. ) 
28. 
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"In order to hide their record ot incompetence and reaction 
Tor,y leaders are tr,ying to frighten the electors with terrifying 
pictures ot the disasters which would ccme upon the country if a 
Labour Government were returned •••• We warn the electorate 
against the mis~epresentations ot Socialism and the aims and 
policy ot the Labour Party •••• The Labour Party is neither 
Bolshevik nor Canmunist. It is cpposed to torce, revolution 
and confiscation as means ot establishing the New Social Order. 
It believes in ordered democratic methods." 
The tact that MacUonald did not fonnally announce the decision 
to go to the t)()untry until 6 October is besides the point. 
Bassett, in claiming that it was the Labour Party which tozmall.y 
expelled MacDonald, is as gull ty as Davidson ot wishful thinking 
in believing that MacDonald was in a:ay position to return to the 
Labour Party. Bassett, op.cit., pp.26517. ct. James, Memoirs ot 
.!.Conservative, p.375. For1il.a.cDonald's hopes along these lines 
see Nicolson, gp.cit., p.49l. For his doubts about the role of the 
National Governnent following devaJ.uation see ~., p.493. Cf. 
especial interest is MacDonald's selt-justifying remark made sane 
time later that "Any man in my position at the time, knowing all 
that I did 'Would have acted as I acted. However, I wish sane times 
that saneone else had been in my position at the time." Ibid., 
p. 494. n.2. 
r 
TIm tTHIRTT~ • 
• 
293 
While the events of 1931 h'ld a. debilitatin,3 effe~t 0!1 the L8bour Pa,..t:,' 
.. 
in the short-te'!'r'l th~r were not as crnoial to the developm'1nt of the Pn,rty as 
mieht at fh-st aI'pe?J' to be the case. The intern'll conflict whtch 1931 ins!:,ired 
W'as no more than the traditional conflict between the ~efo't"!'1ist ard revolnti(maJ'."".! 
eler.len.ts in the La])ou.2' Party, betwep.n its theoretically orientated and ?>.h:t"Xist-
ins'ired Socialist Left and. its I'racmatic nOI1.-doctrinnaire Ll'1,bo1J"t'i ta Rizht. 
It 
was, as Richard Lyman correctly points o'.1.t a conflict betweAn "Socialist 
Ideals and' pr~tical politics" which ce'1tred u!:'on the strate.::y to be used 
to!, attoJ.·nin- (1) 
"" :; the socialist mUlennhun. 
The Part~r' s attitude to Parlia..'nent in the 'Thirtie9 dj,d l1.ot chan~e from 
the lllode:!'ate democratic st!:',nce rrevela'1t in the previous deca"le. Neither did 
the Left seize power only to lose it slowly throtl_.::hout the decade. What 
ha.pr>ened in fa.ct~ 1hat a vociferous unrepresentative section of the Party, 
eJCn!'e . . ' -~ sSJ.OC what '"ere fre,:uently half-sensible views vri th nonsensical implications, 
W'e~ . 
-a giVen excessive crea,en'1e by their political opponents in orde:,:, to da"la~e 
the D!'os,ects of the Labour Pa...,..-ty. FrOI!l th'3 :r;'oint of view of Parliamentary 
~ f ' 
e o:t'rQ the most relevant reriod of the 'Thirties is. the first h9.1f of the decade 
1'o!', to all intents and PU1'Toses, the overall attitude of the Party to the 
I)'~j:lati 
4. on Was settled by 1934. In the years that followed other relevant issu'3s 
~en"i l' " '4~ 1.' ~ settlement we~e the mareinal, 'thot~h in one sense funda"lental, 
q,1J.estion.sof the affiliation of the Communist Party and the United Front. AlthoU:.;h 
thefle i . i 1 f hi h 'l'Je~tions posed fundamental Cl'J.estioQs q.bout the bas c prlnc !' es rom w __ c 
~ __________________ " ______________________________________ __ 
'. R.W. tyman, "The British Labour Party: The Conflict between Socialist Ideals 
and Practical Politics between the Wars," The Journal of 13,..iti!'l~ St'ld.1eCl, 
V, 110.1. (November, 1965),140- 152• 
r 
the Labour Party derived its attitude towards Parliament and the Parliamentary 
process they were marginal in that they were simply manifestations of deeper 
att't -~ udes towards the interpretation of the world as a whole. 
The internal conflict characterised by "Intellectuals-v-Trade Unionists" 
and persOnified by Cripps and Bevin was a difference oftenperament as much as, 
one of ideology. It was also representative of the decade as a whole in'which 
the major events of the World were systematically reduced to the simple issues 
of' Ca 't Plo alism and Canmunism, Fascism and Marxism, engaged in a world-wide 
apoca' .--t . 
...., l.l l.C conflict frcm which only one victor could emerge. To sane extent 
the inabUity of contemporaries to correctly interpret the political events 
ot the day was understandable. As Bernard Zylstra says, "One must not expect 
Go gOod deal of genuinely scientific appraisal of Marx, Marxism and the history 
of' C , 
ommunl.sm between the world wars. Insufficient lapse of time, the violence 
\ of the Russian Revolution the rise of Fascism and the econanic crisis blurred 
one's . Vl.ew of the import of the new developments - both on the (Conservative) 
I~, 
19ht t and the (Labour)tLeft~'" (2) 
Yet if interpretations of Fascism as the last bastion of Christian 
°i " ~ilisati6n or the last fling of Capitalism in deoline reflect unscientific 
and ~ 
ature intellectual -judgements/the refusal of many to apply normal values 
to Tot. , 
all.tarian countries represented a degree of ideological canmitment 
incQn 
Patible with the right to demand individual respect. As Mary Agnes 
lIarnil ton Said , 
"The (political) Right forgave, even rather liked 
Totali tarianisrn in Gennany., Italy, Spain but detested 
it in Russia; the Left forgave it there, to detest it 
everywhere else. Right and Left disagreeing in every-
thing else, found a strange unanimity in applying to 
Russia standards the ob~erse of those used for other 
, countries. It (3) '.-
~-~---------------------------------------2. ZYlstra~ Qp.cit., p.l34, ~.26. 
1{'" . . . . 3. 
ary Agnes Hamilton, Rem'Wfibering My Good FriendsJ. p.255. 
l 
r 
!!:ib~ protesting that. "to us the theor,y of Stalin as modern Napoleon is 
simply unbelievable". (4) is a good example of the unwillingness to accept 
the possibility of either Socialist corruptability or of a conflict between 
the aims of Canmunism ,md democratic' Socialism. 
It was inevitable that the internal conflicts of the Labol.lJ';. Party in 
the 1930' s should be seen not only in tenus of trade unionists and intellectuals, 
tor this was in broadest terms the composition of the antagonistic groups, but 
also as clashes of personalities; for where the issue involved was that of 
lOYalty to collective decisions and the right to individual view of conscience 
the cOnflict would inevitably take place between individual spokesmen such as 
Cripps and Laski and individuals speaking for the collective view. This was 
heightened by the Left's sneering comments at the leadership of the trade 
unions. "There have been many such men in the Labour Movement. They 
X'epresent an English type - a type that means well but is in reality remote 
from the living problems of the Workers." (5) Such snide comments were 
X'entiniscent of the personal att'acks levelled at the Party leadership by the 
CQnmunist Party and appear to reflect a self-induced sens of ~portance often 
felt by the ideologically committed. Not that the Party leadership failed to 
,respond. "If Bevan or anybody else," Emmanuel Shinwell told the Party 
Conference in 1934, ' 
"believes that the Party is insipid and lacking in 
courage and has not got the necessary energy, either 
,to put its point of view to the country or to carr,y 
it out then in my judgement they ought to join".the 
party or the organisation which they believe has got 
the attributes that the Labour Party,ought to have."(6) 
, ' In this context the success of the Labourite Right was assumed for 
lIhateyer Att1ee's political deficiencies, Bevin' s prejudices aild Morris on 's .'. 
"---------------------------------------------------------------------------4.. 
5. 
'6. 
!.ribune, 18 June 1937. 
!ribune, 19 February 1937 •. ~ ,'. , \' 
b,.P.A.C.R.·19.34, p.l4l. Cf. Ernest Bevin's attaCk on Aneurin Bevan, 
lPid., pp. 140/1. 
conservatism may have been, they compared more than favourably with Cripps t 
POlitiCal immaturity, Laski's capacity for intellectual bias and exaggeration 
and John Stracheyts ability to logically spell out to the ridicule of later 
generations the implications of a Marxist analysis which itself was an 
intellectually inadequate'exp1anation of current events.(7) 
While the Party leadership did not emerge from the 'Thirties unscathed 
from the conflicts surrounding ~he issue of "democracy-v-dictatorship" its 
wh -'
ole-hearted commitment to the former was recognised by its opponents. Stan1ey 
Ba.J.d\Vin, for example, told the House of Commons, "the Labour Party as a whole 
ha~e helped to keep the flag of Parliamentary gov~rnment flying in the world 
thrOU€h the difficult period t~ough which we have passed. "(8) Att1ee, in 
:re 1 . . 
,.. P Ylng, said that it was the Labour Party's "duty to preserve our democratic 
Constitution and the workings of this Parliame~t. "(9) Unlike the Left the 
lead -
ership of the Party did not accept that Parliamentary government could not 
lIo:rk in what was called "Capitalist Democracy". As Herbert Morrison commented, 
"411 . 
. this talk by Fascists and sometimes by Communists that democracy would not 
lIo:rk t 
, hat it was slow was sheer nonsense. It all depended who was running the 
democ ' 
racy. The main thing in running democracy was will, determination and 
Clear 
ness of head."(10) In particular they did not-accept the scheme of the 
teft ,-
tor a popular front and so forth because they did not accept the applications 
or 'Mft_ • ~st theory to the British situation.(11) 
"'---
7. 
For Laski's prejudices see L. Robbins, op.cit., pp.77/8, 95/5. A more " 
SYmpathetic account of Laski's abilities is to be found in Kings1ey Martin ~Old Laski 1893-1950: A Biographical Memoir (London: Go11ancz, 1953) and 
a. long and careful analysis of his early writings is to be found in Zy1stra, 
.«2lkc:l1., and a. complete analysis of his life's work in R.A. Deane, The ~itica1 Ideas of Haro1d Laski (New York, Columbia University PresSY-1955. 
8, !L£~Deb~ 302, cc. 3712.22 Ma.y1935. ~. !.1u:a~, 'cc. 372. 
'
0. ~ly Herald, 8 October 1934. 
1. S' , . ( 
1) ea Htigh Dalton 'The Popular Front', Political Quarterly, 7, No.IV, October-
acember, 1936)" pp.481/489. ' ." , 
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Above all, however, the Labo11r Party as a whole continued to depend u:::,on a 
Dl'~atic interpretation of wo:!'ld events. Unlike their ,rede0essors the bulk 
of the Parly in the 'Thirties dtd not dissipate their energies attacking 
p -
al'liament 01' the P.L.P.' I d d t1.. t t i k bl f h th 
- - n ee, r!e con ras s remar a e or VI ereas ' e 
e1"'ct· -~ 10n cam:::'9.i~n of 1931 had been mo:!:'e overtly fraudulent than that of 1918 
the-"e 
- was no strone; reaction, outside the Left whose commitment to Parliament 
'\Vas always bi . t th ki f' P It t th f f am ~ous, 1't~I:I1_ns ' (:\ wor nz 0_ 9.r. amen or e per ormance 0 
the PL.P. ( ) Indeed, they were fre'luently rraised. 12 This indicates the extent 
to whiCh 1931 was reza:t'ded as a tooporaT'J setback unde:t' peculiar cim1LTl1stJ?nc9s 
l'e.ther than the inevitable outcome of' the Party's attempt to secure Socialism 
W1thin a C@~italist fr?mework. It w~s a measure to some degree of the extent 
,. ta which the Trade Unions re-emerged in the !l0li tical arena" afte't' the disillusion-
i~ eX,erience of the General Strike had been put in :perspective; a re-emereence 
"'av 
'" e:rned not by the mechanics of reform (the T.U.C. took as little interest in 
the r f 
e orm of Parliamentary reform in the 1930's as it had in the latter part of 
the 1920 t s) but in the totality of the Fascist challen,'!e and the necessity of 
defendin.,; democracy. 
BeartOZ. these points in mind this chapter will discuss the altern'ltive 
Views of society th?t existed within the Labol11' Party and the positions that these 
1>,. a. 
"'-0 ueed on the issue of ParliamentaT'J reform and, . indeed, on the whole <1,uestion 
or th 
e role of the British Parliament within the fr~ework that surrounded it. 
It w'l 
'1. 1 be s~o"m that a1 tho1..l.gh the e.:pparent differences between the two sides 
in the Party on the specifio details of parliamentary reform were minor enou3h 
to A b 
-na le compromises to be effected relatively <luickly in the lo~-term they 
\'rel' 
e so fundamental as to promote division over,continuine issues; ~~ch as the 
United Front and the affiliation of the Communist Party: that it was the 
~------------------------------------------.-. -.----~-------------
, ~. 
See, for exa.T"ple, IJ.M. Weir in the Ne1V CIB1'ion, 15 July 1933. , , 
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f'..lndamental int~rr"!'etation of Soci.ety and th~ wider ,,,,or1d as the:: eJ~tn'llly 
e ' . ' 
-
1C1
sted that provoked dissension ra.ther than n. simrle clash of per90nali ties. 
What f ollm'Ts is an examination of the variet:' of tenets ul,on which the two 
[orees( 'Left' and 'Ri.:;~t') based their attitudes to Pe.:rJ.t~ment and t ts reform 
a.nd to trace how this affected thei't' views to both these and oth~r alUed 
qUestions throu~hont th'3 decade. 
AI thoueh the ir.1mediate wake of the 1931 Crisis brou::ht with it a v9.ri.ety 
of Elce.!'es concernin.:; the rossible extinction of de1'1ocr'3.cy in' G't'eat Britain (13) 
it can be sa;._d ~ .... uit~ c fi~ t1 th t th i f thi f 1t " - - on :1 en . y .. e e ma n e9.rs on S score were ~L, 
tho'\.1O'ht .~. 8nd e.:rticulated by the 'Left' which was comJ?osed of a variety of elements 
l.'an"'in<7 f 
", . .g rom Laski, Co1e and Strache:r fron the academic world to A1ex Go '3 sip of 
,-the Purnishina Trades' Association on trade nnion side 0.1 tho,;t,.zh dominated by 
nl)o ... CO~nn.tnist l.!ar:xist Left intellectuals (14) such 'as Cripps, Wise, MelIor and 
Tl.'ev 1 
e·yan who wrote the par.lI1h1ets.(15) Its acknow1ed.:;ed leader was Sir Stflj'ford 
Cl.'ipPs and its ];I9.in or.:;anised. force the Socialist Leazue. Its ide01o;;y was 
sbecif' 
'" J.cal1y develo:!!ed from the political inte1:1'retation~ of the world, synthesised, 
'lu.lnoar o 
,,;.. lsed and !,)o:m.larised by HaJ:'old Laski articulated by Sir Stafford Crir:!!s 
9.nd. i 
. 2 Ven intellectu.a1 credence by John Strachey. 
The main analytical tool of the Labour Left in the ea:rly 'Th1.rlies wa,q 
}'ta~ 
. srn. Harolrl Laski, for exomp1e, described the role of Ma.rxist thou.:;ht in 
hi!3 'VI 
ork when he wrote in 1935, 
"No tool at the cO!!lJlland of the social philosopher surpasses 
Marxism either 1.n its nower to exnlain the movement of ideas 
or its authority to pr~dict their" practical outcome. On 
the nature and function of the Sta.te, on 1e~a.1 institutions, 
on canita.list habits, on historio:ra,hy, on the development 
.. ., 
"--
'3. -------------------------------------------------------
. J~e3 MI"..xton, for exa."1,le, declared in the' House of Commons on 8 Septel"ihe't', 
1931, "I have heard ~'mours and seen indications that it is J?rorosed by 
"ariO'lS dev.ices to red1J~e Pa'!:'liarnentary oPI'osition to a merc farce. I ho:!!e 
the Ll\bour Uovement realises thnt Parliarnentar.r O:,!,osition is not its only 
resou~ce." H.C.DeQ. 256, cc.55. 14. ' See Note 1 • 
. , 5. ! brief o'l'tline of th~ Sooialist Leazue is to be found in B.Pim10tt,. "The 
SOCialist Lea .. :ue: Intel1ectua.1s and the Left in the 1930's" Jem.r''lR.l of 
2!;ntemr-ora't'Y Hi.sto~r, Vo1.G. no.111 (1971) !)r.12-33. . 
.. .. .. - .. .. ',. .. '" .. • ~ p ,. ~ ... • 
l 
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"of ,hiloso,hical systems, IhrxisJTl holds the fip-ld a.3~.inst 
any of its rivals. On the breakdo'~m of cl1::?itn,list democracy, 
the decline of' bOll.reeouis culture, th:~ rise of Fascism, the 
role of non-revolutionftI"J socialism, it h'3.s insj.:ht not 
possessed by any other method of e.nalysis. tI (16) 
Even m~kin.3 cllst;~a:,:,y al1o':':':).nce fo~ Laski' s pencha!lt for overstatement 
~.nd over-sinplific::tticn the truth of this !lassO-ee cannot be denier! in its 
a.PDlio9.tion to Laski' s work even if in a corrupted form and more eS:gecially 
to John Strachey's '~he Theo:r:" l.nd Practtce of SC"CiaUsm.(17) Their analysis 
r ..... 
o t~e i:r.t'Ylediate ':'ast and 'Jrediction9 for future develonments were atterl.nt s·. 
.... . 
to r:t~idly a:;:ply Ma...""'Jdst tenets to Eri tain and to place the Eri tish !loli tice.l 
scene in the context of a world-wide :philoso:-hy concernire the al1ezed decUn~, 
COllaDse and abolition of ce.pita1ism l3.nd its reple.ce'1l~nt by S00ialism. 
Briefly, .' the left-wine e.ndysi s was basell on the fund? .. ment 8.1 tenet that 
eConomic interests in societ~r were l1rima:!'y qver !,olitic'3.1 one, anrithat the. 
StAte h d 
" a eVolved as ~m instrllnent for defend1.n~ t!1e interestof the rrivne.::ed 
~~lin~ i . ·_.:rou~ . n socJ.et~T. The prim'3.r'.f f'.1nction of the St9.te a.c~ordj.n,e t() Lnski 
"to enS1J1'e t1:1e ,peaceful 111"Ocess of !,:!'Oal1~t10n in ~ooiety. 
To do so it r:Y-l"It"'lct'3 the s:rstem of I'Y'()cll,ctj,ve relr>,t,ions 
which tha.t !,rocess necessitat'?'3. Its f'.1.nction is to 
<;!Yolve, ".n~e'!.' ooeL'cive s~nctj(')~, the 
whi.ch the society Ir.!lint9ins its life 
in ~'lhich :tt e~l~n'3 -:l.ts Jivi~. "(19) 
1e':;::9J. relations 
in te:r.ms of +.he 
"thO~0 ••••• who see'.( to a1 te1' the 011a1'o.ot0r of the 
distribl}ti.ve l1'1'V)ce':!s in !".r'~r f'l'1r'1"",."nntal-r:rr!:::, '('.rh,.., ~."nt, 
t'h::!.t is, to 8,1 te:!' the pr011'cti ve relations of the s~rste1"1 
'1'11er~'1ich th",~r liYc, !!"',C"t CI.o so b~' alteri!\:: the le,eal.... , 
~-. ------------------------------------------------------~------,~ 
• 
'7. 
18 
• 
See !Tote 2 • 
It is .iT'"'01'tcnt in t!1is context .to note that StrRchey h~rl nl:!'enCly .eained a 
'.Vide re:;;-:;'b.tion with the :rublic~t:ton of The CI"lM1 n"! Str'1.1'":,,:l"! for Po"r~r (r,onooY): 
Victo::,: Gol1a:1cz., 1932)., Strache~r's abilit~r .lay int""e L"res"mbtion of a C'1.se 
in 10.:;101?,1 ma!lrer - th'3 jt;.rl.::;emcn+. S 1.l:;?on '.v}dch his 9Y-,;?osi tlon "!e.s b?93r: were 
f'l'e,!uent1y er:!'oneous. Cole, distr..1sted ~js ,olitlcal jud..::;ement as "'ell- es 
tho.t of Laski. U. Cole, lV'" of G. !I.B'. C'))~, ::;,.201/3. . . 
S.J. Laski, Th~ St?-te in T1ieOr-rq'yln. P="'?!)t5ce (Lon10n: Geor~e Allc>n'& Unwin, 
1935), pp.110/t11.-"The 103al. order is 9, masl.;;··behil1.3. -r:rhich a dominant econorlic 
inteL'est secures the benefit of roli tic~tl authority. It er. his IntJ"'o(l,1ct:i on 
io Polit:i08 (lond.on:Geor.::;e A11en & Unwin, Rev. Ed .• , 1951), p.21.. ." 
l 
"foundations of the society. This they can only 
achieve by possessing themselves, either peaceful~ 
or by violence, of the state-power •••• " (19) 
The previous century - tenned by Strachey "the centur,y of the great hope"(20) 
had been one in which the midd~e class had secured po1i tica1 recognition of their 
eooncxn ' -, J.c power through the expansion of the general areas of liberty and 
d~ocracy, culminating in the achievement of a universal franchise and the 
lllitigat, J.on of the worst features of industrialisation. HOwever, these achievements 
lhich had been made possible by the fact of capitalist econanic expansion throughout 
the "'.;_ ·~~eteenth century, were conceeded by the governing class on the distinct 
understanding that "they did not disturb the essential thesis that the ownership 
ot 
eCOllanic power must remain in private hands. 'llhey were the necessary 
concessJ.·ons of the capitalist system to the outory against its more naked 
oon 
r sequences." (21) The concessions gained, in other words, were in answer to 
the p , 
erJ.pheral questions of capitalism they were not answers which ooncerned the 
fUnd 
amental values of capitalist democracy. Moreover, "the lack of effeotive 
desi 
re in any party to change the capitalist system enabled Parliament in times 
at 
CollIparative prosperity to give the appearance of a successful democratic 
llIac].,.:_ ·~e." (22) 
The fight to achieve Parliamentary democracy, however, had served to divert 
e.tte 
ntion fran the econanic basis of society to its political superstructure, to 
the 
eJetent in society had been hidden by argunents over that the real conflict 
tts t 
ol1nal power-wielding instruments. Moreover, the "democratic" features of 
~ 19 •. ---------------------------~ Laski, The State in Theory and Practice, Ibid., p.lll. 
• 
." ., ... 
<3.. 
(~ 
• 
J. Strachey, The"Menace of Fascism (Londpn: Victor Gollancz, 1934),Ch.II. 
H.J. Laski, Democracy in Crisis (Londcn: George AlIen & Unwin,1933) ,p.22. 
Of. his "The present position of Representative Democracy" in Laski, et.al. 
!.here Stands Socialism Today? (London: Rich & Oowan,1933), pp.3/4 and 18. 
Hereafter cited as uThe present position of representative democracy." 
R.S. Cripps "Parliamentary Institutions and the Transition to Socialism" in 
!here Stands Socialism Tod!y?, pp.29/56(30). Hereafter cited as Parliamentary 
Institutions and the Transition. The essays in this volume were revised 
~ersions of the Autumn series of Fabian Lectures delivered in 1932. An 
earlier draft of this particular lecture can be found in the New Clarion 
5 November 1932. Cf. Laski, Democracy in Crisis, pp.30/35 for the 
econanic background to mid-Victorian political life. 
l 
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Ca)italist de"'1ocr(',c~r were in point of ffl.ct useless adjun~-!:$ 1.n the face of the 
:real Power in society 'V:'tich 19y, "Aven in t~e Stlltes which ••••• yn.f'.int9..in~d 
democratic forms: in the h"1nds 
"1 -
n a Capitalist derlocrac:l the ~ain 1veapons of ] ea,dershil? a1"e in the hands 
ot the ca::;,i talists. Its opponents are always on t~e defensive 'unless th,,:r 
Confine tbeir antaeonisrl to the minlltae of the re,3ine. "(24) Under no circum-
stances Was the :political liberty conceeded by the Ca:;::dtelists to hA. 1.1se1 to 
ee"" ... ", ~Vl .. ,,, econoI'1ic e'lnalit~r. 
Yet the lo~ical outcoI'1e of the democratic ideal of e1uality ~as the 
u.ni . Versal franchise, the achievement of which, by cha~ir13 the psycholo~ical 
disDositions towa"':'ds, anti social eX!'ectations of individuals from, the :political 
... a~!'ltem as a whoJ e, . inevi tably cha~ed the natu:re of social deMo.nds made upon the 
e~stem from superficial rolitical claims to fundam~mtal economic ones. The 
10
3108.1 pro,:;ression froM. political to economic democracy is conceived hy th~ 
as a natural demand to be secnred in the saTTle perceived manne:r as 
demands - throu~h the medium of the State.(25) However, these 
n~ d 
emands involve !,!uestions about the central cHadels of t"1e economic system, 
t.e t 
., h~ rr1-vate ownership of the melOtns of production, and will only be conoeeded 
tr the Capitalists, who own the means of production, B.3ree to do so, whp.:reas in 
rant 
. , a Cal;litalist Democracy, "offered a share in politica.l authority to all 
Citi 
zens u:;?on the unstated assumption that th~ equality involved in the denocratic 
td.eal did not seek extension to the economic sphere. It (26) 
~----------------------------------------------------------<3. 
Laski. De"11I)~J"acv in Crisis, 1'.76. 
taski referrine to the Fabian nature of British Socialism noted "they 
aSSumed tha.t they had only to persuade (the) majority that they were :rizht, 
to proceed to use the power of the State for the Socialist transfome.tion 
Of eoonomic institutions." H.J. La.ski PaT) i~~nta1')r Gove't'l"ment in En~'.I?n4.: 
~o~~o.~t~~! (London: Geor:e AlIen & Unwin,1938h p.19. 
La!)l::!, Do.IDocracy in C1'1 si ~, p. 53. 
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Moreover, C,9.::,i t alis"!} could only !!lake cone 9ssions in the economi.c sphe:t'e 
du.!'ln~ a period of material enD-nsion and with the pxcerytion of the immediate 
... ". ... 
l,)ost",war boo!'1 the Y9a.rS si.nce t'1e first world W3.r had heen c'I-J.9:r'<'lcte-r.-isen by a 
eeneral decline of trade and an a~~r~ssive economic nationalism. Its social 
effects were those of ~enerlll distllusionment. "Certainty, II wrote Las1d j n 
1933, "has been re:,lacen by c:rnicimn; hope has eiven room to des:'f.l.tr, "(27) Md 
not Only was this true in th~ econoMic sphere, it applied also to the I'oliti.cal 
SPhere. Whereas optimism hg,d prevailed previously, the Second Labour Government, 
. 
Which Came to office in 1929, was faced with the fact that economic equ.ality 
'"a.s i!!lPoss1.ble within the Capitalist frarleivork. "There was evidently no 
lo~e 
r any CJ.uestion of obtainirl0 new benefits for the workers without da.ma,::ine 
th i 
r e nte-rests of the capitalist, tl(28) or undermining the stabilit~r of British 
ca)italism. 
"In the so-called cr~sl.S of July 1931 the capitalist 
classes beca.'!le alarmed at what they considered to be 
the dan,:er of a definitely socialist tendenc~r in 
Parliament. They thouzht that if the Labour Government 
was allowed to continue in :rower they mi,::ht have 
attempted a solution alon~ socialist line9. 1I (29) 
\Vh."'l'l. 
v C~pitalism is in ~~ch a phase of contractio~ not only were economic concessions 
itn?OSSible but a situation wou.ld arise in which the :rrivile~ed ,asS'nmrtions of 
ce.J?ito,1ism '''ere in direct.conflict with the e,::a.li tarian iml'licatio':ls of democr~c:r. 
":a. e):resentative democracy b9came unsta.ble because there '.'ra.s no lon,.:er asreement, 
be~ ~iYeen the c;overnin: clr-tsses and the mass of peo:[11e, either upon the ends it 
Harold Laski ShoU.ld seek or the ways in which it should seek th~m."(30) 
'--<7.---------------------------
30. 
!!>id., p.16. Cf. The PreMnt Positio'1 of ReT)'!'esenbtive Democr!3.c:r, py).6/9. 
CriI'ps, P1."'Ji..'1!'1ent?ry In~tibltions an~ th~ T:r-'u!gi.tion, :r.36. All the 
9V'1.de!lce,.hoVlev9r, S'.lrrorts .the New St'1.temQl\' s .contention that "The Labour 
Party has f"tiled not because it h~sbeentoo Socia.listic b1lt bMause it hag 
abannoned Socialisr.l ..... tt 19 September 1931. Cf. Th,llo~k, o;n.cit..,I, ,.451. 
" 
SUCCin~tl ..' 
-, .~_:r r.!"I/!~ t".,~ ·.:'Olnt 130 "'8 +'0 orq' . ., i.ts t"'e()r'?'t..;.~""". i!'1:~l -Lco.tions in 
~_§:t..,t~ In Tl,0(l'Y"'. r "'n. A .. Pr ct· 
,. ._q, .1."''''; 
~ . . .. .. .... . . 
"t!1e :;(ric~ of the cl)n0essi0ns eY::'~0.t81 b~r deJT!ocro.cy ••••• 
9.:,!,eQrn t')l) -!11::h. The ~sS"lT'l.:,ti!)'1f" of' c8,:,i t'1.liqm. t""'n 
cf)ntr!'1.rlic":; t"'", ~.f'r"licq+:j.')Y)8 (If' Q"lm(Y~rac~r. If tl,p -:,h'1~e 
. - ...-
of contr~ction i.B !,r01.,"~'?~., it 1:'\(?~f)1").'?S n(~Cl',,!8~9.:r:r "';,tl-."' .... 
tr) r:-.":rr'f':;Qt9 t~e ~ <>!'1oc .... qtio :'1:'00083 O'l" to 0'" ..,r:;e t"'.~ 
ec')nomic as~·rt1,.'''rti0'1S u!'C'!'l ,~l:-j~'" t"~ cociet~r !'ests. "(31) 
of th : 
. e 1left, illustratecl b~r the histo-r:r of.' F'?,8Cir::m. ~e d1J.PT'TMr' .. cm1sed. b:' th~ 
deno0.~ ti' . 
. J_.a c element in Cap:!. talism (1enocrecy was solved h:' the el1..mi.nation of 
"a1'10ve",ent of the ca::;ite.list class usin:;' the 10'.'T0r 
I!\idrUe cl?"ss [',n1 reas?nts !;l.g its inst1'."lJ.1'10nt, and its 
Sl1Ccess me~ns m.erely a cOI1~olid!J.tion of I10"Ter in th~ 
. hau1s of th.ut srne ct".:;(it~.list class wMch already 
,ossesses it. "(33) . .. 
Its f . 
l:tnction W9.S tl) rescue c!'l.::,i taJJ. sn from its dilemma. 
Of d",,1'I1 . • ~ .. Of}~?,cy, in one fom or Q'1oth~r, it has entrusted u.nlimitcQ I''','1er- to thos8 
"rho 0 ~'. 
Wo a.nft ~('In4:'l" ... "'l th "'0 s of' d c· ti·on 1f(3.1) ~ . ,e ,., .M. ._ rrf),.'l • • Strachey was' less restrained 
th~n t 
. Mkt in his earl:' !tnalysis of F:tscism. "Tbl':l rmrpose of F8.scl.s"1," he wrote, 
"is to Cl ' 
..
efr:n1 by vj.olence the rrivateorrnershi:!; of th~ me-me of l''!'oducti.on, even 
thOl.1-2h 
..... l'!1odern civilisation ha.s become incom::;atible w:tth a social system 
based 1.lpon 
rrrivate ovmershil':" (35) In Germany and. Italy the F9.scist 'attack 
~--------------~--------~~--~~~~~~~~-----3, • tag' i ITI'I_ • - ..... - . "=n- ". "=,"'''"' re· = .. 
el1n'~~ .:!:;H:~ State 1.n Theor:r and Pract1q:-!, p.130. Cf. Strachey, Tl111 rry,-",o"':)~ 
-'-:-'r'~' J~cti.ceof SOCialism, '()!).152T3 • . The First Editorial of the Socif.l.l ist 
tt!) -- .., ----
'-.:,."I"'11erasserte1."Democracy and Der'loc!'9.tlc ml':lthods fail to resolve the. ~ontradictions of Capi ta11sIl1; .they cease' to serve the purposes of a dominant 
lass, conSCi011'3 that its ;zrip is enda~eredt and the~' are swert on one side." 
Stranhe:r , Men~ce of Ff:\,sc:tsm; ::;.136. 
~. J r.135: 'Cf: His 'defiriition of Fascism as "one of the metho0.s whj.ch May 
G·ado~ted by the ca~italist class when the threat of the working class to the 
stabilitv of monoDol~r caD:i..talism becomes acute." The Comin~ St:t''\.1.~.",:le fo't' Pm'ret n "61 "" .... .; ... t_ - - u -. .. 
.... :-. . 
taski, Thl?, St?te in Tl"H?o!.','.'~n.0. l'r¥!t; ~e, 11.131. 
'See Note 3. 
ha.d been brazen and undiluted whereas in Britain the capitalist 
encroachment on democratic rights had taken more subtle fonns. The 
Tra.de Disputes Act of. 1927 - "the first legislation hostile to the 
tra.de unions •••• since the Canbination Acts of 1799" (36) as aski 
ca.lled it, the constitutional outrages signified by the Widespread 
uSe of Orders-in-Council, the famous "agreement to differ" and rule 
in the teeth of public opinion were, to the Left, all proof of the 
underlYing Fascist nature of the National Government. (37) Behind the 
Government hovered the financiers, the real rulers of society. As Sir 
3~tord Cripps said of 1931, it had proved to be "the clearest 
d~ . 
anstration of the power of capitalism to overthrow a popularly 
el ~'. . 
ected Government by extra-Parliamentary means." (38) 
To the Left in the 'Thirties Fascism was the reaction of capitalism 
to the econanic demands of democracy. The question which arose tran this 
'N . 
. a.s. What would the British Capitalists do if once again faced with a 
Soc' . 
:.alJ.st Governnent? It was possible that the ruling class would 
peacefully accede to "the erosion of capitalist democracy by its own consent"(39) 
b~t th e preponderence of military strength possessed by them led Laski to 
ConClUde that, 
"A class which controls the power of the state will 
not surrender it it surrender invOlves the abdication 
of its privileges. It will reform when it must if 
refonn does not mean the destruction ot what it regards 
as essential •••• On any other terms, a rule class will 
tight •••• It, particularly, the conflict emerges in that 
special form of society we call capitalist democracy, I . 
believe that the hoJders of econanic power will seek to' 
suppress the democratio system if this, in its operation, 
interferes with the foundations of capitalism." (40) 
~-----------------------------------------------------36. 
37. 
38. 
39. 
~. 
~.' ." ~<~~ 
La.ski, Democracy in Crisis, p.15. 
See Note 4. 
Sir R.S. Cripps, "Can Socialism Cane by Constitutional Methods?" 
in C. Addison, et. al., "Problems of a Socialist Goverrunent" 
(London: Victor Go11anczi 1933), pp. 35/66 (38). Hereafter 
Cited as Can Socia1isn Cane •• ? 
Laski, Democracy in Crisis, p.84. 
taski, The State in Theo~ and Practice. p.316. 
i05. 
Stra.chey, too, believed that "an attempt by the :British eove"t'nins class to 
a.bOlish deT'1ocratic forms of Goverm"lcnt and establish a ngk~d dictatorship on 
FasCist lines is inevitable."(41) Unlikp. Lasld, howe'Ter, who was at times 
:pesSim:l.stic about the f13,te of the British 'V'To!"kin,3-cll3s':!, Str"'.cbey h8.d no douht 
that the workers' would ''lin. (42) ll.t the heart of this int~"",:,retnt1.on of 
B""t, 
-.1 lah society hW the belief that the di ffere"'c~q be"bveen the variou.s 
POlitics1 !1arties were fU.ndal'lental differences. 
't'ise of or,$8.nised Labour: 
As Laski char:J.cteriseC! the 
"For the first 'time in British history since the 
PQ"t'itan Rebellion parties confronted one another 
with res:pective ways of life which looked to wholly 
antithetic ends. Between a capitalism which sought 
to rr~s~rve the motive of rrivate profit as the 
keystone of the e."t'Ch, and did not propose to allow 
the es<:!enti"tl SO~l.rces of economic p()~er to rass from 
!1riv'lte o'l'rnershi" and a socialism wh:ich a.enied the 
validity of either I'remise, it di,d not a:,pe3.r that 
there was the possibility of a new compromise. 
Chan~es of covernment, in s1J.ch a perspective, would 
mean u!l0n each occasion a constitutional revolution ••• "(43) 
The broad view about the· comin~ stru.zgle fo"t' ,O\ver prod'L1.ced a dual, almost 
Ill1ltually contrnd1.ctory view, about the role, function and pur::;ose of the Laboll.r 
, . 
On the one hand it was frerJ,1.1ently assumed and often stated that the 
tabo ' 
l.tt' Party was fully corr.mitted to the reconstruction of s0ciet~r. "The Labour 
" . 
Pa'!"br," -ote 
y "... Sir Stafford Crip1's, "is not now concerned so much with some 
Dfl.:!:'ticUb.:r orientation of ca,i talist society as with the chan,$e from CI'!,:pi talis-m 
t ' 
Cl SOCialism. "(44) Yet it was also just as often rec00nised the,t t'!1.e Labour 
P3.!'ty did not match up to the ideal Socialist Party that menbers of the SociA-list 
'----------------------------------------------------41. ~trachey, HeM."~e of Fascism, 1'.255;" Cf., L~ski, Democracy in Cr;si.s, p.256, 
the first .consel1llenca.of revolution ••••• would be in fact a. dictatorship of 
the middle class·in kind, tho1..l.Sh not in form, akin to that of the new Italy." 
Stra.chey, Uenace of Fascism, p.255. 
Cripps, Cq~ Socialism Come? r.36. 
Le~~e envisazed. In '9,rtic~11ar the Left-Win= inte1l8ctnals of the 'Thi riies 
VJere convinced of thFl inade1uacy of the polic;:.' followed by the IJ!?bo".1.r Pert:r • 
They believer! i +, to be ~f)n~-hea(ted in its insi.!'ltence on dist5.n~11i~11:i.n:; between 
democ!'!?.cy anti dictatorship rather than bet"('leen Capitalism and SocialisH)" antl 
secta.rian in its refusal to p9.rticipate as a party in a broad !'olitica1 u.nited 
front a:;ainst Fascism and its allies, at home and abro~d. If democr~cy was 
not allo'"ed to work by the Cari ta1ists, it was ar~tled, then the resort to 
dictatorship was a necessa'ry if unralatable t'lethod of sec').rin:; workin:; cl[:l..s8 
The Labour Party's belief in democracy wa.s, in fact, a refusal to face 
\ 
the fact thc,t capitalist d.e:nocrq,cies were effect'1al dictatorships of the rulin:s 
Cle.sses , or as John Strachey put it, "dictatorships of tl-Je whole pro1,Jerty o'7ni~ 
Moreover, tho. Left were particulr\.rly 
<!l'itica1 of the Labour Party's cp-,.te ble.nch,2,. condemnations of all dictatorships. 
'this 
. cender.mation to Strachey, for exa,"-p1e, "im:;:lies that the :;:resent leaders 
Of th9 Labo\tr Paxty mru<e n~ distinction in their opposition to the German Fasoist 
di 
ctato::':'shi:::> of 11i tler ••••• and. the 'Wo:>:.>kers t dictato1::'shi!, of Soviet R1),s~ia. The:r 
are not interested. :i.n the fact that Hitler's dictatorship has as its ••••• object 
the m' . 
. ·"l.1.ntenanc~ of Caritalisrl and the S1.1:;:,re9sion of ever:: forD. of '.'iorkinz-
Cl .' 
a.Zs or::;8.ni93tion, ';"Tllile th0 YTork0rs' dictatorshiIJ in Ruesia has as its ohject 
t'h 
·.e Sl.\;?pression of Ca::;,i talisI'l and. the !!la:i.!:!ter~.nce and. <'tevelornent of wor1dn,;;:-olass 
Labou..r's 1:ostili t:' to s'.lch a l,-rarxist inte:rpr~t;;+'ion of histo~~ .. 
~---------------------------------------------------~5. 
46, 
47. 1b,\i., !'. 250. 
.. ~ ... -
St~.C:h a. st"n~9 W8.'1 l~nfcr,:t'T?_"l~ in th-:> 8~r09 0f' -/:1,,,,, Tc O !""':; ',h'") '::::"":.0"",1 J;)" 
:re:~Y'1"ld t'1e Sovi~t TT'1i.o'1 ."\'1 tlr0 r")t'1':' :'0dti'TC 9,,:':'.."':,10 of: :::::'?')t~_~.,., ~01J;['1i8~ 
in the \'!~rld. (48) In 1931 L88::i wrote that "thr.>Y'''l has 'l)0'?n more C'p.0lis:;,tion 
of De!'so'1J'.lit:, under the SOlei-et re,:im') t l l:ln in an:' ~o~;:':l,,,..gh"!_(' ~;:o~h in h-t:"to""':,' 0 
(If) the metho1 of e~"':'o.ssioJ::l blS br.>en diffl'."re'1t, it r-as not bA9n less ro.'l1. 't(~9) 
St:ra,cheyo t ..3 t.'h S ; t r, t' ~ t t ; ¥, 00, ::;>ra1.so.'t ~_,e 0'1_0: --"overnr:!0n s e.~Y?.nCC!,1(~!1 owarrts .:;en"._ '10. 
"bec811.se the Rnssir.>.n G0ver'.'l!"ent, which h~,s re31ised 
fo"':' the R'Pssi0n 'Wory:eJ"s one h1.m(!:rt>"! ti"'.0S 8,,9 r1','.ch 
democr:lcy a!'1.d libert:" in the sense of 're~l o!'rort-
u.nities for self-development, ednc'1tiol1 and a:lvance- . 
!"lent, !?S an::,' Ca;:ite.list der:lOcr<v:::' has ever dre9.!'lt of, 
has the fr'-'l.nkness to ::v:lnit tl:1'J.t it is, anel r.rnst be . 
until all class distinctions have dts~rreared, a 
dictatorsh.ip oyer the rcpai.ni~ Ca::italist elements, 
the British Labour lea1.ers class it with the 
Govert"Jrlents of the Fascist terror. "(50) 
!Q 'J'h ~f)J":t '9.,'1~ P:>-",.-.t5 ce of' SOIJ:l'll-1,'?!T" St~p.che~r cle.i.meC\. that the d'tctators"dr 
Of '. .. . 
the J;'"l'.'01etariat '\"Tas by d9finition a di0tatorshir of t':.c majority ~.!'ld in the 
inte~ests of the r.1ajorHy a,:ainst the de"1l1Cre,cy of t!1e fe'!! "rhic'1 Ca;:i talj.st 
~e-'ll()cr8,c'r t d 
" re:,'!'esen e • 
"(that ".'1hie!1) the s!,okesmen ofce.rit'llisb call'democracJ, 
!!lea.l1S the effective subje'Jtion of tl:e mass of the po:::m.lation 
to a s1"'9,11minority, w!1ilst what cOmrlunists and Meie,lists 
09,11 dictators'l11, me~ns th3 sl}bjeetlon of a small a.'!d ever-
dwindlin.:; minority to the ~reat majority of the porul~tion -
",hieh is itself democr'aticaU:r or~anised. "(51) 
lly "0'" ... 
. "mocratical1~r or,3a!lised" Strachey meant oT,:anised alon,:; th8 de"'loeratic 
~-----------------"-'-'------------------------------------------
49. 
50. 
5, • 
'" Not only the ,"Left" either. The vir,>':'T '.'Tas commonl~' held throuehout the 
decM.e _ few '!!ere ?re?ared. to be disi'ilnsioned' or sophisticated. See 
P90tnote 3 above. 
'A. Lenin:rad Letter' Th9 N!'>.t.i"", (Ne'.', York) 25 Jnly 1934, ~.101. 
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centra1ist lines of the C.P.S.U. by which the "advanced guard of the working-
class" (usually middle-class intellectuals like Strachey) would "guide" the 
lna.ss of the population .. according to the principles of "scientific socialism" 
~raUgh Which instilled, unspoken and often unrecognised features of 
unregenera te capitalism could be purged fran the minds of the unenlightened 
ln
i j aritY.(52) Clearly, therefore, it was argued, 
"there is an essential difference between dictatorships 
of the right a.nd~bf. the left, not so much in their fonn 
as in the class objective which underlies them. Fascism 
is designed to give the maximum of econanic advantage to 
the middle-classes •••• Canmunism, on the other hand, is 
based on the dictatorship of the proletariat and is 
prepared to crush the upper and middle classes alike." (53) 
Such jistinctions naturally allowed the Left to view the So.viet Union 
,- in" "" , ". 
a rather rosy light. Strachey's earlier comments have been noted but his 
a.sserti 
on that the adoption of the 1936 Constitution, which included such 
li.beral. features as the geographical franchise was indicative of a successful 
oancl . " 
Us:Lon to the class struggle in th~oviet Union was in fact indicative of 
the . "" 
extent to which the Left was prepared to take its Russophi1ia.(54) Laski 
wa.s t 
00 liberal to go all the way to becaning a mere apologist for the Soviet 
~~ . 
g e, and -unlike D.N. Pritt, for example, was not prepared to defend the 
C . 
QrJnunists at all costs but like G.D.H. Cole his feme of reference was adroitly .. 
~~ ~) so as to avoid faoing, or in order to pervert, the political facts of 1if~~~ 
'-----------------------------------------------------------52. 
See, for example, Strachey, What are we to do?" op.cit., In the Caning 
§!ruggle for Power Strachey discussed the potential for a revolutionar,y 
Canmunist movement in Great Britain. Chapter XX. 
Sir Staftord Oripps Preface to Addison, et. al. , "Problems of a Socialist 
". G-overnment" gp.cit., pp. 8/9, hereafter cited as Preface. Cf. E.F. Wise 
"A. Socialist Revo1utionar,y policy" New Clarion, 13 May 1933 and G.D.H. ". 
Cole "Notes on Danocracy and Dictatorship" The Highwa;x:, (November ,1933) , 
Pp. 2/5. 
Strachey, The Theory and Practice of Socialism, pp. 148/9; 
55. S 
ee Note 5. 
The ess~mce of the Left's criticism of the T,9,bour Party was its refusal 
to l'eco.:::=nise the COl!lTYlon str1.1.2cle tl1at existerl betwl'len antl-CapibJ.ist ero1J.l'S 
SllCh M itself, the LL.P. and t!1e CO!'ll!lunist P81'ty. The inevi ta'bili"bJ of 
.P1?,SC i "',. t 
'" resronse and the ,oliticr.l ~"nd. econoMic oprression and miser:,r that would 
\ 
be Consequences of Fascist rule were immediate problems which the Left considered 
2h011.1cl be faced by the Labour Party. The Pa.rty should, they argued, be 
T,il'epaJ'.'ed to fi,:ht FascisJ!l whereve"t' and whenever it appeared. The possi.bility 
ot' a peaceful transition to Socialisr1 was 1:"'.1led out b:r all but the most optim-
istic on the Left, w~ich. incidentally, included, on occasions, Laski. 
The intellect'J.al wea.l{nesses of the Left "'Tere well l!let by the publication 
in 1940 of E.F.M. Durbin's book The P01Hics of T}ernooratic SMiRlisTll.(56) Tlle 
r Weakness of the Left' s ap:)J~o!',ch as it was see:} by the Labour Party as a whole, 
ho",e'V'or 
- , was centred on political issues whi.ch. it raised. The most important 
Of th.ese was the "Democracy-v-Dictatorship" deQate which sha.ll be examiner!. 1.0 
Zl'eat det ail. The ot~e1:" iss'J.es th3t arose W8re in fact, off-shoots of this. 
The United Front and the I],uestion of th~ 
affiliation of the CO!'1!'11mist Par"b; vrere de~l t with a,s parts of the broad spect:r.'l1ID 
Of df:'\mocracy and dictatorship upon which. notwi thste,ndin~ the continuation of 
the "United Front" issue to the eve of the Second World War, there 'vas general 
a.'!1'gel"'ent on th'3 issue in the first half of the decade. 
Many of the internal problems whi.c':1 arose within the Labour Party vrere 
d . 
el'i'V'ed. from the alle,zed "S'\VinC- to the Left" which occured at the 1932 TJabour 
~ ~J Anml.al Conference and which was summarised in the Trevelyan resolution . 
'?7htOh stated, 
'------------------------------------------------------------------
S.F.M. Durbin,Tbe Po'~.tt("g of D~~OC1"3ti(" S()ci.~,'ism (London: Routledee & 
Kegan Pan!, 1940). 
, 'j 
"that the 1eade:!:' of t~e next Le.bou!." GovG:r-n'11 p nt 8nd t'he 
P.L.P. be instructed by the Natj.ona1 Conference th?t on 
essumine office, either Vlith or without powe:r-, definite 
Socialist 1E'~is1atirm must be jmrned5.9.tely !!roJ111l1~,.:nt')0, 
and that t'1.9 Pe,rty shall stand or fall in, t~f'! HO'."'..'3e of 
Commo'1"l on the rrinci,les in which it has faith."(57) 
This resol~ti~~: -to~eth~r with a nnmb~"t' of oth('!rs, p-nd the revo11.1tion~r~.' tone 
of Trevelyan' s s::,eech, were generally ta!::en to st~nif:r Sl1CC9c;S for the newly 
l' . 
o:t'Jned Socifl.1ist Lea~e whi.ch WC-!'l cre:?ted by and includ.ed most of the Left-
Win3 intellectuals. (58) Th0 r8so1ution, how~ver, was so broadly stated that 
it . 
could be ta:::en to mean al1ythir-3, even thou:h in his speech to the Conference 
TreV'<>l ~ yan suPl)Orted by Att1ee, s::;,oke in t;,.u9.si-:r-evolutionaT"'J terms. Attlee, 
fOr it' ns ance, implicitly rejectin.:; er:J.dualism, state(l that 
"we are bO"tmd in dllty to tlJ.ose v/horn we represent to tell 
them (),'lite clearly that tlley call11ot ~et Socialist wi tl:.-
01).t t ears, that w11enever we trtJ to do a~TthinJ we will 
be op::?osedby everJ vested interest, fimmcial, rolitic3.1 
and social, and I think we h1.ve eot to fe.ce th~ fact tl-Jat, 
eve'1 if we are retu."!.':J.ed with a majority we shf:1.11 h~v8 to 
fi~ht all the '!Tf-!;Y, th9.t we shall have a!l0th"'l)" crisis at 
once and that we have to ho..ve I). tho'l.:ht-O~lt r1an to de'11 
with tho..t crisis. "(59) 
At t}, 
"e broarl~st level Attlee t s speech could be re3~rded e.s 11 rhctoric",l v,,!"'r'!=d.on 
Of t}, .' . . 
. e 'lntAlle0tn~l 8.'13.1ysis yet, in f9.ct, ':v"1ilst Trevel:ra'1 e.nrl AHlee 1'l~r have 
rn~ent. th ' 
• u .J~ revolution in the violent sense the EJ-rec1Jtive me3.nt s0methi~ enti:rely 
i. 
Elx~ctly what the Executive did m3".!1. w?s made clear in its atti tll-1.e to the 
l.t.p. which had e<>.,rlier in the :re::tr DOoen ex::e11ed fr0!1 -I::~e IJe.bonr P~:r-t:r 
'-------------------------------~------------------------------
~: . '-'-' . 
. . . 
See UCt0 6. 
3Jl- ' 
"He had gathered that the I.L.P. believed that 
ultmately the transition frcm Capitalism to 
Socialism would be made not through Parliament 
but by a direct struggle for power between the 
working-class and the possessing class. Did 
this mean that the I.L.P. stood for socialism 
by revolution?1f (60) 
The same question with the :implications it had in favour of Parliamentar.,y 
Democracy may well have been asked of the Socialist League. 
This is hardly surprising for those within the I.L.P. led by Frank 
Wise, Who had recognised that to leave the Labour Party would have meant 
an ineffective existence for the I.L.P. as a whole, instigated a virtual 
take-over bid for the S.S.I.P. to fonn the Socialist League. Henoe the 
stance adopted by the Socialist League was akin to the views of the I.L.P. 
and ' 
the ideological unity between them was substantial. ,The only real 
dif' . 
terence between the I.L.P. and the Socialist League was that the latter 
l'~ ° 
aJ.ned inside the Labour Party registering at the 1932 Conference a number 
ot apparent Buccesses against the Executive and creating the :impression 
that the Party was far more~adical than in fact it was. (61) 
It is not frequently appreciated, however, that the reason for the 
SUCcess of the Socialist League at the 1932 Conference was the broad 
agl'e~ent throughout the Party that the 1931 Crisis had been manufactured 
by fO . 
J.nancial· circles and that the National Government was the. direct 
Pl'oduct of a "Bankers' Ramp" and the fact that sane of the larger trade 
~ons had supported definite Socialist measures. (62) The divergence 
that 
arose between the Executive and the Socialist League derived tran the 
la.tter's insistenoe on antioipating trouble upon the 
~.------------------~-----------------------------------------60. 
61. 
McNair, op.oit., p.210 
"Labour swept by Socialist wave" ,Forward (Glasgow), 6 October 1932. 
Ct., "the bulk of the Labour Party appeared to be frankly hostile to 
anything short of a clear-cut Socialist revolution." H. Pelling 
~erica and the British Left: Fron Bright to Bevan (London:A. & C. 
Black, 1956), p.139. 
The confusion might well have been exaoerbated by the fact that 
Laski was entrusted by the N.E.C. to write the Draft Manifesto for 
the 1931 Election. 'N.E.C. Minutes 60, E.C.14, 1930/1, M.500. 
5 October 1931. 
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election of a future Labour Government and the for.mer's recognition that 
the "Bankers' Ramp" explanation was not an infallible one. The differences 
were aggravated by conflicts of personality between Bevin and Cripps but at 
the heart of the conflict l~ in the analysis of society and the interpretation 
of events derived fran the analyses made. The broad principles of the 
Left-Wing approachbave already been mentioned, and an examination of the 
iSSue of the specific rol~ of Parliamentary institutions will follow 
shortly, but what must also be· understood are the broad principles that 
- . 
underlay the Bevin, Citrine and Morrisonian approach to politics in general. 
Unlike the Left the Trade Union dominated Executive approached 
Politics fran an empirical rather than an ideological point of view. Even 
r John Strachey wr~te ~ 19.32 "The present leaders of the Labour Party and 
the Trades Union Movement are •••• just as ignorant of, and hostile to, the 
SCience of social changes as were their predecessors." (6.3)' Thus 
notwiths tanding the early 'myth' of a Bankers' Ramp, the general 
interpretation made of the 19.31 Crisis was that it represented a set-back 
:in the inevitable progress towards Socialism rather than the collapse of 
democracy •. Moreover, whereas the Left spoke of the inccmpatibility of 
SOCialism and Capitalist Democracy Bevin, for example, concentrated on the 
need for "intense and co~tinuous educational work'.' designed to prcmote "the 
SPread of knowledge in every possible w~ in order to get the principles of 
SOCialism more deeply rooted in the hearts of the people •••• " (64) - ~ aim 
Which t though often professed by Cripps and the Socialist League was often 
denied by their self-professing intellectual superiority.(65) 
'---~---------------------------------------------------------------63. 
64. 
65. 
J. Strachey, Theory and Practice of Socialism, p.447 •. 
Quoted by Bullock, or.cit., p.SO.3.·· 
See, for example, John Strachey's designation of British Socialism 
as "so intellectually inferior to the main body. of Socialist 
thought that it is difficult for me to admit that it is British 
Socialism." What are we to do? p. 70. 
Jl3 
Above all, Bevin and the "Labourite" section of the Party 
Continued to profess their belief in the efficacy of Parliamentary 
democracy, and its fundamental value to the Labour Movement. At the 
1932 Conference Hend~rson stated specifically, 
"that nothing has happened either to the Party 
or our own electoral position to warrant any 
scrapping of our programme or policy or the 
revolutionising of our methods •••• Political 
d~nocracy is not to blame for either government 
or parliamentary failures." (66) 
Eenderson was particularly critical of those elements who blamed Parliamentary 
democracy for the failure of the Labour Government and who despised 
COnstitutional methods as a result. 
n(They) do not tell us exactly what they have in 
mind or want the Labour Party to do. Political 
democracy - the principles upon which the Labour 
Party has been built and developed - is today •••• 
being attacked by determined and resolute enemies. 
It is being prejudiced, weakened and undermined in 
our own country. That is a challengedwhich we must 
be prepared to meet fran Whatever quarter it may 
ccme for democracy is a cardinal principle of the 
Socialist faith and democracy is an essential 
condition of the successful accomplishment of 
Socialism. tt (67) 
It was this belief in the essential primacy of democracy that separated 
the Executive fran the Left during the Thirties. By "Democracy" was meant the 
aChievement of Sociali~ by Pa~liamentary means and the underlying assumption 
that thi s was both possible and desirable. There is little doubt that this 
bel' . 
lef derived fran the life experiences of Henderson, Bevin and their 
COlleagues, which they had appreciated during their own life-times. The~ 
oWn ' 
rise to success and leadership and the constant negotiating battles they 
ha.d c . .. 
, onvJ.nced them that politics was the practical art of the possible rather than 
----------------------------------------------------------------------66. 
67 .. 
b..P.A.C.R. 1932, p.166 •.. See Note 7. 
1.P.A.C.R. 1932, p. 166. Cf. The Labour and Socialist International. 
"Democracy can only be defended effectively· as it develops fran 
Political Democracy to Social Democracy" L.P.A.C.R. 1933, Appendix 
X, pp. 279/287 (284). 
the . t 1.n ellect'1al science of the cert8.in. (68) Not the leq.st of the qualities 
Valued by the I,abour lee,dershi:p ":Vas that of loyal t~r to collective decisi.ons 
and the wi11inO'ness to cO"1'Jromise. 
~ - On both accounts they h8.d cl"l-shed '.'Ti th 
the Left' s predecesso;~ in the Minori tv Movement and were iust as ad8JTlCnt in 
~ v 
their dete:rTliM,tion to o,rercone the :pretentions of the nC71er Left. 
Moreove:!:', because they neither shared the same ideo10.:;ical rremises p,s 
the Left nor re.:qrd.ed P'\:!:'J.i[>J'lenta~: denoc:!:'?c:' as the tool of Ca~)i talism, the 
E:<:ecu.tivc 1 t d d t vi th tlU' t d ~- t" and th S . tu· . R. so en e 0 9W ,.9 m .. e .!;'.LVn e OV1.9 ,n10n 1."1 a 
different l' J.ght. It naturally followed from their insistence in the a'bso1ute 
'l]'8,11.1e of deeocracy'and the rractical natu:re of politics that they would condemn 
di 
ctatorshi, in any form and that their attitude to the United Front and the 
SOVit:>t U' fit 
r .,. nJ.on would be governed by this and by their eXllerience 0 comcrun s 
t9.Ctics on International bodies. The~r denounced the Communist Party as the 
tOOl of th~ Communist Intern9.tional, as a body which did not believe in the 
S1..'lle deP.locr'3.tic rrinciples as the :Brittsh LabOL1.r Moveme':lt, and as an hypocritical 
Cl'01.1..'O wh1.·ch. bt t -~fili t t th L bp....· d t b rt d 
- 901.10 • 0 tu. '1 ~ 0 • e a our ~ .. r.:...,y 1.n or er 0 8'..1 .. vs an 
di.sl'\;l!;lt it, and subject the international Communism dirl~cted from l'itosoo'.v. As 
fOr thQ 
,-- "Un;tted. Front" that was a transparent tactic desi:;n9d to divide and 
\'1 . 
eaken the exi st inz Unit e0. LabO"t.tr Movement of Labou.~ Part~r, Trade Unj.ons and 
CO"oDeratives; s11ch a "Union" would be both artificial and disastrous, servinz 
Only to d1.··....t .. de tl'" t h d b th . G h th C ni"'t V.L. 19 l,"ovemen as a sen e case J.n ermany w erl') . e omnu Q 
~al'ty, under t!:le direction of the COJ:1TI\unist International, had fat~.lly weakened 
th~ .. 
. " vrorll:inZ-class movement, 1. e., the 80cia1 Democrats, b:' their unrestrained' 
hO~tilit:r in the vital perio~_ immediatel;' rrior to Hitle~ts accession to power.· 
Th.~ ~?m)arison between the intell~ct~.1al an.'11ysis of the British sitnation and 
thQ· f -~ Drac.tic~J. s,J.!:'erin..: "''!.nde!'~one b:r the cf'lutiu'3ntal T:!:''1dEl Uni.on collea31les 0 
'--------------------------------------------------------------------
68 
• noy Jcnkins !'takes this roj.nt, Je!'lkins on.d.t.:--.67 • 
31.5 
"At t 1'8 I'3.b'::cr~~ p".~t~r C!",r)-P",",:,~"1~8 r:-P 1933 "'r':(')~ t"'~,:"~~-l-;4""~ 
of th~ ".'.'1i.t01 f~~'1t t sho'.ll:!. ",:;h<'>('I:"0ti.0')JJ:r h:1'T", ~0;:"1", l'!', 
i-l; :!'''l0~i1To1 "l0 ,.,,.,"1 "li.1 ""'''J.t-t''l''1 ••• ~ .th1.s "m~ rot be~ew:1'"! 
C0~J::t re-P0:!""'\i~+' 1 ~~"!~:,:",,, h!1.1. st::-."'!-;:<>rt 0"t ? :':"?'1~~-3.Y)0.-fi1e 
~0v')1t. '!":1P.y h9.1. no ne80.. to~ th(' 0.910,3",+":'8 '1:"1.1. hal 80 
1!'.r:e r> .. bell:" f".ll ('If C')-~,,~t~t ta,?+'~ cs that +''''cey 00n11 
no+., for h0'.-r"!Y0J:' j"st !1, C'l"~0, ?88CC;n,t? ~·rjtl) t'l:~;".1f(70) 
T11!'! strol'':'9st St~t"l'l0Y)t of I!!b!)'l:r' '3 -.,ositi.on ''Tas r~''1de in ~::d t:i"l', I,Clh...,',,,:, 
""" -
'rIo",'t' 
'" '>, 1.on. 
"~():1 its h8.:;:in!1i!1.'::: the :Briti '3" I,::.bonr ~,!o'r0I'\e~t has be0n 
b?.s~d (m de1"'.ocr'ltic prindI11Gs ••••• Its l'olicy, born of 
it'3 O';7~ tl'-o'.'!.:ht and e':;:,erie!1ce h:ls been arriYed 9.t b~r 
fr~e ::tisc'X3sion, nntr~melled b~r ?:'efe:>:'Emce for derter!"1-
in'ltion 0::: dec1sion to Ot},~:::- less de~ocrS'.tic bodies 
eithc't' ~,t hom"l or abroe.1. "(72) 
tt~l!'~' R>lssian Revol,,_tio!:1. 't>78.s ••••• the in0yi table r8':'.~t:ion 
B,3ainst Cz?<rist ty~~mn~; and t~e horro!.' of "'Te.r ••••• the. 
s:rn::!ltlcet1c intc:rest (of tb~ Eritis'1 I,abou:r. l.'.ovement) in 
Soviet ec()nom~"c 8,dv~nce hag been TJ.ali,fied. by .r::rowin.:; 
rgsentl'!':'nt a,:(:!.inst Russian effort th't'ou,:::h the Communist 
Int~r!11.-!::iane.1 to establish and finance rev0lutionaJ."'lJ 
Cou).T:lunist Parties in oth'3r countries with the object of 
destro:ri~ existin.: de~ocratic indu'3-!:::rtal~.r:.(l, rolitical 
L~hou.!.' HOV8!!1e:1ts, and of hrin~i!1': abo'.lt the overthrmv 
of the existin,:; social s~r~tem by violence. "(73) 
After 9,tta~k1.n,3 t~e COr:ln1'Joi st International's failure to a?::?recb"te 
I, "~!':,rin..:; national tr?ditions and circu.!!1stances" the dOC~'J'1cnt stated the IJab01.U' 
Pe~tJ's e~.~i~,.~~oJ_ 
_ _._,... faith in ParlieX!entar;,' and. De!'1ocratic Soci.alism. 
~----------------------------------------------------------------------
71. 
72. 
73. 
CUrine, Mon f'.nd Wortc, ::I. 253/ 4~ 
R. Post"'ate, "A Criti"u9 of COT'L"!Junist Teo~ni'1'.les" Atb.'1ti.c,Hrwrthl:~. 32, '. 
( July,~1934 )::?~.281/8. 
1,..P.LCR. 1~36, A;pendix IX, ".296/200. 
, ...... > 
11:r\£.., . r. 296. 
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"The British Labour Movement fran its own history, 
its own knowledge, and its own common sense, realises 
now, as ever, than an instructed and convinced 
democracy, loyal to its principles and inflexible in 
its determination, can shape and adapt the State to 
its democratic Socialist purpose •••• In Britain 
Labour's case requires neither conspiracies nor 
foreign subventions. Its strength lies in its clear 
appeal to the masses and the steady support they give 
to its open agitation for social change,." (74) 
Recalling previous attacks by the Communist Party on the British Labour 
},fo'Vement th .,. 
, e ~xecutive detailed the Canmunist attempts to disrupt the Labour 
},fo'Vement, through such organisations as the Minority Movement and latterly 
thr 
ough the United Front. The purpose of the United Front was clearly to 
su.b'· . 
Ject the British Labour Movement to the dictation of the Russian Government. (75) 
, S . 
l.l.ch a course would be disastrous for the British Labour Movement and consequently 
th E ; < 
r "e, xecutive said that the British labour Movement "will not attempt to achieve 
a apuri~us unity with those who hold principles so canpletely irreconcilable 
~ith Labour and who have no faith in democracy."(76) Underlying this attitude 
wa.s the recognition of the political insignificance and weakness of the 
C ' 
ommunist Party of Great Britain. The Labour Party was the party of the 
WOl'k' .. 
. lng-class in Great Bri tainj to broaden its base would serve no useful 
POlitiCal purpose and could bring only internal and external trouble.(77) 
Despi te individual differences fron year to year the' general underlying 
att' ' - . 
J.tude to the United Front remained constant.· Underlying it were not only 
tun . 
damental cleavages over Parliamentary Democracy but also over the concept of 
'--------------------------------------------------------------74. 
.Th:iA,., p. 297. 
75 •. Ibid. ,pp. 299/300.' Cf., Herbert Morrison at the 1933 Annual Conference, 
quoting Stalin's statement that "the. United Front tactics were set up by 
Lenin in order to make it easier for millions of workers in capitalist 
Countries who are intected by the prejudices of Social Democratic 
opportunism to cane over to Canmunism." L.P.A.C.R. 1 , p.145. See also 
.the Canmunist Solar System (London: Labour Party, 1933 • . 
76. kp.A.C.R. 1936, p.300; The N.E.C. had reiterated the view that "the . 
fundamental differences between the democratio policy and practice of the 
tabour Party and the policy of dictatorship which the Canmunist Party had 
been created to pranote _s irreconoilable." ~., p.Sl. 
77. Se~ Note 8. 
r 
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To th~ Executive loyalty was esse'1tieJ.ly collecti.v~, ';r'1"!:>,ee,q the 
indivtd11al to dissent from wrclYlc-heA.ded policies was of prif'\f\:r:' 1.m.port9.!1ce. 
'!he Executive viewed the Party as a Trade Union Party operatin.:: on Trade Union 
]')1" 
.. lMiples ani acce::,tinz, above all, the resp-:msihility of collective Mtion. (18) 
A.s E:rnest B • t t G D' IT C 1 enn once wro ~ 0 • .'].. 0 e, 
"YO'l see the difference between the intellectllals 1)'11. 
the trade nnions is this: You have no res:;;,onsibilit;r, 
you can fly off at A. b.n,;;ent as the wind takes you. 
We, how'ever, must be cons1 stent and we have a ~re3.t 
amount of responsibility. We ce.nnot eat up in the 
mornir1,3 n.n1 Cet q, brain wave, when father says 'turn' 
and half-n.-million I'eople turn autoMatically. That 
does not work."(19) 
J3evin, for whom "the a'lt'!1entici ty w'i th YThich he represented and e'llbodied 
in his own p'?rson the character and convictions of the En~lish workinc;-cla,'38es, 
D1'ej'\d.i.ce~ and 13.11"(80) still held a fascin·'ltion for the Left, commenteil. at the 
A . 
nn.ua.l Conference of 1934, "If oreanised Labour in the tre.de union sense has 
tt'usted Us destiny to this Party, this Part~r has no ri.:;ht to allo".'T ~m individual 
ll1erJ.bex- to' fiirt with that res;,onsibili ty. ,,( 81 ) 
I 
At the Annnal Conference of the 
:t'Ollowin'" .,.,.. h id 
... yeC>.J. e sa , 
"The great crime of Ra"!1say MacDonald was that he 
never called in his Party and the crime of tpese 
::!e()ple is that they h:owe eone out, they have sown 
discord at the ver:: moment when candidates wanted 
unity to face an election."(82) 
Su.ch individuality was indicative of the intellect,7al's irresI'onsibility and 
lack of loyalty that ha.d, in :Bevin's view, produced the political crisis of 19)1. 
'-----------------------------------------------------------------------
78. 
79. 
80. 
8, . 
82 
• 
See Note 9. 
Bullock, op.cit., p.532. 
!bia., p.535. The New StatesT'l"1.n described him as Itmuch the bi~gest man the 
Trade Union movement has today - the only m2,n in it wh.o looks at ",,11 like 
a leader." 30 December 1933. 
L.p. ~.C.R. 12;1, 1'.140. 
L·P.A.C.R. 12~5, 1).180. 
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Ralrh Hilib8."ri h8.'3 :r.-emarked in r~s:r:'e0t of tl-:!e cl-Ja,...acte:r.-isation of the 
diffe't'~nt ~olit1.cal outlooks of Cri~,s and Bevin n.8 "intellp.ctual" end "T-ra/l.e 
Unionist" that 
nCrir~s had many ide<1.9, bl1t to c:1ll hi,m an intellntt1al 
doctrinnaire is to o~rerloo~c the fact tllat he was 
exceedingly weak on doctrine; nor was Btwin b:' fln,,! m':l~n8 
a,s c'!'assly em,irical as his own antitheses, then and 
later, were intended to StleCest. On the contra~r, Bevin 
in m~my ways, had a mnch mo:r-e orJanised theor,;r of t~e r-:>le 
of La'l)our than CrjI'rs •••• '.At the core of that the'):!'y lC'..Y 
the notion of institutionalised co-operation between the 
trad,e u.nions, manaceJTlent and the State, to be. r,u~~lem':,mt(>d 
b~r the rarlia.'llentar,;r pressure of th~ I,abour Part~r for 
leeislation beneficia.l to the working classes."(83) 
"In the absence of industrial militancy thl) atte..ck in. 
Parli9.ment falls flat, no matter ho\'1 eloquently it ma~,r 
be state1. Parlirunent is rarely the Dl!"ce whe!'e a 
political 'crisis o!'i~inatcs. It is the place where 
it finds final e~:r.essiol'1, in a fashion which enp.bles 
the Labour Movement to:) obtain th~ maxit!1.um advanta~e, 
both in the immediate results foJ.' the wo:rkers, and in 
the ultimate 'lnfJre:lsed political consciousness of the 
whole moveI'lent."(84) 
'Ihis is not to deny the vali(U t:' of l.1iliband t s ~.n9.1~!si9 w'lic!! is t:rue to the 
e'lctent that Bevin' s ideolo~j_cal framework VTas :reasonably well established. 
lio'l'l'eV'er the real point to note is that the frQ!l1ework itself ,ras the rroduct 
O¥ -~ Labol:rite e!J'1"iricisM nnd ."re;udice ra.ther t'l1an un.;J'T.'oved and un-:Jroval,le 
... .. IJ __ 
Cl, l\"'i ; • ~ asslw:;,tlon. As Bevin :rointedl:r askeri of G.D.H. Gale, "How' conIC!. anyone 
h . , 
aV'e follo~"ld you in 
The differ~nc"lSof ~0litic3l Q1'1al:Tsis 1:mri s00ial inte1?1"'et1.tlon '.'fere 
To t~e 
........... 
--------------------------------------------------------------
See Note 10 • 
. as. '& 
.lllock, n".~it., :,.531. 
r 
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~.lthOll"'h on this o' + 
"'-' ,I' 1'10, 
These b9,Slic differences in res:;?ect of the question of ParlicJlv'rtar;r reform 
ce;ml;; t "', 
o a he?,Q ,£"t the 1933 e,r..d. the 1934 Ar..nual Conferenneg '!Th"'!~"3 t'he :r-efC':t"'l of 
B:o"so 
" .. Of C0T:11110!"lS :;,:'roce1Yl.:re :::>.111 the t~ctics to be ad0:!?te0. 'by",. Lf?,bo11:>" G(we't'l"r'ient 
in. the event of deliber'~te s1.1,bY"'rsi0n by its enerrd.es vre1'e thro.shp,0. 01.lt !"nf1 
After this the continuinJ discussions over basic 
That the r:,nestion of Parli~tl!lentaT"J refor'TI, rei,n<.:!0, e.ny heat at 
9,11 wt),l3 A 
,.1.',e ,rtYl''0.:rHy to the atter11!ts b~! Sir Ste.fford Crip!,s,' to ,OL'1)18.ri,s9 the 
€!Cl!>ct· 
" 1.e opinions of lIe.rold Laski by rosin?, the unnecMsa:r:,r e,'11 deliberately 
D:-ro'loc~ti ( ) ~ 'le '111t>,sti0n "'Ce,n Socis,lis!'1 come by Consti tution:<"l Hethods?" 87 
'l'he notoriet:r att~.cb.ed to Cri.rr s ' lecblre "Can Socialism Come by ConstibJ.tiong,l 
~\teth d 
·0 s?tt 'Was derived from the recertton the lectl1.re received rather than the_ 
eave, which was, . in fact, a ,:ualified "yes!t(88) • 
. '----,--------~---------------------------------------86. ~. lio!.'J:'1.son ; "Soc:l8.1 Charve-Peac0f1.l1 o:r Violent?" Pol-tt't,2!J q"?,rt~"'ly. Vol. X, 
0.1., (Janl.la-r".!-U9.rcJ-l, 1939), p.8. SA'9 also Note 11. 
e 
7. See Footnote 38a.bove. 
"' .. 
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1'0' t 
. 1.n to rG!qe"lb8L' abo'.lt t'1.e l~cturl) is the fact that i t dealt wi. th two int0Y'-
"'MIst the latter P!lrl' of the lecture \'Ta'3 concerned. with chan[;cs in P~',""ll;l!!lenta:r.:.r 
llrocedur9 d e!'li~nc:i to make it r..o-re res,onsi VB to ~, po si ti ve enact!:lent of the 
electorate's mandate by the GovemT'lent. 
tn Cr:I.P1?s' ~.s"lertion that a reform0d H01-,,-se of COT'lT'1ons was eS8Gntial to the 
ef'fi~' t" 
, ~len imr1e"1ont'3.tion of a Sod alist societ:r. The st om of critlcisr.l 
8.!'OUsert by the lA.,l1ture la'.r. n~ !1P., .. S been notA~, "' .. at 1._'n th " h h 1 ¥ .~ __ -... <;-;''', . ,' 1 P r~(mC_1)S'Lons . e roac",!)'., 
but in the implication of some of the rer.1a'!'\::s he m'l.de and, in ?articular, in the 
com!'J.<>nt '~ > ~ s male by his col1ea~'ues in the Soci'llist LeaC"J9. . That this is 90 will 
been 
,,!'le clear shortly but it is imrortant to note that the b:lsis or Cri?ps' 
lectU1"Q ~. 
-"I an,j, indeed, much of t!1e substance of the second ::!~~ of the lecblre had 
b""n d 1: ~~ e :lVeL'ed 1.n 1932 as !la.rt of the Fabi9.o Society's autumn lectn:!'e r7'O~"'?,Jl'Ime 
With 1 t' . 
> () 1 even 89 r.rnc 11 as a COJnr.1ent. Evf'!t'l admittin2 th::,t the titlE'! b~d been the 
leas" ( ) 
" -t'!'Ovocati ve "PaL'lia.mentaI"J lnsti tution8 and the Transi tio!'} to Socialism," 89 
and makin~ c.lle allmvance fo:!' the scant reference to the Laski-ins:;(ired 1'rophe0i.es 
e,bl)ut Cf\:'italist .re9.ction to the adv0'1t of a Labour Government, the ree.ction to 
C't'i~",,,,, 1 ' .. " 
.'<;,'" ect'.tre was based on accidental or deliberate misre?resentation of a 
ca::t'ef 1 . 
u ly e;r.:::u.ed, if not carefully conceived, 1'll'!.n of action. 
~~ premises ttnderlyin,;! CripI's' lecture were S'3t out j,n the preface to the 
coll ' 
acted Socialist Lea~e lectt~res for 1933. The St8.te, it :nas claimed, was 
a.n instrtunent of class domin:1tion and its use by some class or classes would .. 
inevitably hrin~ f),bout r oli ttce.l, social and economic conflict wHh the class 
against whom it was to be used. ,~,The traditional method of ca::?i talist rule, 
thl.'ou"'h p . 
, '--' a:!.'liamentary democracy h!l,d in recent years collapsed with the> erowin3 
. ,. 
~--------~------~-----------------------------------------89. pp. 27/56, see also Footnote 22 above. 
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ineffioiency of democracy in face of the growing complexity of. society's 
economic life. The obstructive nature of parliamenta~ democracy had 
eXacerbated political,prob1ems whilst the mass democratic implications 
Which were derived from its theoretic~ premises had, in the search for 
efficiency, provoked a variety of dictatorships. These .imp1ications, of 
course, involved' a transfer of econemic power fran' the oapitalist to the 
working class which the ruling class of capitalists would resist. 1931 had 
praYed this. The result was the National Government which was in effeot, a 
"Parliamenta~ Dictatorship." (90) 
HaVing managed to drive the Labour Government from office in the past 
there was little doubt that the Capitalists would seek to repeat their 
sU.ccess in the future should a Labour Government be returned to office. Aa 
Cri PPs wrote, "a Socialist Party must be fully prepared to deal with ever,y 
kind of opposition direct and indirect and' wi th financial and political 
sabotage of the most thorough and ingenious kind." (91) It was not clear 
"hat fonn this opposition would take but it was the Socialist League' a 
selt-a.ppointed task to ensure that the Labour Party was prepared to deal 
effectively with any kind of opposition that might arise. 
The circumstances. in which Cripps envisaged the retu.rn of a La.bour 
~OYe 
rtlrnent were perhaps best sunrned up by Frank Wise in his lecture in the 
s~e Yolume; (92) 
Itr asS\JI1e that the next Labour Governnent will be a. 
Socialist Government, taking office in order to oarr,y 
into effeot the Treve1yan resolution of the Leicester 
,.conference, which laid it down that the next Socialist 
'-------------------------------------------------------------------90. Cripps, Preface, p.8. Cf. Article in Reynolds News 8 November 1931. 
Ivor Jennings pointed out that all Parliaments oontrol1ed by a 
majority were diotatoria1 - it was the possibility of peaceful 
change which made the system democratic. "The Technique of 
Opposition," Political Quarterl.y, Vol. VI., No.2, 208-221. 
Cripps,' Can Socialism Cane? p.38. 
E.F. Wise, "Control of Finance and Financiers." Addison, et.a1. ~oblems of a Socialist Government, pp. 67/94 (67/8). . 
r 
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••••• G:)v~rl"f!!ent WJst be ~nim8.t~r'l. "'~r a :t"l-1;hless deter-
mination to carr'.! t"'ron~h Sor.ialist T'l0::1,c:m."!"es, whatev('l't' 
the obstacles. It shou.ld hold offtc~ fo1' tlv3.t 
!'llr:'ose only, and o~ly for AS lon.:: as trR t C0111'Sr-l 1. S 
rossib1~. I conteTI":,late, too, that, for sHch a 
!,"t'oe:r?J1.119 to· be ca~i.ed thro11::;h by Parliarnenta1'",;r rn<'>'lY)s7 
f"nd~1'!lenta1 chr>.!l.:;es in constit.ntiona1 l"1etl:.or'l.s I:'.nd. 
!"rocert'lres v70n1d be necossar:t. Parliarnent sl;("-lld 
ce~se to be a -1;001 in the hands of obst~Jctionists; it 
should becone an efficient :tnst:r'PJ'l9nt for the ra.pid 
l'tlssa:;e of le1islRti.on 1'>l"'lY'0we,..ing the Gove"t'nT'lent to rut 
i-f;s rro::!r~r1e into ~ffect." 
This :oass~ . .:e is in fact an interestln,3 s1.unmar:t of Crip:,s' lecture and 
hi~hli2hts both its stre~ths end weaknesses. Hot tl-J.e leqst of its weaknesses 
'.Va~ the inability to reco,gnise t!1at "fundamental ch9.nzer. in constit11.ttonal 
Illethods [',nd n,. roced"r"' .. s" co 1.3 ot b f d th h t f 1] 
_ u. . U Cl. n e oree· , ron.:::.~ as par 0 an overa . 
Soc1 '1 . a_ st rro.::ram"1e but mnst, unless there was to be a constitutional bre3.k-
down ' ) rrecede t'l}e tr?nsition to Socialism. Certainly some of the reforms could 
be delayed until tl-J.e tr'lnsition was well under way but the ~~nerl'l attitude of 
the SOcialist Lea:;ue seems 't0h:;"ye b~en dictated b:r the d.esire ann necessity 
of DroVokin,:r an apocal~~tic stru.:.:le w1th thA 'C~.:~italist :t"11ing clas':!, !'lO l'1tlch 
so, that the str1,:,~le a:,pearedin thei.r doctrine as An inevitable part of the 
~~ocess of co~stitutional c'l}ange. 
A second weakness lay in its ass'll1'11ption t!1at the La~ortr P"l .. :rty.shared the 
s :. 
Br.le Sociali1'3t convictions as the Socialist Le8.2'').e. . For wha.tever the Trevelyan 
~eSOlution mn."lnt to Frank Wise it ·coulC!. not, by a'('t~ st"t'etch of the ima .. ,Zinatlon, 
be t 
aken to cot'll'1i t the Labonr Governrr.ent to ca:r::r.-:.: throuzh Socialist meesUJ"es 
" '.Vhatev9r the'obst;'cles":-- Tr'J.e, the r~s'0111tion did in,I:~" that the P.L.P. 
s~ 
'°U.ld attem ...... t to enact Socialist measures - which WIse cle'lr1y reco,:nised -
b """" 
lJ.t the Treve1yan resolution. was less of '8, sta.tem~nt of positive Socil'l.11st 
~t· . ~ lOn than 1:'.0 eX]?ression of ctis.:;ust ",i th ~.hcD·0'1a1d' s atter::.:'t to eccopl1'!lOdate 
Vfl19,t Cri!,::'s e,~d his !'.ssociates did ".'Tasto j.nter-re1ate two 
~e,,~')'o d 
..... ·-ate processes involvin~ .tha t!'8nsit1on into Socialism on the one hand an 
323 
the operation of Parliament within a Socialist state on the other. Harold 
Laskifor example, was clearly referring to the future role of Parliament 
When he wrote that, 
" •••• the leisure~ processes of parliamentar,y 
debate are far too slow for the requirements of 
economic decision. They tend merely to register 
agreements arrived at outside the legislative 
assembly •••• No one supposes that Parliament •••• 
could charge itself with the control of the 
detailed processes of industry; at the most, it 
must confine itself to the largest general issues."(93) 
O1'1pps , too, as we shall see, aaw the future role of Parliament in these 
tenns and his proposals for Parliamentary refonn were to effectively 
introduce the Canmons to that role. 
Cripps' main tenet was that Parliamentary democracy, as it stood, was 
r inca pable of dealing with the canplex econanic and social problems of the 
20th century. 
"One thing that has been proved, beyond all doubt 
since 1918 •••• is that the nineteenth century fonn 
of democratic government has shown itself incapable 
of adaption to the economic and social conditions 
of the present day." (94) 
~e analYSis was neither new, revolutionary, nor was it particularly Left-Wing. 
l:t had inspired refonns trom sources as diverse as the Webbs,(95) Winston 
Ch . . ,,' 
Ul'chill (96) and Oswal~Mosley (97) all of wham argued for sane fonn of 
alternative assemb~ or bureaucracy to deal with "technical" economic questions. 
~le",' . 
01 S lrCposals ware trose most closely para.l1eled by Cripps in his argument 
"-------------------------------------------------------------93. ,. - 6/1 ~ski, The Present Position of Representative Democracy, pp.1 7. 94. Cripps, Preface, p. 7. . 
95. S 
· & B. Webb, "A Constitution for the Socialist Commonwealth of 
~reat Britain," op.cit., 
Churchill, Parliamentary Government and the Economio Problems, op.cit •. 
Mosley's proposals can be found in J. Strachey and C.E.M. Joa.d. 
"Parliamentary Refonn: The New Party's Proposals." Political QuarterJ,.y, 
II, No.3, 319/336. See also Mosley's evidence to the Select Committee 
on Procedure, H.C. 161 (1931) pp. 311/27. 
that t~G Goy::;::-::mert sh::mld. lay 10~:r:l th9 .::;en9r3.1 :;)::-i..nci.:?1 ?'3 0: 1 "',:::i813.-1:: 10'1. 
",hlch should be :in::>lernE'nted by 9'!:".:'erts 'J.n:i acl~i(]i'Jt1"':1.tot's '·d.t!l P:lrJ.b/'l0r..t8~r 
indi . d . ( ) 
, V1 u.~l and class inte-rests i!3 nory- univers'llly reco.:;nised ••••• " 98 The 
ma.nner in w:r~.c!l t"i3 we.9 to bp. done wa.s di8tit1~"lisl19.,ble frory} the iss'J.c of 
P""'l' 
'"-L le.mento..r'J ~9forr:, al tl:lo'.;lgh reform of Pa."!:'li::;.l~lent w')'.'.V. !'13,'<:e it s 5.m,l ement8.tion 
A 9~con1. ::;,rinci.:>lc 'tlncl':!rlyin . .::; Cri:?ps I wor~c was the fi!.Ct that the La.bour 
Pe,J:'ty Was a So~5.alist Par-bJ ct)~i tted to 1.1sin.:: the exj.stil'1--S le3is1a.ti ve maohi",E' 
for accgedin,:: to .:?0''18r and to tlsinc that :>o"Y'?1" to chan.':9 the f't'.nclar;tE'utal b?gis 
OT' ~ SOciet~r b:r the tr9.nsfer of econo'r.'j.c power from the ca:>i talist to the workin,:: 
Class",,,, 
~Q. The struJ.:;le ".vhi,::h. wa.s different in essence frot'! 0.11 previo'ls 
was b'lsed on th~ "cornrlete severance 'lVi th all tradi tiono.l thef):!'ieq 
of e()V'~:rnnen.t, t~is deterr:dnation to seize power from theru1in,z class and 
tJ:'a.nsfer it to the p~o:Dle .as a whole ••• ,. "(99) 
Cri.ppS took: the view that thsre wo .... tl,:l be no time at the outset of the 
neiCt Soai~l,list Govern.r:lent to reform Par1ia'11"3nta!"J in'3titutions, which. "1C\'tl.1d 
hf\"I'> t . b' f t 
'.. 0 e refo:t'!'!ed th:t"o'.\Zhout the transition period as a whole, :Dre erably a, 
a.n. e9.l'ly sta,ze, and imrlied that in order to forestall the implementati.on of 
econofllia de:nocrccy, the ca?i talists wr:mId :Dreci::?i tate a fine.nclal cri sis in 
the hOr'e that they would drive t~e GO'Te!'T.ment fror.l office, as thpy h!?d done 
in. 1931.(100) Hf)wev~r, wherea9 i~ his le~ture to the Fabians in 1932 Cri'fs 
'--------------------------------------------------------------------
98. 
99. 
'00. Cr. G.D.H. Cole I s. letter to the !-To'.'" Sbte"lm~.l1, 29 Ar'r:i.l, 1933. 
r 
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Contented himself with the statenent t~.at "those ,.,h" b'31.i.r>V8 j'1 :'0li tical 
democracy de8i.,..e trl ~b,::e t'1:rt fi::'1t (fo!." Socialisr.l) tn P"rrli3m8nt and at 
the ,0Us ( ) e.nd not in the streets or at t'1'3 h2J~·,.-jca"l,es," 101 in his 1933 
le':!t·u.re he freely s:?ecule.te1 
Pa:rliament 'Wonld :-rove to be 
on the likely o':ttcol'le of a Sit11Ptio'1 in "rhtc}l 
ineffective. It w'),s this £!rec1l1?tion on the 
c . 
onse11lences of the accession to rower of a !,a"bour Govern.ne'1t that rrovoked 
the storm of t ' cri l.cisl'l from all Cl'l1.arters. Anticipatin.:: a constitutional 
C:ri s' b . > 
-, la etween a fl1lly mandated Socialist ~overt"~'l1ent 7 prevented fron :?assin~ 
'1Iid.~-ra~in,::: refo~s an:la re:cctiona"l:-:: cari taU st establis'I-Jmrmt, Crir::::'s 
enV'is~ed a' si tnation (l.r;.s:t~ in whlch the Socb"list eovernment P1i~ht be forced 
"to make it",'elf te ~ il i t di t t 'f,..' t', th tt 1.:1 'b i:) __ ~T'l?0:t'ar y n 0 a c a ors'1Jp 1,ln 1._ .e r.1a er cou '..l 9r::::al.!1. e 
J?u.t to t'f,.. . () 
119 test at the rolls." 1 02 The alternative to this w0111d be to a.llow 
a ca 't .,' . 
, ::')1 e.list 2ove:r!1.r.1ent, relyin,: primarily upon the mili tary fo~ i t.s S'1~~...,~t, 
to m3,int.''1j n itself in office in face of :p0r','la~ 0:,Y1nion. 'l"1.is Crirps clear1y 
di~likei, but tn!) ul tir:m,te C::l.'lse of this s:ttu'ltion w"\s the ina.de'1ue.c~r of the 
lI1ac1-tin!=!~r -~ol of ~overnment. For Cripps, therefore, this was the primaJ:7,r 
0011."".;! .; 
, ",1\.ce:t'8,tion: 
"Unless "some adeq;'.1':l.te democratic maohinery can b'9' 
devised, Socialists will be left with but bl'O' alte~ 
natives •. Either t')seize a diet at o!."sl1ipor else to 
a.'l:>aI1don rower.and hand it back to the Ca!,italists. 
I can re2ard neith~r of these with e'1uanimity, as I 
3m cO!1.vinc'9d that both '\'Tould mean dictatorship. 
Obviously, a. dictatorship of the left bas~d u;,on 1'\, 
T'l?.;",,"';"b,r in raV01},!, t)f S0I)1 ?H-3r", wouli be the better 
of .t'\V') be/lalt"trn.!J.tives~ . It ·is from t~lis that the 
'U:resncy a.rises for the develo;:ment of a r.1achine of 
~overn.nent wh:icl'} preserves the fundamental conceptions 
of democracy and frcedor.1 and yet at the same time 
enables the elected majority to carr;r through 1'a,1d1:' 
and without interfere!1.ce the d,rastic chan2es desired 
b:r the people. "(103) 
~--------------------------------------------------------------------101, , , Crip!"s, PI'l:r1,if'.ment.a"l"'r Tn':lt.1t1lti ')"'~ (l,,,d the T:r:?'1si.t.i on, r. 37 •. Cf. 1.D.H. 
COla ~.nd U. Cole, A (;'d,(!~ try H')~o,.." 'p.oJitiC.9 (Lont'lon, Victo1" Golla'1cz)1936), 
1'1'. 413/4. 
Cr1:?ps; Cg,'1 SociaJi~m COTllo'?p.46. See also Note 12. 
Criprq , Pref'ac~ ,;Jp.15/16; 'It2li('!Ol Hi ne. 
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In this context Cripps' proposals appear relatively moderate and, indeed, 
the Oonditions surrounding the actual establishment of the 'dictatorship' make 
it appear to be little· more than the use of those Emergency Powers accorded any 
demooratic government faced with insurrection and sabotage. (104) The 
literature of the Socialist League fre~uently asserted that they were seeking 
to reinVigorate Parliamentary democracy. "Socialists stand for true freedom 
~d . 
real Democracy," declared one of their publications, "but are opposed to 
th -
e time-wasting and obstructive use of Capitalist democratic procedure which 
has brOught Parliamentary government into disrepute and on which the propaganda 
tOr FaSCism fastens; Parliament must become a workshop." (105) Cripps' fault 
l~ less in the content as in the tone of his speeohes and those of erstwhile 
COlleagues, for he made it clear that any action taken by a Sooialist government 
~l . 
U d be dependent on that Government having the support of the electorate. 
Ind d . 
ea , Cripps was desirous of raising the general level of political consciousness 
in S 
oOiety as a whole. Even·the most "undemocratic" parts of Cripps' lectures 
Were ~ualified statements. 
"Unless during the first five years so great a degree 
of change has been accomplished as to deprive capitalism 
of its power, it is unlikely that a Socialist Party will 
be able to maintain its position of control without 
adopting some exceptional means such as the prolongation 
of the life of Parliament for a further term without an 
election. Whether such action would be ossible would 
depend entirely upon the temper of the country ••••• 106 
Socialism.could.and.should.come byconstitutiohal means 
but if unconstitutional means are used to resist it, 
those who use unconstitutional means must not complain 
if they are met with force.'"(101) 
See Note 13. 
: ~ 
!orward to Socialism (London: Socialist League, 1934), p. 14. Policy . 
statement.o£.the.1934 Socialist League National ConferenceG 
Cripps, Can Socialism Come?, p.39. Italics Mine •. 
!cid.', p.66. See also Note 14. 
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so fnmi.bl:r - it 'VIlS, at t'1e le<ist, bad te):}tics. 
porula:dser't. LIlSl:i, besides :::rovidin,:; the theor~t1.cr.l.l fr-:l"1e'vo~~~ f(n~ the 
by ordinance and decree; and to s").sl'en.d.the classic formnl'le of.' nO'>"1'l\al orrosi tion. 
$\ ... a!'~nteei03 not to '\.lndo the work of social t:r-ansf'orrnat5 .. Ol'i be~.m b~r the' L~,p~'.1r 
Party s~o'J.ld the latter have the misfor"b.m.eto be· defeate~ ?:ot th"l rolls~ 
Unde't'~.y:t:u this ~~'1alysis was the a,ss"tlM.::?tion t!1.""t the dU'fe't'ences of ro1 Uinal 
rhiloso::;,h:' b~tween the two major Ilolitical z::M1).ra (the !'-T"ltio!'l"l.l C....,ve~f!\e,.rta!"lrl 
th.e Lt>Jlol1r Pa~y) "~re ·fu"l.C'.a."19ntal - 90 fundaMental in fact that the:' ch?n,:;e1. 
the rnles zo,"erni.~ the ::;,olitic'llsyste1Ol.. (109) .- This sitt".ation,· ?rtlcul"1.ted 
~:r ,IJ'lsk:t, , ~),1tici!,ated Cri;"s t. Socialist Le~""ue lecttl.:re and :tndice,ted, the . axt~t 
.. 
'109. 
!'J;'. 87/91; 119/126; 239/2/!3~ 
, . , 
See Colats. oomT'1ents in simile.!' vein on "P"lrliamenta:r:r fo~s" Tl:';.e Tnte.llt,-;~n.t 
Mants Review of n',rope Tod3,'t. (Lon0.on: Victor Golla~cz, 1933),::?;t.598!.9. ., 
: 
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of the Left th.roU~h('1l1t the dec'1de. In y.articu1aL', the as'3ertion that the 
new i'lJ,ndx'lente,ls of: the systen l!ll1st b"! "Socialist", i1':':>:,es:~ective of thn 
decision of the electorate was, to the 1J9ft, the jnstific9,-I;ion for "enli.:;~tl>ne1" 
di.ctatorshir - not~ithst".'1d.in.z their conaer.mat:i.on of s'vlch 1':'e.:;in9s in resrect of 
Gern.'lany and Italy. (In all fairness to Laski it should be 'pointed out that 
" .~ 
his v~ue refere!1ces to y.ublic o,inion 'Clay c:ualify this statement in his 
',,;:, 
particular case, 'I'lhilst Cripps ':"as certainly far more circ"llrls,ect on the whole 
Cl',.lest:i..on) • 
The second situation Laski sa'.'1 was that the Labour Party would come to 
office only to ~ind its ,roposa1s for refo~ sabot~ed by financial interests. 
The Government would, therefore, have to resort to rule by a. Defence of the 
Realm Act to enforce its will. "In these circu~stances" he wrote, "it ~rpears 
r .,. ~ " " . :. 
i~evitable that the resultant exacerbation of temper would rroducethe nO::r'!"'!~"l 
,.evollltiol"a~r si.tl.l,ati..or., and ynen wouldraJ:lidly S'~l;; th.emselve~ for civilW'~r. "(110) : 
, . -"' '-'. " 
Fmm the pen of Palr.le Th.ltt Sllcl-t a statement would be ri~htly dismissed as 
doctrin~lly inspired conspiritorial nonsense, and the similarity between the 
'., .' .:;. • 1, 
COrI1'mnist and the Left-Wiru a.nalysis is so great as t; 'be almost indistinzuisnable. i 
. " 
This T\er se explains the failure of the Left to secure a lastio3 foothold in the 
hi~her echelons of the Labour Party, which 'consigte~'hy rejected the Marxist 
- I , 
'.': 
basis of the ~nte~retations made.(111) 
, , .', 
The third possibility LasJ..:i s:;?oke of was, in his vie"" the most likely. 
- '; • ~ :> " 
",' -' 
\ .~ 
Should Labot1."t' win at the polls the financial interests, throu3h their politic9.l 
- j ". ;" . 1'""; , . ' 
"" 
allies (the Tor.: Party), would attempt to persuade the leader of the'Labo'tU" 
« 
, , --., '" :;; •• ': ~ i#- ' , , • 
111." Dutt' s views are to be fo~d in Fascism and the Social Revolution (London: 
'" Martin ~no ••.. 1934). " The main difference between the Labour t!Left" 
and Dutt was in the latter's willin.;::ness to draw the 10S'ical conclusion 
that, ' given the validity of the Marxist analysis of "Ca;:;>ita1ist Democracy", 
the social democratic" ideal of a roli tica1 .. conrl1:test of power \'ras a futile-
delusion. "I •• 
, 
r 
I 
r 
" I 
t·, 
t 
f 
I 
! I, 
L 
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,Party to head a 'national administration', in the interests of Capitalist 
democracy. Should this ruse fail, as it probably would, then the 
Conservative Prime Minister would refuse to resign or to summon the new 
, Parliament. "Instead he would rule by emergency decree until a second 
election could be held in an emotional "save the nation fran Socialism" 
atmosphere designed to secure Labour's defeat. Whatever the outcome of 
this second election the agreed political basis of the Constitution 
would have been destroyed and respect for parliamentary democracy 
irreparably damaged. The Conservatives would resort to overt or covert 
. " 
dictatorship while Labour would be forced to adopt more direct methods of 
~ "". ~ ,- ~ 
achieving soci~lism. The similarity between Laski and Cripps is quite 
clear, but Cripps hedged his version round with so many qualifications as 
to quite severe~ alter its meaning fran'that advocated by Laski. That the 
two sets of views should be indistinguishable to opponents is hardly 
, j' 
surprising and neither is the fact Cripps' view that" it is, I believe, 
possible to make the change by constitut~9nal means •••• "(112) went 
unheeded. 
The result of this misunderstanding led to concentration on the 
wide spectrun of Cripps' views and the canp1ete ignorance of his views 
on changes in Par1iament!s role in the political system designed to make 
. .", , 
it more effective. Why this was so will becane apparent short~ but it 
is important first of all to examine the kind of changes envisaged by 
. ~ ,. -
Crlpps in'the role and structure of Parliament. 
:. " ";. 
Cripps, like many others, was'concerned that Parliament was mere~ the 
tool of the Executive and, indeed, had bee? ?cmp1~te~ignored during the 19.31 
~" "" ,. < ~ ~'. ~ 
:i'i, ..... ! 
112. : "CriPps, Can Socialism Cane? pp 6516. Others, however, were not 
; "always so optimistic •. See G.D.H. Co1e, Modern Theories and 
Fonns of Political Organisation (London: Victor Go1lancz~ 19.32), 
p. 154-.. ,.'"' 
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political crisis. "Unless Parliament" he wrote, "is capable of exercising 
a real control we shall inevitablY lapse into a state of dictatorship 
which would •••• be a real tragedy." (113) To prevent this it was necessary 
that Parliament be made efficient. This involved two essential factors; 
firstlY, the sovereignty of the people's representatives in the House of 
Commons. 
"to preserve democracy in the sense that the people 
through Parliament initiate the main lines of the 
National Plan and have power to see that it is carried 
out. We cannot hope that any democratic assemblY will 
be able to carry on the detailed legislative or 
administrative work. This must be left to the Ministers, 
and, if they fail in the responsibilities, Parliament 
will be able to turn them out." (114) 
The second essential factor was that the Government should be able to 
discharge the people's mandate. Indeed, Cripps believed that "the 
,. 
efticiency of the Goveranent •••• is even more vital than the efficiency 
et Parliament •••• " (115) 
Parliament must, with the Goverrment, becaae the tool of the people 
governing according to their wishes as expressed in the mandate approved at the 
polls. It was clear to Cripps that "the problem of democratic government •••• 
cannot be solved by relYing upon our existing machinery." (116) New effective 
machinery haG to be developed both to secure the transition to Socialism and 
to ~erate in a Socialist state in which the tempo of legislation implemented 
would be greater. Oripps, it should be noted, was not clear in his own mind 
of the differenoe between the two situations and his only reference to the 
topic was far frcm clear. (117) This maohinery would be designed to increase 
the effioienoy of the House of Canmons, the Canmons being sovereign and the 
113. Cripps, Parliamentary Institutions in the Transition, p.56. 
llJt.. Cri pps , Oan Socialism C(Be? pp. 64/5. 
, -
115. Cripps, Parliamentaa Institutions in the Transi tiqn, p.42. No doubt 
reflecting George Bemard Shaw's pointed remark, "What is the historical 
. 'funotion of Parliament in this country? It is to prevent the Government 
tr(B governing," "In Praise et Guy Fawkes" in Where Stands Sooialism 
TodV? pp. 16i/205 (171/2).' 
, 116. Oripps, Pretaoe, p.12. 
117. Oripps, Parli8laentm Institutions in the Transition, p.37. "ClearlY 
there will be no time to enter upon a refozm of-Parliamentary institutions 
before starting upon the introduction of Socialism." 
. ' 
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In order to seC'lre t~e pass':\~e of tr.e hi.:h V011ll!le of le,:islgtion invol ve1. 
in the o=,~r:ltio'1 of a Socialis-l:; St2te C!'i:~,s :),dvoc'lted thp. rest~:J.ct::i.on of 
whi.lst the il"l:,le!!1entation of such le~isl!ltion WQuId be enfor~ed by .A~i'1istr~t:i.vo 
Or1.ers .... rhich i1011ld be chalI~n~~abl~ onl~' in Pa~lbmt">~t itself [',(ld not in the 
Cou:r.ts.( 118) 
devices a~,'?il?,'hle tot!"e Gov'="'!'1':"1ent. 
d~velo:'M~nt o~ these ••••• metl10d~1 of ~"n')reasi!'L: t~19 le.!i.slA.tiv~ output t~l:lt t!l'? 
!IO;'S0d' CO;MOnS';3.'1 best ~8 ::'::::::'te.c!l!'a.ble f'::rr ftg nei1 tas'<:."(119) 
,'. '": -o' , 
of t':1.e COr.1.:!1ons wl-Ji,ch b~ t~'-',.''::'i; sho'.tld hI? C1:\~!'l-::90. so [1.9 tf) TI1?:'.:" 1.t J!10re eff0ctive. 
-., ; 
'!'Pe first !'J!.'iortty ':'1'J.s to restrict t!1e dis0'Jl;'sicn of t"e R:':Iuse to O!'JC' ?X":'P.13,!.· 
of t:'1~ Kin,:; t S S:"Ieec":1, the J3''''.d.;et, final1.cial resol'.lt:l..ons and. t!'.e gecl')nd. reC'.Mn.:; 
deb~teson mast of thg i!'l?ort:l'1t I'."east{res !a.,.{r~.~J·th9··7.~::rl'c~ "(120) , This Bill . 
" , 
would. la~r dO':'m t!1~ r..::1.in lines of le,::islation in ever:r s,here for th~ comin,:: year 
.". 
or ::-eriod. of :r'3o.rs ani' on~e gl'l':t'ov~cl could. not be redisc1.'sseri. "It is tene, 
Th~ :Bill \vo"'1.1d~·orco1J...rse;· receive' fulldiscus'3ioi't 
118 •.. ~. ,P!'_ 32 end 54. Seg lTote 15 • 
. . . ; ,'" .. 
120. l2.i1., r;;.55/6. 
121. L,t")c.cit • 
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so as t., ohviate obstruction ani waste of time. 19(122) Th~ details of the 
Act '.vo111d be effected by Uinisterial Orc.e:r- - c'.1allen::,;:)3.ble only, as has been 
Mentioned, in Pa~liament. Secondary leGislation :J.'!'isin.; out of th'3 PJ.e.n 
. would b~ bro1.1sht before Pa:dia'!lent for a second readin.3 on tlJ.e floor. of the 
ROt'!.seand. ls,ter for one final staze durin.::: which. Govert' ... :'l1ent amend.l:1?nts alone 
would be dea.l t m. the 
operation; these proposals would serve only to reinforoe, the :'01'1'<)1' of the 
Executiv'3 over the leJisl!?ture •. Uore so ~'hen Cri?::!s' p::::ere!l1.lisites for t!'le 
'transition to Socialism included th3 ~g,ininJ of a Par.liarlC:1tar".{ majority and 
electoral :plurality "definitely ~nd irrevocably'pled,ze1 to Socialism ••••• "(123) 
,un1er sl1ch circ'.1J!1stances suxely o::,::?osi~ion would be a mere formality? 
, not so far as C:d,;,s wa.s concerned, -for al thou.z'.1 he envisa3ed a ~oli tic ally 
a',vare electorate in favour of, and a. Pa:r-lia.'llent OO!'!r'li tted to Socialism, h9 
assumed a. ~oli tical syste"'l in whic~ individl),a.l Members of Parlit'J!1ent wer~ bound 
les9 : by Part!' consVl.era.tionbut n:ore by the nee1. to ~ecure ,8..'1.1. maintain the :3001 
of the nation •. " To ',enc?'ll'aee creat~r inde:;?endenoe on the pa:r-t of Mertbers Crip::?9 
:;n"o;,osed to. create a system of,o'J'Terful· St'lnd~na Committees based on particular 
erou::?s of Governmental activites (in PC.rB amenta~.rTnsti tll.tions in th'?! rp!'~.n,,,,dtj on, 
-he proposed Finance, Industr;;r, Social Services; External Relations, D.efance, La~ 
. 
and O:!:"der andEconomicPlannin.x)(124) upon at least one of which,all M.P. 's 
The Com!'1ittees, ·wh:tchwould. have Govemment "",''",'',,.-' 
122; 1!oe. ott. 
~;3': ~.!pid.:: '1'.39. 
:,' 
~ ....... "' "'- <- '. 
, 124. ' Crir,s, Pa.r~J.~T!\ental"'r Tnstitnt~(me in the' Tx-9.nsi.tion, '1'.50. See 'also .. 
1'.42. ' . See, Note 16. ' < ••• ',. , 
, ~ 
l 
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majorities, w01),10. no~ only delibe"!'f'.te on t:r.P. s'I,Jbjects fl.'mi,:n01 to then but 
",ould also "exercise a :::eneral S'.'.,e"!'Vision over t~P. wholn ~~~~ of these functionq 
of G-overnme!'1t with which they (we:r.-e) concerned."(125) T'1ey world deal with all 
Ma.tters of SUI':rly and be allowed to receive e.nd initiate S1.'~.::estions an to 
legislation, rather than simIl13' s<.:!!'Ve as a platfo2"M for the airin~ of 3rievances .(12p) 
Indeed, Criprs was willine to allo'"! these Sta"ldins Committees 90 r.mch power that 
an adverse vote on S'-'!.ch e. Committee could result j.n the removal of the Min:tster 
. concerned. (127) However, such a defeat should not lead to the d.ownfall of the 
Government. ' . "Provided that the C',-overnment can retain the confidence of the 
House in matters of. first-el.ass imIlortance, defeats on r.lfJtters of detail s'h01.'..ld. 
not have a.n.y effect upon its term of office."(128) Indeed, Cripps took the 
view that to restrict soverronental resisn~tion to major-policy ~ue9tions would 
'enable the R01..tse to discuss and vote upon matters of details on their merits 
tmls addio.:!to the indere!ldence of Members and the utility of debate. It should 
perhaps be added that Criprs' ass".lriion thet defeat on the" floor of the 
GovernTlient s'hould autom8.tically lead to the resi~nation of the Gover!1."'lent was 
not as eencrally accepted as he believed it to be. Ma.cDonald, for example, 
had made .it perfectly clear in 1924 that he wo~ld not accept defeat on the floor 
of the House as final, unless it was a matter.,of confidence.(129) : 
-Criticism of the Government wou.ld be preservei, presnml1bly on the floor of 
the Rouse,. by allottinz to the Oppos! tion a certain number of d~s in the year 
to raise a~r matters they wished and to use whatever Parliamentary measures 
125. 
1.26. 
127. 
128. 
t 129~ 
.; 
Crlp!)!':'!, CM SociaJ5sm Come? p.57. ef. 
Transi.tion,.p.46. ... .. " " 
CriI'I's,' Can Socialism Come? ,.57. , , ~., ..... 
Ibid., p~59/60. cr . Laski; ·The Lab('mr Party a" "I. the Constitl.l.tion, :p.10~ 
----- ,. , "Crl::?!;~;" Pa~lianent~~tI~st1ttit-ion~ ;n the Tr'3."Att:to", p.44,' 
See'H.C.neb~·169,cc.·749/150, ·12 Februa:~y 1924, and !-Te', TJ(.l~d.e~ 4 Janua!"'J 
1924. .. It was a view MacDonald had lon~ held. See Parliament and 
Revolution,'p.111. 
'. 
they desired, for example, CenS1..l.r9 motions, to ao1;ieve this Im:t:l)ose. By 
alloi'Ti~ the Standina COT'l..'11ittees to sit conten::!o't'9.neot1s1y with the Hou se, a 
eree,t deal of time would be saved, poesibly p.n9.l)lin~ the actual si ttines of 
the HOl1se to be limited to alternative weeks al tho':teh it w')ulri be in cl)l"ltinnou.s 
session throu.ghout the :rear, with the exce,tion of the s'.unmer recess. 
Conse1uently, Members would be freer to s,end more time in their constituencies 
and as members of the Re.gional Councils ensurin,:: that the Plan was beins 
implemented.' This, tozether -vith the other chal"l39S, would make suxe that 
Members would be "fully occ'lpied with important and responsible wOr.'k." (130) 
As part of the overali ad1"liQistrative chanzes that the transition to 
Socialism would involve GovernMental Departments, ne'" e.nd old, W'ould be re3rou::?ed 
into eight or ten main subjects, each under the eeneral charge of a Cabinet 
'iJinister. " The more detaile1 work would. be carried, out by a.ssistant ministers 
w'!1i1e the Minister himself would devote his, time "to the workit'l,.z out of the 
plan of national develo::!ment," in conjunction with a larze body of technical 
ex:?erts. "It will be essential'for this body of experts.to be inspired by the 
. . 
Socialist ideal, eni not to spend their time lookinz for dtfftc1J.l ties and 
explainiru that they-cannot be ove~ome."(131). Here,·CripI's is ,articularly 
wea.k, for in acce;,tin,z the .need for a SOCialist civil' servic~ he iznored t'h,e. 
reality of an existinS cor.se~~tive bureaucracy. 
To round off his rxocedural chanses CriTI'S, ad.vocated the removal of such 
anomalies as the University vote, pluxal votine and the elimination of the 
power of money from ele~tion~ so as to "remove the capitalist bias of the existine 
.'. machiner.r andene,ble the 'electors to choose fairly the policy they desire."(132) 
',. , .. 
130~ _ Crippe, Can Socialism Come? p.59. 
131. ill£,. , p.61 : 
"t".".-,. '" 
132. lQii. , 1'.65. 
.. '" -" .. 
~, ~ 
., 
.. 
'I· 
. " 
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There wa.s ver-<J little about these pro:!,}osals th9.t was revolutionar'J. 
True, the:. aos1.."Jned a certain de::rree of electo:>:'al ra-!;ionali t:: t~':\t, WO·'J.1d h~.'1p. 
op.en h'1ro to justify in practice, but Cripps was sayin~ little more th3.n, 
for eXaM!"'lp., Philip Snowden, ","0 asse:-:-ted in his A"tobio":r1.rh,, that, 
"Ttle '!'Taste of time in inte:!:"minable talk will have to 
cease ••••• Pa~li~~enta~ discussion s~0uld be confined 
to the ;:eneral ::;n:'ineirles of a 13ill and. the d.etails 
should be left to a bOrly of ex,erts for close eXaMin-
ation." 
Given Snowden' s :>:'ecord"the civil se:>:>vice could well be exrected to be c"lte.1orised 
as "ex,e:t'ts",' a desi.:;nati.on which in no wa:r reflected on the ca,nci ty of 
Parliament to deal with ;:enera,l econordc r:uestions. Indeed, Snowden asserted 
that' 
"Sol':l.ethini will have to be done to na.lte (Parliament) 
a more efficient machine for le;:islative pu~oses. 
Otherwise ••••• Pexlirunent will continue to lose' . 
l'opula:t' confidence and ••••• encolL"t"8.5ement (will be) 
~iven to revolutiona.!."J and anti";'del':1ocratic methods: "(133) 
. , 
Expressed in this we::I even the most wide-ranzin.;; reform~ could be justified. 
The real weakness of Oripl's' e.::?proa~h, hO'~evcr, la:r in the revolntiona~J 
context in which he pla.c.ed his, pro~osals and w~.ilst. it wO'.lld be wrong to di~iss 
him as naive it iscle3:t' that he only ha1f-:rasred at times the s:t.:~irict:>"nce of 
what he was- sayin~, w~i1st on oth~r oecn-sions h~ simply did not ar:,re~iate th!3.t 
. , 
hie cOr''lJTl.t=>nts 'l'Tere o~~m to se~ioug 1'!lisinte'l"".::reta.tio'1. (134) 
. . 
perfeotl~' fair to Ori1':'9, his o"m l'')sHion if (\a~ef1.".11y re9.d, was cle3r, the 
, .. 
COr.m1'mt: of bis 0011ea':'.1e9 we ..... e 1:-!.''rt'9 extr~.!Ile Md. be.::;an in ~~.m~ to, he a!'3socif>.ted 
with hi:1self ra..'!'t1z' because of his o'm inn.btl:tt:rto reoo':ljiM the incom:;iatibiJ.it:' 
,';, <~, '; -; .~-; , ~ - • '" .• - ".. , 
• 
133. 
; .'~. 
131. 
, .. : 
..... 
, ., ..... <: ~""~ ... -
T t,:;" S'1o"lete"l., _~·,toh10~e.:n"''' , .c..I t ,.10 3 ~. 
S",.:,' Eric ~it0-:1~.~k, Stif'f("l,;-r:.rl Cri'l"'I"<:.!! a. '"R~,('I;;'T''';'h:r. (Lo'1(lo":: '7:D.l:t2.";'! rreinne~o.n 
19/,9\ 'Y'\"'32012r:;. C~i.'?·)S had,. as the X)"~ S+'~+''"lS''''''''.r r('li..~t:::."1. out, 11.sed t'un:wise rh.;?~e;" on 'cc;e.sion""'17 Jun':! 1933, altho'JChit .later a:r,:ued th!lt the.Prf><:'!s 
hs.d 1.'tse1 extre'1'e stat~;",!.0nts fo'!:' publicity purroses rather than the l"l9.in. . 
trp.l'1dof his s")e8'clJ.es. (See 3 F(!brt'c.~r 1934). The F,I)on!)rlist took a b:t'oad.ly 
simila"t" thO't'-3h.'" More cr:tt1<":::tl view of the situatidn .. irJan;;;'rJ 1934 • 
of the Ca.;:tt'.:\list into th~ Socia.list syst~'1!" m~ans which in. 11i8, 0:>:' the 
it" t S 4· b • t~? ~. t t t 
. 'lon 0 oILal:1sm. TrI?y e ca:r.:r.'lI'~d._ .. on .... h COr1sti tu ionally, and die P orsh1!, 
avoi.ded~"(135) 
"We a".e all of us ••••• nni.te1 tu our desire to comhat 
the I iSMS I of the world, whether they are Faeel sm or 
COi'1.munism. We have all of us ::-led,3ed ourselves to 
follow the darnooratio course in brtn.,::ins abo1.lt ••••• 
chances ••••• (Oltr) conviction of tne effecti~ of 
of social det'Jl')cracy' is' one wh1.ch has zot to be ra'!'lr.led 
hOMe if ~1e are coin,i to kee, with us all, the keener 
elements in our Move!nent."(136) ".'. 
His :pro~osals# lle claimed, were c.efensivc measures de9i5ned to meet a ~reat 
Droblem. As fa:r-as Parlia.~entar.r :procedure was conc'?!'!'led, for example, '''lfe 
want Parlia~ent.so reformed that it is ~oin= to kee~a constant and effective 
\. ' , 
control of all Ministerial pow0:r-s,"(137) ove:r- whfch'the.existin,::: Parliament had 
.', , 
no contl'Ol. 
, 
C:r-ipps did not l!I~ve a reference.back of the relev3.n.t section of 
the N.E.C.'s Rel'orl bccau8e he und.e:r-stood that the Executive '\"Tas :D:r-e:pared. to 
- ,",' ,~ : ..... . ". 
conside:r- the matters raised in his resolution and to re20rt baclc. to the Conference 
the followinz yep'~ - a fact confirmed by Geor,::e Lansb'I:t"J .. (138) 
136.;'··L.P.J.C.R. '193~, Loe.cit. 
Ibid., t .. 160.'; 
----- .; 
138. Lon.c:tt. 
" 
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A number of dele,,:!atea were ~ot impressed by CripI's f c 19, i."': <1 • 
Shi m'1'e 1 1 , for exarnple, com,lained th:1.t, 
"Fo~ the past t'.'1el ve rlonths 8"nd !!lo-re the HO'Tcment 
has been in a st!3,te o'f confusion and bewilde"'ITlent 
in rel!!tion to t 11C issues ••••• now presented to the 
Conference •.. The teeth of the lIovenent ••••• have 
been set on edge ••••• with all the controversjes, 
the Press scares ••••• the talk of disunion in the 
Uoverlent, of dict~,torshi!" end the like ••••• we n:l:'e 
asked to dismiss those controv'3!'sies and refer 
the whole matter back to the Executive ••••• so for 
the next twelve months the controversiBs will 
race ••••• tf(139) 
Shinwell went on to attack Cripps' tactics of ,x-ovokin3 c.n im1"ledtRte 
co~stitn.tiono.l crisis between a Labour Government and the House of Lo!'ds - fI,' 
criticism su,;:orted later by Lees-Smith but claimed, "that any difference that 
exists between my friend and myself is merely a difference in ::?hilosophy."(140) 
r' Ernest Bevin,' at his most partronisin.:!, en ended the difference to a way of life • 
. 
.. . 
"I want to put the point of view that I take as a 
Trade Unionist. who has to deal every day with the 
masses of the !'eo::?le. h~ba1:ll:r WI='! live i~ 
different world f1"('HTl "', ,n;f")O~. mp-,m' who h~now .~oin'3d 
t,heLq,hon ... r P'lrt.~' •. Our work· is of a. different 
character, and hence probably we a::?rroe.ch these 
rroblems from a different an..:;le. Ou.r work is 
el!l!!linently rrRCtical.. o •• it is to. (leliver the goods 
to ou"t' members and we know ••••• the a'1;)solute folly 
of. rnttinz u::? pro,crMUlles that are not likely to be 
realised, because we have to ZO b'lck to the branch 
members and report, and be judzed by real deMf")cratic 
In?chine!"'.! an,1 proce:lur9."(141) ". ,,-,' ' 
, 
Tvrittinz the advocates of r3.pid tran'si tion for re'lu.iring another tirel Vel 
months to consider how they were ZOinz to achieve it Bevin attacked several 
leadinc p~rsonalities of the Socialist Leazue.·- .. 
. ,,'~',- ' 
" .', 
, ,). ,', ,'/ t· 
.' . 
141. LoO.cit. Italics minI='!. Bevin seems to have had the Carit~.l Levy 
. ..; 
; . 
" 
spoo:tficaJ.ly ,in mind .. 
.. "" " 
.;~ 
.. : "" ' 
:1-"l: -,!: .• 
<.- '~., '.: .' ... 
f!' ~= 
. '
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Underlying the attitude was the belief in "Scientific Socialism" and the 
I 
"bourgeois" nature of Parliamentary institutions both of which Bevin 
tlnphatically rejected. To Bevin such sentiments smacked of the same 
intellectual smugness that had reduced his fellow trade unionists to 
'enslavement in Germany and which had proved in the past to be as fim 
as shifting sand. 
In' his Memoirs Wa1 ter Citrine recalled a meeting between himself and 
a nl.lJlber of the leading personalities of the Socialist League at the London 
Sohool of Econanics on 3 July 1933. (148) Invited to make an observation 
on the League's views Citrine delivered a Memorandl.lJl entitled, "The 
Tendenoy of Dictatorship" in which he asked a nunber of very pointed 
questions~ He began by defining the issue:-
"The first queation is •••• are we really sincere in 
our opposition to diotatorship? Do we desire to 
prevent its being established in Great Britain?" 
and cont:il1ued, 
. '", ! 
"It we do, is 'this the right time for responsible 
people in the Labour movement to be talking in 
terms which give o.rrency to the belief that we 
are ready to abandon, the methods of democracy in 
favour of some form of diotatorship?" (~9) 
~t,· he asked~ "is the essence of the theme 
expounded.by Sir Stafford Cripps, G.D.H. Cole, . 
, Major Attlee, E.F. Wise and others? Is it not' 
that Parliament is outworn, too slow, not 
responsive enough te the electoral will? That 
it. machinery is adapted to other days and not 
to present ~ needs? That the attainment of 
Socialism through the present maohinery of 
'Parliament is impossible? That, therefore, acme 
meua must be taken so to alter this machinery, 
and to deal with elements iD. the oOOllllunity which 
mi&ht . oppose socialist legislation and to ensure 
. that the progr8.lllH· of the party oan be rapidly 
ourie. threugh?- -'1.50) .. 
148. Citrine, lien an. \fork, Ch-lB. Beatrice Webb theught Citrine -the 
leaGing min. in the tra.e 'Wlion movtlnent. - Vol. 47, p.161, 
2 October 1933 (lmpubliahed Diuiea). 
Citriae, Ken and Work, p. 299. Cf. his article in New Clarion 
24. June 1933 • 
ISO. Citrine, Ken an. Work, pp. 291+15. 
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the l!ove:c1er.;,t. 
sO\J.'1.din.:.::-boa;>:d fo:!:" tho GO"'3rn:rl'?nt. 
had secured fron the majori t:" of tho e1ecbr?,te. 
to 8,C()oJ:'l.r1odate th~!'1 ::'011 t5.call~r. 
t~e conflict as bei!\: one between "Socia.lism" o,nd "Co.pi talis!11" w'.1ere'lS Citrine 
r s~e~s to have seen societ~r !!'ore in te:t"rls of interes! ~rou..."0s. Moreov1r, Citrine 
e,sserled that P::tr1i3nent had 1'18\;r ed a. useful role in the sCX"..ltiny of 1e,:;islation 
in the past in.cll1di~ the modification of prorosals and if this role were tl) be 
. ~nded it wI)u.1d effect a Par1iam~ntar:l revohltion by ensuri03 that "the Government 
will zoyern, not as the mO ..... 1thl'iece of the House of· Cor.l.~ons, but somethin.1 
Quite, apart from his beHef in the aJsolute value of democr!l.C~r Cl trioe' s 
attitude was be.s~d on ho other consicterations. The first consideration was a 
.... 
:practical one. If, 0.9 was uT.laI1y the' case with roli tica1ly motivated 1'eop19, 
their oppononts who ~'1e:t'e at ::;n:es~'1t in l''),:,:er were to ad.ol't a ro1icy of OV9T-
ri.djn.,: minorities, o:!:"anticj.patin,:; Crlp:::,s an1. the Socialist Lea.:.,7V.e b:r resortin.,: 
".; . 
'to dictatorial method.s, Lab0tlr could hardl:r object, having advocated s'.1ch a ~ 
-ro1icy themselves • ~'I predict," Citrine re:n~rked, "that tr.is sort of wild talk 
.,. ;' 
J" r 
, , 
.. 
any thin::! else" and as such was a dan,:e~ to th~ existenc e of the 1abo'.lr Uoveme!:1t 
itself. (152) This wa.s unlikel;r to ha.V9 c'3.:r:l"ied. m~lCh wet.:'1t ".'11. tl-J th? Socia.1i.st 
Le~~e who believed. the st~1~gle to be inevitaQle. 
Hastin.:;s Confe~encet 
"Some people se;;r ••••• we had better not ta.lk e.bout 
thes~ thin~s and. then l'err'3.,s the other side will 
hot t'1ink of t~em; if we onl:r kee~ ,:!'liet, then the 
dictators will fo:':"get to dictate. That was exactly, 
the delusion which carried the Gernan Social 
Democr:1tic Party to destrnction."(153) 
The second point Ci tr:tne mad.e was more fundamental. 
"1he theo:t"'.T of the' all-powerful Governm9n.t has 
not ••••• been acce,ted by the La.bour l!ovement. Even 
, within capitalist society , it has been re::;a~ded as 
perfectly le~itimate for ~rours to show their 
, o,position in a constitutional way to acts of the 
execl.,tive of the da~/. If once t'he L?bonr l!ovemMt 
·~lbsori.b~s to the p1':"inoirle that a Governm9l1t 1':>3.9 
the ric;ht to over-:dde' all 0p:::08i t:i.on by whatever 
means in its :rower, it is difficult to see how an . .' 
inde::?endent Tr:tde Union Movement could continue."(154) 
C' 
This was the heart of the Tr~de Union vie~. The V9r-J existence of a free Tr'J.de 
Union Movement Vias, to :Serin and. Citr:i.ne, livins :proof of .ad,emocratic society. 
As :Sevin ".'T:rote i.n .tl-te T.~V.G.U. Re~l)ro, 
"we are more likely to Z'3t what we want by our' 
educat1.onal efforts and b~' or3anisation on a 
volunta.""Y basis, andthll.g· secu1':'i~ power by the' 
consent of the -::;'9"1'le, tha.n if we tried to develoJ;l' 
an Or3s.nisation to tal{e!'owe1':' by force ••••• The 
best way to combat dictatorship is for 0\.1r people 
to be true to their denocratic faith and to teach, 
the children the value of Tra.de Unions and to 
resist '''ith all ,their power a.ny attem,t by anyone 
to destroy them."(15S) 
,152. '.!.Q!{!., ,.2971i 
.;153. L.'P:A.C.R. 1933, 1'.163. 
: f" ..... , 
154. Citrine,' 1119'1 a'ld WOTI::, !'. 297. 
*155. :'T.W.~.U.' lloonI'd,' ~{ay :193~' pp. 304/6. Cf. !Wan Durbin's CritiQue of the 
. Socialist Lea.:r:1.e in "Democra,cy and Secis.lism in Britain", Pol Uioal 
. Qna.rt8rly, Vol. VI. t No.3. t (J1l1y/Se:ptember., 1935), rp. 379/85 es::?_ 385 •. 
: 
There i.s li ttle dOl)bt t~~t the RtCl-Jt '.vas di. vidAd fror.: thl) Left by ex;:'?~~ p,nc~ 
and disposition just 8S J"lucl-). PS i(!eolo~. 
extremis'1 AS tithe occu!"ationaJ. dis~asq C0111r10n M'O~ hi~h-strun~ Tn'?n ",nd wO:r:len 
'''ha COMe out of a conse-rv3ti ve Anvi 1:"0nment into proletarian ,0Iitics." (156) 
Whilst Citrine cOI"!:r:l'?nted that, 
"with ral'e exce,tions ];lost (intellectt1 als) never real1~' . 
unilerstood the trfl.,de union F.'ovement. The~' assicned to 
it a militant outlook which most of its membel's did not 
possess, I3.nd they we~e irl'itated at the reluctance of 
the trade union leadel's to res:?ond to their flichts of 
idealism in a world of stern realiti.(.>s. J3evin h<\1. 
little time for the!!1 ••••• he resented their intrusi.on into 
tl''lde unien affairs."(151) 
Freedom was 'essentially em;dl'ic'll and no amount of intel1ectual so:;hist:r"lJ or 
specious id.eoloC'J could restl'oy this belief ~ The T.U.C. Genel'al Council stated 
its case qnite clearly in its Anmutl Report fol' 1933. 
,. 
"There are some who de~y th~t freedom c~n exist in a 
ca~italist society. They recard it as a bourceois 
. l.nstitution of no re?.l v9.lue to the 1'1301'113.' It is not 
to disre,laro the dis9.btlities of a waces S".!stem l.mde:r 
ca::dtalist control of industr:,r, to point out that in . 
G:!'~at B:!'itain an individual nO:t'Illally possesses certain 
liberties that are worth ,reserving. 'The Steo,te has 
not yet the authority to shoot citizens without tria1~ 
Nor do peo,le disa,pear at the hands of a secret 
po1ice ••••• nor is the criticism of the Government a 
·crime ••• ~.A,ze.inst the tyranny of Governnents and a 
return to economic servitude the institutions of free 
citizenship and the orzanisations of democr~cy are Ottr 
stron:est safecuards ••••• The freedom and inde,endence 
of the unions wO:lld not be worth a. da~s t rurcha.se if 
these safe:uards were destroyed."(158) _ 
.~. . .' 
, ' ~. 
The ~~bjection of co11ea.~!es abroad, first in Germany and then in Austria, 
o~ly, rei~forcE'd t!1.ese attit'J.des (',nd it was for this re'tson that Citrine w'rote, 
156. Cole, Ed.) Beatric~ Webb Diaries 19:?~:-1932 }pb.96/7. 
157. -Cit~i~e, Men and Work, p,.360/1. 
See also Note 17. 
158. T.U.C. Repo~t 1933, .• ~pendix C.425-35 (434) S99 also Para. 40 (433~ 
See ~A1soNote .18 ... 
.' 
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"There is a dictators"'i::? of a diffe1"'",nt ki~rl in Rllssia, 
bu.t a. dictatorshiI? nonetheless ••••• we hflve to cle~r our 
o,m min1.s as to whether 'VC) real1:' believe in deY1]0~r<l.tic 
institutions. Far too '!lany rl'3o::?le in the Iahl')1,.~:r' 
Movement are not only cri tioal but scornful of P:1::diamentr~~T 
Government. It is abo'lt time we cleared the decks for 
the settle:nent of the issue of der"locr'':''.c:' or dictators11ip. n(159) 
Thus it was in term.s of "Democrac~r-v-Dictatorship" rather th9.n "Capi talism-
v-Socialism" that the iss'.l.e of Pa!.'liamenta:t"J reform. wt)s seen, as the Gene!'al 
Council made clear, 
"Parliamenta:t"J ineti tutions have recently come in for a 
good deal of criticism. There are unquestionably defects 
in Parliament~TmachinerJ an1. there is general aereement 
that institutions which were desi~ned to meet the needs 
of another period are not sufficiently ex:pedious and 
efficient in dea1i~ with oomplex rroblems of tod~r •. 
Constrqctive criticis!'l is desirao.le and necessarJ, but 
it is not in the direction of limitin~ rublic freedon 
that a re~e<t" is to be f:>und ••••• We s"'1o'_lld resist an:r 
attempt to ~lrersede Parliament or undermine its democratic 
"lorkinz. It still remains tr1l.9 that efficient eOv9rn.!'lont 
is no substitute for self-eovern.!'lent."(160) " 
On occasions this distinction was blurred b~r rhetoric s1},ch as that used 
by Joseph Cromrton at the Labour Party Annual Conference in 1933. "Fr.scism't 
J '" • 
he decl~..red, "stands for C@.,italism, for 9ubjMticn, for Dictatorship, for War. 
We stand for Socialism, for freedom, for Demoorac~r, for PeMe •.. ' There can be 
no co~rromise on t~eseereat antitheses, no halr-'17;~r hO~lse of e.cc crrL''1od at ion • ,,( 161 ) 
-<;" • 
Yet, as ,.,e have note1., they did not see the National Goverrunent as nascient 
fascism and. it is clear that their use of the word. "capitalist" was in an 
analytical rather than a Marxist sense. Hence, the ovs-rla:::,in.: te:t'm;.nolo~ 
• 
159 •. 
,. ~" 
160, 
161. 
J: CrOT:!rt0!1, Ritl~;~'-m (London: T. IT.C. & Lobou_r Part:', 1933),F6re;"~rd by , 
Citrine, r. 7 •. Cf. C:tt:t'ine t s a:':'ticle$ ,0"1. t'1/2' subj~ct in th~Labo"r 1,~!'ea~dre,J9J3. 
Per Citrine's, s!,9cifio v:teurg on the RnB"!i?xl' J)ict9to~sh"lr see' t ~"' .... mh. fn'f'o' 
~,th {.,., ~'~<:J{!\ (Lo1'1don: Geoi--:::e Rontle~~""/1936). ~"e re~a1:'kable feat'l:t'eof 
Cttrj.rle t sboo!>: i~ not t"hR.t be fO'.m~ •. ru;.ythin.z w:t'on: in Russia but t'1r>,t he 
found so !'\Uch~o~d. . , . ' 
rTI.TT.r.. R"""'I'):",t, '1933,' A,;endix C. Par":3~. r~432.. , .. _ 
t',~:~~(':~,"'Ci3},":<1J1. er.,It.H. Elvin p,t th~ T.U.C. in: 1933T.':T.p.T?";)r")""~ 
1~3A,.:r. 78. ' ' ...... - ... . 
. , 
: 
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";, ; ", . 
"Fascisr:" t~e !'-ht1on8,LJo1nt Gou-'1.oil· :>::,~s.:?ond.9d. by issuin.c; a "c9.11 to t.}1.~ ;:'1"'1)::') r>" 
• 
t~e r.~ft or of' theR5 . .:;h.t. Th~ 13~itis~ '.Labo'.1..!.' Movement, 
"believes that Co United.Workil'l.[S-cl~.ssl!ovemp.'1.t,.fo'.mr'!0d. 
~m.d condu.cted on. the broadest· del"'locrat:tc rrinci::,18s, .CE'.n 
estc.blish a Socialist So~iet~' e,g soon a.s the workers gre 
sl"tfftc1ently adv/?nced in rol! ti~al vr:i.sdom 9,S to r,'lHce 
thFli:t" OWl"l, Movemp-t!t ir.. thFl seat of' GO'Termnent, e:t'll1ed with.,. 
all the:'('IW~r9 of the Det:locratic Sta.te. . British LD-b('\ur 
has lead. the "'orId. in its claiM. fo"t' Trv',,-stri9.1 Democr!:1.cy 
9."11 its demp.n.d for Politicr-1.1 Dp.l""oc:rr.cy.. Its hlstoric 
tas!c todey :i.a to nrhold the :;?rlnc'iples ef Social 
De!'1oc.,..~:r. "( 163) 0, , 
Tl'HO! !Tfd:;.o!!al &ecutive Cot:lr'.ittee S?elt out what it meant 1.n its Report to th.e 
'" '. "The L9,bo'1:r- Pc>,rt:' 1n.rlan!1in~ for tne ,eoIlla's ;fr~n.doT'1 
realises that it ~lst be a de~ocr~tic fre~~om. Th~ 
'.-~: Part!' : st9..nd~9 no,,, t ~ e"s ever, for. e f~ee hp-ss ;" "the rieht 
of free assembly, the rizht of free speech, the holdinz 
" ()i' free eleotj.ons. " Th,~Pa't'-/;;': st~~r1S fo"t' tl1<o.se, d.r:>T'1I')I'):r:~tic ;j- ~., 
~O"~:it11)"'19 bec~"se th~yRreintT;_.,!'!tcally r-:ood; .theya"t'e 
.,_L) t~a ~t:t'easu.res ·won .b" .hard .e.f.foTt; ,. a.nd .much ',sacrtfice bv, . 
... . lo~-de~ :eB.1.ers of revolt.:.(~64) " " .' 
". . - ." ... ;-- ~ ~~ :;. '.' 
.: ~ ., -,:. , 
Joseph Crom!'ton, f s Chairman f s ad.dress re-em,hasised th~t the opinion was shared 
~' .. '~ '!>.':~'{... \. ~ 'J",; ".;,'-~ :1 -' ' ~'t, ... ~ 
by the leadership of the Movement as a whole. 
,". 't:-', V •. - ''f, ..I,:It' '!'" 1-;: 'I.. ,:;. -,~ • 
• 
'. , 
,162 •. J.F Na~llor notes "The Secretar-.! of the T. U.C •••••• disR.Zreed t!'-_'t'ou.:;;ho1Jt the 
:" ";";'decadawlth a'6~'nical inte:rpretat:tcm of the intentions of. the NationaL 
Goverrment." . Labo".:!" El Intern">.t-tonal PoBc~n The IJabou:r P~:'r't~T in the Th Ttteg 
',~ (Lon10n:Weir'lenfeld & Nicolso~,1969 ,p.50.< ;:, .'- "" .• ,;. ~~" •. j,:.,. :';<'.±;'» •... 
163., · .. Democrac;r-v-Di.ctta:t.orship (London: .T.U.C. & Labol.'!.:!, _Pa:r.~J, 1933), raras. 17 and 1~ 
.. ". The statement is published as A::n;'endix IX to I,.P.A.C.R.1~~3, r1p.277/a (277) 
See Daily HemM,:El<l1.torial, 15 l~l!1,rCh 1933.· Cf. ,"The .LabonxParty stands 
fil."l'llly .for .democracY •. '~. It is irreconcilcblyo!,pos(-IC'. to Dictators~ir by any 
individual or group. It will st!'enlto'J.al~~ resist e.l1 attempts on British 
liberties ei,~h.e:r. from inside 01" outside the count!."']. It ~ab.o:J.r' 9 IT'lMerti A.t~ 
Pro~. (London: 'Labour Pa.:r-ty, 1937)~'·i\ .. :,' ' .. ,;.:.: ':.' /'. ,. ';.' ., .... 
~ ,~... ""'.:. ~~,~. _.~. >l. ;'; ". < ~ • ., :", ":",' .~.~_ ~.~ • .,,' "'",. 
i,:p}.\:C.l=i."19;U,':' 1':'5.' I.t:,a\5.csrl ine •. : . ~ 
<" • ;~.. Cf,..,.~, _ • {; 
.", ..... _.." · .. -•• ~r"" , .. ""_ ~,,,,,.. , __ ~." , ........ ,,' ~. • .. " "', '" r" - '" .". ~ "-,: ," 
~ '".". f" 
,'" ;~ "" .': - ,.':. ':. L f 
,. 
.-
"Speaking as a Trade Union official, I believe I can 
s~ for my fellow Trade Unionists, that we still 
believe in democratic ne thods and principles, and 
that we will never tolerate dictation from outside, 
'fram whatever source it may come. Fascism and 
Canmunism alike are a cn..nenge to our democratic 
. institutions and to the system of society based on 
political, . social and econcmic equality, which we 
seek to establish. I should have preferred that 
Labour haG been able to persue its work of 
emancipation without having to divert even a part 
of its energies to fight new fozms of political 
dictatorships. The British Labour Movement has 
declarej itself to be uncomprcmiaingly opposed to 
'. all fol'DlS of Dictatorship. The Labour Party pins 
its faith to political democracy. It has spent its 
energies and its limited resources on its etforts to ' 
seoure a Parliamentary majority. It will not be 
deflected frcm its task. Onoe power has been achieved, 
it will carr,y out the will ot the people as 
detennined at the polls, with vigour and determination, 
and it will not tolerate faotious opposition and 
obstruction in the execution of its du'tiY to the 
electorate." (165) 
Herbert Morrison in retusing to acoept the reference back of 
"Demooracy-v-Dictatorship" reiterated the point. After reminding'de.legates 
of the oircumstances leading up to the issue ot the Man~esto he pointed out 
that co-operation with the Camnunists was impossible "because they themselves 
believe in a fozm of aictatorship •••• The real point about the Manifesto is that 
we oondemn dictat~rship as such, whether that' dictatorship is a dictatorship 
" ~ , 
of the Left ~ ~ the Right. We cannot hunt 'with the hounds and run with 
the hare." (166) 
. . 
The reterence back was lost as was a motion regretting the 
N.E.C's failure to parti~ipate in the United h~t.~ (167) 
'. ,.' t.. ' 
The related issues ot Democracy and Dictatorship and Parliamentar,y 
Refozm were bothaettled at. the Annual Conference ot,1934. In the ensuing years 
f' 
_. 'c 
the struggle betWeen theN .E.C. and the Labour Lett was concerned less with the 
. . \ 
'. 
165. Ibid~ " p.135. : et. Labour' a Immediate Programme ··op.cit~ ,pp. 2/3, and 
Attlee's speech to the Labour Conference 1937. L.P.A.C.R. 19J7, 
pp 181/2. 
166. L.PeA.C.R. 1933, p. 219 Ct. The T.U.C. which argued that participation 
in the United Front meant "aaking those who believe in democracy to . 
unite with those who believe in jictatorship to combat dictatorship." 
T.U.C. ReROrt 1933, Appendix C. Para 32, p. 4.32. . 
167. L.P.A.C.R. 1933; W.220/221. 
,. 
:;:ossib1e circumstances surrounditl3 the accession of a. Lab on:>:' Gov'?r~!'lent f'-r)(~_ 
t"'e va:rtety of institutional reforms that a Le,hO'.'-r Gov~rnm'?'1t would insti.c;r-tte 
tha.n with the intem!ltional context of the st:t't1.,C;.:le bet'l'I~~n Fa"lcism 13)'11 
Sac i9.1is'!"l. ConS'3'luent1:r , the i9s'1es u,on which the conflict was t:re most 
" 
acute were'thos'3 conc0rned with international a:ffai!'s, deferce, non-intervention' 
in S,ain a.nd to a lesser de.c;ree, a Popular Front. The Question no longer 
involv.edthe validity of Parliamentary zovernment bnt the basic principles of 
intra:-,arty democracy, in particu.lar the deJTlands of collective 10:ra1 ty and the 
rizhts of indi~dual conscie'1ce. Increasinzly, throl.lehout the decade the 
snipes at Parliament9.r'.! eove.rnment came from academic circles. By 1940 the 
a~ti-Pa.r.lie.rn.enta~.! Movement h~d lo~-since run out of ste::un. 
The most obvious rease!'} for this was the .c;radual but positive hardenins 
of the official Labour line towards the Labour IJeft. ,~Open misrepresentation 
of officie.l, LabOl.tr :volicy was actively encoura~ed by the pronouncements of 
C:r-ipps and other Uenbers of the Socialist Leaeu,e. On6 Jat",~ary 1934, Rreakin.::; 
to a university audience et Nottin2h~m,Cri~~s had made a 'speech w~ich contained 
cavalier references to Bt'lckin2ha"!l Pala.ce and a. count2"\J eentleman tY:!,e of Fascism. 
On 24 Janua~.!1934 the N.E.C. issued ,a statement attackin~ misre.::.:>resentation by 
supporters'of the National Government}claiming that, 
"The attitude of the Labour Party, as has rereatedly 
been made plain in its official,decl~~ations, stands 
for ParliamentarJ Democracy. It is firmly opposed, 
to Individual or G~u.::? Dictatorship, wh~ther from the 
Rizht or from the Left. It holds that the best and 
indeed the o!'}ly tolerable form of Gove~~ent for t~is 
countrJ is Democratic Government, with- a free el~ctoral 
system and an active M.d effioient Parliamentary>< 
maohine.,for reachin!: effective, decisions, after reason-
> able o:,porluni ties for disc11ssion and criticism. The 
. Labour Pe.rty bases its 8::;.::?eal .~o public 0::;in10n on, the 
ureent need for far-reaching economic and socialchan,C;e 
" .. -, as set o~'tt in its Pro~rt'm..'lle, to be "brought abou.t by ~ 
'oonstitutional and denocratic m",ans~In so far as any 
state;nents ""hioh are at variance with the ,declared rolio~~', 
"I ••••• /cont1nued 
" '. , ~ :-. 
, <, 
,.. 
,. 
of the Part~r on this <"llJestion have b0E?Y1 or I'l£'.y be 
mlJ.de by individnals, these are hereby d.efinitely 
re.:mdiated by the lTatio!1!?l Execntive. "(168) 
In Febrn8.:ry the Co!!u:n:mist and Independent Lab')'lr Parties renevred their 
efforts to seCllre Labo.~ ... r particiratj.on in the United F:!:-ont. (169) COIlt"1unist 
tactics throuzhont the ~r~ar rro~rl'ld to be ir:t'i ta.t~g, whilst, within !l for-tnizht 
of !.tosley's Blac!cshirts. External13T the colla:::se in Feb!"'la!':r of the Austria.n 
socialist and tr~.de nnion r1ovement, which hM. Generally been th01.1~ht to be far 
stronzer .than that of Gernnny which had bee'1. ea8il~r s".J.bjected by Ri tler in the 
previous ~rear, was keenly felt in IJa.bour circles • 
. , The collarea .. of the Austrian movement was a :re~t shock to the Trad.e Union 
• 
168. 
-169. 
170. 
171. 
The debate on the issue made it clear tl'w.t, 
"the iSffi18 is not so ~10h Fa8ci~ or Co~~~nis~ but 
th9 dictatorship of the Tot2li tarian State verSl".S 
de!":ocrac:r !?!1d h:r '1el"'ocrac:.r' 1':'e do no"': n"!cessc.rily 
mean affeto fO:!"!':ln of f?rJ.i3J'lenta:dr:.nisr:!, but a StCl,t~ 
in ~,:,!j,ch ~!1 i~s cttb'1ns c"1~ cbtl?';_l'I a f1111 mE"l~t:r~ 
er 91)ci11l justice c01'1:!}at1bll? 'l'."U'1 riCht o:,:,d"~r and 
:':.'~,:,~gO!1. "(171) 
~ 
ttc,)),!1:~19tef8.i"::h 1_!1 t!"c :::>:.'~.l"ci::l'?s of S-:)':~1. ~li8"l r.!"1. 
d.~oc:,:"c.c:'. 'r!e. b<915.0're tl::::.t the '70::,11 cannot be 
:t'econst!"'Y:lto.r'\. 1:>~T !!!etl1~~9 of 'viole':'c~ 0.'11 s'J..:':,ression 
3.nd. tb .. ~ COn.::=!:,,~8S ••••• ;;!l~~=os its'?l.f' +'0 ~'c::rk "T!1ole-. 
he~rte11:r r'J!:" th~ :mc.int9"l!:\nce of free insH t'l'tio\"'.s, 
" :., . ./,.,. ..... +. , Ad' 
o • • • ... ..., v n ~ J_n:1:. . 
T .• 'P .. ~."''Q. 19;~, :,.9. S99 Also Hate 19. 
.. r 
·r.:p;:~ :c~. '1;31, :,.:'.1C!11. Cri.:':!!s' s,<?ech a.nti sl.lbsetp).cnt h2.0ktrMkin.; is 
_to ,bo ,found.in Coo1:o, o"ctt ., l'.:': 150/160. See also S"nt'l.!',:r T5."""!s 7 JM')$!'."'J 
1934. Cl:rnes i.l':l!·'1e~i~;:toly .~e::'l1diated 'N~:lo.t CriI'!:?s he.d. S'lid. ' 't';,m9s, 8' 
:Jam,.o.r-.: 193'} •. A..!1 elator;;>,tio!'l. of the' COU'1-l:::r:' centler.mn 'b.,r,e of ,Fasc}sm 
,is to be f'o,).!'\.1 in Cri-r;s' )::;,a~1"1l~t it N!,!-I;j O\'l~~. F~(.ldR':l ~," 'f.\"":it::d'1"(~ond.on: 
;, Socit'.list Lee...:1Je,1933). '. ' ....... ': '."" .,., ., , ........... '. 
T~U.0. Re;,o:!'t 1931-,' r:?~435/50., See 1,.P.A.0.~:..19J1.,.A:,::,en1ix XVII 293/309. 
T:U"C:R~fo~ '1931, ~.262. The S:'90ke!' was Tom or:3:den. Even the 
irn:>rassed .for a g110rt whil~ with the Labour Pa.rty's rerformc.noe. 
editorial 10 Se;te:':lb0!" 1934 but of. 4 O~tobe!" 1934. 
T:l1'1"lS ".'T:lS 
-See. 
l:tbeX't~r of s::!~ach, of tl19 !':ress, of ~?,.lbUc I'1getinJ ').1"'1 
. the ri~ht of assocb ..tion. ':Te set O'J~ fl:'-~~ a....:;il.iY!.st 
. e.n;:,'. kind of dicta.tarshi~ as b0~ n,:; fa! s"! to tt!O£'9 de"0t91 
!'ionoers, ~1''108e s3.crifices hav') br'::)1J,:;ht 1.'..8 130 fa.'t' 0';. th6 
road to the dcrlOcratic Sta.te t'1 he r",!p,c1-)e1 'D:r or.. im-:,~v'3Q 
. n,n"l. ,rl ,,,;,,.,..m,"l P",.,..H ':1J'lr.>nt ?,""';' s~;;t'eI'1. 'i(172) 
'rl1e 1&01.-;: of effective 9:'ro'3tt1on, :::a"!:'tic')J .. 'lrly in corr.:::ari',:w!1 to tho :::2''''',i0 .... 1S 
y~a:,; i~di~~te1: e': fal iin~6ff in the 3trenzt~ of the Lcft-T'fin.:::. 
; ,~ 
This' tre!1d ''\'T'aS a.lsa ~;raret1t at t!1e ;LB.bour P3.rt:: Con:~oren~e at S01..1thjoC't. 
, , 
;,X'actical detaUs with the issu'3 of ttFor SocialiST'! e.nd Pe'1ce" a ~:i.de:"re.n.:::i'12 
:p~lic:?, id;C';;~':lt ''\'Thich'' was based on the ,08"9ibi1i ty "of "th"e a~~ievcnlent' of chan::=e 
; :. 
b~r the process of consent. tt The doc1.1I1cnt 'l'lfl,S nnco"l1J:lromisi~ in its reaffimatio!'l 
-; :-
of de"!:1ocr?cy decla....1"'frg that t:he L!".b01:~,r U(we~ent S~ .. W, 
"no re~son why a ,eorle who, first in th~ world, 
achieved... throu,:'h Parlienentary . institutions their,:. . 
politicsl ~.nl reli,::iou9 fre9d.om SPo'..lld not, by the 
same means, achieve their economic emancipatio on •. ~( 173) 
: <~ • 
On the other hand it r"?cocnised the need for reform Etnd ::rre::;ared .a sracific 
document on : "Parlieoenta:t"/ Problens and Proce1'tre. "(174) The whole te~or of 
"For Socialisn and Peacett re:n.·esented, It •• ", •• a cha,11eU3e to those who W9re 
- '" '., .... 
claimi~ .th9.t Socialism could ,not be. broUCht .about, by the ~stablished methods of 
Parliam.E'nta,rie.nisYl"(175) and. therefore had to be cha,lleI1,3ed by ,the .Left but the 
... ~ "'-~ 
special report. on ::;rocedura1 reform .was acce:;)tab1e and,wi thpne. :small.~T?~s!'3ion, 
was com1'renoensive. ' . Thus the' Left ado::lted adlla,lsta.n,ce of acce~tin.g the special 
r9!'ort .but rejeotin,zthe cO!!1.::?lete docu'1lent u::I0n which it was based. Tactically 
this .:ploy was a f9.nu"!:'e~· The Cl1.19stion ofPal:'lio ..mentary,:reforrn was dealt with 
-.... ~;, ~ .~, 
172. T.U.C. 'Re,ol"t, 1931, 1'.366. It~.Uc~ 1"l;n9. . . 
173." ... Fci~Socia,11sm'and 'Peace (Lonri6n: ~~hO'l~ 'Pa't't~r, 19 34 ~ 1" 32 .,~,"'<wc",,· ... ". 
174 •. For a.n amen.dedversion.;.see·II.P.A.C.R.1~34, Appendix VIII p:;:>.261!3. Other 
St1J'llrlarias are to be found in .Dalton "T!1e Labour Pe.rty Proposals for the 
c; ~ Reform of .. Pa:rliamentar.: Procedure. U Politteal g,varterJ.;r,Vo1.5 .1To. 3. 
(July-Se,tem.ber, 1934),an1 his PrMtica.1 Sl)ci.ali'ST'I for .'B:>:-i;tain, Ch. VI •. 
~75. ~q .. ~.e" A History of t~9 T,e,bl')1):rP~~y f1"01" 1911,p.297; .. 
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at the' Coilterence before the fundamental question of democracy was broached 
so that the most' Cripps could offer in hi~ 'amendment to "Labour's Aims" 
was "to make Parliament effective" altho~hhe admitted during his speech 
;. , 
the. t the previous: ,days' debate had covered the situ&. tion. (176) Consequently, 
~ -< . 
on this question Morrison wu 'able to chide the Socialist League in general 
and William MelIor 'in particlllar for using generalities Whilst the N.E.C. 
had,beenproduc~g detailed'doouments for di~cuss£on. (177) 
"Parliam~nt&ry Problems and Proc'edure tf 'was' one'su~h document. It 
...... y ,~~: .:..i .~. >.~ ~ 
" , 
arose out of di~oussions which had taken plaoe sinCe 1931 on Constitutional 
and Parliamentar,y questions and represented Labour's most comprehensive 
statement on the question, of Parliamentary refonn throughout this period 
~ "... c· ~.".".! '1 ' -A' •• _,:;. ~'..~ ' •• ; 1, .~.,,': .. -;\ " -, of", ,. t~ 
a.s a whole. The RePort itself was diviaed up into' five 'parts;' the Allocation 
~. .- ,...- -.:~ ,~, -- ;::~~.\::; 
,. of Parliamentary Time; Finanoial Procedure; Delegated Legislation; the House 
- ~ ~,". !.;') • ~ " ._ :" ': t.., \~ ~- ",,S; . ,,' ; i __ ,/ 
Of Lords and Fm.ergenoy ActiOn. ,:. 'The last b-'o se~tions need not detain us. 
All that should be said about them 18' the. t th~ Party. wouid ~not br~ok ' ,u} 
opposition fron : the' House of lJords,' Which, in 8ny event, "it would: ~e~k to :, h, 
abolish during:its tenn of office ~d wOuld; if met With re~i8tan:oe 00. the;~ " 
passage of 'an lbergency Powers Bill, effectively 'deal 'with 'a situation 
~ , , • " " .,', ., , '" .. ~ ;" , r,'" " ',1 ,,' ",', ,J,:' 
arising after the accession of a Labour Government to power; and "use all " 
• y , , ,. "', ,\ .". ., • • , t .. ,., l- :f"'~ ~_~~ 
would interpret its manda.te fram the eleotorate as oonferring upon it full 
authority to proceed 'in this' 'w'a:y." (178) 
.. '.' 
"','Having remo'V'ed the ma1lt source of disoorcf that divided it fr'onthe Left 
!,~ ~,. "\ 
oftheae issue. the N.E.C: stated its objeots in teIin's with whioh even Crippa. 
176 ... 
177.' 
178. 
"i'--- .c. 
*~, '"':ii.~'" 
c, ~. :f-
... ;, '_., _~" :t--
L~.A.C.R.'193lt, pp. 158/9. 
r-, ... ~~""-:~~ -~'(~ -t.~~f'" ,,-:_~.:~" it'," ~"~~.~ ~:.. \"'!. !,.;:" ~~/ ~-:'f T"'!->~ :\"·:,~".: __ ~~·i.':-;':;:;~~ 1C"}.t;,-.k:-
~~ ,:i;. f 163/4.. L; ~'.Am, ~,ntine, nt ~aa'ief. ea ted,,", b:,' ,2,~ '~. ,:0 '~. ~()()() (p.16S). ,.",.; .. " ": ,0 ' " ",:.; , ; ,1' ,. ~., .,! t " -. 
'. <' ,~<"'< " ' •. _.,....... '. F •. _,.,.,.,. ... ""o.-".,~_:. 
IDid.:~ p.263. :.,. :'. r· ,.: :' 
".:\, 
' .. ~: t~ :."': j 4.: "~. ,1,.:. __ , { ~.". ::" :~ _. c;. .. .-j... -.::.i ~ 
."" t, .. 
L:: .-..... 4-
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could have no quarrel. 
"The Labour Party, stands fimly for Parliamentary 
Democracy, whereby the will of the people as 
, ,expressed through their elected representatives 
in the House of Canmons shall prevail, without 
undue delay, but after reasonable facilities 
have been afforded for free discussion and 
, criticism." (179) 
The purpose underlying the refonn bore a distinct resemblance to Cripps' 
proposals. Parliamentary procedure it was claimed was, 
"antiquated and unsUited to modern conditions. 
It must be brought up to date, so that 
Parliamentary Democracy may became a reality." (180) " 
. Reform was necessary so as 
r .~ 
"to enable a much larger vohme of legislation " 
be passed in the course of a Parliamentary 
Session, and while retaining all proper facilities 
for debate, to put an end to the gross waste of 
- time and repetition of discussion on the same, 
, points, which are bringing our present Parlirmentary 
',', ;; proceedings into disrepute." (181),' " <,':-,; 
r In order to turn Parliament from a tool of, obstructionism into an 
inBtr\lJlent for positive change, the Party proposed that a pennanent Camnittee 
of the House be set up, starfed in'relation to the party strengths in the House, 
whioh would allocate the maxim\lJl Parliamentary time for all· stages of. Government 
Bills after the first reading. ' Its reoanmendations on eaoh Bill would be made 
at the appropriate stage and would be open to discussion but ·not debate and' 
would be enforced by the Chainnan of Standing Ccmnittees who wouid also be able 
,to seleot amen_ents for oonsideration. (182) In his book, Praotical Socialism 
for :Britain '. Dalton advocated the restriotion of the Report Stage to the : 
.aooeptance of Government Amendments with a maximuntime ot one day. (183) . 
179. 
lSO. 
. 
,~ .. 
181. 
182. 
183. 
Ibid •• , p.26l. 
,'Lgp;oit., Of. -to make easier the passage of legislation without 
placing dangerouapowers in the hands of the Government." W.I. 
Jennings, ParJ.¥m.entaq Refonn (London: Gollancz, 1936), p.12 • 
L.P • .A..O.R~ 1934" p.261. 
This was granted in November 1934.. See Dalton Praotical Socialism 
for Britain, p.52. n.l. and H.O. Deb. 293, 00 2169/2247, 15 November 
1934.. 
Dalton, Praotical Socialism for Britain. 
3.51 
The N.E.C. proposed that the number of Standing Canmittees should 
be increased in, number ana decreased in size, (184) and the use of 
existing Standing Orders to enable the whole Parliamentary day, apart 
fran Question Time, to be devoted to the work of the Standing Canmittee, 
thus facilitating the passage of a mmber of measures at the sacne time. No 
mention, however, was made of "Functional" Canmittees and, indeed, Dalton 
expressed his opposition to them. (18.5) Certainly the proposals as such 
reflected no danination of strict Party discip1ine'and allowed for no 
restoration ,of, the freedom of the indiv1dual Members which Cripps had 
envisaged. The N.E.C. was prepared to refonn Parliament with a view to 
making it more efficient but not necessarilY to make it more effective. 
According to Dal ton, the procedure for financial legislation was Ita 
,. tedious and stupid anachronismtt (186) which required abbreviation. Originally 
designed to'p~otect the House against the Crown it no~ cons~ed one-third of 
all Par11amentar,y time (187) in a series of repetitive debates. This was 
because if the main object of a Bill was to raise public expenditure, or if 
it involved, even as a subsidiary feature of a Bill, the Itc'reation of a public 
charge" • Financial resolution had to be proposed and passed through Canmittee 
of the whole House ~d then Report Stage. The N.E.C. therefore proposed to 
abol'ish all tiancial resolutions with the exoeption of the Budget Speeoh. The 
Budget Resolutions might -be made on the motion for the first reading of the 
. , 
Finance Bill, thWI allowing the Second Reading of the Finance Bill to be used 
tor gene~l debate on the Government'. overall plans and proposals. (188) For 
1Stt.. Dal ton suggested an increase in number tran 5 to 7 and in size 
" .". tran between 50 and 60 to a maximw of" 30. ~., pp. 52/3. 
185.·, rug.; . p.53. 
, lli,9,., p~55.: ", 
,Jennings, Parliamentary Reform, p.166. 
See Note 20. 
,. 
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circulated ~ri t!1 tl1 e. :Bill. 
The 
was re'luired to slIm'! fo"!: n(la~tion ~nd e~e"!:imE'ntnt:ion whilst Modern condHion.8 
T'lade it necesst>.X'lJ to combine P:l:!'li(l.menta~· Governn~'nt with mTift administr?ti ve 
?.ctj,on.' Underlyin,:; this was the ove-.:-all need to rel:ieve pressu.re on Parlia.r.lenb.!."'J 
time. 
-c. "the Labour Party t~.ke9 the vie..,. that subject to sllitable 
sa..fe.:;u~..rds, the effic1er..c:r of P:"'.:!'1ieJ:'lent will be ,::re?.tly 
increased by the wide:!' use ofdele.:;ated lo.::islation for 
a1?1?ropriate r:n.l.rr0~es. In matters of le.:;islation, 
Parliarvmt ou,::ht, bro!?dl~r, to confine i h:elf to two 
functions:-
a) It should debate 'e.nd decide on th.e :,:rincipl~s and 
ceneral strl-'.cture of le3islation, and 
·b).it should examine and approve the Orders and 
Re,::':t1ations by which the Deryartments of State .::ive 
effect to leJislation."(190) . 
The Rerort continued,. 
, "A Labour Government' ••••• would seek to !'lake. Pa.:rlia.r.lent 
the ,lace wh'?re principles and le.::islative strlJ.cture, 
and not details are debated and decided. "(191) ,. 
I:t. took: the . .vie")'. t!rl.t. in appropri!?te cases Parlie.ment could use. the St.g.ndiU3 
Committe~'3 for c.etermining whether Orders and Rezule..tions fellprorerly w'ithin:' 
• 
___ ' ....... : .. ' "'<.-C/";"'1 ~'~ " , 
190. L.~.A.C.R. 193~ ;1?262/3 • 
.. ,. .. ~ .... # ... - ~ • ~ .. # 
, . . , 
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the terms of the Acts ou.t of ",hich they arose. (192) Da1 to!'" ~ hO'"ev~r, r:"'ent 
erl'roval,' s'1ou1d be c.ee'TIed al'?roved unless rejected b!r bot'1- House'3 of 
Parli9.1!1ent within a. ~iven ?€rriod.(193) 
.. The debate on the Rel'o:!:'t'.'las a. short one with Crirrs saytn,:: that it 
satisfactorily covered all the points raised at Hastin:s Confp~en~e, a claiM 
which W!J.'3 disp'lted, in res,ect of the r:ro:;:os'lls dee-lin,:: with the Hou.se of 
Lords by Lees-Smith and Emmanllel Shinvrell, before beil\3 carrieCl. (19~·) 
It would not be fair to rezard the docl~ents as a victo~' for the Left. 
Indeed, they brou~ht out the fnnd.aT'!pnta1 contr"tdiction in the attitude of the 
Left, for if "ca,ita1ist de!!locrac!ru was inca!,able of facilitatin3 'the tr9..nsition 
to Socia1isn then reforn of the institutions it had fashioned was a 'waste 'of 
,. time.', It m;i:s th:t.s basic misinterpretation of the nature of the 1931 Political 
Crisis and of British socie~r in the 'Thirties a misinterpretation c~lsed by 
subjective irieolo,::ica1 bias, that coloured all inte11'retations of their ideas 
aboutParlir~cnt~J refoTm.(195) In bare detail these pro,osals, set apart 
froI'l the context of crisis in which they had been placed, '",ere little more 
than, l".n ill-assorted mixtm,'e of reforms sueeested by ac9Jiemi,cs and politicians 
over a number of decades. The Left was not pre:!llred to admit the eclectic 
na:b.lre, of their prorosals but it is clear that few were oriCina.1.· Indeed,'" 
whereas Laski' a initial response to the N ation~.l Gove:rn~ent' s use of Orders-in-
Conncil had' been hostile J .R. CI!rnes had imr1.ediately pointed out that such 
• 
, 
192. Lon.ott., Cf. Da,lton, !Tectil'!r>.1 ~f)ci!tlism fo~'Britain, rp.63/4. 
, -
, , 
193.' Ih,iti. , '!'p. 64/5.' ., 
194.··· L:P:A~C.R.1~n4, r-p.148/51 ~: ro~ t~e ~hol,e debate. 
"i§,P.' 
. '
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techniques could be ,,-sed by a futur~ Labour Governrn.ent to nationf-l.lise eMontif-l.l 
industries, (196) wp.ilst accordit13 to Dalton he first heard. the Su.:.:.:::"'!stion that 
f)nancial resolutions be abolished from Lees-Smith, who was hardly a Left-Wiruer(197) 
, .' ", , H • 
'rh!') ·'su,~.:esti6n that functional .Cox!l!ui ttees of the HOU.39 be a~pointe(t was little 
~ore than a re~lr:itati~n of the ideas of Fred Jowett, suitably modified to 
. fit in C with' the proposals made for stror-e1y-mandated government. In all the 
'. , 
~roposals of the Left can be said to re~res~nt the inevitable reaction to the 
inade':'lacies of, the Second Labour Gove~nJTIent set Within a s11!'e,..ficially pOI'ulo.r 
,,.;ideoloey. ,".<' ... , .. ' 
:By cont~st the proposals adorted by the I,aboll2" Party in 1934 reflect the 
• 
fa! th of the Movement' in "the efficiency' of democracy' a~ri the Parliamenta":'Y 
method. It did not'relect a stren,ztheniQJ or vreakentns of "gr3..dualism" but 
1 ! • .:. . ~ .\ 
¥8, restatement' of its [value' in teres of necessar/ reform. The inade'luaCi.cs 
of' a . ~olitical analysis which took little account of pconomic forces was full~r 
recoenised. " "Political fo;rmq," wrote Ru..:;:h Dal ton, "axe t~igted by econom:i.c 
. '.' ", 
.. , .; ,," 
fo-rees. CUizens, ; leeally elJ,uf),l, wield unequal poV/cr. Politicf-l.l democ~acy 
> , ~ ,- .., 
will only be fully alive when m:u-ried to economic demooracy in a. 90ciet'-J of 
, e'luals. "(198) . Yet this a.i:n was realisable throuZh ParliamentarJ mel?ns, "even 
, if alterati?ns in the procedural details of the, House 'of Commons were necessa.-r:.'. 
Renderson IDe.de this ,oint a.t the 1934 Conference when, 9!,eelcin,:: on the <,!uAstton 
., 
of war and peace, he said, 
"We a.ll ~"Tee tha.t P~t:t'linn.enta!"J I'rocedllre must be ' 
modp.rnised e~d speeded up, so that it can deliver 
the coods and eive effect to the "1'1:1.11 of the 1'eo:,"le 
••••• /continued, 
, .. ----------------------------------------------------------------------------_. 
_,196. H.C.De'IJ.256, oc.436." See Note2f. 
"-,,-:-
• ~.,~ - __ ~, "" "' ,,,,- ".< < ." T';' •• ~" • 
. ~ 
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without let or hindrance •••• Bu.t we also agree that 
Parliament is essential to freedom and democracy, and 
" indispensable both in our struggle for power and in 
our plans for using power once it has been gained."(199) 
Parliament was "the natural instrument" in the struggle for social justice. 
Nonetheless, there was little doubt that Britain was freer that Fascist 
oountries having, 
"periodical free eleotions and •••• between elections, 
" a oontinuing right of free political speeoh, discussion 
,and oritioism, both inside Parliament and other eleoted 
bodies, and outside." (200) 
As for the belief that demooraoy would not work Hugh Dal ton wrote, 
"I disoount heavily, in this oanmon-sense and 
politioally mature country, all panio talk, 
whether fron Right or Left, of an inevitable 
orisis •••• " (201) 
Jennings made the same point in relation to the refonn of Parliamentary 
,. 
procedure when he wrote, 
"the problem of Parl~entar,y procedure is not a 
party problem. It would beoane more aoute under 
a Labour Government which proposed to introduoe a 
oonsiderable number ot radical measures. But it 
is one whioh demands solution whatever •••• the 
Party situation in the HOuse of Canmons.- (202) 
It was these procedural problems that the Labour Exeoutive sought to solve, 
not' the pseudo-intelleotual problems oreated by the Left. 
199. L.P.,A.C.R.19}t, p.157. 
200~ Dal ton~ Praetioal Socialism for Britain, p.32. 
201.'~.' p.15. 
202. Jennings, Parliamenta£Y Refonn, pp. 9/10. 
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!lI.'orosp-ls ,for the T~fl)r!'1 of' Pa:>:'liam(>!1ta~" ~:ro09dll're it \'1'~S not until elev9n years 
later that the!' we:re' in a 1'osi tiot'}. a,_,thoTitatbre eoo1.1..:h to ena11e theT'l to 
C~~!l1ittees. 
'With the O:'::::osition th!'')l,'.::;hthe '1.tr1.'.el ch:?n~;"ls 1.n. 'an. att~~rt 'to' r!'o1:nce a ;i'. 
co~se!1g,~~ of' 0,in1on a"jo~ the leo,d.ers~yto· i.fnot t'1~':r2,nk-o.!1d':'filt) of th(; r.l:l5.!1· 
"~;:; "J ! ~)~: ';:"_ .~~ !¥ ,,'-./; «.,'~' -:: •• !.,;'.: 
a "no':l-;ert1san"! iss1.'e as rrocedural :!'f3fo::m. :.Int!'le ca.se of the fin:t!1otal 
Tesollltions this i3 C'7t.at th~ Laoour Po.Tt:,' did in fact do, 
y. " ' ", 'z ," '" 
htwinz rreviotlsly 
" 1'. 
'i 
,,;.,, '.'J . , 
, . 
·1';' 
:.';;"''il 
.' 
, aooepted the Government's refusal to agree to the Report of the Seleot 
.. Ccmnittee on Prooedure that they should be taken after the Seoond Reading. 
The Labour Par~' s protest arose from the rigidity of the financial 
resolutions drawn up by the Government which, by their narrowness, 
, -, 
prevented effeotive discussion of the subjeots under debate. (203) The 
Party moved on the floor of the House that Standing Order 63 be emitted 
: fran the Standing Orders of the House (204) in order to show its annoyance 
, at the" framing of finanoial; resolutions in general and on the Special Areas 
, Bill' in particular. Their oanplaint was that the Government's' aotion was 
reduoing Parliamentary government to a farce. (20.5) " 
",:., _.,J 
The end product of the protest was the' establishment of the Select 
Canmittee relating to Money Resolutioxswhich reported in favour of a 
rdeclaratory resolution of the House calling for financial" resolutions to be 
t 
.' expressed in wider terms than its detailed provisions and that such " 
resolution:s should oane after the Second Reading. (206) , The Report was' in 
due time accepted by t~ Govenment in practice 'though the declaratory 
: resolution was not employed.· (207) ,The jmportance of that acceptance 
fram the LabourPar~' s point of view was that' it was a recognition of 
.. the Party's progranme of reform on that issue - 8J.beit a small one and 
it is"~otioeable'that it'was on that one issue which the'Party actively 
pursued its declared polft:y that it a.chi~ved' its ajm. ,,': 
: It may be argued, of oourse; that the Party:had little reason to pursue· 
'suoh details as procedural reform even in' those oases where the oase' for change 
, ,'" ~1' ,_ :'__ . ~ ',' " ~" . r-:~ ~', . .;;;. . ~ . ,l !> ~. ,-' 
'203.;:"See H.C. Deb. 321,' oc • .544/6 and oc.' 81.5 et.seq~ ,4 and 8 Maroh 1937. 
~' •• , • ,.' ,_ .:". ',..... J t, _.~._. ,_"~ •. "''' :"'''' '..:, •.. ~ 
204. The Standing Order (63) dealt with a reocmnendation fram the Crown 
:- ~ :~" which .was required before the House could discuss applioations 
relating to the raising of ,revenue • 
. 20.5. ";~:Ibid.,' c~ ~ , 848/54' (Speech by Aneurin Bevin) • 
- , 
; 206. "R rt of the Select Canmittee on Procedure Relat 
~~ 207. 
'Regolutions. H.C. 149. Parliamentary Papers 193 
13 July 1937. ,See espeoially Scott Lindsay's evidenoe on behalf 
of the PIP pp. 6.5/77. 
The Seleot Committee's recommendations along these lines are to 
be found in ~., para. 6 (i) (il). For the, Goverrment' s response 
see H.C. Deb. 331, cc. 67/105. 1 February 1938. 
.. ' 
, 
" 
: 
was so obvious •.... Moreover; it could be. claimed' that as the Party was 
caunitted to reform when it secured office it was well-advised in following 
a moderate policy designed to prevent the alienation of its opponents on the 
question.' Finally, there is little doubt that the Party considered that the 
burning questions of ccntinuing unEmployment, Fascism abroad' and events at ' 
bane demanded more attention than that of minor tinkering with Parliament. Yet 
the Party accepted the general oontention that Parliament was too obstructive, 
filled with the repetitious debate of a ~ta1king shop" instead of being the 
business assembly it ought to be." They believed with Hugh Daltonthat,' 
" :., "the Parliamentary machinery can be modernised and 
revitalised so as to enable it to y.eld a greater 
.. " legislative output, while dEmocratic principles are ' 
fully maintained, and Parliament is better enabled 
to disoharge its functions. It (208)~.,'· ;: .': . ,:,' .L \ 
<;:iven that belief the Party's lack of urgency was incredible i' a: judganent'~ 
reinforoed by' the Party's assertion at the outset of war that "the procedure' 
of the House of Ccmnons must be refozmed to enable it to grapple with the'> 
problems of, the positive" State. It (209); The Party's aotivity on'the question 
did not accord with its med1Uy. ~: .. ';. . . ~ . '. ",,'L' ,'. . ;, 
':,' One reason for this was the Party's adherence to the traditional; inter-
pretation of the role of Parliament as the grand inquest· of the nation.~;' "This 
House,ltdeolared Attlee, "has never been a mere'assEmbly<f,orJegistration~{ It/:·,;< 
has never been: a mere debatirig society~ It (210) .. : In effeot Attlee' was argu1rlg that 
"the most important duty of Parliament is to approve or disapprove the proposals 
of the Cabiriet in office;'; its business is oritioism not legislaticn~ "(211) The 
208. Dal ton: "Labour Party's Proposals for, the Refonn of Parliamentary 
'I '." -
Procedure," Politioal QuarterJ.:i, 1931+, op.oit., p.45. 
'1 -"1;';;" 
,,.~"" ;" ;<,; " , 
: 
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Party's commitment was, therefore, the preservation of that traditional 
role whereby ,.theCOOIIIlons oould influence polioy without ruli;ng and the 
Oppo~ition maintain ita conatitutionalrights against possible Executive 
abuses of power without neoessarilYrestricting the power of the Exeoutive 
itself. ; Thus the LaboUr Party was conoerned less with the functioning of a 
prooedurally perfect Parliament as with an ins~I'UIIlentof government whioh 
they ,by adopting a consensus polioy in the present , oould use to seoure 
Socialist aims in the future. ,It was in this way that the Party contrived 
to give the appearanoe, of oonservatism when its polioy was essentially 
pragma. tic.;: " : 
r ',: ,It was, for this reason that the Party, had little time for the 
traditional,role of the Private Member. Private Members' .:Sills may prov,ide 
time 'for oriticism but not for really fundamental aotion. 
r '. . . '" " " ," , 
As Hugh Dal t on 
~ " " ~ .. 
wrote of Private Members' Bills "it would be better. it fewer got a Seoonj 
", _ , 'cu -, •• _..-. '-<. _v_ 
Reading, , but it most of whioh got a 3econ~ Reading pass~, amended whe~e 
ne~essary ,into law. tt. (2.~2) To: the Party the most fundamental ohange~, that 
had to be made was by the Party as a whole rather than individual members 
k" '> • {. ",' •• : > -, • , " _ •• .I " .' , <." '.. ~ > 
and ,the usage of private M~bera 'time "to ~urther the ~~rty:s aims seems to 
have been thought of sparingly., Indeed, the nearest the Party seems / to have 
.' •• • . • . , ,. ~- ~ '" -. '"~, r 
been in deolaring itself at all was when Mr. Tinker failed ,to get the Government 
'. -, < - , "... ,- ," , ' '~ ...... ~. .., ~, .'., 
, 
to consider that it would also give faoilities for Second Reading discussion 
-~. ' - ~ ~ ,~ .. ' ,-.., \ 
ot Private Members', Bills suooessfully introduoed as first reading in two 
. ~ .. ~.,. '. " -'. -. ~ 
oon~eoutiv~ ~essions. (213):,' Like most politieal parties the Labour Party'. 
concem for the right. ot.the Private Member was greater in opposition than 
_ ~ ~ _ '0- _ ~ • ". _, ,.- • ,,-' • '- _ • 
in otfice, ,but in the ,,'Thirties it waa virtually non-existent. ~:- : 
212. 
, . 
213. 
" . "'''' -
DaltOD, Pract.oal Sociali_ for Britain, p.58. Ot. Morriaon'. 
evU.nce to the Sel .. t Camnitte. on Prooedur., Third R~ort of the 
~ .. t OClllllAtt •• on Proc.aure, (H.O. ,189, 189/1J, Q. 35013675 
pp l4078. ' , -' '" '" ".' ' . , 
B.O. I).b.' 312, eo~ l.826~ 26 May 1936. 
One reason wny the Labour Party did not involve itself more in 
the general question of procedural refonn of the House of Commons in 
the years 1931-39 can be found in the fact that it formulated its own 
proposals after the House had examined the question itself. Procedural 
-. 
refonn in the House tended to be generational in the sense of its being 
discussed by a Select Cannittee ever,y fifteen years, (214) and a general 
re-examination of the problem in the 'Thirties was unlikely even if it 
were necessary. " The Select Canmittee of 1932 whilst not the strict 
successor of that of 1931 used the evidence placed before the previous 
Select Canmittee when reaching its conclusions. Starting fran the same 
tenns of reference as its predecessor it unan:imously concluded that "the 
Procedure of Parliament is sufficiently flexible to meet all the demands 
.-made upon it." . The Select Canmittee proposed a number of changes in 
addition to those connected with Financial resolutions to which reference 
has already been made. The Government's attitude was suitably illogical 
resisting same proposals, rejecting others in a manner vaguely patronising 
and explici tly inadequate. The Party, in, the House, having probably been' 
consulted through the usual channels, did not press their case far 
further changes to a division. (215) It is significant that the Party 
made no fannal camplaint against the Government's proposals but insisted 
only that the changes woUld not ,"infringe the fair rights and opportunities 
of the Opposition, or unduly strengthen the Government against private 
Those Labour Members who spoke regarded the changes as Members." (216) 
~'~ .. V-:'''''''<-''.J~.,,,,...., ""'_~"" .'I!" """'_.'<1 .•..• " ~ j ., .-
" making Parliament less· obstructive and thus more efficient. The Report of'a 
small expert Ccmmittee naninated by the Speaker at the request of the Select 
214-. For example, 1902; 1914-; 1930-2; 194-6. 
215. H.C.'Deb. 293, cc. 2169/224-9. 15 November 1934-. See Note 22. 
216. ~., cc. 2176. Attlee. 
,. 
, , 
.361 
GOV~"!"'1nent. 
officers of the rr"'.,,-se /:,,9 bein~ electe:l He"'h~"':'s. (218) Tl1.e N.~.C. decided t" 
the Chair, a.nd that the necessa::r".! !=tlterattons in the law wou.ld bo :::rr0c~:'!'?0.o(1 "Vith 
b~' cClntestin.,: the S:H~9kert s sl?at ~.n, 1935 rr)11ch to the. dis9,::?!,roval of S0r.19 
intelle~t"al ci~ieg. (220) . Yet vrhen the House of Commons set'1.1., a Select 
Cor.m;ittee ''to consider what ste:Ds'~ if any, should be to.ken to ensu.re that ho.vin,:: 
due re03.rd to the CO!'lst'ttntional ri~hts of the electors; the Sp92.ker durin,::: his 
217. 
218. L.P.A.0.R. 1?3?, p.71. 
219.-N'.E.C. Mi."lJ,tes Vol.63, E.C.11,1932/3,21 July 1933. 
220 ~ .. See ~' ;;; "~~~~;ie, H~H·Fi~~;~· ~e< b.~e of~ ('~~~~T'l~~t ,«k,nd_~~t~;!~th~;~n; 1946), 
,':.; pr.104/5.·· ... , . '" - ; ..... 
" 
continuance of office, shall not be required to take part in a contested 
Parliamentary election." (221) Labour Manbers did not dissent fram the 
Report which reflected the Parliamentary conservatism of J.R. Clynes, 
George Lansbury, Will Thorne and Sir Robert Young who accepted the need 
to educate the electorate as to the functions performed by the Speaker 
on behalf of the HOuse. "(222) Whatever radicalism existed in the Party 
, , 
on the question of procedUral reform it was not translated into effective 
action by the P.L.P~ 
Tactically the policy of securing agreement in the House on 
procedural chang'es' was' useful in allaying fears raised by Cripps and the 
" 
Socialist League whose' sole contribution ;to the question had been to deter 
the Party fram the appearance of innovation. Yet the Party seemed happy 
rto accept the intellectual ana~ses of the failings of Parliament without 
accepting any' of 'the proposed solutions. The Party recognised, as did the 
Select Canmi ttee, of 1932, that the probl~s facing the House of COOll:lOnS 
were neither new nor confined to the House of Cammons. 
l i-" 
, 
"They present themselves in almost every elected , 
, ~, assembly in all countries where modern views as to' 
the powers and duties of the State are finding 
expression and where the vastly complicated social, 
industrial, carunercial and econamic questions of 
our time are demanding parliamentary attention and 
solution." (223) , '," 
., 
However, more importantly, the Party did not dissent- fram the view that, 
"wherever a representative assembly acts as a 
healthy and vigorous organ of government, its 
regulations and fonus must be such as, while 
i« ___ •• _ •••• _ c,' pennitting adequate debate and giving adequate 
.221. 
222. 
.. 223. 
powers of initiative to its individual Members, 
,will-assist the ~xecutive in providing with 
regularity and celerity for the vital wants of 
the State." (224) c ' " I 
Parliament a , H.C; 98, , 
Parliamentary Papers 
. ~ .. ~ ~ 
~~, "para. 6l. 
Select Canmittee on Procedure, H.C. 129, (1932) Op.cit., 
p.vii. para.2. 
224. ~., p.vi. p~ra.6. 
,. 
Parliament remained the erand in<:nest of the nation. 
The only re~l, exception to the acceptance of this tr::'.d.i tional role was 
in fact, an atte~t to extend it by nse of De:::artmental COMrrJittees. The 
of the Select Corr.mi ttee·· "'es eene":'al and 11ndefi.n:?d. The maj ori t~T of the 
Select Committee had stated that they were not convi.nced that these c0!'1!"1itte0s 
wou.ld either be !J'1,tfficiently re:::rescntative of the House as a whole to achieve 
the end d.esired, or balance the zrave dj.sadvantages which wou.ld, :i.n their 
j ud3ement, arise frOM the del?~s inherent in the ~:9tem. 
(T. Ca:::e and R. Davies) rroposed to add t:h.e wor·is ttbut tp.ey feel that the 
subject :t"eTlired :more o.etailed E"xarnination than has been possible. "(225) The 
Part:T did not pursue the matte!' 8:(ry further. Thus whilst it is true that 
..there has been amonzstacaCtemics a. 
'(; "belief that the House of Commons oueht to set up 
specialised Comrnittees of Members who would act as 
some fo!'!ll of link between t:be Hm.'s"! a,nd the 
individual De::?s--M:ment of State" 
that belief has not found many "influential" su::?porters in the Pe,rty, a fact 
which ra.....~ially accounts for its fa.ilure to have any real impact before 1951 
-', .. " 
at least.(226) 
If.the :t"ecord of the P.L.P~ on the ~uestionof procedure wa~.barr~n it~ 
su:::,:,ort for :personal secllri ty for Me:nbers of P:rlio.ment reMained cons:i.stently t I 
stro~, if never forceful. To SO!!le extent it was unnecessary for the P.L.P.b 
.. 
225. 
226. 
..~ ,\, ~ ..... '. F • • I."~ > 
I!?1i., para. 8. 
pqrlieJ'1.e!'t~!",r Refo:r.m 1 Q A.,S\1"r'V"'" of' Re~ nt P1:'t"\"f)S.9.1.~ £0":' t:h.~ 
Commons,. .Lond.on: .Cassellfor .the Hansaro Society, .1967)P .. 45. 
Attlee .did stl-PI'ort, the id.e!.'\. but !,ut in. the context that "I do not think 
that a Labour Gove:rn.ment shollld waste much time over elr>.borate attem::?ts 
.to alter ,rocedure but should only m'3.ke sHch alterations as arF:! !'e'l11y 
nenessar:tfor effective work." ~ttlee, The Lfl.hOl~,!, P'3.rt~' 1.n Pe:r~rect:tvn.. 
p.l7l. . . . ........ ' .. " ...... . 
Its de~ise was n~v~r' fully accA:,ted, not eV0n in somA 11",h')ll"" c1rcll""l, (227) but 
the need to :!?:r'ovide mo'!:'!;! ader;.'.:o.te sala:t·:.' j:!~JI conditions for Me1"!hel'~ ':;f1.:tne1 '·r:i..::'ier 
Labour Pa~y to state its ,oeUton on s~lch Tn.?tters as salaries end. ?ensio~s. 
The Question of sallll'ies was ctealt "rith in 1937 wh·om tlle Gove'!:'PMent 
introo.uced·R rAsohlt:i.on ex::;'ressin.:r th~ opinion of th8 RCllse th:".t sale.riAs 
should b~ in;t'~as~d to £600 l'er emnul'!. (229) Neville Ch~~be'!:'lain, the ~i~9 
- . 
Minister, said in I:!ovi.n.:; the resoluti~n that it was based u:,on the Rerort of the 
tbe .:rener1.1 fJ.t''"'~t;ion c!' t1-,,,, nr:~1 to :ro'v1.1.e·~ :Anstons i't;!'ltl for 1~pryh"'r'1; "'M-.~.ch 
.' " 
. ..'; .. > . 
• ..,..- ...... " •.. ,,--'.,.><-......... .. 
J'o~1.'1.h ':'Tea.=""o,:'!. p.:r,:ued dn.rin,:: O~le d.0D:?te that 9." 1 f'; l:l'>"I~~:'" '''''''''ra-r-Q'3 
for p:.'..1)lt~ S'e::v1~0'3 '.'Tore l..m(1:3si."'~'-')1e; rr,~,T\n<-322:6;-.o688?)91·b;.t;' of,_.,:, 
CO".:>:'':!? \.'r9·:t~':l':'-:t 0,)".11 1'I.ffo::,,~ t(' b~ in1.e:!i~'10~nt '" 
,-, - '-' ".. , ~ 
228~ H.~, 1'\.0:-.,' 325,t:'c.10·19 ~t..~;''':. 27 In'''',~ 1937. 
... '" 229. TT.C~-!)';~). J?5, ~o.1102. 
: ." 
Co"~titu~~~ies.(231) 
decl9ore1 itself in .favour of t~c ~.~itiation of 19,:isl9otion ".'T'lich im::'1os9d ~o 
The Corm! ttee h?d in fact !):l'o:?oserl the insti t'lti!1$ 
of a rensions s~he':l,), '.'1hich it re,::a:!Xleri !'.S the corollory of the :p~rment of 
.. 
~~ stro,n~th of the m~~~lre w~s testified 
by the natu2"e ef t!lr:3 e!):;(osition S~10Ym to it, ,';hich C0J'le from rich Conscrv'lt1.ve 
• 
"co~sciou,g ef the fMt that s~larigs were recently 
inc2"caged; ..... :m1. be:l't'i.n~ in mind the !.'ecent decision 
not to incr'3:?se old a.:;e pe"lsions (tM.s Rcmse) o.e,..,1ine9 
to con:;l'ide~·9. s~heme for rens;.ons for itself de"t'ivcd. 
1n pa2"t from publio fnn-'!9. "(234) 
230. l2.1i. t cc. 1055/60. See also the debate on Hinisteria.l 82.1a:r1es, H.C.D.eb" cc. 
322·and 639 et.se~. 
231. H,??""o,~ •. 351, 00.1858/9,31 July 1-937. 
232;', R.C.Deb.343,< oc.418. et.se'1. 
233. ttRe"o~' of the Do:pqrlm~mt9.1 Committee on Pensions for l!c~bers of tho !!0'J~e of' COl"l!1onstr,cmd. 56'>.4 (j5ecember 193;1~ 
234. H.C.Dob. 343,cc.42$~ 
~; 
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Lees-Smith repeated his claim. that the House had to talce account of the 
new type of Member who had entered the House, one without resources. (235) 
On a free vote the measure was approved, with Labour solidly supporting 
it. 
Throughout the subsequent debate the same patterns prevailed. 
One Labour Member, Ben anith, thought the basis of the Bill was wrong (236) 
- ~ . 
but t?e gener:alLabour view was that it was a step in the right direction. 
Opposition .to the measure was protraced and irrelevant. One member, 
Hely-Hutc~son, an ?ld Etonian, argued that "if anyone cannot afford 
to become a Member he need not stand for election, It (237) while a Major 
• ;, -.«' ~ -, ." 
Proctor spo~e of the need to give the. old age pensioners a rise, 
notwi ths tanding th: fact that he late:. v?ted against a resolution 
'it. (, 
, regretting the Government's failure to provide the necessary means 
'\.- - : '~ > ~." "". : 
for improvem~z:t in old age pensions allegedly on the grounds that it 
was a vote of censure against the Government. (238) In Committee the 
Conservatives resisted to the end, fo~cing an all-night sitting in which 
;":)~..- "'.~ •• i!' ~~ 
they were defeated on all ten divisionS .they .. called. (239) As always in 
'.>- ,~, /, ~ ,- , • ~. ". ' 
such matters the Labour Party was prepared to meet such persistent 
, . 
• " ~. ,! ".- • 
oppositionwit~persistent advoc~cy. In a Parliamentary system which 
. .. 
encouraged obstructive opposition progress was won by eternal vigilence 
'. ,,' .' 
and the proper exercise of superior voting power., . 
. r. t J' 
235. 
236. 
237. 
238. 
- 239. 
~ .-' 
_. 
H.C. Deb. 349, cc. 2509 et.seq. 
,"- ,- "- .,~. ~" ~ - 'Y "," ~ ;~ 
~., cc. 2562. 
. . 
Ibid. , .. cc •. 2521 •. ~ 
~ c,.' .:- ~.,. ~:.', ". _:-. '-~. '.:', > • '"".~_. 
See HeC. Deb. 350, cc. 1717-24. 27 July 1939. 
H.C. Deb. .350, cc. 569 et. seq. 19.July 1939 and 1359 
et.seq. 25 July 1939. 
: 
(c) Parliament, the Executive and Representation. 
One of the problems which presented itself as a result of 
formation of the National Government was the exact nature of Parliament 
and the Executive in general and under a Labour Government in particular. 
During the decad~ this relationship presented itself mainlY in the 
Ministers of .the Crown Act which followed a resolution of'the House of 
. Canmons declaring itself in favour of the ranoval of ananalies between 
various Ministerial salaries. (240) The Labour Party unsuccessfully 
moved an amendment to prevent an increase in the overall expenditure and 
moved a similar 8Ulenament on the Minister et the Crown Act. (24l) The 
basic argunent used by the Party was that the whole structure et 
government required rationalisation. (242) Not that the Party had done. 
ver.y much previouslY. The most frequent problem was the chaotic state of ' 
the law brought about by the piecemeal devel~ent of aaninis tra tive . 
functions since the 18th centur.y. During the Thirties Viscount Cranborne· 
had the distinction et . having two Bills declaring the ,law. so 'as to remove 
doubts concerning his eligibility for office. (24.3) The Labour Party 
=--
opposed the latter Bill 00. the grounds that the administrative.';' 
framework should be reorganised to fit the job, not fit the person 
\ .. " I , : ~ 
• e •• , , .. 
into the framework and used the opportunity generally to protest. '" The 
to ~ . .,. (~;;, " ~. ,. ;- '" "" '.,~,..." 
Party, however,' made no attempt to state a definite position on the., 
~ {,~, ~'.~. '; , 
question of the relationship between Parliament which was in any w~ different. 
\ ""'. 
-.'\ "!'. 
H.O~' Deb •. 310, cc. 1251 et. seq. '25 March 1936 •. : 
H.O.tDeb. '322, oc.'639-752(653) '12 Aprill937~">' 
<~ __ ._ .. ;:.~,~!,; ' •.. :;-,.~ _,."" l",.. ",' 
See, for example, Arthur Greenwood's speech Ibid., cc. 653/64. 
i'" ~ tl • ·f --i ,~ -
H.O. Deb. 250, QC. 361/8 ".25 March 1931 and R.O. Deb. 304, .,' ." 
cc. 828 et. seq., 15 July 1934.. " 
'- ,f 
":- .' '';.- '" ~ 
.; '.":,, ¥---" ....... 
:. ;' 
from that of its predecessors. (244) Parliament was regarded as the 
check upon rather than the controller of the Executive. Outside the 
Left there was little more than a cursory reference by Hugh Dalton as 
to the possible adoption of occupational groupings as the basis for 
representa tion. (245) ~ 
The main activity engaged in by the Party tended to be, as in 
the case of adm~istrative illegalities, responsive to events rather than 
the pursuit of well-defined aims. Part~, this was due to the nature of the 
subject involved. Redistribution, for example, tended to be an inter-party 
question attracting the attention of such Members like those for Ramford who 
were direct~ affected. Increased facilities for Blind Voters provided for 
by a Special Act (246) showed what could be achieved if there was a large 
degree of agreement on non-controversial technical issues. 
Not all isaues were technical or non-controversial. The Labour Party 
resisted Tor,y measures designed to disenfranchise negligent electors (247) 
and increase the powers of the House of Lords. (248) Throughout the decade 
the Party used what few opportunities it had to pursue the fulfilment of the 
principle of equality in electoral matters in accordance with the Party's 
general commitment to abolition of plural voting. 
Dav1d Butler has rightly pointed out that dUring the 1930' s 
"the Labour Party •••• abandoned all :interest in changing 
the system of voting, despite the fact that in 1931 they 
suffered the heaviest blow ever to befall a major party 
, (When) "their numbers were cut fram 288 to 52 and for four 
""" years they rema:ined disastrous~ under-represented :in the 
House. It (249) " -" " 
During the Second Labour Government a Bill was passed to remove 
doubts as to the meaning of the Succession"' of the Urown ~ .Acts of 
""1782 and 1801. "21 and 22 Geo. V.-,Ch. 13" 1930-31. 
"i>aJ.ton; Practioal Socialism for Britain, p.31, n.l. 
23 and 24" Geo. 5. Ch. 27. 
"H.C. Deb. 288, cc. "158/62. 10 April 1934. 
< '" 
H.L~"Deb. 90~ 00. 605;,et.seq. the 19 Deoember 1933, the debate 
"was oen tred around Cripp8' proposals as set out in Can Socialian 
Oaae? See a180 H.C. Deb. 273, 00. 681. et.seq. 16 December 1932. 
Butler, gp.cit., p.84.. Apart fram a resolution to the Hast:ings 
" Conference in 1933 (L.P.A.C.R. 1933, p. 238) the subject of " 
electoral refom did not arise at the Labour-Par~ Conference at 
all in the 1930's. 
,; .':'J,,..-t c."; "r('\' '1:" 
.. '" . - "-., 
R'l\:h Dalton l1'3ser-ted that, 
"there ca!! b~ littlp dOl1.bt that (p.~.' .•••. h~1"10a t.0 . . 
de"l+. ... ":. .. n~'"'1cc ... Qtic eOV"."Mr.!ent tn Ge!:'Ma.n:r h:r C1"'1~t~,..".: 
e."! ,,-'ne'1r)'tn.: serief:! of de<>dlocl(s ••••• weak Coali tiC'n 
Govn:""'1"'!ents, ?"il. tl-",-s ~,"'.<:)c"!:,8(1 .. tt1.n.::; Pa"!:'l:t:,.rn",,,:,-I;n.-:r-:,r 
i1"stit'l"..ttons, "(250) 
"it .1,9 1.'1' thos"'! c~'t'nt~1J!s t~'lt ad0T)t~Ct -r:>'Y.:'o""o ... tio!:'l!'J. 
, 4 ~. 
re=' ... ~Mnt?,tion on the ve"!"y best ,lan that ,,'e have 
seen, Fasnism:" late"!:' Ac'L~in.: th::\t, 
"t"'o enthnsi9"3T') f.or JTlino-rit:r ... e:,~egt'>!1t8+':i.l"\n hM ol'!ly 
. C0l!le since the cl'>_!1nce of. zettin~ a. m~.jo!'-t.ty ha~ 
dp:::'3rle~. fror1 the Libe ... <>.l Pa1"t~t. ,,( 251) 
., ,; '~";" 
t"'.9 L:the!'als. MO:>:'Mver, vrhile he m?:t h9.ve tholUht P.R. ",a,s useful ",hen Labol1.:t' 
w~s in a minor! ty it h:ld no vah1.e nmv. (252) 
.. ( , 
250. Da,lton, ~ .. ",+.;,. ... ' Sl')ciql1s.",-ro"" :R1""tte.-l.n, "2;35/6. Cf. ,"the"!:'e,is nothi,.,..:; , 
.' ••••• in Proportional.Rer-resentation torecoml"'l'Omd it to the rJabolJ.r Party. tf 
Laski, I.·",,0f'1"'~'!' Ps.:ct:t e."10 th9 Con<:<4-;'i,t.nt.-i.o'1: 1',13. 
251 ~~""'R~C.D~b'~283/:·ci;.1743/5;~et. S~1~: >:Tl1~'t~~~oith~' ';;;~tion Y'eM, ttthat, 1;""'" 
..; order to ,ensure in"fU.t"lre Parliaments a gre9.ter cones::,:'onde!1.cebetiveen the 
._ stre~th of o"2ioioo in the 'col'J1.try ano. re,resentation in the H"'.l99 of 
Cow.mons, • it is desira1:>le ,to reform the present system of P.a:rJ.i;;unenta!'y 
elections." .CC~ 1125. It W~9 lost b~~ 128 votes to 32. 
252:'; !h1.d~:· 00.'1741/8.' Cf. Dalton who' a.sserted that t~e A.V. had been 
'ii"inOlllded in the Lab01 r Govern'lJ1ent' s Electoral Refo:r.m EUI of 1931, in 
. .., order, it a::7,ears, to I'lge.se the Libe~.la." ~~_~1.. ~,I"\"ia1isl'\ fo:t' 
:Britain, 1'.36. . ~ 
-J70' 
fact which rr0'Toked At+;lee t~ r'3tort, 
"He (Crt,,8) is not in fllV'0'.lr of ~. r'ltcta-t;ors!lir, 
no~ ?.M I, bll~ ',ve '?~e :l '1. favf)u~ of CJe'3i.t'l...: t'1:),t democracy 
. ";'1o~ks.' Vre believe th3.t the najori t:, in th.e c01-'.nt:r:' 
should 1".11e, and ... ~tlJ.rn a 1"ajor:tt:' to th:l.s H0'lse, and 
our 1.l'11nedb.te cor.c ?rn is th::>.t there is abr?<:rs a da.n~~r· 
that the najori ty 0;(tnion .. ''1i11 h" th~"".,..te~" h:' enothor 
tll'lre,resentative House. "(253) 
The ~ervas:tve influencl'! of the' "Dernocracy-v-1)1.ctatoT'shi," :debate reverberated 
throu,:hout the e?rlypart of the dec9.do, an influence which !"oT'haps Q.CcO't.mted 
. f~r At'nee' s e~.ri;; disassoci!).ti.on fr0T!l the Lea2"-l.t". 
the 0'1'1.'1'8' rroposal'st'oo t'h.""t q.D.H. Cola wrote, 
It W::OS i'1. t".js context of 
, '1 
"To' P.R. the Labour Party is opposed, b~cause there 
is need, above all in a period of rapid transition 
for an electoral ~·ster.1 which wtll produce a. too 
stro~ eoviilrnment and ei ve a. l'art~· ""hich stands for 
a clel3:r-c1.1t"policy a eoodche.nce of secn.riu.:! a . 
majority in Parlirunent, tt to which he add err , "The 
A. V. on the oth'?!." h~.nd, O'l10ht 5.n my opinion to be 
seri~?sly cons1derei."(254) 
'Tht.le th-e E1ector~l ,Refo;rm Bill had been the produc,t of cOr.lI'rom:l.se the 
"";'" .c 
atti tllde of .th~ Party to "electoral m2.tters had bgen cons:i.stently advocated' 
~ <, "," ,- , ~', -T '"', , :" " " J , , 
IS~1es r~ised on that 
occt'I,sion l'rere r"ti ~erl f:!'oT'l time to time in debate '1.n the Rouse of Commons. The 
'" ~ ~ I ~, 
P.R. motion.in 1933 h'O\s.already been. noted. ~e return of Rarnse~ Uac1)onald 
'; , ,,~ "" ' I' ~. . , < L .';' • '"-' ' 
e~9 :Member 'for the Scottish Unive!"si ties rollowin.z his masqive defeat by Er.mv'tnuel 
~ :~ . : ,! ~ 
ShimvE'!ll at the 1935 Gene!"al Election p!."ovoked a P'l!"ty motion in the n~me of 
'S.P.Vi~~~ ariVOcatit'~'theabolition :Of 'unive~'~it~ re~resentatio!l.(255) . Viant 
.'. , " ;",.~ ~ ';: "" '. ~ " ' "_0, , f' _}-: " ,:, 
- ".,." 
.. 
'. ' "4 """ ... ~.~ - i ., ,'.' ......... ... ""'-'" .' ,. .. '~ l; . 
,,255. rr.d .neh:io9 ,cc~469. ~t. '3e':.26 Feb~zY .1936.' 
/. 
took the o:pportunit~~ to' attack Universities as a means of :,":>:'ve1"t:in:: tl1e 
democratic :'f1ill of.the':lation o..''1d asserted that all ::lural votin.1 ':'Tas a,3ainst 
the ~ri.nci,19 ,of 9'luf'.l,itftrian decrocr3.C:' to which the p~rty ',vas cOl'mni tted. 
, Three.years.Jate~}~a.jor 11ilner took,the or.:?ortunity rrovided 1)~. Priv1.te 
Uem1?ers'ttmeto introduce a. ;Sill de9iened to prohibit the use of Cars a~ 
elections "in,o::oder . to. ta.ke voters to the :,olls exce?t under. the supervision of 
the RetllX'niru ~ficer.(256) ,The Party's main emphasis was on the need torernove 
thealle,3ed un,tiue ,influence of money, in elections.· HUSh Dalton had ea.r.lier 
ar,:ll.ed ;that."Our ~a:rliamental;O:l, elections. are ,stillf?USht under an electora.l lllw 
which favours ,wealthy =,011tica1 pa.rtj,es and :certainselect zrouJ?s in the 
eleotor9:te, '~(257) and it was this point of view that was most promino'1t in debate. 
rbeJ,.ieve '~hat.v.n1er:thA'preSe!1tsy9teY!l, the ;creater number. of motor cars ,in use at 
91eo..t10n9 a.re at .. the service otone of ,the '.'!reatrolitica1pmies, ;th~twe want 
to place all r'1rtie~ on the same footi~. ~(258) ~; Hen1lerson, like Milner, had 
claimed. .that :the' /l~lesti(m .WIlS a non-~~ty one: and. indeed thqlatter had a:::'I'e~led 
to ,the ~Hous~to: support it ."onaro1.1nds of, justice ani fair· pla~' .of ~a1herencetl) 
the'sritit of.,the,law as walLas ofletter,'anq..of publio right an.dcon~,enience.~" 
'(259) 
His ca!,peal met, "'i th little positive resj.'onse and, a ':3reat 'deal of sarcas~. The 
measure cwast9.lked.out." 
p ."'~,Inthe~immediata historical context .,of ,the r' 'lliirties the :Labou:r ,Party 
. . . 
becaus9'of (the '; dominance t'hrou.zhout of the Nati0l'lal Government and foreien 
m:1. ttentiY,!,1U'sued<by :the ,Party ~ere' to' finda.:res:;?onse :durina; ;'lnlr-tj:meand 
' __ ~}~~,:,,~,,"_~.~:.~'~.'~:<11 ,;~~::~., ,.'>"~ t ;~~ ~ 
consl~~ation under the Attlee re~ime. 
" -"T. ~~ r~ "." ~ ~ j- ~."jo ."~.,, ~:, .~;.' 
. 
256. 
257:-
258. 
259. 
R.C~'ri~~~331, 'cc:1460.et.se'l. 11 Pebruary1938. 
Da.l ton;'Prnct~oA,l ' SoctaJ.ism'f'n"lC" B'ri t1.d n; ~ p. 37 ~. ?:".~>:. 
':1'.~;~'-",:,!: ( " _;'"'.~ ." ". ~~~ .;;. ~' ..... .>~ ~~.,;. .",~:_~. ,:~~,,:, •. _ i~,'; :,:. ,.'_:!t 
H.C.Deb .. 331 ,oc.1470.:,~" ,.' ,'" ,,~, ': ri,:' 
""'4 .!I \ , ::0' 0 '14' 66 . ,;:;; :"~ " , £"., ,,' .. ,.. • • • ' ' ~., ".. _'1 '. Iii-
. .; ..... ~ 
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(a) The Thirties: An Overview 
The most striking differenoe between the Labour Party at the outset 
: and at the close of the 1930' s was the change of emphas is fram domes tic to 
. foreign affairs. ' This was in part a produot of events but it also 
represented the re-establishment at Parliamentarism in the Labour Party. 
Whereas in the early part of the decade, the very ooncept of Parliament as 
an instrument of change in the transition fram Capitalism to Socialisn was 
. ~ <.: ' . -. : '. 
unaer attack;:albeit fram a Left-Wing'acoorded more status than ~ts real 
• .~ ~ • y > , • 
numbers deserved, by the ens of the decade the Party was praising Parliament 
as a. living' symb~l,Of d~ocr~tio government in a world too fond of 
dictatorships;" (260) :: 
As has been seen the attack on Parliament was that of a vociferous 
,minority rather than the Party as a whole whioh like Attlee ac.epte. the 
7""'::- ,1.·'1."; '~',_ A _~ .... t; .. -<'"_'; .:: .;;. ,:. to.' • .".,' , ~" 
rejection of "the method of violence and the device of diotatorship ••• "(261) 
" .: "',: ';.J J' '~', .~_ "~, ,,", •• ' ,-,"., " •• , '!" >,~ " ~.,. ", < i ,",..,' ~,,' ~;. ,".~ :-',; \,': ," ~ "".; 
a statement indicative of the degree to whioh the Party's ccnmitment to 
, .:. .. ",I, ... - ":- :,; ~ f • ',r • . ;; .. 
Parliamentary government was ostensibly perverted by the antics of the 
'~.::: '"'i\ :~:_~:'.,:'.:': ~'· .. ,",, __ :.{,i:,:· "'r"'?'_''',_ , "A ~ ~ ~ '" ~ ',- 0 •• -",,' 
Socialist League • The trage~ of the unnecessary intra-party battle was not 
. ' -, ~- '~, . >.~, ;. ; <, "" ~, 
only that the Party had to dissipate its' energies in br1l1ging dissidents 
,". ~ .f .;- ~_~. ".> " ~., ";. ~ ~>, ... ' :=,. =. .; ~ -"', . 
into line but that it was dra~ away fram ,the grave problems o.~ "the 
-- t'~. :~".;.. t- '\"':; :-. / .~ ~:. " ,~ .'/ . ~,., >; ~, c, 
Qefioienoies of Parliament8.1'7 government 'to the bro..derquestion,of the 
~.,~: ~~,~,,~:.: .: "" '~.:. ~:',-: ~ '<:,' .~ .,~~' ,." '. ,,~ ~-. ., .¥' ".~.;,.", '<', ., ;," '~:: ,.~, .. , .. ,~" 
au.f'fioienoy' of Pa~liamentary" government; fran the ratiorlal. eleotOral 
: .. ~ \':" l>"" ~ • ~~ ) 
oonsiderations of the Party's proposals to questions about its funQamental 
• ,'- -:' "".:.~ 'if, ~,. ~7' _~" ... :,!'~ t. ~'... • ".:' ·i. c',:' , ~ :~ .... ,~,., ~'.-<; ><",:~ ;;: '" :'.:';" \. .:; (> ~ , ' .'.", F 
dema.nGs. (262)" 
• ; t ~ ".", !: 
---------------------------------- ,'_',c>~~",.. 
; .~; .' ! 
261;" C.R. Attlee, ' The Will anG the Way to Socialism (LonGon: ~ethuen, 
. .' 1935), p. 111.' , 
, -". ~ <":' ~ '~' ';'.~ ; '~.: .' ,'.";, ',\ ,-, \: ,~ .. -" :'.:,'-- -' ;."~, ,~";,<;~: ':,>: ',"'~ ~'-" ,-.'.-.! 
262. ,;;, Henert l(orriaoD. 'ai-su" that ttit'the Socialist League point Of view 
" were approvea by the Party it would arive us to Getena ourselves 
tor the greater part of our time against Tory allegations ot 
Bolsheviam anG dictatorship •••• " New Clarion, 30 September 1933. 
~ , 
~73 
, Thus the question of the efficiency of Parliamentary institutions was a 
fundamental part of both the Socialist League's indiciment of the failure 
of Parliamentary democracy and the Labour Party's ccmni tment to eoonanic 
planning.' G.D.H. Cole, writing in the context of Cripps' proposals 
claimed that;' . .... 
"The Socialist Government will not be able to spare 
several huijdreds of its picked men to sit d~ after 
day in Parlianent listening to one another talk, when 
it will need for vital administrative and pioneering 
,.-~ -
work ever,y ccmpetent Socialist' on whan it can lay hands~ ,'. 
It will be best, as soon as Parliament has conterred on 
>;,., '. "~ J 
..•. the Government the necess8.ry emergency powers~· for, it to 
meet onlY as often as it is needed for sane clearlY 
~; practical purpose, leaving the Socialist adminis tra tors 
'i ., to carry on with the minimum of d~-to-d~' interference. 
' .. There wnl' be no ' .. time for superfluous debating while we 
';' are busy building the Socialist Camnonwealth."· (263) 
, '. '> '. ~~ ," t:., ,.,"~ ~~. ~,~ . '1 ,.,> t. < ~ '" ' ... i ~,. j .. ,; 
Clearly, in the mind the Left Parliament's role was secondary to the 
,1, 
Yet not all members of the aclmowledged Left took so severe a view. 
¥ .... >;; '~.;I ': ",. ~~. "";,:) -:;, : .. ' .... ~. :~ ~ ~ '7 ''fo to'" • "0' J :" " , ''''~'~' .' , . 
Harold Laski, for example, made the important point that "A Parliament is 
.1" ~ , ,"" ;;: ~ .. J' ... ,~,", - ,>,'j-.. : :' )'._< :;,:' ,,;,~. 'r ~ .. ~ ~. \.:.. ... , ~ .' ~ r -"" 1 ':, ' 'i-' !'" 
not a 'collection of' di~tinguished experts," (264) and argued that, 
~'~ f. ,! :. -'~:) \4: ~ ,: ;.: ::;, :'. ' .. ~ ; -.:: !.:;; s .'!. > .~~. -:> ~'> ~ ',~ :, •• :. ~ .~~;:" oj.'" ~''': _i _ C ',: 
"the sooner the function of Parliaments, in all 
1".;;~ , ,,: •. ~ . legislative matters, :.is confined to discussions. of 
general principles, the more satisfactory will be 
.. ~>"'.~ ~ .. ; :.the,legislative process. :"They cannot hope, fran: f', .:; .~ .. '. i> 
. ~ their very nature, to be more than organs of critical 
'.:,~ ,,:.':,registration. '. Those who pin . their faith~to the revival 
of the intensi~ of the classio parliamentar,y oontrol 
" ;,: .! '. wholly mis take the inherent requirements of the modem· ,~, 
state." (265) 
i' ; .\ . "'. \ ot'co~s~; -th~I.L.P. adoption of Jowetts' ideas was one example of suoh taith, 
, '~iti;,~ iiic;th~'~ ~ious oritici~~' whi~h' d~o' p~;~~t~d'th~~~i ~~~ .. ~ the"i;tt~r 
.• ~ ~. -"~! f . ".. '., if _~, '~'>. ,4 ;. -.' ,. >I .': ..... " .:..: ,<. f 'r _, ~ . . - . _-<c 
263. G.D.H.'Cole, ~"Sooialist Control of Industry"' in Problemsot a Sooialist 
Government, pp. 173.: Cf., Cole, The Next Ten Years, pp. 155/6. 
. -264. '. i.a~ -;~~Atw·inO~isis·;;'P'. 79: /,': .. ~'\;('. ,,' ~;, ','" 
, .... :.-" ~."' •• :,.~ .. ~ ~ _.,. >I ~", .• t"' ~':.-t" •• '~ "'::. ~.' ,~ .. ,: .... ,-" '~', ~ ~'.'~' ~"dr'-';"''''' ~. ;~ : .~~ 
265. Ib1d~;·p.82.· cit ~ G.D.H. 'Cola;': Eoorian!c :Tracts for the Times. (London: 
. KaanUlan, 1932), Ch. XIV. 
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part of the 'twenties they expressed a general dissatisfaction with the 
capacity, of Parliament to deal with expert or technical matters such as 
economics. By the mid-thirties the capacity of MQlllbers and of Parliament 
was no' longer in doubt, the ground of questioning had shif~ed to the appropriate-
nessof Parliament in d'ealing with the details of such matters. Parliament's 
capacity to deal with such questions was no longer doubted. . 
. .' ' . 
. :-:,~: _ The posi tionof the Party regarding Parliament in general was basically 
conservative:.Attlee summarising the Party's proposed reforms of the House of 
. - . ~ " ~ 
Commons _ placed them in. the traditional :British mould of .. reform. .: . 
l " .. '." .,"Most· experienced Members of Parliament" he wrote, 
"would agree that, without in.- any waY lessening 
.. , L :.:. .::. efficiency, a great. deal of time could be saved by . 
sweeping awar ebsolete forms and by utilising the 
:"'" , .••. personnel of the House more effectively than is done 
'" - tod~ - when in fact, the greater part of the work 
.. ~ :.'.: ,c, '-~ falls upon~ few. "(2~6) •. . ;.....': .. ; Le" ;,'.: i~' -.; 
. ~' .: ", 
It'was not without reason that a contemporar,y American commentator could s~ of 
. , " . . - . -,,'" - ,- .. .' ~ 
Labour politicians that "it is a commonplace observation that :Britishers are 
. t·· ~ .' " ' 
averse to, theorising ••••• They prefer poli ~icians. to~muddle t~U8h', seeking 
the methods which produce the'best results, with appropriate deference to customs 
and traditions."(261) It was this deference to customs and traditioosthat 
caused the Party to support the traditional impartiality of the Speaker, when 
.;....-.. .. " 
discussing the Speaker's Seat in Select Committee and to' accept the right of 
H • 
the Prime llinister to choose the Cabinet even if advised by a group of party 
officials. (268) 
• 
. 266. '. Attlee, 'Th' 'fill·' and. the 'fay to Socialism, p.11.2.,: 
D.I.':McH~~~ 'Th~ '~our 'p~ 'iB"~M~ition 1931-1938 (London: Ge'org.·· 
Routled.ge, 1938)i).2 •......... ~ ...... ' .... '.. . . . . . .. . .. . . .... . 
. - -. ,; 
L.f.A..C.It.1933, ·pp.8/11. - .~, relevant .. section of the Iteport wasdesign.d. 
to.sattlUaed.the Party - i.e., it was a conservative rather than a reforming 
measure •. , .In the event Attlee ignored it. . - '. -
.\ 
~75. 
If the Labour Party appeared to be more re.d.ical than it was in the 
'Thirties this was derived primarily from its ree.d.y emphasis on the Fascistic 
" 
menaCe' throUghout :Europe and its willingness to over-emphasise the dangers of 
some" me~sur85 such as the Incitement to Dissafection Act passed by the National. 
~Yet 'their' prot~st~tions': given the context of the 'Thirties was no more 
re.d.icalthSntheir Liberal predecessors, for notwithstanding the publicity 
,-"" -, • > ,,' '. 
given b~: their opponents, to ne..MaXXist';,' intellectuals and other e.d.mirers of 
\, ... 
cont.~ner;t~al philosophy the Par,ty remained first and foremost distinctly British 
in o~tio~k: ~"ract whi~h rei~o~ed the P~ty's 'co~itment to'Parli~e~t~ 
'" ,:[11 
"institutions. "In a very real sense the Labour Party was the inheritor of the 
<). '.3 :~ •. ~_ ~~ "'~.'< .~.";:;',,,~~; >"~ .. <~~ ~ ~ ~~~ .:~.;"'1'~ , .... '. ~.< • _ ~ ':.') ~ 9 ".~ (1'~' \. _~~. ::- ' " 
Liber8J.' Parliamentarytre.d.ition and the supplanters of a Liberal. Party", 
; inca~a~f'~~f':da;~i~'~{·c~:~ ~~~~o~~:~onditi~~;.('269)'~::,.~t w~~ 't~ these 
.-•• ,," " ,.' ~ "', ~.'";:,.,,,.-,,~ > ,. .. 
, ,'" ~-' ,:. .,' • f'~ ' .. ~-" • ';< -;'., If , ' ~. .~ \ W'?- ~, ',._ ~ 
oondit~ons, t~t~he Labour Party sought to adapt Parlia.ment, and it was these 
i- ~, " •• '; .... ,.- .-. .... ~; '1,' '. -, :: '; .: I. ." .·S • ,. I' ..'- ~. .{ _ 
oonditions, heightened by the advent of , war, that began the prooesses whioh 
·",·,~'~d' ~', ,.;:~~J",.. .. ':,'''',:':, \:, ". '~;, ~,,~~'- .. ,,""0. ~~:,'; ,':'" ,:', I.,.. ,;~ '",.'- :',' : '\ ~-""'. ;':.-t< . ~ 
led to 'the oUlmination of many of the refoms e.d.vooated by 'the Party. ;". 
..... ; ... 
- ',:. ~ of 
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CHAPl'ER SIX NOTES 
1. The distinction is an important one for the "Left intellectuals" of the 
United Kingdom were in an almost unique position in belonging to a society 
in which the expositors of organised Communism were the articulators of a 
:. tradition both novel and alien to the established . traditions of freedom 
.. of speech, association and political activity which had been virtually 
established during the nineteenth century in England. This was reinforced 
.• < .',.by the role of a non-J4a.rxist, but broadly progressive, Labour Movement, 
which, although opposed to Communist tactics for a variety of reasons, , 
... " including its ideological and cultural development, . was not averse to 
allowing ~sts to join it provided they obeyed democratic procedures. 
·As Attlee commented, "The natural British tendency to heresy and dissent 
, has prevented' the formation of a code of rigid' Socialist orthodo~." '.' 
, The Labour Party'in Perspective (London:.Victor Gollancz, 1931), p.30. 
;. In ,the ·Labour .Party ~"intellaCtuals" were usually regarded as those .who did 
:;,.not owe their position toa Trade Union organisation. New Statesman, 6 May 
" . 1944.',' ~ "'. :'." -', ? :. ..' '. '.. .- , " - ,. • .. ,' ~ ., • , 
.. ,,~.' " ,>' 
,f'.' ..- .L'L~ ~:~. - ~.~.\.,_ .,,;o.'~_ " ~,~"~\-_'. ~,""'" ': I:.. t.". .' ;.,~'< .. , i,' ",-,,"" _ 
2 •. ~. A Key to Communism; Laski I s review of "Marxism and Marxist Thought" 'by , 
N.I. Bukharin et.al. New Statesman, 20.July 1935, p.102. Cf. John.Strachey 
:"The Theor,yand lTactice ·of .Socialism (London: ,Victor Gollancz,:1936). Part IV. 
f. Neal ,Wood cregardedStracheyas . "a .fellow traveller strictly adhering to the 
r ,'I Parlyline.". COmmun,ism Md British Intellectuals (London: Gollancz, 1959). A 
2>: somewhat cynice.J. .']:r:ade :Union ,reviewer .,wrote .of .The Theory" and lTa.ctice of 
!. Socialism, "the critical reader. of this, book does .not ,.get . very ;far .before 
,'-';: he .suspects . that it is yet another contribution to the, insidious propaganda 
: ' of., the Communists to destroy, the influence of the present . leadership of, the 
':,' Trade Union alld Labour Movement. His suspicions will be well founded, by the 
time he reaches the. end of the book."" "Mr.' Strachey Tells Us How", .• T.W.G.U. 
:z Record (December,.1936),p.111. <It should be pointed out:that the.Marxism 
adopted,byStra.chey alld Harold Laski was one which rationalised ,their own 
i:~ role in .. revolutionary", circles by, attributing the:revolutionary. insight to 
I; the bourgeoisie rather, thall the proletariat or more subtly redefining the 
. "proletariat".toinclude themselves, and that their,practical proposals 
. included strallds of. the. Webbs I and' F. W. J owett ! s proposals .. for reform. . The . 
::1 recent biograpl:w. of, John Strachey: by Hugh Thomas unfortunately' tends not to . 
'~, delve deeply enough into the forces behind Strachey ~ s intellectual development. 
':;:Hugh Thomas, John Straeh.v (London: ,Eyre Methuen,,1913). :: ,'. ,,:'~,:.::'.,:" ' 
,~ .~ -i. '; • 1;.';',.' r '; } ," .• . ~:ft .'~ ... J • "., ~';~ .' .. _. ::, ," to. "',~. ,: : t .f.,-" .• '. .' ... :,; 5 ".' ._', .. :; J'~ '.-. l: ':; - 'io:. ,.:.; -i' ",:.{- ~\...~ ..... -'{. ·1.' s". ~ ", 
3. ;',Cf •. "Thepurpose of Fascism, both,before it has ,the, State power given~toand­
.. a£terwards, is to smash those institutions which .threaten private, ownership -
;', to smash the democratic machinery by which the ,workers ~ obtain a measure 
.;., of political' power .. ~ •• ", ~. " pp e,,131 /~.,,:.""'<; .,; :, ,'j'" '. 
~ .... ~ 
'. 4. " See"fo:r: example, Laski' s claim. that the Na.tional Government' a speoific use 
~;o£ Orders in Council represented the most,:violent outrage of ,the British-
{,: Constitution in his time.,· ': • Some Implications of, the Crisia I Political ....... . 
"~erJ.yLII,, Bo.4., (October-December,1931), pp. 466/9. Cf. Strachey' a . 
;' "pediction that nu, a ca.pit8.1ist class Call succeed' in transforming. and: 
.. ;~~: tusims ,itsexistinc . political. parties; ,. into a . 'National" Government! t for 
k insta.t,loe,the destruction of democracy will be . gradually and,· if possible, 
,: imperceptibly withdrawn." He continued," "Power, may be gradually withdrawn .. '" . 
,',from'a dem<>oratica.J.ly:elected Chamber (cf.,Reform of. the House of Lords·in •. , .. 
:~J~ri t&inL or a.J. terna.ti vely the franchise ~ be gradually curtailed (cf. the 
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proposals of th~ British Conservative party for withholding the franchise 
from persons in receipt of poor relief)." Strachey, The Coming Struggle 
for Power, pp. 263/4!. ,', :, .: ' ' ' .. '.'.'.' . : ',: ... 
5. 'As Margaret Col~ wrote "Even if the most sEmsitive could feel that the 
excesses ,of post-revolutionary violence might easily increase rather than ' 
,die down, the continuing high hopes of the Revolution, the knowledge of' 
what its makers had set out to' achieve, and were in part achieving, compared 
with the dead hopelessness of the breadlines and the dole were more than 
enough to outweigh or even'to dispel any beginnings of doubt ••••• Douglas ••••• 
saw in Soviet Russia, the negation of the immoralities of Industrial 
, capitalism and the system of private profit and was eager to follow the 
, gleam without seeking to imitate in detail. It, The' Life of G.D.H.' Co1e, . 
p., 190. "J .T. Murphy thought the existence of a. fifth column ,of counter-' 
revolutionaries headed by, Trotsky was nothing extraordinary. "Murphy, op. ci t. , 
pp~, ~~~I.~',;'J' :,"'~-:''';j; t:::;:,: ,,-"<,''',-'';'l';:~'-~ ";,-,', .i.'" 
- .... :.;> ~ • :,,", >,' ~ ~ 
6. The Sociaiist L~ague was formed out of an amalgamationbetween'the Society 
for Socialist Inquiry and Propaganda and the affiliationist minority of the ,.. 
~,I.L.P. led by E.~. Wise, who had refused to follow Maxton and the dis-
, 'affi1iationists into political' oblivion. n' The I.L.P.' affiliationists had. ' " 
insisted on :,the'exclusion of Ernest Bevin, Chairman of the S.S.I.P. ~ 'from' 
office in the Socialist League. ';Bevin, for whom the experience -merely"'" 
confirmed his distrust of "intellectuals", wrote to Cole,'''I'do not believe 
the, Socialist League Will ch~every much ' from the' old·I~L.P.:attitude,". ' 
whoever is in the Executive." {:Bevin to Cole, '24 September,r1932);Quoted'by; 
Pimlott,' op,cit~, p.19.' See.M. Cole,' The'Life of G.D.H. Cole,pp.' 175/180" 
and 191/3; .. C£.:Bu.llock, 'op.cit~', pp. 515/6 •. Bevinclearly~resented his ",," 
~.exclusion from office,by what.he considered to be self7 seeking elements in 
;'·the Party." "I shall alWSiYS watch,"~ he wrote Cole, '"so lonS as I am in the . 
Movement, the.antics' of oareerists who seemto'>think.we' have'oreated' the ,,}::. ~ 
Movement- as a: short of ladder for individualists~ It i ,;: Pimlott;:loc.oit.;'Bevin t s 
analysis of ,the role of the Socialist League proved'to beaccurate.'-'·As Lees-
Smith wrote'of the Sooialist'League in 1934; "Its policy and outlook is much 
the same as those of the 'I,L~P. when.~ ••• it disaUiliated from the Labour ';::, 
Party. ft' "P&rties and the Next General" Election: Prospects for the'Labour -
, Party, ..... PolitioaJ. Quarter1.y,'VI, No.1. (January-March, 1935), pp. 20/28(24) • 
.,' Given this ,it.is .hardly ,surprising that Bevin declared publicly that tlI saw 
, 'Mosley come into the Labour Movement and' I' see no' difference' between the" "': : 
taotios of, Mosley and Cripps. tt. Daily Herald, '19 February ,,1937.' " "', -- '" 
_.:. ~~~ ,,,' et -+ ".'.< '. j"" ." ,.} ..... ,. ". -\ ,! , .. .:. ... 'j :,':: .~c;. ,'~"":.... ~ 
, 7. One p~st:..w8:r/;observer ~s not~c·th~t . ~The·~~entsof AugUst 1931-werethe'!"';l'~ -
only" substantial 'piece of evidenoe against' the 'libera.l theory of the State 
which has been forthooming since the outbreadof the first world war put', t::" 
an end to'the Ulster crisis.".' Boy Jel11cins/ suit of Pro ress: A Critic ' " 
isot th Ao evem t d Pro ectof the LabourPa't' .. London:. W •. ,.; ,~;:'" 1, 
Heinemann,. .1953 •. . Yet .while . "Fa! th .in . the .applicabili tyo£ the liberal' _ . " 
'theory ,of the State to a period of transition to socialism did not disappear -, 
entirely ••••• it became very weak. Professor Laski's ParliamentarY Government 
in inglaed gave sophistioated expression to a very gene~al.attitudeofmind.~. 
~ .. ,. ,p •• 83. ' . 
.. 
: 
8. 
9. 
'If , 
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"In Britain the strength of the Communist Party and its electoral 
successes have been negligible. The one Parliamentary seat held by 
the Communist Party was obtained at the expense of the Labour Party." 
L.P.A.C.R.1936, p.300. In an official letter to the Communist Party 
Henderson.had.insisted,that "The Communist Party does not believe in 
Parliamentary Democracy. ' ,Communist Parties are allowed by the Third 
International to enter Parliament not for the purpose of organic work 
but in order to de~troy Parliament 'from within'." L.P.A.C.R. 1934, p.11. 
" ,;,~ :'" i '",- .,_' ." _..,- •. . ~, . ..... ~ • . " 
"Once a decision 'has been arrived at, all must conform. Whatever m~ 
have been the difference of opinion ••••• as to the wisdom of the deCision, 
there is no room for individual action once the die is cast, throughout all 
Trade Union' activities this solidarity, obtains." 'Attlee, Labour Party in 
Perspective,' p.61.' For an alternative view see C. Cooke,The Life of, , , 
RiChard Stafford Cripps (London: Hedder & StQughton,1951),pp.141/3. Cf. 
Bevin's.speech at the.1934 Conference, L.P.A.C.R.1934, pp.140/3 •. 
..' Jp.]i, .:'. _ " # ~ • • _ 
10. Many years later Citrlne expressed this fundamental difference of 'approach 
when he wrote of Cripps, "Like many others I was perplexed to understand,' 
, how a 'man of such legal eminence could utter such irresponsible drivel, 
characteristic of the tyro in political affairs," and of a meeting with the 
Socialist League "I was astounded at the extreme ,'views expressed which' 
seemed to m. to 'show no 'awareness of the realities of the political world." 
Men and Work, p.293.', ", ,," ;) ,- '. " '; ,,' 
... " ,; of'~' .;, 1 ... ;;.~ ":,.' ,.: ..;: i{ .'>' . ~ .,:". "", .' ~ < :.:, '" '- ,'"' 'f";' '~ .. ;.~ '< , 1<, - ;' :.~;; ~... ' • 
11. Se.,:'.too his speech to the Party Conference on ttDemocraCY and Dictatorship." 
L~P.A.C.R.193J, p.219, where he said he would"reserve the right,'faced with~ 
. the use of' dictatorial and Fascist methods by~the other side, to utilise any 
method which was expedient or . likely ,to be successful •• ' •• ~ " Cf ~ . Ernest . Bevin 
"The perils of diotatorship" T.G.W.U. Record ~ 1933, pp.304/5.~· "if we, in 
this oountry, leave our democratio principles and methods, and start olamour-
ing for a diotatorship of, the proletariat, then we must not oomplain if our 
~ :,'~ opponents olamour for a diotatorship of the Ruling Cb.ss and get there first. " 
,t;' :.. ~,,:.'~"~ ~ .,.;.,' '(" ,. "._ <'-1>'".,:.' '~ ~~,.~ .. ;".,." , .. ".~ \.",1,..;:.;:'.;' ~)': :._+ .;-;~' .,.:~..: .-;c:; _' 
12. "This constitutional orisis will thus result either in the oa.pitalists·,': ' , 
Biving w~ to the will of the people expressed' and enforced oonstitutionally, 
. or in a oapitalist or Sooialist diotatorshiprelying for its power upon force 
alone.' '. Suoh a diotatorship will almost'inevitably lead' to revolution and 
violenoewith what result it is impossible to foretell." .!J2i4..~ p.48.'~" 
Against this argument Rerbert lionison posed the unanswered question, "And 
if we were defeated at the Polls by the oounter-diotatorship. ~'. ~. 1" Ne" ., 
Clarion,' 30 September 1933.,1 ' t: >:!,"-; 
13. Cf~ Laski,;:"the rlght,if a Labour Govemment~is unoonstitutionally challenged, 
to utilise the State-power for its defeD.oe. ".; '!'he State in Tb.eory and Practioe, 
p.298.'Foran earlier exposition of this point of view seeH.N. Brailsford" 
SooieJ,ip for Tom, (London: I.L.P., 1925) ,p.61." Brailsford had argued ,that 
~the .f':Lrstopen step whioh a Labour Government takes towards Sooialism wi'll .' , 
at onoe arouse an embittered and unflinchin8 ': 'will to resist. '~' We ~ have 
to answer with emergenoy measures and war-time preoautions." Rowever,he . 
wisely' added that "even then it would' be folly to abandon Parliamentary forms." 
" -'- ,' .. ,j...!,,,,- .. ' ""\.'.'. r~.~':·: ... ~:~~.!;~:·!, ,,-.,; , .,~ ~ I,,"~"~ .f}- :~:, ":~.::' -,' l,:~ ~)"':!i{" .' '·.r" .. ",,;:~-" -'.:.,,: ..... < <._;~';'<- . <fj 
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14. In "sofar ••••• as it can the obligation of a socialist government in 
15. 
normal times is to throw upon its opponents the burden of the resistence." 
Laski, Democracy in Crisis, p.252. Such resistence was, of course, 
inevitable. , .. SeeLaski, The State in Theory and Practice, p. 316. See also 
New Clarion, 17 September .1932whereH.N •. Brailsfordargued that it would 
be-ill-advised.to allow the facilities of the new society to be opposed by 
an unfavourable election result from an ill-educated electorate. G.D.H. 
Cole, however, did not accept the inevitability of violence, "Peaceably if 
we m8i1" New Clarion, 27 Maur 1933. 
AI though this is a far cry from Laski' s original criticism of Orders in 
Council (see footnote 37 and note 4 above) Cripps was still critical at 
least in 1932, of the "free use" of such orders which he claimed "has 
converted Parliament into an institution to register the decisions of the 
Cabinet or of the Ministers." Ibid., p.33. It seems surprising that Cripps 
should be so critical seeing.as-hewas so willing to use the instruments 
and techniques for his own purposes. Apparently his main fear wa.s not that 
such techniques were being used but that they were being used by the 
Capitalist class and that if a Labour Government used them the Conservative 
. forces in society might use the Courts to invalidate them. Moreover, 
Cripps seemed peeved by the fact that it was the National Government rather 
than its Labour predecessor that had used the procedure, whilst R.H. Tawney 
noted, ~.the present government has shown that weal. th can be redistributed, 
and existing contracts broken by the convenient procedure of Orders in 
. Council. The precedent should be remembered. An Emergency Powers Act 
. is on the statute book and Labour must be prepared to use it, and, if the 
. powers which it confers are insufficient, to pass another." 'The choice 
before the Labour Party', Political Quarterly, Ill, No.3. (July-September, 
1932), pp. 323/45(328). . ...... -- ... ' .... "... . .... 
16 •. For criticism of the ide'a in respect of Parliament and the Cabinet see 
Hugh Dalton, t c 1 Soci ism for Britain (London: George Routledge & 
.' Ions, 1935), pp. ·3869 •... Itshould perhaps .be pointed out that whilst the, 
proposals referred to here involved Cabinet administration i:ll is probable '. 
that Cripps regarded them as being applicable to the Commons as well. . 
Dal ton clearly recognises this by proposing that the number of Standing . 
Committeesbe raised from 5 to 7, whilst it would be· inconceivable that 
Cripps would forgo the logic of examination at the 'highest rather than a' 
secondary level. 1I0wever, if all M.P.· s were to be usefully employed a 
variety of committees would have to be utilised. 
17. In context Mrs. Webb was referring to Susm Lawrence and obviously she did .' 
not apply this to Cripps. Instead she wrote in terms of ambition and 
.. personality clashes: of "a. growing jealous): among the other candidates for 
eventual leadership at Statford' s rapid rise as left-wing leader of the ' 
younger generation of intellectuals. Stafford is a dear good fellow: he. 
has the manner, the character and the personal conduct for leadership, 
whether he has the health and the intellect for the role of The Leader I 
ra.ther doubt. He is curiously childish in some of his reasoning.tt ... 
. '. ~ Unpublished. Diaries. Vol. 47, p.81, 2 June 1933.' Italics in the O;1ginaJ,. 
lB. 
19. 
Beatrice Webb summarised Henderson's views as follows: "I am not 
'going to throwaway the principles of political freed em and' 
· personal liberty, in which I am a life-long believer, until I 
am convinced that the parliamentary system cannot be worked in 
the-interests of the canmon people •••• I am not going to advocate 
any fom of' dictatorship, until I am convinced that the 
parliamentary system under a constitutional majority, as we mow 
it, is a failure frcm the workers' standpoint and that there i! 
,a desirable alternative." Unpublished Diaries, Vol. 47, p.107. 
: 5 August 1933.- Italics in the Original. 
· The New Statesman whilst criticising Cripps also criticised the 
. Labour Party for going out of its way to repudiate him.' 3 February 
.:.1934; .:An early draft of the resolution was approved by the N.E.C. 
on 20 Decsnber 1933 but was not issued pending consultation between 
the Constitutional Sub-Canmi ttee and various members of the Party 
who had made individual pronouncements on the subject. N.E.C. 
Minutes G4, E.C.4, 1933/4, M.IOB. The Constitutional Canmittee which 
drew up the draft was headed by Clynes and included Dalton, Laski 
and Lees-Bmith. Attlee, Citrine and Cripps were absent fran the 
meeting. (N.E.C. Minutes,64. Constitutional Canmittee Minutes (13) 
30 November 1933. They were, however, present at two subsequent 
meetings when the matter was thrashed out in full. «15 and 16) 16 
and 18 January 1934, 45a and 45&1). . 
At the N.E.C. Meeting on 24 January an attempt was made' by Susan 
Lawrence, Herbert Morrison and J.C. Swan to modify the tone of the 
last sentence, it failed. N.E.C. Minutes Vol.64, E.C.5, 1933/4-
24 January 1934. 
20. Under the existing procedure taxation was made valid frcm the manent 
the Budget Resolutions were passed; that is, at the Canadttee Stage 
of the Budget Resolutions - hence the change would be more oonvenient. 
Jennin&a whose original manusoript ~or his book was read by members 
ot the N.E.C. suagested the diviaion of the Finanoe Bill into two 
separate Bills, one dealing with policy and the other an annual 
taxation Bill. ~., Ch. VII and Pretace, Jennings Parliamentary 
Retozm. 
21.· Ct. Editorial in the DaillHerald, 14 June 1933 •. ~ "The present 
22. 
· aovenment has set us a splendid example' ot how to push throuah 
legislation in an emergenoy_ A House of Commons controlled by a 
Labour majority will be just as fearless. We shall use our power 
to press for all tOImS of leaisla tive enac1:ments, Imergency Power 
Bills, Orders in Council, Proclamations by His Majesty the King, 
Provisional Orders and all other fOIms ot constitutional procedure. If 
By contrast see the New Statesman's aasertion at the time that the 
Orders provided -the legal basis for an extra-Parliamentary fom ot 
Government - a mild form of Fascism." 10 October 1931 and Laski's 
view in the Political Quarterly, Vol. 2. No. IV, (September/December 
1931) pp. 466/9. . ..' - . 
Amongst the changes aocepted was one which Dalton had advocated: 
the extension of the right of the Chairman of Canmittees to select 
. ataendments. When this was brought before the Commons Attlee 
oammented, "Although. we are in Opposition,' we do not take any 
different line on this question frcm what we would take if we were 
in office, because we consider that when the time canes in which we 
ahall be in office, we shall be concerned to see that this House 
does its work properlY and expedioiouslY." See also footnote 82 
above. 
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23. Of oourse it oan be argued that Sooialism did not provide an answer 
to the problems of 1929-31, although there is no evidenoe that 
distinotly Sooialist measures oould not have worked had the Seoond 
La.bour Government tried to implement them. The possibility of this 
happening was, of oourse, impossible given the Government's dependenoe 
upon the Liberals in the House of Commons and the domination of 
Snowden's autdated free ~ade ideas. It is true that Keynes' eoonomio 
dootrines proved. to be more useful to the post-war Labour Government 
than many of their own ideas but this was beoause the Attlee 
administration possessed a degree of intelleotual and politioal 
flexibility not possessed by Keynes and whioh had oaused the la.tter to 
alienate many influential leaders of the Party. See F. Williams, 
Nothing So Strange, p.10e/110. 
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The opportunities and realities of power • 
.. . . . . - ................ . 
. . , At the outbreak of war Parliament granted the Government wide discretionary 
powers in a series of Acts,(1) designed to provide the Executive with the 
freedom from Parliamentary interference that was necessary in a war-time 
situation which demanded speedy action. . Ironically the powers which the then 
Conservative Government was granted were the kind of powers which Sir Stafford 
Cripps had suggested that a Labour Govemment might have to adopt in the face of 
determined capitalist OppOSition to Socialist policies.(2)· Under the Emergency 
Powers (Defence) Act 1939 the Government was able to enact "such Regulations •••• 
as appear to him (the King in Council) to·,be necessary or expedient" for public 
safety, the defence of the realm, .the maintenance of public order and the 
~ • f, \ 
\,;- "-:" ~:{:('O .~ ",. '.'~ - .<.,"';', ~., • 'h 
- efficient prosecution Of. azry war in which· His Majesty·, might be engaged and for 
'. ;"'.-:", ~'. ~_ ;;~ i h 4,,";~ , ";:-~ ~:J "" .. ' , .. '~ "'- '" .. 
maintaining supplies and services essential to the life of the community.(3) In 
addition the Crown was authorised to make regulations for more specific purposes 
'. , : ." ..... _'; '. l~ ,.'.~r:: ,,', ~~~'.", -:~ . .::. _ ~ ':.~. ,,~~ ,.:. r, -'"'(". ", ". ' ,,'~' ~,i': ;-.• '< :". 
including the imprisonment of persons whose detention appeared to the ~ecretary 
.-'*,,.,~-}:.~,j.),:::. "" ... ':1."- ~ .. ~_ .. ) ~";.J""~' ":';,.'V'~_ . ~.'-:;:'-.' '. ,'+; 
of State to be expedient in the interests of public safety or defence of the 
_~ ;; L;' ',,-, ~" .. '~~. ::,~ ':.'! ~~ J c~ "~:~. .::: - :"' ":::: '1 ~ . .,',-'," . '" ;' 
realm and the amendment or suspension of any enactment and application of enact-
, . 
ments with or without modification. These powers were extended by the Emergency . 
. ~~.-.-:.r"~~'-'1,t~; :;-~:l:;_:~ :~.,:"!'/ '"-'::" -'~<>'''-_, . ,; "" !-... :;"" •. 
Powers Acts which were annually renewable~ 
" . 
. " 
The Labour Party had accepted the necessity of these powers and the employ-
.. ~~.~; .. ",,'J.}"J ;_::.,t'~ '.:i"'.1" I .. ~- ::;,._ .... , ' .. ~.J:;.:, . .'~,:.:l".~"~>.~: .. '. ~~ ...... ~.>"'~ (;:: ~:.' : ~.~,,:.: ".";.". --:. .. " ~~' :,',_ 
. Bent of such regulations as early as 1934,tollowing the publication of the Report 
"':"'.'1 .""0".",,::-. '.~". ".~ ':. '''. ",.Ir.~., ',' •. , .... :~, •. j.~- r·· .. ·~~.>.- .;.;..... , .• ,.,,,-,.,.~,'., 
the Donoughmore Committee and the intra-party debates over Parliamentary retorm. 
-! ~ ,,0:: • '." t.,..·.,," ~v.{ . :};',.\ ~:,';",,~1'~ -: ~:.,'" ~u ,:(:;<.','~.s:.~,,~-·-,·t ~,</;~.~\.:,. 1~ 't:. 'J,~"'~ 
.l·, "":.~.' ...;: ;, -.' 
. ~. "".-
• 
,.:<.t'~ c·~:;--,.~_,;:·_~J;,_ ',. ,~." t~j ,,' .",;,:.-3' ,.t:~!'.~~',~~ }'::~ ;.;:: i 
1. The Emergency Powers (Defence) !at 1939. 2 and 3 Geo.6ch. 62. 
" ~ _,',-". r ';" ',::.,J . I ,I;' :t~;;.;. ~'. ~:~.~ ...:.,;, ~,."~:;."'. ~~ ""'d~i ,,,.'~,,,( ·:~,",·~t. :~- ,':,,"!:~: :t:~::' 
cM,' SooialiaCOIle? Op,cit. '':c,' C ., :::~;»- _.""},'"L, .i /i::i ',:::~,~ 2 • 
3. 
....... '~';"~ ... tI'".", .. "," •• ~~.'; ... ~.>f.,. ..•..• ~ .,;.;:~~:~~~ ,L, .• :e'"~· '~,_",1 ~ ..0;....,.. :~ ~ l'f t;<:!:{ 
2 and 3 Geo~ 6.' Ch. 62, P~a.' 1 (1) ~': All defence· regulationspersuant ,to :'-'i-;, 
the ~t lay before Parliament for a period of, 28 days during which 8i ther -" 
Houae .ould,: 'by resolution; annul any regulation. 
It is true that before entering the Coalition various Labour leaders, 
inOluding Greenwood and Morrison, had argued that the rights of Parliament 
must be maintained, in partioular, against undefined or broad powers,· but 
having joined the Government the Labour leadership generally, and Morrison 
speoifioally,'were loath to ha.ve their judgement questioned. .In response 
to oritioism from the House, Attlee retorted "Parliament has to trust its 
Ministers,' or, ~if,it distrusts them to take aotion aooordingly,"(4) while 
" . 
Mor.rison, who had no~i~tention of allowing Regulation 18] to be disoontinued 
While h! was Home Seoretary protested that Parliament's job was not that of 
Court of' Appeal in'individual oases b~t' of matohing thei~ oriticism that his 
"what the House must do," he deolared, 
,i\ .;, r .. · l. \ '" '" "'. {, " .",,' .. - . . . '-0 • • ~ 
"is to keep a wa.tch on the Hom.e Seoretary, to have '.' 
a Debate, to look out for cases where in their . 
,. judgement he has gone wrong, if they oan get evidence 
">," . , ,that he has (Interruption). I know the limitations 
':," of'the House •. ' I agree that'it ia not altogether ~, 
" cricket, but I oannot help it. "(5) . ' ~. .i,': '_.; , i "'. " .' " J.;. ->0 
~or those Members who did not aocept the 'Executive's innocenoe s~ch an inter-
. ,- ":":'- ,., ""~ , • ,? .,\ ,"l~ .. ;" < f : " ;.' , . 'r ' '::, • " ' ,', • "~. ~ ','_., ; ,. 
. . 
pretation of the Executive/Legislative relationship was unfair to the House 
,'" - ... :~ ~- -', ..••.• , ';".- ~ :c,.. , •• _ ''':-- ~, ~ .. _.' ~-'._.r;. '"-.;-..;,. .:, .'._."'-' -:, {.\. ':",~" '.~.'\. ,.~~ .. ".-.~ _<t·_~_""\::':' 
., Whioh did not have, and was r~larly denied, aocess to the evidence upon 
: """. ;0 ..... '. !' ...... ;:.;.. ~~ ~ "'._ i .... . ' (,' ... ( •• J. i'''''~~-'.':;·~~' ..1. 0 <-'.~)- ~, • ,-'" ":;: • .i. ~ __ ~/.:' ::, \~ ,"~-.'c .i.~" 
Whioh the Executive based its deoisions • 
• ,.4<f '" ~ ~"'" .0; ...... ...:. ,~. ;I..;:" 1 .;. '. <.: '. 
';' Morriaon's interpretation o:f the relationship by whioh the Government 
, ,. .,..,', ' .. ~ ,'.. • " ". ~ : .. - ..... , ". ~.~ .... '~,< _,," .... <., ,~'. . ..... c') ',.' 
ruled and the'Hou;e of Commons critioised was oonsistent with the Gladstonian 
, ~ • ',,,",, ,. :,' _,' , ,L - < , , •• ~, .. , •• ' '.: '" " .. ,,r -'." 'r." .... f .' ;r ,,' " ' J'>. " ,< -'",\ ,. ;,(., .,,:~; .:; ... ": 
tr~ition,c.on~~.n~Et~?yCripPS .~n ,the inter-war period of Parliamentary confusion • 
...... p 
4. Le,Deb. 369, cc.816. Attlee ar~ed that the Government could not -report 
.!l:!.the facts to the House, without destroying the basis of 18B., Cf. 
Mo~isoAts argument along the same liAes in H.C.Deb. 391, 00.503. . 
-" -'- "" • '" .... 4""' ..... -..._ ....... -I~~ , ..... .-..>j .. , ... , ...... ,,~<i...,. '«,I>"'._J"'~ .... "'0>0 _ ... ~ ... ....,." ~ ........... ' j ~,,"-i'"'' ,../""'" ~, r.<" .-~~" .... ~. , "., .. ,," ~'" .... , ... _ ~''''''''''''''')'''~ 
5 .• , R,C,Deb.' 381, cc.1509.-, It was not without reason that Tribune regarded . 
Morrison.' as ,"a' dangerous debater who is not' over-sorupulous .in his choioe . 
of arguments", (15 JMuary 1943) •. ' Morrison was insistent ,that on. ,the 
question. . of Regulation 18] there sh.ould be no recourse to an investigatioD. . 
. ". r by a Committee of the House as opposed to the existing Advisory Committee. 
See CAB 65/19. 91(41)9~8 September 1941~ ' .. ~/' i' ,'....., 
1«0- ... i' "_~ !,.~ 
" '" ./l, f~ 
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',It waa shared by the majority of the P.L.P. but not by a minority, led 
. primarily by Aneurin Bevan and Emmanue1 Shinwel1, who J1egarded the 
',Government aa often ham-handed and oertain1yover,:",sensitive to what the 
,dissidents reg~rcied as oonstruotive oritioism of the war effort and 
-. 
,administrative inoanpetence. (6) It waa a view eohoed by the journals of 
.. ; the Lett such aa, the. New Statesman., which regularly, ori tioised the 
Government's frequent ,resort, early in the war, to ,the use of Secret 
Session, an~, aa, vic:to7Y. dr~", nearer, the oontinuance of the E1eotoral 
. Truoe. 
The opera tionof . the Electoral truce had caused disquiet among the 
''',., "; . .".' -,..\., " ':, ."-
'.; lef't-,!,ing ~,t~~" Labour Party .. which saw 1i tt1e Qifferenc~ between an 
'.,. allegedly pro-Fasoist Chamberlain and the openly-Fascist Hitler. Although 
- ,,",;-, -'<'--' .',.- ' •• ~ , , ~.~ ,. - '- '" .•• • 
-_. , 
.. ' this waa an extreme view" it waa oertainly true that Chamberlain's continuanoe 
.,-, " , . ~ .' "''''';'.~ -~ .,., ,. ,·r". ,1' 
as a Cabinet Member, after hia defeat and. resignation aa Prime Miniater in 
." ... , ,o.. 'II! ......;. ';,,~ .'," -., ", ~- " • -, ~ .," .: ",' ¥. > , ~ 
e'!.' D, ". ,: ... , ", ':.. ,~~...,' !:' ,- .~:,: .".. •. ~'. _,,' ~ >" ",' '. ",t, . 
Ua.y 1940 was widely. resented •. ,i These views were well expres8ed by the 
-,' ,,~.,. , ... , ............. ", }' _ • ., ~.. ,.". " ., :.';. ,. '"' " '-~ '" ., ••. " • "-, .. , . + ., ." 
- " '4; " ,,} ~. • ~:. '. ...."!.. ~ : ' '! _.' ~ .~. ", .~ .. ,. , . .' '{. ' ... ( 
publication' ot ,"Guilty',.Men": (7)~: Grow1l1g dissatisfaotion, first with the 
".' .: .. ,- ~- ;~'.": .,,,,, >' -to ... ",',<.0> '"' ." - "," ~ , '-' .\ • , ~., '" " ~ 
• ".,~ "'">-<;{'. ,N.-f· ,.",.-" " '1-::.J >. . 
oonduct of the' war and then with the projected principles of the reconstruoted 
,,~' ..;~<.::"f't'. ~.~.'"~'/~"<i'~) ;~-'·(",·.'·if'''~-;''':' ,,' " ",:;." . .J~ 1'~ ... """'''{'~'''\ "'~ 
peace, coupled with a number of instances in which Labour' a participation in 
the Coalition ~ seetned ~lllce{ that~ ora jwu.or partner!'" (8),'prod~e~. ~'\~ertain'~',. 
,~, ,. .~, ~ -.:;,.'" .... , ~', '- p-, ;. ,~, , .. ;_:1 '. , "~..,.",. ',," "',. >'" ~'1 ".;",;.., it-.,., ~ jj..', ,I t~~·:"'} 
degree ~ ot intra~p8.!ty' 'factiona1ism' and the Bupport Or Labour' inte11eotua1s . 
. ' . 
" ,'_, _~, -" ':'" '._ 11, ,~. ,,_. -'J" .~,.,..." " 1':" t," ~,'" '( ~~ '''' " ,f.,:. ~; , ~': .~'c R'~ t" _, .,.( "; 
tor independent candidatea against Conservative candidates'in otherwise ,~ 
unoppo~ede1eotionS toparl1ament." '" ' i' >:'" '" :-'." ~,;' n,:~ ~.: ~ ';;;:.:\,,~ C) ;0:\. , " 
1 
'. '. On "the floor of the House the oonatituted Opposition waa composecl of a~,~",,,n' 
motley co11eotion' of malcontents oommonly co1toerned to" ~heclc:: the Exeoutive 'wi th 
:':"<~J; <,'i.", ';'F;~~':',,- ",,'~":.:"<;.*"-\-f--"", ~ ,_'_.': .. ", :-""<~ "~'~'+.:;"'-'·~i'I .. i.j* ,< '-'",;'-::-~ .; .. ~-~: 4~: i-'~ .'t:~>"":;-. 
-
", 6. 
8. 
.. ', i "By·. iJiS is ting ~ on 1 rigi. party cl1soiplille s iiioe 1940, the Government 
. .... have often deprivecl themselves of etfeotive Council by the House 
<~,.itselt. tt, H.O.Deb~ 404;' eo~683. Aneurin'Bevan, 31 Ootober 1944. 
"Oato,'GUnty Xen·(LOntion: Victor Go1lAnozi 1940). See Note 1.' 
, . . . 
On one oooaaion the Conservatives carried their opposition to the" 
appointment ot one Labour Member, Major Milner a8 Deputy Chairman of 
Waya and Mea.ns to t.Qe floor of the House where they protested they ha. 
not been consulted. H.C. Deb. 386, co .... 252/267 •. 20 January 1943. See 
. also the ccnmenta of New Statearu.n, 23 January 194.3 ancl'"An 
limeMaaary Incident" Eoonauat, 30 January 1943. ' 
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a View to providing intelligent and constructive direction to otherwise 
arbitrary and often incompetent and foolish decisions by administrators. 
Inevitably they were, and to some extent still are, characterised as the 
defenders of life, liberty and the principles of democratic society,(9) but 
essentially, notwithstanding the overriding aim. of winning the war the aims 
of.the various sections of the Opposition were more concerned with securing. 
the peace which, ideologically at least, was seen in Party terms. Thus while 
Members of 811 Parties w~re concerned with application of the Emergency 
r8€Ulations to Members of Parliament as an infringement of Parliamentary 
privilege and a dangerous use of power by the Exeoutive against the Legislature, 
tlle individual' cases of Captain' Ramsaor and John McGovern attracted a different 
In a debate on a motion that the operation of' 
,. . 
. Regu,lation.18B should be' reconsidered, '. :; -< 
/ "and,': in particular,' that the detention' of an honourable 
Ilember for over four years without trial or charge 
r; .: conflicts with the ancient and well-established right of 
the House to the service of its Members ••••• and ought to 
J :, cease unless justified to the House, if necessary; in .' 
Secret Session" 
->..,):. ->'.~<.. ;: ),J:';'"l 1".' ~ :.~':'. ~' ... ";:li.> >~'>' -,~ .~-~. i S", ,'~ 'l<~,".:.! .,. 
" .. ,/'" 
only one P.L.P. Member, R. Stokes of Ipswich, voted in its favour.(10) In 
'-.4. .1-" .~:;:. \t;~,:~ .A·>~ '~,<,-;, ;."t,; ~: .:'. ' .. ~ ~;;' "l'!: i -t" t;/,_ ,. ~'Il ;~,.; ,i.·i·'-·."" 
tAe MCGovern case several Labour Members spoke vigorously against the decision 
;;, ~ ~',,~ ~~:.~ .. ~~;:.~ ~'_'.~._::'c <~'L:j';.'.f;-"'" _;r. '~ ,_ ~::';""" ~ ~'~;'."-""., ,,~;: .~.) .~~~ ~':~} ~( .. ':,:,) :~>'~)", 
wA10k prevented MOGovern from travelling to Ireland 'on Parliamentary business.(11) 
; ... '~: ':~':':.' !.;," ;:: '.~:-; '{f( ~::.,L,-:!,··~t : . .';',~. ,,~.: "'~ .': :"" ," i·~~.J ;;i~.' ~: .. :.'3 '..i-" __ :.:,,1 ':'. :'.:.-1. ~ .f- :., • ;'.J, 
~ain, when the HOlle Seoretary released OSWald Mosley late' in 1943, the main 
/ ..... , t,' ') 1",.:- ·~i·:--:~r< i. •• ~~ d' ,~ '!" •• ~:: ;: '":.,., ••• -~ t >'. ~_ .. ;)~,.~ ~ -~ I ~~~ ~~'7 ": _ '~:. ~ ". ,-,.':': 
oPPolilitiol:1 oame from Labour Members. (12) In the nature of thiIliIil this was natural • 
... 
"!-.' '-.; , " :,;,i.: i:" :'.'::, ~: ~ ~ 
9. Am0Elist their activities were opposition to the Parliamentary recess and 
··~",tA. use of. Seoret Sessiol:1.(See R.C.Deb., 374.00.39. 9 September 1941 &Ad ".o_~?~,_ 
.C" H.C.Deb. 363, 00.1193/1206. 30 July.1940.) 
" ,h ".,,'. :'" • ".~':: _ -. , ' ''$' i"'-1.0~ 'R;a,'~b~ :400~ ~~'~2j17, ~t.seq.16 'J~~' 1944 • 
. : .. ,. ........... 
11~ H.C.Deb. 374":oo.1703,et.seq. 21 Ootober 1941.~· C.",·),:,,, >,,,c,',~.,,, 
~' • ... #, • • .... -1 '" , ; ,<'.' f'.:' ,~~ • 
. 1~ •. H!C.Deb. :"395;"00.395, 'et.seq. 1 Deoember 1943. 
4-:.""'" "_'<'~'~.,'~'" l·~:k·:.;" t: (.':':;'~/:;":::~;1f -... ,: }I' "'~v~I):',~f1 .. : >~:::".'" ,t·'··~, .. ~ ~ ... ~ 
'.' -,1_ 
:;-~ t: ~« \,.- ~~ ., ~ 
d' ,!--" ~ 
:i'tJ. :0 
. " 
t,':.i,.A: ": ~ ., ~ "., ~ ~,,~ :)-~. ,~.; _ ,~<".0I 
; -- f"" . 
. ..... ,. '" ~ 
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There were, of oourse, oooasions when the issues enjoined between the 
"Exeoutive and the Legislature were, in fact, primarily oonstitutional issues 
.~hioh adversley affeoted the House of Commons. Three Acts had been passed 
: .. " ',;', i : ~ ... . t 
'. without opposition at the outset of the war limiting the applioability of 
~i~~~~ifying legisl~tion to Members who joined the Armed Foroes,(13) beoame 
• L ,~,~_ '" -' . : '. c, _ 
Regional Commissioners (14) or were appointed under the Ministers of the Crown 
~~~rg'~noYAPpointme~ts') ~~ .. '1939. ( 15)' ~. In 1941, howev~r, having alre~ 
. , .... 
'~pointed Sir Stafford Cr.ipps and Sir Sa.1IlU.el Hoare to Ambassadorial posts in 
" ' .. '.,; ~' 0 • 'iF .. ._', 
... ~ -.f >' ~c .' • '" • ~ < "" _ ~ 
MOsoow and Madrid the Government, owing to ambiguity over the applioation of 
f .,<~, . 
, >- ~_ ,., ? .. ;" ":~. -', -'. ~ ~ t_ 
the Place Act of 1707,(16) introduoed a Eill designed speoifioally to allow 
: ..: ~ ~ • r J " A " 1- ,", • " ,,'" ' ~ ". ~ \ ." • ;; 
MaloOlm MaoDonald to retain his sea.'t in the Commons on his appointment as High 
:-- -:;'> :.t-·:! _:~r~. ~:_._::':" ~~;r:', 
COmmissioner to Canada. MaoDonald himself had offered to resign but the 
Go~~~~~t '. ~;~~~ .. t~e~:view't~t'i t ~o,:8.d··· b·~.' an ~n~eoe~~~ loss' to the Hous~. (17) 
, ," ~ -' - -;. '.~ ~ . . 
lAdead:' th;Pr~e Mi~~s'ter t'o~k it f:;"ther ~d made the ~tt~r '~ne or' oon£ideno~ 
•• . .. 
a fact whioh somewhat soattered the L&bourepposition.(18) It did, however, 
..... , ":.',_.\.< ,;".:f:...:1"';,: .:-;\..:~~ '~':'~,<,:" .: ,-,_,: ,.~ ;" ',< \,' .. ,_'. ".;,:. 
bring out an interpretation of Parliament and its role that is signifioant in 
cf •• _,( • ....; :., j' ,,!..~ i~ ':,~. "1" ,-, " ~ _ 
_ « .~' "'. i.~;" ',' ~~ ~ ",' ,:. 
,{ : .~, ,~ ... ": :. '., ;',,~ ", 
~b.e history of the Labour Party. The Government t s view was that the 
proseoution of war and the servioe to the state that it required was the primar,y 
.:c.:I.:~~,:<~ ... ..-.~ ..... :" t .. -.~ :'.;~;,~.:; 
servioe that the oitizens oould perform.' . They were-cwilling to allow the 
.<,:;,,~,;q ,'''':"*! .... :1':~ '.,. I. , • •• ~"j ',( ;~! ' ',';'1\\'( 
appointment of a Seleot Committee to enquire into the whole oonstitutional 
Position of Offioes of Profit under the Crown but those.who were thus appointed 
." ..... _ "'. ~~, v. ';,,' h ~ " -, ~ _' • ... " 
were parto!' ~ ~roll: 'of honour".: This interPretation' w;'s' oh~llenged by Aneurin 
"',~ ',.,.' ._r .~ '~. ...... .,_' . .. F' -"'- - " .... ... 
.. 
13. The House of Commons (Servioe ill.' His Ma,jesty's Foroes) Act 1932.~" ·:),.::-L~:. 
2and,j -Geo.6 •. Ca.85 •.. ' ., .. , .. ,. 
14. Th~hiionalHOoDissioq.e';s.iOt;~;1232, 2~~d":3 Ge~.6. Ch;76~r ~,i.,; '~:,::" .c 
'5. '. 2.·ud '3 ·GeO.b~Ch.77 •. , , .. , ... ', ... , 
16. There had,. of oourse, been previous ooourrenoe,s of suoh ambiguity. 
11. TJae House of Co_oBs Disqualifioation (Temporm Provision)A.ot 1241: 
. 4 . and 5 .Geo.6.Ch.8 •. ,See Note 2 •... ,...... . ." .... '. '.' •.... , ... ' 
H.C.Deb. 369, 00.655. et.seq. (S~ond Readin,),27 February ,,1.941, 00.795 
et .. seq .. (Committee), 4 March 1941. See Note 3. ....'. ' . 
.;; 
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"I regard service to this House as the highest service 
a citizen can render, taking precedence even over service 
in the Armed Foroes. If that is not the case, what is 
the meaning of constitutional. government?"(19) 
:B;v~'s st'atem~nt is important in that it cogently expresses the two fold 
acceptance by the Labour Party of the central role of Parliament in the political 
r-;· ~: ),. ,"; ,,',~ . -
syst~ and ~ ~s~ertion of the primac~ of the institution as the method of 
1> < r:1 "': ~:' .' . _ '_" ,.'~ , _,. .; 
achieving social change. Whilst the exercise of power might, in fact, lie 
,~:-: ,;:: ,,- ~,,, .' i., ~ ., , 
with the EXecutive, this was less important than the representation of the 
"-., , 
intere~~'~' of th~'~o~it~ tbro~h election t'o the legisl~ture • 
. " I, 
The performance of this representative function was the subject of increaSing 
c, ,', 1: ',: ~ ~\..., "~ . 'r"' ",' ;" ... ,. .-~~ J 
criticism as war progressed. The New Statesman, for example, constantly 
-, , , 
.. - ... , . 
expressed dissatisfaction with the personnel involved in the war effort and 
~ .. "~~ .F,g+,:·1,Lr-·.~~·(_,::~~.r ;c" '. '- .'~ ~I. "".""' ~ ' .. "r :.. "-:, ~;:,... '1'" •• " , ,~ .;-., c 
t~ose sympathisers of Hitler introduced by the Conservative Party into t~~ 
~,.:~:~.;.r\~ \~t,·,: ,:)':.>} ~l'~,~ ,£~-: ·:".I.'~;. " '; i. _ ,~< . "" ___ \'.~,~ •• ~~ ~ " .:"> 1 
Commons through'by-elections. It was,ariUed "the political truce serves to 
,.'" .,';-, '" ;'1 ,,,, S~. ~" , • ~ .I- ... r , 1'1 ,-",;, • t' . _. ... _~ '- > •• :.. :.... '. ... 
hide fro~'th~"H~u'~~' of Co~~n~' m~;h that is occurring in 'the country"(20) and 
'!' ".' ,,~:: ~ .7, .. ~. :,;',! L;::' ;-: ",' ~ ~,.~,;.; 'i'~'" ,';,. i. ,;'; ~- '\.' ,,- 't' ~.,. .-' '.' .,:. ,.- '. :~:' ' •• ': .. ,.: ... '" ., .. 
t~ing the view that the future lay between Communism an~ Socialism expressed 
h.:'- >:" l.:::.._'~, .... \ , ~.\.'! ';. !-5," LJ..: ,.~>,:.~:.~ ~'';'.::' ~ :.,:, ..• ~, .' .~ <.,' ~'., s :.'; ~~. ' ,~.<. _.". 
disquiet at the Government's treatment of Parliament. In an editorial on 
"<':.~':" ~ ;;~ .,.~,.;l., "_':'~ ,:,;,":,\::' 
1 February 1941, it declared, 
.... ;:,-:,.,;,~ ,J-;, .••. , :~~:', \.,.1<~,-..).. - :~:,,: '~i:- \~\. ,. >~,.,.. ~.~'.',..:' '.:~ ," 
_ "Ultimately the only answer to .the Communists. is 
~'<' ';;': to.show that capitalism can be transformed peace-
fully even in a democracy such as ours is today," 
. . -, . ~ ..;"~ 
While sixteen months later it spoke of, 
. ' .• ,; .",. ,. '-\ .:; .... ' ,_;'. ". .' " •. ';, .~ -." ;,.>,~, "', '.; '· .... ,·.C"'~ ~ ,~, ~'. • " .~'< "\~ 
.c .. i "the' degree 'to' which Parliamentary . institutions 
become discredited when there is a growing disparity 
" 'between what the nation requires and the House of' 
'> Commons is prepared to, accept. "(21) ,_' < ~_ 
::-.~. i<.·~_t, '.,'; ':;e:,}" "". •. ,'4 .,. , ,.. d' ,,..< ~ ':;', '. 0:: ~:;." "" .~;f~ ..... -", 
:.,.., • • '_. ",.'1. ,~ 
1:'.,.. ~.;, 
20.,_,,"Th.e:S:dtiih Tradition" New Statesmap..5Jp:o.tl.lSftl. Tribune took a similar line 
throughout the war. .- " , ." '. . . . . . . 
21. H.J :"'~i;"The:~buX C~~~~~~c~ 1 ~'d 'Mt~;;' ~N~~ St~t;s~, '6' J~e"1942., 
• '0' •. " , ,-' ..., •• . ' - ",.; -
;~ ~...,:,:~.- -It:1~:: .~,)'~ --:00.. .:~~,~. J '~_",,~ 
f; ,: .• ~.;:~- ,;.~~:':_·L1 t~: ":;~':' '~~;:.~'~'~'! ~.~:~. tL~~~ .~'.}~f ~',.", ., .:~ .. -, . 
i:>~.; :~:.' :;:;",,~_,~,~<:':. <;;'je!. 
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As the end of hostilities drew near these ideas found expression in the 
dema:nds of back-bench Labour Members for a general election which they argued 
was required in order to restore the balance of representation between a 
Parliament predominantly elected in 1935 and an electorate whose liberty had 
been preserved by ~ecl fo'~es consisting in the main of youngsters who had 
not been able to vote because of the electoral truce or inadequate registration 
procedures. 
.( , 
T.h~s themajorissu~s which 8£fected the 'Labour Party on the question of 
Parli~ent'~ ref~~~ );;~r~ ~h;ee fold.' "In' the 'first pla.ee there was the control 
of th~ dis~~et'io~ad; poV;:er O'f the Government, authorised under Acts approved by 
Parliame~t. Secondly,there was the question 'of the relationship between the 
Crown an~ 'Parli~e~~;'~s :'s~e~ 'i~ the "di~p~te ; o~~;r t;~e ~D~n£ud Bill. Finally, 
"th~re w~~ the qu~stion of the representa~iV~ qualities'6f' the House. The first 
issue"w~';~'~~~e~e~'n~t ~im~lY' with ~he b;o~ i~s~es~f p~~sonai and civil 
liberties' b~t' 'wit~~he"~~ed"to'~ontrol ~uch r~~iations~~s w~re issued~" The 
t·.,· ::' :,":.,:- 1-·~,~··:-_-'··.s.. i;, ~:~.~.'~ .~. < /;.. ~-'r ,'.' ~.:~ ,_ .:". " '. _" t.~, 
initiative on this matter'came not from Labour Members in either Government or 
:; <~;". ~".~~,,~ , ~,~ ,r' ~'" ~'5 .. ~ ~.. -< .'-.~ • 
... . ~ .~. ~~. . 1::~,~f..~_.,'J.-.,.,..",. , ,,;_ ... -. 
opposition who, as we shall see, regarded the development of such regulations 
i~~;ita;i~:"~ece:s~~;·~~" i~·;po~t-wa.r 't~l:!mS~ ess'ential t~ the'transition to 
. . ___ ~'-:"; .. ~~:.;:' ~},~.;.1 r~·'··,,~:,-~".,;"~:· /~" ':':'J., ~'":' ~~,~ ~ . .'. ~.' " ... ,'-, .0.,. ,~ • .. 
peace if the Labour Party should be elected to office,. but from Conservative 
, -' )11 ; ...... ~,~ '-•. '~;.~: ~ •• L·,~ .~ .. ~., .. ;< ~ ~} --"",:j ~:~ r'· . .;" ~:: 'J .;'.:;" .; ~-.; .... "::::""~' ,11 ''''''k '<: -.. ~~'~ ~:·.i' 
back-benchers who had great distaste for such regulations. ":.1 On the question of 
'representa.ti~~;'t'h~,i~~~t>i~~i~e j~~~. ~~inly"r;O~' Lib~~~ ~d CommaJ.Well~h Members, 
.' ",.-,;j' '_.-:~'~~';";;"'"t-;.~.tl'/l.J,::.,'" >,t:: .. . \",.: ~::,,;;:·~,t ·~.':·l·'f =~i} .. ~, ~+,-~~,~ ~;'~f:.. _ :,""1 
partioularly Sir Richard Acland, who used th~ opportunities' afforded by the 
t"':_'~\ t:-::{-: ~~;,',:""',"'.:-:'{~_:._~ t."',::,~.:;':'-/)'r .~_:.~, :;;~-' :::,~" ;:.;.~ .. /~.:,: +!~,,"~-: f_ '.~ ;-.'-~"'i'·':?' .:-i' .. " .;';, , 
annual renewal of the Prolongation of Parliament and Local Elections and Register 
, -
.' . \ . 
. ~:iEi;~"t~;;"(T;;po;a:ry·Pro·VisionrACltl'to'preiss for',reforms;(22)'''''' It was in""~'" 
. -;:':"'A"~">':'::";~ .~;"':;, :=:;':>0; /1';,.1 (,~,~.;~,. :,~".! :;,~; .. ~.,,, .. ,~."': .. -~ 
• 
" 
22~ 
.' , 
. ..... -
• t ' •. ':. ;',: 'j', 
!eland also raised the question of Parliamentar,y reform by opposing the 
Government when it moved "m- Parliament writs for Eddisbury and Daventry, 
in March 1943. See H.C.Deb.387, co.1003/10 andH.C.Deb. 388, cc.1/5; 
61/70., See also ,the ,comments of the Economist, 20Ma.rch 1943 (p.355) and 
New Statesman, 20 Maroh 1943. (183). --, , , , , , . 
:;., '-' 
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response to thecamnents made by these Members that the Goverzment set in 
process the chain ot events that led to the Speaker's Conference ot 1944 
and the war-time measures emanating tron it. For the Labour Party the main 
or1t101,sm ot the continuing problems ot,registrat1on came predoninantl,y 
, 
tran ,outside the, House, mainly tron the" intelleo tual Lett. As we shall 
see this was because th~ presence ot the Labour leadership in Government 
meant that suoh6~it101sm as' was expresseCl came trem the N.E.C. \". The 
remaining issue, ~~; the',re1ati~nshipbetween the Legislature 'and" Exeoutive 
, , ' 
Was the tirstto be~raised and solved,and,theretore, as a matter ot 
; '<. ( 
oonven1enoe, will'be'dea.1t'with tirst~ 
;~~i ~~~~d 'to th~ Ma~Do~ald ,Bill- has'beEm mentioned above~ 'In' 
" ,I,:.,' -, t~' -:........ ' ..... -. .', ~_- ~c ': ". .' _ -, . ,,~< 1 i ."-. . . ...:- . ; 
the" debate'on~ the Bill the Labour Party' took the tiew that th~ question' 
~' .1 r' ] ,.,':1" /,·t;;i .• .'o-:.;",l,' ,', ",:' ;: ;.,<.",._:e'~' '. ,;.,;. '~;"~ ._,~ ';': ,"..., , \, .:.i :'~':, <~ ~:.' ~', :., -. 1__ .'-' 
Was "essentially a. House ot Commons matter." (23) Aneurin Bevan argued that 
•. ~ ~ ", ~:..:~ ~ .. \. -_.1'l...~-~>_~"" rt:~ ".)', 'f.-',,~ >l_:'-~,;_; > ~-' ~ '",. t" 
1t was necessary "to l~it the extent to which the Exeoutive can absorb 
.: }'.{ }: ...... ~ ~.!.,~~ :'" .... _) .. ,,~ '.'" v., .; .~,' . _ t';.i'.< :' ",~~,.' ;-
Members cf"the 'House' ~to the" Aaministration," (24) while Lees-&dth led the 
-,: ,-.::~; ,.s'1j:'·~· :\:"';:·"i.;.'~ '~.,:.; ..... ~'> ~:., ;;."'1.: 1, l ,,-., ' .. ', '~-'." !.-~ et""~"~ . • ;. ~~'. ,.'~. ": ':~"">.'.,> 
other Labour Members in agreeing with the Government that a Seleot Oanmittee 
on the 'whoi~' question was essential. (25) Josia.h Wedgewood introduoed a 
note of extre:~;p~l~ent~r:i.~ ;~t~' the .. ~r~e~~~~" by, d~~la:ring, 
" :, .. -'~';, .1 \~, -t:- ~,: 5, :~ ',~, (~::.; ~, , ~ :.'," _~ ..... '~,.' ,"'.' t 
"This Bill ; enables sanethingtobe done.which •••• 
may,be in our,own personal interests.but,wh1oh is 
against the traditions ot Parliament and against the 
wishes ot the constituents et, many Members who are 
being deprived ot theirrepresenta.tion." (26) 
.. :~:~,;r-'.'~ ':"':'/'~ ~,,~.'\.-:. f- " ." :':~:" ~: ..... -,I"'; ~"'~~ '~';;~';' ~~.:i ... ·-\\f~:~_.;". ';, ':: .. ' .... ~.;~.::t-~ (;'''' ""'" ~-.i 
By we:! of oontrastMajor Mllner argued that the Bill was necessary" and 
I 
• \: I ,':.·'~ ... q'U~ >'~"':I. ,'-,.r .:). '; . ">; I" "'- .. 1 ~"';l~ ,'":'. ... "?' /:.~-.~." .•• , -.,\ ':~ ."_ "_,' ~~,. '!! .. ;{'< ... ~ .~~.~ .~(,. , ~~<~"-" ~ ..•.. ", 
dealt ftore1blywiththe argtJnents raised against it, denying that Members • ~d 
-' 
"," ~ .. .,.,~~:!f "''''''' }_.. ~~ 
'. n1d~:: tic: ',717 .'J:, ~~;, .....  
25. !2!!., 00. 66418 •.. 
26 •.... ~., ..... 718/9. "0'./''<' 
< .. '.. '.'~ ...... '._ - 7 • 
" 
i., -..:: '"'.: _" \':_' :.' ,+ ~;. ',< _ ~ .• t~. ~. -. '~" .:.' ,*, ,;i ~~'. 
f.." ~ .: "', <. :... ~'~ .~;. 't . ): ''t.,. ~ ;",'i ~' -.-, ,! ,i, \ ~ 
. ~, : )~. ~~ ..... k~ < ~~. : . ; 
.", -'" 
1-'1 
; ,'"" .... ~. 
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the Administration were "by the mere acceptance of their purely honorar,y 
oftices made dependent upon or necessarily supporters of the Government" 
or that the constituencies involved ,were disfranchised. (27) The CaDnittee 
stage produced ~ore general critioism at the passive role of Parliament in 
the conduct of the war. Bevan speaking in Carunittee declared, 
"I hope that there will emerge in this House a far 
grea ter spirit at independence than has been shown 
in the last 12 to 18 months. It would be disastrous 
it' the House of Canmons did not gain in vitality as 
the war went on •••• It isbeooming, not less, but 
increasingly difficult for independently~inded 
Members to state t.heir, point of view, and to exert 
, " influenoe upon the Executive.": (28) 
-' ~ ~ ~, .' >, •• ' >0 • 
Follow~gth~ ~eeond Reading' a SelectCaDnlttee was set up to inquire 
into "Offi~es ~~ Pla.'oes of Profit Under,theCrow~." (29) Its Report in 
~ , ":' >~ .'~ • 0 ",' ~ _ ".;,. .'" 
Ootober,,194l. came to t~ ~~n~luSi~n" that "in the main the law and practioe 
as to disqualifiea tio; by" reason of: offi~eWlder the CroWn is o~ the right 
; ..' _. ,_ f -'; '. - , -," " , .',; - .: <: " ": -f : 
lines,· 'and that all that was neoessarywere changes in the law to remove 
" . 
• > " ,", ~" '\' , • \ ." • '. ~ 
ananaliea and bring'it up to date.~ (30) To effect this the':Seieot' COOun1ttee 
" . 
.j ,", ' 
reoanmended, ">" ., ,. . ~. . ~. ' . 
." "tha't steps' shOuld' be'taken to 'draft and':httroduce" 
in the House of Commons as soon as practicable a 
ccmprehens1ve Bill setting forth -the law on this 
subjeot on the lines of, theex1st1ng law and ",:,. 
: practice; 1fi th such of the alterations or new' . , 
,provisions •••• in this Report, as "the House of" 
. Canmons ln8y approve. ~ •• " (31) ",' '" "',' , 
The Select Ccmimit~ee'took thevi~ t~t'with ~p'e~1iic:'e~~~ptto~ (t~~~g;' 
-
28. 
; '. ';, -~ 
"'.;. ... 
~., CM.' 687.Ct. H.C.Deb. 365, cc. 1075/9 where he argu~d for'" " 
" " greater involvement of Members in the running of the War. 
;'j ~ •. ~, ~. ", ~ 3, .;' ,.~. _:' ,:,.,' • ,,," 
R.C. Deb. 369, co. ,812 _' 
, ~ 
1:, ',; ;\.,." > :.~ ';0 '. "£ 
R ort from the Seleot CQ1ID1ttee on Oft10es or Plaoes of Profit 
lJnQer the Crown. R.C. 120, Oetober,1941. Parliamentary Papers 
In, 487, 1940/i). ,The Party olaimed part'oredit for the setting 
up, of ~the OCDDittee., See L.P.A.C.R. 1941., p.68. 
R.C. 120, p. XlV •• para. 21. 
Ibid., VI.XIV ID, para.' 22. 
" l ' .. '
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proportion between Ministers and parliamentary secretaries laid down in the 
Ministers of the Crown Act 1937 should be maintained and there was no need for an 
increase in the overall Membership of the Commons.(32) The need to continue 
the House of Commons' (Temporary Provision) Act 1941 for a further limited period 
.. because' of war-time necessity was ~cepted but it was recommended that the 
eXisting emergency legislation'be terminated as soon as practicable, if possible 
before the cessa.tion of hostilities. They accepted that the existing situation 
wa; both abnormal and temporary but stressed the general belief that " 
"the limitation of'the number of Ministers qualified" 
, to sit in the House of Commons is regarded by Your 
) ,~ . "'.,; ~',,;? Committee as 'of great importance; they also regSX'd it " 
as a matter which should ... be specially watched and 
'. ", '. ';., insisted upon by the House because of the natural 
tendency to increase the number of government depart-
',', mentsand of Ministers. "(33) ,;, :,~' " " ... 
They alsothoug~tthat the open~e~ded'nature of the Ministers of the Crown 
~(.ergency Appointments)~t should b~amended to restrict its -dUration to a 
more specificdate'~ (34):"" Underlyiug the'Report were three broad principles; that 
the holding of 'certain non-ministerial office,s was incompatible with Membership '" , 
Of the House 'of Commons;truit there was a need to limit the control or influence 
of the Executive over the House which th~ existence of an undue proportion' of . 
office:.holders in the Commons tended to produce, and:, that the essentiaF'" ," 
'Oonditions of a certain 'number of Ministers being Members 'of the House for the 
Purpose' of' ensurini control of the Executive' by p&'rliament should be maintained. (35: 
. ,f . The importance of this Committee is tha~ it acted a.sa Committee of the' .~~ 
. Legiala.tuxe 'declarirli its views' on 'the constitutional relatio~ship between the 
,," 
, mxecutiv~ and the Legislature~'- ':, There is no evide'ncefrom :thaprooeedirlgs of·: 
32. Ibid~', p.XVI/xvIII, para.25. 
33. Ibid.', P.xxxrx,' 'P&r~:~82:"i.·:·; ." 
'34. Ibid:, .p.XI;'·para..83. 
35. Ibid., p.XIII/XIV, para.19.' 
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the, Committee that anyone thought the hiera.rchal or constitutional relation-
; ship between Parliament and the Executive should be fundamentally changed. 
," ~ ~.
There was no attempt by the Labour Members of the Committee to argue a 
'., . 
constructive or radical Labour Party alternative. Both the Report and its 
, . 
PrOCeedings indicated an assumed acceptance of existing constitutional develop-
, ' , 
menta as the reference point from which to start and as a consequence the 
_ presentation "of 'such outmoded and, in realistic political terms, irrelevant 
eighteen century principles of representative government were not even " 
\" , " .·'r..,.' • .-' • ,-, 
questioned. ,'The Labour Party was' essentially a cODsti tutional party l'efusing 
to 'recognise the conflict between firm, , effective government and a cri tic~l 
leiislattire. " For' the Labour Party as a whole the traditional role of the 
" 
Executive' a:s'the "King' a ~ver~ent" and the House of Commons as the ttGrand 
Inquest'oithe Nation" were 'se.cros~ct. " In Opposition they' defended 'and 
:- " ~ ~:. J. '__ ~ ~~-
Ministers of, the Crown Act, while in office Parliament became an inconvenient,~ 
. -.~: :: : J ", !" i • ~,';'" L \ ," ' i.", _. " ~ ., __ - ~ " ; ,"", . ,f ," 
restraint on their power, especially if it was as active as the Select Committee 
' .. "'~~.; ,.J .. ";"'~,."~,,,.,.;; .~~, ,,;...,.'. c 1:'>',~ 
on National Expenditure.(36) 
r',: '.';' .~. J,. 1,.,., ' ." 
Yet there were a variety of means by which the House could be used by the 
';,' i "r ~ :~ ..: < 
Executive •. On questions such as this one it,wa.s alW9\VS possible to assess the 
~ ~.:/ "" .,:. '. , __ ~ .... ;~ I. J ,; , ." "" " 0-- ., <c', :-i_:;~ :;:. ~ , ........ " .. d' ' ' '';. '", 
strength of opinion'_in;the' House by allowing S;' debate, which, following the 
.~. -,' .,c ~ ."," v ~, "; ,;. " ~J - .~,. ... 
, , e:x:prelilsed View' of 'the Select Committe'e, thei did~ (37)",; The debate, which took 
'. \ co. ~'r 
place on 5 Februa;.y. 1942; v/u on' a motion' recommendi~tlle Select Committee' IiI 
... ' .1 ... , 'l--. H~' , "_.,, , • ...<.~ , >,-. ~, ,.,:..- ~ . ,;. . :. ':'J "F,.. .. ' '" 
RePort "to the co~sideration of His Majesty's Government n • (38) .' Pethick-Lawrence 
~e the point that the Select Committee was in effect asked to work w1thincan 
-
36. See Note 4. " " 
• ;.< :-~ '.F': ~ :! ,:" ~ ~ 41.. 
H.C"l20~·:. p.XL iid. para. 89. 
,'.~: , ';";,' ,'-.~. ,,;; "".'-
H.C.Deb. 377,cc.1290'et.seq. Se. Note 5. 
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!:d.sting"essentially conservative, constitutional structure composed of 
. ". ~'>' .} 
~~hs and conventions and that it proceeded on the principle that these would 
, f 
oontinue to exist. j :" , The Report, in his view, was 
_ "in accordance with the general conservative tendencies 
"'of this country, that it does no h~,that it preserves 
the framework of our Constitution and ••••• does not ' 
prevent those changes which the efflux of time and the 
'. economic, industrial and poli tica.1J.1te of the country 
" .... ~~demand."(39)' " , • ,', 
~';~in :B;v~'l)raised.the"Report a~!' "one' of the best repo~ts that I have ever 
<. "'" ~ .~ f ~ " .... ~ I ; ~ - ,> " : ",', .... l ' , ", .,.,. '" .",;". " ,;-,; • ~ ',' ,. • • ~ ~ <" < ~ ,"'. • 
seen coming from a Select Committee"and'a.d.dressed himself mainly to'the possible 
~- ' : ' , '~I"; -', . ' ~ _~ ....... - , ~ ~ ~ '! '" . {' ",' - • 
Confusion"over the' a.ctuai' ~nding of the emergency situation and its possible 
a.p;ii~~t'ibn;:in: f~t~~"~it~ati~nk~ (40)" R'acog;isingthe necessity'of revamping 
;,' '-: , '." - ~ -~ ,:" .'. -f. ,. -\:, -,,' . ., - : 
the rOles'of Government ':and' P~lia.m.ent he declared, 
'-.(." 
,.~ .. :,., ... ::."~.""-,,,, ."r'::l ~) ',1:. '..~ ""~t'?' ~ _;. :~ ~1--' ~ .. ~ .' .): 4 ,,,"- .':.c.- "'- '~ ;'d''- "' .. { 
"It is alw~s necessary not only that the Government 
:,!,: should be powerful, but that ,the critics should be 
powerful if representative' government is to continue' , 
';, ;"in wholesome,fashion.~'(41) :', ,< 
'. 
T.Rus ~hilstBeva.n accepted the existing constitution as being the most ~ffective 
. ". '('.,.,"./ , .. , . -" -:, ..... ., '-' 
means of ~overning, he envisaged a positive critical, role for Parliament. Years 
... " .. "... ,'.. ~ .,- ... >, J>~ • -~ .~ ..... J!, - ~",,i;" ;~~ .. ,.l. _, .. ~ '~~ ,!,J:. 
la.ter he. eJC;presliled the, same view in la Place of Fear. ,.:"Parliamentary demo~ra.cy," 
• .,. _ • c.!> '., ." ."~ '.-.~ ,..., " •• ': < ." .. :: .~" ~ " ,. < '.,lfl, ..... 
,he wrote, 
;,"is essentially government by discussion. _, But if", '," . 
discussion is not quickly followed by resolute and "~: r.,." , .,', 
. "', deci si ve ac tion then the, vi tali ty . of democracy., ""." 
deolinelil ••••• Parliament does not keep the ring,' .' '":"~<': ::; ", 
... , .. ,~ ... Parliamentis one of .. the conteliltants in,the,ring.,_ "" .. M."', ..... w.~.,~v, 
," tIt is not. above thelattle •. It is a weapon" and the ... ,',' , , " 1 
': . ~ :,:, mOlilt . formidable' weapon of all, in l the. struggle. ,,( 42), "4' ,;. ' :: ;". ::'" : • ~ " 
-
,I'"",. ". 
<,,,. ~'. ~ ,i>-
40. :Ibid~'~' ~o~131~1e~":1 J) .. 
41. 
42. 
Ibid., 00.1318. ",., ",' 
, ~ .... : ,.c. ~~"';:o .-:-: ..j,., , .,..-.... .... !~ • ~:< .. \., ' . .,. ."'It 1-:.; ,J, ':" :~'< ," .. ' f'e ::".11.,:.:; , ".' <: ': .. :"- if> :::, 
."A~:BeVan;:;'I~· Place" of Fear (London: MacGibbon &liee;' 2nd Edition, 1961), p.49. 
'" _ ,:-,. ~:' .:'~. J; .">1' ( •. -~~ ..... _ •••• ~ • 
.", 'f 
~. • _ .. \' l <t 
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~evan, of course, took the view that the constitutional and political 
~a.vereignty ult~ately lay with Parliament, therefore, its role must not be 
\ .... , , 
r.estricted because it did work and could work to bring about Socialism by 
'"-; ,,".)." 
uSing its power thrwgh the role of the organised Party of the working class. 
l· ~,t ~" ~. .\ ", ' ., • 
~o the Parliament'arianin a democratic system Parliament was supreme. By 
.~'. ~~~..,:' .<' '. 
1942, ther~f~~, 'ev~ on the Left of the Party the neo-Marxism of" the Socialist 
\~. ~",'.'~;.:, ."! " : -. }', .'~' . ! y) ".~ ,"~ -. < ': :'''" -: •• ,' " , ' " • , 
t,ea.gue and Harold La.ald. had taken th~ir place in the museun of discarded ideas. 
~o;' :the' G~V~I'rlm~~t,:.&rthu~ Green~ood ~noun~ed that Part I of the Report '( that 
• I. ". • .-- , ~ • ,j •• ~. " ' -"."" • lit 
dealing'with p~~n~t peace~t~e legislation was~der consideration) and that 
~ ~~'f~ .t j;. '. T.:; ~. '~_' •. '", ~"'~'~",. -L" __ ." I ·c;- f.- ",'. .':.~ ,l,.. . ,~ . \, _.". ' .. ' .)-
oertain recanmendations made by the Select Canmittee in Part II would be 
,.,'>. 
~b.odu~~d ~ :a't~~~~ing BUl, ~:~ttitud~ which Jam~s Maxt~ recogni~ed 
~~'~o~t~~ ~~"~a:~~f~~to le~~late. 0:3) ;h~ ~isters of tm' Crown and 
Iio~e;'of~~~s: D~'q~fice.tion~il·i (44) inc~rporating two ~e~~endati~ns 
of the"Se{~~~";C~tte~'w~' pas~d through its '~~~o'n~i:~~d~g 'and SUbs'~~uent 
1. - .'( 
It was renewed annually 
:."; . ,'. '} ';'.,::'" .... ,; ~' .. " {.'~ .. / .~, , .. , .. ::' ,.~::;' ,'.. ,.' , .. " , '. .' 
for the next two years betore being allowed to lapse. (45) Its enactment did 
-,<,,: 
:. ,", ;, .. ,,'<;. {:,,:<.:~,··~~~:',·~r_-: .!:.{.~';¥"!;.,.<.~{.::~ ",~ ~ .- .~ ..... > "~ T') ,:' .• ~ :". ",' 1,:'",' , , ",,;<.. 
llot oanpletely abolish ananalies as the Arthur Jenkins Indemnity Act showed. (46) 
. :.~:~ :'~: ... ",. "': "', ~_ :_,,'!::.~:~ -~'.'~ t j " ~ .~,i~,..;.-·., ':" ... , -',. 'f 1 ~ "' __ .' \". ~. ,~_ ~('~~~~ :.:~ ~x-.~.--: ·r·~, ...... _-
The Select Committee had looked at, but decided against discussion upon the 
'.~ , "_",-, 1~; :>.f" ,<' ;';.'~ (':,_,': -~ :::", ~.·'i,~'., :,,-""~~' ~,-~ L .. ·.'·,'J .·:,.',"~ ... r~' ~~' .. "'::;:l :re,;; ,-, , t·, \. ' .. ,~,' 
practice of the Re-election of Ministers. (47) This practice had been repe~ed, 
":~ ~;;",~~""~"'-";".":."!: ~-;<!'~: t~'-~-~i ,t,.>.- "~;.:.-,, ... -~_ ~?~. \' ·Y:_:~~_:~~,.'-; <' ... "" <:-~ '.,,-, '-,.' .r i ,,·;) .~. I· .... 
tirst,in part in 1919 and then' oanpletely in 1926 •. The faot that no opposition' 
was fort~~~~"~;~' -th~ L~b~~ P~ty;~~' 1941 . is ~'f~;t~;~ il1ust;~tio~i' ~ t;~" , 
-43.,' R.C. Deb. 377 ~ cc. ·1323/5., Greenwood. ,oc. 1334. Maxton. Churchill had told 
FiiS OabInet colleagues Itthat he saw no reason why a Select Ca!mi ttee of the ." 
!:rouse should not be ,set up to make recanmendations in regard to ,the position ••• 
after the war. It CAB 65/13. ,20(41)7. 24- February 1941. Italios Mine. - , 
.'.i;' ~gislation was not ~forthocming until 1957.·~~~. f<;;::"~' .• ,::<:: ,~~, '. ' 
,44. Enacted as 5' •. 6. Geo.6. Ch.ll. Minister of the Crown and House _ of Ccmrnons 
Disqualification .Act, 1942.' , < - ; • ". ; -, Id ' ,,' .; " ,,, ;t 
4i. See Note 6. :,' ;,':~ . ,.: h.. ,',,' : •. ,,~ C,'i, .d "t' -;':"~[ ':'i,'" Y';'~ 
4.6. Enacted U 5 .' 6.Geo:6. Ch.l. Jimmy :Maxton used the Second Reading as an 
\ ""' opportunity ,to enter a mild protest over the triviality ot the oase.~,'''<~"'''~ 
, ' .!Le. Deb •. 376, 00. 1408/12. 
47::' R.C~·120;'p.Mr;ni~pe:ra.27. 
themes underlying the Labour Party's conservative attitude to constitutional 
change. When the post-1918 Coalition Government decided to abolish the procedure, 
whereby certain office-holders had to re-apply under the Succ.ession of the Crown 
Act, to the elec~orate, it was opposed by the Labour Party, which was at that 
time attempting both to preserve the integrity of the Parliamentary system and 
establish itself as the alternative iovernment. Their 6pposition. to the 
Re-election of Ministers Act· was,therefore, based· on short-term considerations. 
They rightly took the view that the,Government was seeking to avoid rejection 
Of its candidates for office by an electorate stampeded into the "Coupon 
Election" of' th~- ~~~-rlO~S yer:.r'. -, The Party's opposition was, therefore, directed 
~a.inst the ~oli·hc~l nature ofth~ B:ii~, e~peciallY its timing rather than the 
c'OIisti tu~ional :i.~s~e- inv~i ved •. " , • ~ > , ~ > •• ' -"-At a time of widespread industrial unrest, they 
. l>'~ (',; .'~ ";," c-~~' :'::' .. ,",:: .. ::; >~, _ ",,' ~ '- ._ .-'", '." ': 
Was detrimental to Parliamentary government. 
,.; 
- . 
In particular the Party objected 
t~it~:~etr~~t~~~' ~l~~~~"~hich ~b~iated the need for the re-ele~tion of fo~ 
indi tid1.l.a.l Mhi~t~~I/ i~",ol ved.' Th~s the: Party ~as conc'erned to ga.i~ politic&! 
,~;. ;~ .: ,-,' ;-~.;~. ; . .. :t - -? ::~ _ '. " .; ~: ~ -to ') ;" t:. "?'~ . ".,' , ~ , '>," " .. > , .~ 'c- ~ .~ f 
a.dvaritaies from' oppositionCtopol:1.tically,:,motivated changes in the constitutional 
at~~t~e~'J ("It ~ffer'ed~o alt~~n~t'ive theory'~f the ~~nstitution to' th~t already 
<. "':'-,~',_~-''''' l":",t':f" .~::.:- .:~~ -r-',;.:: ,:':, .-~ ··~'c." '.' '.<_ .-··t <-!~'" -~;'. .. .:'.,!.J-~._. w '. ,.", 
in existence other than to support the continuance of a system descended from a 
~.1 .. ".'. , •... ~"": ":' "": -.! ......... , .... ~~, .• ~._ •. ,~.~_: .-:"1' ~<\ >.':·~.',': .. t •. _ •. , "~._" .'V- :.;;< :--'..~:'. r :;.. tot&J.ly"difier~ot'" ,:md~o~rati~ :pOli t1c~ ~y~t'em which had originally been intended 
. . . 
to' ~u~t~n £ the\)Oliti~&lcp~we~ ~f' ~ :;~irli~g;d gr~up. .. "./ i.c,~ It mB¥, of course, be 
<. 
I.l:~ed tlU.t' the'a.utY :of an Opp~sition~is' to'~ ~~~~se ~d, ':i.nde~d, in its~Annual 
.. -.~i ~., •. ~. . ". ", .-'.{ ..... l'l:.,~_";,, -.,. ~~. " ": t ;." : .... ·0' ,: ... ',<,"1 1,' ,,'_.'. _. <' ",_ . '::'~~ " '" .' .. ,,,~ . \~-'". ~'- .. , .. ,-' 
Report t~'Co~ei:~nce the·p~ii~ent~p~tY'.·Cl8.im~ci 'that' itS'CPP9sition' wa~-- .' 
~~;i;~d~t~~";;~~;";~dtification ~d:"~i~;d-'~;edi t fo~' ~bt~i~i~''';;''~;~dm;~t 
J.~ , ... _ ~ '", .... {'. :.~ ':' !I- ,.' _::: ':fI -, . " ~ '!- • 
"providing t~t only those who are promoted to offioe in the first part of a new. 
,,,'<cc< _,~":',,,;:_._~ 'i""~:'r '.y\\ ~~, 1: ;.~.; ..... ; 
P~liament Shall be exempted from a by-election."(48) David Butler, who perhaps 
~ >"-'," i.;~::· t ~'1.' ,~",<;- .. ' . ..1,.." ~'.: 'b- :i·~.··. ··x_~·~ .. 
-
46. L.P.A.C.R. 1919, p.58. 
- , '~ 
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underestimates the importance of political background to the introduction of 
:he B,ill, quite. rightly notes the irony of the fact that the Labour Party in 
1924 was the main beneficiar,y of the 1919 Act.(49) In 1926 political motives 
accounted to a large extent for Labour's opposition to the Bill. As in 1918 
the. 1924 Eleotion had produoed an unre~resentative Parliament. Thus, athough 
Clement Attlee militantly argued that the Labour Party was absolutely opposed 
to ,the ,Bill on the principle land.that "no opportunity should be lost, ~f allowing 
, 
pe?ple to say what they think of the Government of the day" his comment that 
. .. 
. ,,; :., "it is not a time when we should take away any 
opportunity of the electorate saying what they 
i ,think of the.Government ail the.electors of North 
Hammersmith did the other day" 
- ~ 
\~; -,' ";, <:-.\, . i" .'~ O-J .~. !t .. > , _1. d' b~ 
indicated the poiitical '~oti ves involved. (50)" By 1940 there was no" p~litical 
'- ~ <"~ r' 
.. ' .'>c.-'.'; ": ',y \:"" ..... 
reason to restore the practice. 
The c~nt~~r~f. St~t~to~ In~truInents byParli~ent wa~~ne a'spect ~f the 
,,".;::.,,';.;$:;-*~.,. ·~:kf·t.~,·."·.; .< .. ,,~,;< .. ":~ ','.:>:-/\' r.' '" ," ~::., 
Executive/Legislature relat:l.onship which caused the Labo;n. Party little'difficulty • 
• \ '. I' ,-r' 1. ,,~, , -. t..... _ • 
The reason' fo~ this ~as that'the Party' had co~stantlY taken the attitude that 
'>:' ,.-.~·r_." 1 j'-{ !'---~.::~:,:~~ ;:.)-: .~:',:""~ 4,'-';-:~ ,f-.'. ,,'J'-' .. ~.' '/, ,':.,., '.,~ ,.' " > ;, '" ~he increasing oomplexity of modern industrial sooiety made delegated legislation 
~, .• <~ ~:-. .:\, '(~'/i i J;~. 
an inevitable development. Th~ 'u~~" of'O;d~rs~in-c'ouncil by the' National 
'. ',Ir.. l,~·.,-~' .,~.< ... -+'i":.:~" ~. 1·"·/-,.<~.. '~~>,'. :" ' .• !,...... -;..._. 
Government, 'though railed 'ag&1nst" at first by' int ellectu&l.s like Laski, was 
, ,,- ~< ;~;',.'., 'c"', .,<:: -:::;. ~ ::'-~ t,}": .;<", .'- ",; _~ .... -: ;:.\;'<::..;-;':> .... ,~. ~ ':, ",._;,. "_ ~~,., co· 0;,;, ,,:.;. ,P'." .<~,"" '. 
weloomed by J .R., Clynes as a means' of effecting SociSlism. (51) . Laski and Cripps 
,'- . ~ .. ~ ~,I.J-';~ '~" .~~ '\ ::'~' :'~~, ~ ""!""" 7', ;,~, ~~ ~J". J." <~':" ~. r.:;: ,> ,':,;. ~,. ,; ,., _, • -T" t ... , - t '~' ( T ~ 
lOon accepted this notion even extending it to make the use of such Orders by a 
.. ~b;~ ~~~~~;~t ')~~~~l~ni'~a.bi~';~niY':·inp~li~e~t·· ~~t inth~:'c'~~ts,~ ~as7was' th'~'; '~r 
Oase pre~~~~i~'~(52)~' 'Thi~~~s,;' i~ f~t;:'th~ '~it~~tion'cre~ted {~de~".;a:r'::1;ime···· ;';; 
~ ", 
, .' 50. " H,C • Deb·. ,·196"" 00.1871/2. '~'-'"'''~'''''''~~'~''~''''~'''''"'"'''''"_.+, .. ,.' "';.,.,.,..;/,,* ., .. ' .......... "".. .. "". '_~"" ._.~_ •. , .. ~.,.,,~.'"'" :.~'" ~ 
... 
, . 51 0 ' s~~ ·'F~~tnote ·196 ':p~354~~ Ch:'6 •• · abo~~; ';:... ,'; 
'. '." " ...... , • .,\.~~.,. < ••• -,.~ •• -, ;:: ... :~."."- ... -.,,.,>'.,,~.~-.. "" .,-., ....... .; .. ..".,-". \ .. ,~" 
,.52 •. 
"":t , '+.:, 
\,' I,. ,:: ~ .,;;~ 
legislation. (53) In the intra-party debates in the Labour Party in the 
, 'thirties the Party had confirmed the inevitability of delegated 
legislation and in its policy statement on the "ProblEms of Parliamentary 
Government" incorporated the recommendations of the Donoughmore Committee 
oonoerning the setting up of a Parliamentary Committee to sorutinise Orders 
. and Regulations f~ling properly: within the terms of the rele~a.nt Acts of 
Parliament. (.54) .... There was, however, no response fron the Go~ernment and' 
apart fran brief discussion' on'a motion presented by George Strauss, 
little response fronthe Legislature either. (55) 
... Parliament willingly gave up its legislative initiative at the' c, . 
outset ot the war and it was not' until 1943 that "dEmands fo~more effective 
parliamentary control over the Executive becamecammonplace ~theHouse of 
Canrnons and grievances were increasing." (56) These demands came not from 
the P.L.P. but fron back-bench Conservatives. On three 00 cas ions in the 
first seve~ mont~ of. that 'y~r they·'..o:vocated the setting up of a Select 
Canmittee to "vet lt . Ordera ana Regulations before they were ·l.aid on the 
Table of. the House. ,(57) Apart tron concessions on the smplification of 
Orders the Government refused to accede to the Conservative's' demands~ 
Herbe;t Morrison for the Government argued thAt; Parliament had freely' 
delegated the re~ponsibility for re~ations,' subject to Parliamentary. checks, 
to, the Executive and the Executive could not be expeoteG to:mar;'that resP~~'ib:i1ity 
'. J; 
with a Seleot Committee.~. Whilst he wait prepared to agree that the views expressed ,[ 
.f. 
by the Donoughmore, Canmittee' were applicable in time of peace they Wer,e C not'" 
-, o:~~~:._~~~-:~ - -::';'>j,~~,';:.;_ :!:;:.;~:_;,~~_{ ;'.:'.,Y;': '-b::.~. ::_.:.:.> .. :'o,;~.jI'.,,-; ~ __ " - ;."~"'."; ,'". ,~-;:'.:_ .. ,,"~;_.o~ .. 
applicable in ,time at war. , c,The strain of appearing before a Seleot' Canmitte~ J 
-
53 • 
. 54. L.P.A~6'.R: '19:&, P"263.;:;ci:~~~;0~~·'~f th;'Canmittee on Ministers 
Powers, Qni. 4960' ge.cit., Harold Laski was a Member of the 
, .' Donouglaore Canmittee. 
H.C. Deb. 330, cc. 1239 et.seq. 27.December 1937. 
- Bavea, op.cit., p.103. ' " , .,' -~~~: " . 
~, 19 Januar,r 1943. H.C. Deb.386, cc. 149/180: 26 Ma3 1943. H.C. Deb~389' 
cc. 1593/1694 and 15 Jul.l 1943 . H.C.Deb. 391, cc. c 425/536. See .a180 ". ' 
kves, ge.cit., pp. 105/6. c', . '. . .,..., 
J 
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· would be an intolerable burden on Ministers and officials, would impair 
. efficiency and introduce delay. Whilst notusympathetic to the alternative 
of a Committee with powers to examine Departments the Government had not been 
Convinced that it would achieve anything. It was the duty of Members to be 
Vigilant and of the House as a whole to exercise its functions of guardian of 
· the Executive. (58) , Labour speakers did not fully support the Government's 
· resista.nce to change,: they· declared that change was necessary and urged the 
Government to assist the House in setting up effective machinery.(59) . Not 
infrequently Labour Members berated the Conservatives for using the issue of 
Delegated Legislation in order to prevent a post-war Socialist Government from 
, PasSing necessary post~war-Iegislation.(60) In particular Labour speakers 
rejected the'specific scheme'proposed by the Conservatives.(61) Ellis Smith 
summarised Labour's attitude when he said, 
.... "The question whether great executive power is good ' . 
or bad depends upon how the power is used and upon 
,', the type of Government'" -
although the debate revealed certain differences between P.L.P. Members on the 
desirability of a Select Committee. (62) ; , 
, The Government's resistance, however, was apparently based on differences 
~ - . ,-, , ' 
Within the Government itself as much astraditionalo executive resentment against 
~ , 
interference from the legislature.(63) t By the time of· the next full debate;" 
on 11 ~ 1944~ on a motion calling for the establishment 'of a Select· Committee, 
... 
58 • 
",' ;'1". 
H.C.Deb." 389," cc~ 1646/69 passim •. tlThe real aim should not be to resist the 
. principle of delegated legislation but rather •••••• to devise a Parliamentary 
. check whereby the Government may be prevented from running away. with .the ... :. 
show." H.C.Deb.413, cc.1050.., . . . 
, . 59 •. See, "for :exampl~; H.C:Deb,' '389;~c.1622/9. Silverma.n: cc.1633/46 Ellis Smith. 
'·'60 •. :tbia~, c~'~ ~,623/ 4~: Sil verman',' 'See Note '8. "of .,.':.,\.;.; ';;.-:: ~ .'. i;,::: 
61. The 'Conservatives had proposed to set up a Parliamentary Committee to 
Q,uestions before they were laid on the Table. 
H.C.D~b. :'~3'9;:~O~' "1644~' S~e Not~ 9. 
.' .' See 1fote 10. 
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the Government was expected·to be more co-operative.(64) All the old 
&rruments were used by Labour speakers who, in speeches interlaced with 
, ~ 
accusations of political motives on the part of the Conservatives; took the 
View that if any. Select Committee was to be set up it should have effective 
.. 
powers but should not be used as a reactionary piece of Parliamentary procedure 
._ to block necessary social reconstruction in the post-war period. In other. 
Words, delegation of legislative power to:the Executive was good and the 
leeislature should'exercise a sustaining and clarifying role rather than one 
which involved a judicial or restrictive function. (65), Replying for the 
Government, Rerberl 14orrison, who had made a numbe~ of speeches since -the last· 
Debate on the subJect in.the Rouse,. envisaging an increase in deleiated-leiis-
lationin the post-war period, announced a change in the Government's attitude 
and proceeded-to survey the general problems'invol~ed in setting up particular 
kinds of Committees.withaview toen~ing that'the House could fully express 
its Wishes. (66).:: Claiming that the previous attitude -of the Government had been 
based upon "the nature and quantity' of Defence Regulations which were beina _ " , 
turned out (at: that time)"' he said that the Government were "most anxious that '. : -, 
delegated legislation shail be subject to effective Parliame~ta.ry'checks and, j 
.!.her.v.r B~cessary,", effective Parliamentary control.:'(67) -- Retook' the -view that 
.. "' .... 
tae C~~tt~~ . ~~~~d. have the power to _ send for offi~:i.al~ and papers but net the 
linist.rs ooncerned and declared that the Committee would be given the help of 
OO"a.l." Th •• oiien was w1thdrawnand a month later a'Seleet Committee' en 
11 
" i! 
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- Statutory Rules and Orders was set up.(68) By its tems of reference the'--' .-.-,.. . ';\ 
1I 
~5. 
, "~ 
67. 
68. 
,.~'"" '", ··,~_e';;·:;·~·t ,.::.' ::'.,! ,~':':"-'} .. \.::,' _-:,'" \0-), ", "<'? : ... ' 
laC.Dei. 400, 80.202 et.seq. See Not. 11. 
S •• 'Jelin Wilmot, R.C.Deb. 400 oc.219/226 and14~Wyn_~uih,es co.276/80 •. 
S •• N.t. 12. " : .', -. . _ ,-,-, - _.- '- ," - - _- - ---- . 
~-., . ' . -- ~,_ '0":"' "'_"" . ~ .. f." ,.... ",'" "" . .r 1 y"', {:~ -:",.~. ::, ."-"~ ;..".~,~ ...... ":~ :'.'~: ":: '/'.~;" < .",'", 
LQ.::QJi..400,· 00. 258/75 'passim.,. See NO,te 13. '::.~;_, :,",' -'.i. t.· 1" ~ 
LCiDeo.400; 0~.:262 •. It..ii91 "!d~~. __ ::::', ;. :>,; ',,~' <'. 
se~·Net. ~1~" . ~;,~: ' .. ; :;,,~: :;';'~' •. " .. ,. ,.' ,<~','." .' "',j .;.,;>~' l! 
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CO_ittee'was designed to sift through Orders to check for abuse 'of delegated 
power~'" not" to concern itself with the merits' of policy or legislation. ' . This 
, Was hportarit for 'it preserved the "oonventional' diVision' between Executi~e and 
legislature ~hiCA had been challenged by the activities of the Select Committee 
on'N~tiorial Expenditure. i-', . ',,'.' 
;~,:,,;, The'Labour Government of 1945-51 reinforced the power of the Executive with 
··.the "pusage of ;, nUmber "of ACts'designed to deal with the natiods continuing 
· ,oonoDdo 'difficulties. ': At the same time, however, the'powers' of the Select 
· OOQ.1 ttee were erl~nd;d to eD.~ble it to report an instrument· on the grotmds of ,'" 
, delaY 'in iaii~' it befor; pa.rlia.me~t~(69) ',,' Arguments on the'Labour side tended 
to' be repeti tio~ of those ii yen duririg:the ~&;r' al thoUih the acoession to power 
efa. Lti.bo~ Gov~~entreminded La.bour'b~kbencher8 of their legisla.tive' ~~le:" ,': 
lJheReportl of the': s~rU.tinising Co~ttee ~ere :"instrwnent~in • securing Uniformity 
in the del~ated :'l~iislati~n' itseif, ~ainlyCfo; the ben~fit' of' efficiency in 'the 
, , 
ltoU8 •• (70) ·~-:~Ind1Vid~8J.'La.bour Members ~f the"&crUtinis:iiiico~ttee used'the 
'Per some Memb~:rs4 of' the LabOur" P8.rty~: however;" thecontinUaO.ce' of Emergenoy r powers 
: .,.t' theeff~cti vs 1 n~iation of' parliamenta.r,y\ dem~or9.cY ': and : they l';ft the" P8.r~y 
. , 
&J.t~~,th.r~ (72) .,: '~or:;lIlost Labo~ backbenchers howe~ve~~ ',the' &ddi tional pows:rs;; 
obtained ;wer~ "sYJabolic "of the" d.t~r.m.ination 'o~ the Government: to ~ defend its'"" .'~ 
'Power against '&J.ternative erlr,;,parliuuJntaryinfluenoes.''','AsRieh&rd Crosaan.' 
• -&id in' the' debat~ on' the Supplies a.nd. Serncea: (Transitional P~w~rsrBill~" ;;, 
. - . 
' ...... 
It 
69. !ne Select Committee has been known as the Select Committee on Statutor,y 
7,; .: hstrmaents sinGe 1946.' For details of the powers taken or extended by the 
Labour Government, see Eaves, Op.oit., Ch.6. 
, 7()~"-' s •• Note~ 15:'" ""'~".w",' .. ~" "H""; • ':',' ,,":"" • , 
" '11.8 •• ,;'1'01" exa.ple!R8urmond. ~~'{H~C,Deb.,414. oc.147. '.' ',I 
72. 
.j ~ ~ond Blaekbllm and lvor Thomas, for ·example. See Blackburn's speech on. 1: 
tae Supplies ud Servioes (Transitional Powers) Bill. H.C.Deb. -441, 00.1867/" I 
70 8 J.upst 1947 • Cf. '!'Jp E;osiop, of Freedom (London:. Times PressI1964).~'· f 
Blaekbllm, of oourse, had other more personal problems. See I am AA Alcoholio I 
,(Lol3.don: Allen Wingate,1959). For Thomas see H.C.Deb.457, cc.108/119 (a ,c ," ~ .' 
speech followed by severe booing). - ." . . '. 
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nThis)~ill is a.- symbol"of one fact - this is not going to be another 1931."(73) 
,Thu~, in ~h~ maintenance of Pa.:rliam~nt~ democracy, the Labour Pa.::-ty adopted 
a. !~iety of stances often tactically dictated by the roles of individual Members 
. . '" . , :,... 
~f th~ POli~~cal_,struc~ure but fundamentally motivated by the de~ire to use the 
, in~t~:ntso~ po,,!er to ,achieve social change. ' In practice thisinvol!ed the 
implementation of trends already in existence and at first resisted by,older 
• ,~- ",'" ~ ). . ~ r,' ", • ~r_ • J • . 
eenerations of Labour leaders and thinkers. The use of emergency powers" 
~ ., .", _, !" ,~ ~ ~ , •. ~ • K" - ,,"~, ~ 'h','. ", • 
justified their continuatio~.and made the use of delegated legislation respectable 
as a.n?rm~ity by 1951, notwithstanding ~onservati:ve opposition •. "TheWorking~of 
the Select Committee on Statutory Instruments merely reinforced these trends by 
< '4. .. '" ~ • -'" ~ _ : ... ~ 
. 1Iltroducing a bi-pa.:rtisan examination, of~ delegated legislation. ; , ,On the general 
,-.--, .... .,,' .. '" ".,'''''- "t ,.'" .•• '~ '-~. ,'. • . ~ ,., ...... _ •. " •• ;'.. ," "--' •. ," 
que~tion of such legislation the Labour Party, can, be said,. to have acted differently 
'., " -~ . ;: ,,..h,,· ,. ''''''- ~ ". '~>i- '~'" • , ," ~ ."-, ~ ~ -\ ••• - '-,,- ~ .',"" .-' '."".' 
~rOJa ani/other political pa.:rty.,,',' The. length of .time involved in securing changes 
,~ .... ,j.;." ~. .~~ .... -' "e J~. ~ .. -~" ~ ~ ~ .• ~ , ~< +- '-', . .' '", - "' .'~.. ~ 
tn t,he controL of delegated legislation by Pa.:rliament, however, broadly agreed 
... - . • • I -. .,. ~. -. - .-. ~ . .,- - - " i~' . ~ ~ ", ,. ~.,. '-<. • 
by. an impartial Commission such as the Committee on Ministers' ,.Powers, was not 
." '" .'........' '" """ , " " "... '., . " ", .,...!., , ., .' ~ ,. ..." -,.. , .. ,. ... ,. .~.. . '" 
eJCeessive ,in terms of ohange in the constitutional arrangements in Eri tain., . .,.: 
""p "" ' . ."_~_' ,, __ ,.f,..<>- i. ..... <"' ....... ,:", ~." ,_" "'C" ". _. ~ "'~',," ;!I,."",,_ 
~~eed, had it not been for th~ war the setting up· of, effecti ve Pa.:rliamenta.ry'.~" 
• '.- " .~. .'" '" ,- ,,' ' •• " < .. ' '.' = • ,- .." :. ~:' -' '.' ,_ ,. ..... < ' • " • " " c ~ ~. '. ,- ',. -...--"" 
JIIaohinery might well have been postponed' for oonsidera.ble time., '" The Labour,,,. " 
, .i., -:j."'<'~~ ",'. ".,.,' ........ "'" .......... :", ""_,~. ., .. ~.""." ,,-: "'.x' .. ,·'.t.',t,'.,. 
, ~'s role' was, one of constructive suggestion, motivated very la.:rgely, by" their 
~ - C'. ,- " _. ,_~. .:~~, .:; __ :., • :» ~. , _", • _. "~", • _', ~~' ,,; _, " '." , '. '. '" ~ </'>,." , 
~ -
~ .. neral desire to implement social and economic changes, and it wa.s the Party's 
• • •• , -< .. ,- ~ .... 
-
COnscious, "unswerving and, empirical application of, the principles, of, ohange ,by" .. 
•• ,.,.'., .......... ,' Jo' •••• " • .- ~ ,- ,~_:,' - • ' ''./ .,' ~">' .~ .. _,' .. »." " .. -, ~ '~'.~' .-.'~ ,.". ,-,' 
tae .A.ttlee admini~tration that ,removed relatively minor,. issues from long-term 
,". ~ (,-._ .• _ ......... _. _ .~.;. _,;."~. " . ,~. '. ~'.:' ".~ "' . .... .--··"r'··'-~.;· " \ 
Contention by riding out.abort-term oritioism, much of which was based on opposition 
!-~;. "'f 
~ ~ .. ' i • 
r", ..... :) ~''-.'k-- .. ,<~~ 
: . , .~ ,. " '. 
I ~_~ ____ ~ ______________________________________________________________ __ 
13. LC.;p.b.'441 ;co.1819~- 8 ~st~:',1947.;~, ~~"'" 
"."I ";,~ ~'",,~>:,;,,:.;' ~.,;:- k-- • ", 
,",. 
, , 
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.:;; .. The same broad conclusion is true of the third issue which was raised 
. in an acute fom during the Second World War, that of Parliamentary r.epresentation •• 
~e suspension of electoral activity at the major Party level nationally and the 
oomplete abandonment of local elections, coupled with the "freezing" of the 
-,. 
eXistirigelectoral register in October 1939 served as the reference point for 
those 'groups demandiQg' electora.lreform.(74)· The Labour Party was not particularly 
,a.etive 'in' artioulating these demands most of which apparently came from the 
Liberals, although theP.L.P. s1.lpportedsuch ~fforts in the House as the mSJ.-
functioning' of wa.r.:..time elections'- to the detriment of,' the progressive cause -
,beoameclearer. :" However, as is so often the 'case in British politics, espeCially' 
then chaOge is : required, . the'role of individual Ministers was vital in e~surill€ 
that changes would' be m8.d.e:·" As early as' 1940 Herbert Morrison was promising , 
", that· once· the primary aiIit·· of winning the war was in hand, attention would be 
Paid to' the question of electoral ref~rin.(75) ,'In 1942 Morrison'set'up a' 
. departlilent8J.' CoIIllii.ittee'.to consider whether improved electoral machinery and"" 
llethods of registration' oould be devised, especially in' the immediate' post~wa.r ., 
period, and to "examine 'the teohniOa1;problems involved in the redistribution of 
'seats. ' Its Rep~rt,(76)'as David Butler says,' "served as ~ basis for the'interim 
, 
arrangements on' registration and.' the permanent solution of the redistribution ". r ~ ;':,' 
. .• 
••• '<'I ",,, T., +" ""''':;., \.~ .';\ ", '-:;', 
'. , , The Report argued that' the pre-war system of registration was inadequate; to '. 
,eope with the'mcb:1.lity'of population'produoed by war-time arid 'likely post-war 
..... 
. 7~. See Butler,' op.cit., p~87 •. Subsequent by-elections therefore were held on 
'. -'-"the1939~egister .. --" .-.,,' : ,"" ~' """,. -. " ", '-~"" V"""."", 
75. H,C.l>eb.' 365, 00.1059/1061 23 OCtober·1940. 
76, itp,rt 'Of- th,Comm1tt,e op Eleotora.lMaohinery, Cmd.6408 (194,2/3):iv.297~ 
See Note 16.: ~;""':'!" ...•.. ,":, "'''''~ ,,' 'I>, '. r: ...• '; ,< i .> ~ 
::BQ.tler,'ip.oit. L P.88 ... butnot without oomplaints that the Government was. 
dr8l&ini :its ·feet. " !fe! Stg.te!:!Jl:M!Bt. 20 March .1943."".: ~h.:· .. > "",;:9': ,:'~ 
• "" 1 ' .. _ •• ' 
; ;.' ".; :,. '-/ ii ,:"; #i :": r " ...,.. '" 
situations and recommended a system of continuous registration based upon the 
National R~gis1;rati6n Ma.chillery. The idea of basing ~h~'electoral register 
on the lists obt;Un~d'bYI1;he local Fo~d Officers whlch this entailed had long 
been ~vocated ~y Left~Wing journals.(78) On the question of redistribution 
the 'COmmittee apparently followed the broad precedent of the 1917 Speakers' 
" ", - ., 
Conference for its definition of issues. It forcibly pointed out that since 
'. ' 
, the reports of,the;Boundary Commission issued at that time,the question of 
redistribution had been no-one's business and recommended that there should be 
" , 
" ,& permanent Commission with the Speaker as ex-officio Chaiman to deal with ". 
the question of a,non-party basis." The Committee adVdcated,~eparateCommissions 
tor England, 'i Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland and recommended that these : 
.' ,.' " - # , - ." '. "", • ," .-'.., 
proposals be effected by Orders in Council a.f'ter approval, by Parliament. ,The .. ~ 
~ " " _.. '"' " "" ." .,; " .. "'. f 
. ieport '~veyed, but made no positive recommendations. about, '. the merits of ' ..... ,. 
•• • ~.- - • ' - < ~ ",' ;:; • -<-~ . 
Partial or complete redistributions,., 8J.thoueth in a reservation "the Labour .",: 
• • ' .. ~'~" ....... • ""'~_'_ 0... •• • ..... ,. ~_,~"' 
Xembers of the CO:umd ttee, made it clear that they considered a partial. distri-
.~, ,. . , _ , , ~ ,<. • ~:v " ,. ... , ,;, 
but ion . to " be undesirable, and likely. to cause controversy while a full redistri-
- - ~ . ' ' .. 
'. < .,. ,- ,-
but ion was not practicable until a c'omplete resettlement of the population had 
, .. ~ l ,> • ' -- -, ~'-.r 
taken place.(79),_ As we shall see"with lit,tle modifi<lation thisattitu~e .. was 
ConSistently advocated by' the La.bour ParlY in the ensuing debates on the question. 
, ". n _ ,- .' • • " ." • ~ • • ....... ". • ~ - -., ",: • - )., 
"; 'The ilDmediate produot of. the Committee's reoommendations, was the' Parliament 
• , > .. .t,'. .-', \' , ',"'" " ',- . ,". 
(Elections and Meetings) Bill"whioh dealt with the question of registration. 
, • .~ "" ~, • ,I ,.. • <, ,'.... -,' .'. 
" ltoV1ngthe Second' Reading of the Bill on 26 October 1943, Herbert Morrison 
. . ',' , . - ",... c: 
.. -
S.eforexample,:TribUp.e, 2 April 1943. < '; .l ,;.;".'" ,,,',, ."" '::':".:., 
,~~~, '<',' :., .,;". ,:" f:- 't ,.,~. ..:..' '", "c" " ':1 
'1.G. Hall (M:'P.· for 'Col~e Valley) Garro' -Jones (M.P. for Aberdeen) and' 
G.Jl. Shepherd (National A6ent)Cmd.' 6408,'p.32.", The A6ent had,; in faot,' 
uke4th. N.E.C.: for guidanoe on the question and the N.E.C. had oome .' 
. out asainst a redistribution ~. seat.· in war-time. N.E.C. Minute. 85,''1.0.18, 
1941/2t K.290, 25 Ma:roh 1942. ..' .. 
"to provide an efficient and effective system of . 
. registration of electors, despite the difficulties 
••••• brought about by war-time conditions •••• (and) 
to modernise the law as to the direction and 
conveyance of Parliamentary Writs."(80) 
Basing., the new scheme upon the National Registration system the .Act provided 
for three parts to the new register upon which any election held dur~ng the 
. . ~ . 
emergency!ould be fought., There was a civilian register, based on a two 
, months' residence. qualification; a business voters' register on the same basi~ 
and a Se~ce' r~giste~, "~ltho~h a' bu~i~es~' vote~ had aJ.so:to bill occupier of 
A. variety of means were provided. for proxy, absent 
. -
and othe,r kinds of~v~ters.; In view of the fact that .the minimum time required 
f' . Or ; ~he publica.tion Of the register would be ,thirty-six dSlfS a.rter., the initiation 
Q~~the,electiontheGovernment proposed to postpone the dissolution of Parliament 
.' • F:" • 
until_thirty_six dSlfsa.rter the Royal Proclamation had .. been issued. (82): Hence 
, "~'"' . 
~t Was expected that polling d8¥ itself would not take place until about seven-. 
and-a..half 'weeks a.rter the issue of' the .wri t while the period the. country would" .• 
b . " 
e w1thout a Parliament would be approximately three weeks. 
i.:':' There was little opposition at the Second Rea.ding,' although Charles Ammon," 
. '~ 
Who, Was elevated to ,the. Lords the follow'ing year and serv~d on . the . Speakers , '., 
CCi)1lf'erence as a Labour peer,' regretted. that ,there w~s no. assimilation of the. 
, 1· . , . . o~&l. government 'and Parliamentary franchises upon which, the Committee had looked ,; 
. ~.. " 
w~:th .i'avour. (a3) .. Protests ~~nst the Bill came mainly from Conserva.tiv~and·o; 
, . ', '"' i 
t....:. --..-------....;,..;..-----:....--------------~ ... 
SO". i.C.hk .. 393 co.58. The B~ll was elU&cted as6 + 7 .Geo. 6.Ch~48.Pl;;,~ to .. " 
.,;: • 1D.trod'lloe a ~ill on redistribution were postponed a.rter the Government had 
decided to oall a Speakers' Conterence to inquire into electoral matters. . 
Seelnltler,' op.cit.) p.a9. . 0' . d.... ... ..• '. "." '.' '., '. . 
. . '~1., Th~'~ ~t' p·iac~' t~~~~i~~~i~n t~' register on the voters themsel ve~.' S:e 
> .. ' EA! 6S/sq.· 47(45)2. '", ,,. d .. ,<" . 
-i ". .",...... '. .. ';""":, .. ' ,.')c :, t~ . .. , .".. '''..: 
• . ~C.DeA. 393, oc.66/7 • 
. .!b:i:!.~, oc.70. Cmd.640a p.8. para.27. 
406 
t~ilities wouidbe,sutticiently extended to servicemen.(84) At the Committee 
" ,-- '., ,,~ ~" ... .', ~. , 
, S~aee;(85) there ,were a number of Conservative amendments, but only one, that 
; -:., , ,,-_...... :. ""- '~.' ' 
conce~ning the ,business premises franchise, which was pushed to a division" 
,,- • .:. • • - • "- • '<, , " 
c,a.us~ the Labour Party to participate from a Party point of view.' Once again 
• ."'- -.!.., """~ .' ," 
it reiterated/its.consistent philosophical position wh:ich,John Wilmot summarised 
when he .said .~nresponse .. to a Conservative interrupt:Lon, 
"T',' ~ '~The only tenable principle of voting is that,. each 
. citizen in respect of his citizenship shall be 
, .:.entitled to one vote in. the place where he lives. "(86) :' " ... ', '" ~ 
In the absence of,Herbert 1vtorriso~,.Attlee and.Thomas JOhnston.led,the Labour 
torces into.the.lobby,to make ~urethe amendment was defeated.' Included in 
'" " ... . . , 
their ranks ,were a number of Members who were later,to represent the Labour 
Party,on the Speakers' Conference.(87) 
. . 
',,! A quarrel arose over an amendment which provided for;,the. continuation ,of';. 
Plural voting by virtue of' a person being the sp~use of" a registered person, who 
COUld apply ... on . their behalf'.'."·· The . P. L.P. made, attacks. on the principle of plural 
voting 'in which, according to Glenvil Hall, a Member of the Committee, it had. .. ", 
j • • .-. 
&Qquiesced but ref'used to. see extended. (88), The amendment itself' was, negatived 
bat a similar. one was drawn-1iI.p by the G~vermnent, and passed through the House. 
" 
!ae p~test. continlled on every occasion plural . voti~ was mentioned. during the .' <1 
'COlDIittee Stage,;deapite the~r'8 attempts to r~nd1vtembers that.theissuewas· 
'. one ,tor the proposea. Speakers' Conference and not forthe,Committee.(89),.Apart 
.. ' ,-," ~ .. , "'~" , -e. ,-,- -. , - ,-, '," '." ~.~. "" 
~ .. this and the q1il.e~tion, 01' postal, Yoting,f'acilities'f'or csemcemen, • the P.L.P. 
,.\-.. -~. ---------------------------.----------
,., 84. 1,010»-'0. ~393:~;~Q:98Ai.:,willL~'·W;U~Labour:M:P~<:>i~~ vDol1oa.~. ". ". 
" 15. .w£:~,'oc;685/et:&e~~ ~3 Nov_ber 1943:,~}'"'":":'>",'.;' '~," ,,:' 
.16.' ~'~ .. :,~"h,::~.,., ;-.. ... -:'-l.~"',:"."~:~., -' ... '.'.,'.;,~f;"··~~ .. '~ . "; .. ' .~: l:' ... '·~, .,~,.~.j~'~~'.,~< -,.,.<.~.~_ 
.. ~.,oc. 728. ,'''' »I, "', .. , .. ". " '. '.,' Y!",.'" ''''." , ',," 
• ." ~ ~,.", ~, ,'''- ',.-". < ~ • 
.. 87 • Foster, Aimaon, Green, and' Parker. ~; ~::"':~ :" ', •.. ;' .~ 
.~.' B,o.:alii: 393,; co. 743. '., :',' .',0 .' ,~ .. ',> .. , ,:;. ,....," ',' 
'.' 89. S_e;'£o: e~pi~;':C~l~~·~o~~s'~~~t~~t~. Ibid:',·c~.1022/4. .;. 
, .' 
~> ,: ,.:} '.~ 'r,.. f' 
~ok little interest in the Bill whioh petered out in a series of Conservative 
: ~~~ ~" .. ' .:: ~"- /: -. " . "'~ 
~ndments and Labour demands to get on with the Bill. (90) The Act proved to 
, '.\ 
. be' ~~r~' oanplioated in' its' applioation than w.:s at first envisage'd ow~gto 
~~ :~~or~g~ of ~Omp~tent staff ~d an Amending A~t was passed abolishing the 
~. " 
. qUality~ p~ri~d'- (9i)~ 
".;: ... :<r';~ i ... ' '>_~. . . ,"" ~t _; ,,' ' _~, ,~~ ~- / .~.'~ .. ;, .,.; ;~ .. -; 
The motion weloaning the Government's proposal to set up a Confe'ren~~ on 
." ~;. ~.~ ': :; ". V-j .' , ! '." t- ,' .• :.: -. <'Ol\"; .-::,..' <-". '::"f .", > ,_, ,.... ',...,'" ,~ :'.," 
ilectoral Retom'and Redis~ibu.tion 'wS:s discussed in the Canmons on 1 and 2 
"FebrUarY':1944~ ('92)'~ A~' D~vid 'B~tie~ po~t~'~t thed~b'~te was '''no~~ble'~'~;'' ' . 
. ~';ra·th~r ~t~ 'e~lghtennent."('3)' 'In 'hl.~ introduoti~~ ~the subj'~~'t 
liel"b~rt M~rr~i8~~~;'~eo~~d 'the hist~~y of el~o;~;~l ~efonn in gen:eral and of 
, ~i : \.-. ~ _~~ "i'~ ._' ,_~ '". .. ,. ,....:- '_ c 
Cent.rence wO\D.d ca&~e~ oit "the~ P~~~iple;~f ,"z.ediatribut1on and the direction 
Views of the Departmental Camnittee on the question it was far better, to obtain 
, "" - .. 
&l.l-party, agreEment upon ,it. ", The Hane Seoretary also raised scme of the ~.: ..... . 
questions he,; considered the Conference would have to discuss and, said that. the 
Q.overnaent,hoped,fOreariy consideration. ofredistri~ution, methods of eleotions 
a.nd~the merging of, the Parliamentary and local goveI'l1lllent franohises. (94) , 
'", ~""" ''II!" " ," 
The question of, proportional representation was, in fact, "the main issue, 
··.to .. , ... ", ," ,. ", \", .. , 
CIlwhich the'debate showed an,y great difference of opinion," (95) with'the Liberals 
• • '." ,"" ,<'- ' '':' ~,- •• - • ': •• ,~ _ •• ' •• ,. " ... , - ". .' - • 
in, ita favour and the Labour Party atta.cking it. Arthur Woodburn, who later, sa.t 
',. • ~ 1.~ '~."_'.< ~. , 't,-" ~""><". ~ -~ ,~. • ",'. r J' • 
-
9?: ,'. Re~~:.~~~,~,~,,~~~:~~~-:~ ~~~o:r,~ ~~,s,~~~e:~,~L.P.A.C.R. 1944, P.,~~s.~,~_"",_< 
91. !)rliamentw Elections (Wa.r-Time Registrationl Jot, 7 + 8 Geo.6. Ci},.24.· 
In addition to removal of the two months residential period and putting 
baok, the. qualitying date by one month. The proposal was opposed by' the 
Cons.rvatives~ See CAB 66/42 •. 44.(214)· "Registration ot Parliamentary 
Bleotions",2O April 1944 and CAB 66/42,,56(44)4. 24.A.pril 1944.. , ',' 
'92. 140: ~b.~396: ~o:i ll5J+.~,,:et. ~eq.~1288 et~;~q~ <, - '." 
93. ButJ.er~! oP:~it: ~ :p~91~ S~edto' s'ane degr~e'b; the Press. Eoonanist, 
5 February1944,(168!9) •. -'- ., .• ',,,., ."" ";"'. '" ,,,= ',,' .-..~;, '" ,.'-~'~" ~< "'...; l' ~"<-... :,,.;,, ~-{ .• ,- . ,",' ,i",,::~ ".~.;;,< .... -.".~~, ~ ... ", .' .'!' " ~.'"\.". 
9~ 140. Dob. 396, :00. :1154/68 •• ,' :,':.'. " ~:,\ "" ,.' ",',';!'i" 
95., Butler, loo.oit. 
) ;: 
in the Conference, came out forcibly against P.R. He argued the classic 
liberal theo1-y that' democraey involved the operation of democratic machinery 
.... -,. '", . , . 
,by democrati~ people'and that the majority must take account of minority 
opini~ns~: 'He ~eli~ved'that every Member 'under the existing system dutifully, 
~k.":! 
iave' expre~sion' to minority poi~is of vie~ ~hen necessary.:' , The real; althoUgh 
not th~" o~~~':' ptir,pose: ~f '~lectio~s was'~ to' choose: a Government. (96) Woodburn 
~~o'; ~tt~k~d" :pi~~ ~oting (~l though he ex~ept~d' the ' City ~r Londc)li), criticised 
the bU;;itig' o£~~at~; reiterated the;P:L~P. 'views, exPressed on the ;D~paXimEmta.l; 
Collmti:ttee, ~~g;;d.i~ the postp~ninent' ~f ~~distribution Until':: after" the war.' j 
\ 
'.- ". 
, ' 
.... :;. '~,'; ~~~'~ ~~ . .;.: ... , r".i;~··~t~~:"· .. ...., '0), ;'~ ~; •. ,,;.' ,_ 1- ,," ~.,-
"that the House of Commons does not proceed acc0rding" 'J.. 
:,";: ~.>;; to the views of the electorate as expressed at the .. ",,', . F ." 
" last general election~ ••• ~no institution (is' as)"" ". 
;., ~"""r' "sensitive to publio, opinion as the House of Commons. ~t(97)~ , 
'.: .... v···~· __ '_~ ..... ,·, ... ~~~.,'O , ... ,.,;; _. ~,_ C",,""", 'I' '\;,'Jo...., • .:f_.".,.,"'l ..... -* 
~o.t of ,what Woodburn said was endorsed by Conservative Member~., The question 
'" - -':-... '... ' ......... , .... ,>--, _~v :- ~_" .I'-'-~ ~,"'*"'~£;".;.,-.-,,,.~--. ,,,," 4.~ •. " ,,"---~ ... 
of Candidates' personal expenses received particular attention,and although the 
. -.... :-- .,-..,t..' .. ~ ... ~.,."-,,,."'" _.'.... .." .... -, -,.~ ~~_, t :" ..• ,<'._ -'J' ,,-,' ~ 
,~P.&k,er ruled'th~t the question might be out of, order the tone of the debate 
"' .. " ' ..... ~ ., .,., .,. " ':.'.. ~ \-lo, ,"..r' •. .,;. .,. ~ '.; .... ~. "" -., ,;. 'J~ , :" 
,caused ,the 'question of~andidates t and Members' expenses to be "added to the draft 
• h,.. "" ',. "." -:; ......... ,; ~.- ." '. ~.: .'" ~"J. ~,' '" ".', •.• 7",;.; 4:"~' "" ~, ~ '_;' •• j 
,terms of reference. "(98) _ " 
- .~, .~<' --- ~;. -. ,~, -, ..,., ". ,.'... <1',' , .. :.: ; 
Glenvil Hall, who a.1sobecame a Member of the Conference, echoed Woodburn's 
~ .. ".-/' "',~,.""." . ""~."'''''''''''''' •. ,"~'" "... """""." -'~'", "l"'\ '''t', ,'" "<... ,'",·l·.l.. -,,11' ,~:·~i .. ,,-' .. ,~. :: '.' ~~--·:.·~·;t,>.. 
. 'Ien,timents on P.R., redistribution and called for the 'abolition of double-memb;red 
• ',f 'Ii ~.. ,.'.f ''- - .. - ...... ,. ',,- ", ,~. ,,:,~ .~ ~ .. f!' _, ',_. ~ -', -; "'~: ~ .,; .'''''''' :.,,' ." ,\ .• '. r, ';~""'-, o ..• , .~, • ~.' '.'.>, ",' ~ .:" 
l/)ollStituericies~d-the abolition of the use of cars at elections.(99) '" Thomas 
t '~ .• _ .. ,~ .. _ .......... ",'.". ~ v', :'1. . .., ." ..... :'. "'" ..... ~ ... \-/ y, ."J4' "" ," '1'," ;..,....,,;., .. :. "" ~~:"~." 
JOhnstonremarked that in Sootlandthey had had P.R., " 
. . ~ , .... ~ ",~. -.. "~ ,"'" '" ,\ " , ',. 
96. Ii,C.I?!b.' 396,' 00.1188/1203. 
. ~ . -;. .. ~ . 
"7. 1Jai~,' oc .1202: ':, :>.;:r:i'.,~;, '>,:,'. ';:, ,,,~'; 
',' ,;,~ •. Ol~'tbe 'dr8.rt ;:terms H.O.Deb"; '396 '00.1163 and ·the fina.l terms in Letter 
'" ' fro. ¥r. Speaker to the Prime Minister, Oonference on Electoral Reform., 
, !AS theR!d1strib!t1op. ofS"t •• CM. 6534p.2.:, ',; ~ ,; ";;.:,~,, ,'; 
""'-"' .. -i~ .• '~,,:.ot ...... ~,~"' .• :.~~ .. ,.,'~<"4:'::.':~~;"~-;;.,,; ·""-'I';~,~'<"'w~ .... 'c,~. ;1 :'~~ ·~·;.~,.",!.t~. \ .t2" , .. ~ 
99. ' Ii.C,I?!b. 396,00.1228, Most of the Labour M.P. 's who served on the 
i' '.;, B,eake. Conferenoe partioipated in the Second Reading debate. 
; 
",~ 
< ~: 
"for educational aut~orities between 1919 and 1929 
and our experience was such that there was no body 
of opinion at ,the reorganisation in 1929 which 
advocated its continuance. tI (100) 
.' ..... ~ . .' "".. f. f 
~oughout the debate it was made clear by ~overnment Speakers that the matter 
~ '..... • r.. ": 
Was one for Parliament not the Government to decide. 
. .: .' .. :~'~ . ..:. i ' 
Other Labour Members 
. , 
e~phasised the, same objections to plural voting and the need t~ restrict the 
'; ... -~. ,:; .;J;. ._~.,A ,~" .~ j.;'<'~ _." ':'~ ~.' ) ,'~:' , .;'" f ~' ,'.'." ~.' .' •. ..,.?.. • 
i~fluence of outside organisations during elections.(101) The important point 
. .... " ~: ,'~.~ \t:~ -.l_.: ;~- ,:~ f' o' _ ' ~ -<; .;.. '-;:. ,',~' _. ~ __ , ~- ,..~ " • : ~. ,- ~ ;." .,'~ "'~ ."'" ' __ ':: ":. _ '.. 
about the objections raised by the P.L.P. concerning the questions to be placed 
. ,,!., ,'.~;" ,~ .. ~1 '. "." >;;' •. :':" , " ... ~, ,._~_." {' '.' /' 'l '.' ~ , ','." ~ , ... I, .. "~;. .,,~ ":~" '~, 
before the Conference is that they were in essence those objections which had 
,!~ ·;~·~'-"·'·" .. 7~,~" .-,_;.~.~~,~. :.:..'.:\ .:'::<::~:: ~ '..-:.":, .,~: ~t •. ~~ ...... ':-.:~-'.;\ --'!':/", """>, ,': __ ;'. ;·'i., • ,.>-,> 
b~~~ advocated by Labour Members before the Ullswater Committee in 1930. There 
had, in fact, been no retreat on any of the major questions involved. As a 
.~. \~ ,~''-: '-.'; ,;~ .~' ~'·7".·_~· ~ "'- _~l~ ~+. ~'?~ "''''~,!.', /'~:.. ~:. -:~ t ~-'.':. ~ ~ ,_. _'~" ;:, ,,:1- 1':~ 
W~le the Labour remained opposed to P.R., plural 'voting, the use of vehicles 
';;,. -.:, ";; .!, '~j-~:,'; ~.: ';, :,!t: ~,) '.'''-~ "~'" '" "'" ", ',,-,~'!' , .. ;"',I ... _ t:' ! 
at elections and the influence of money in the political system. Their views 
. ~'-.4.:, i:.O;,":i.; .. ;)._ :"~_'o! ::.l:' ,'.~<J ~.£~': .. i-~~~~,lI ::;'~:""~:,5,\- f~:""~~::'~'i~ 
of Parli&ment r~ain~ 'basicaJ.ly' that of democra.ey-v-dictatorship. As 
Greenwood said, 
institutions." 
"Hitler' sOhallerlge wa's '~a . challenge to our Parliamentary . 
t;~\ .:>_j.","-"'~. ~.~. i ~"-' /"!"";' ",,, ;'., ~!,~~ /' :~.~- ," .... ',:.r'." 
Those institutions had not been as effective in the past as 
they m:t.iht ha~e been but "they 'were ,"the symboi'ofazi'orderof democracy ••••• "(102) 
l:',_t>~~·,.ch '~';.:,. ,',,;:,~ ,:'".. ,'. ~,~,'\'f';., , . 
. . Feat'ful. of the return of ·a.nunrepre~~ntative Parli~ent 'a: significant number of 
them felt that r~~£st~i~~t"{~n ~~~{~ ~~~~:Si~~~~d until after the post-war, 
I~:'. 'L I.",.. t~:~ :'l~~>.. l,~~~.i '~';il"- .. ,. ·t,l..~ '.;. ... ".\' ,_>., :,~ ;.~-,,,~·,;.f 
resettlement. (103) ,There were, of course,' exceptions like Sir Robert Young, a 
r<:' ~~~ i. v ,:'''-·'·:" ,t:·,: .. :~ {>: ... ~>:~'-":"-'~:;:''; ,('.: ~.!:l i; _::·:,:.~.{:,.l t, t~" .< 'j- ,':-,"','1.;-\ ~ ,; ;'} ~.'.~:~, .,~,~~~-.) ~\i~ .;~ ~;: ,.~':-i~ ,d '.. :' 
lit'e-loil& supporter of P.R., who spoke in it's favour.(104) : S.O. Daviesquestioned 
Ge~;~;n~~s /~~~~er~~y! ~X;~~d: ~e w~~~d ~~~~. ~ai~;~\~~ :~otion it' P~~~i~~e, 
":"':"~''-' ,'" ." "1p' :.>-:: ('~.!_·,:i:~~ ~':f ,,:.-1'~,':.~.'"_~.f; ~ t, ~ ~,'~>';t-, ~,4.fy, '~.'. '1":' ,t,' " .. ',,' ",:,;-. -1"'; 
10a/":lbi4./12.8~ Ct. ni~e£in':oot~b~r 1940>H:C~D~b. 365/cc.1075~ 
";,,: ". ,', -. . .~, ',' -,,":' ", . ,.' ;- ; 
103.,· 'S~~;, for ex~ple, ',Woodburn (00.1197) HaJ.l.' (~o: 1'230), Guy (co.1305/7) ~">_, 
J;' Cf. Parker,who,a.rguedfor immediate general redistribution (oc.1351) •. ' 
, 'lI<' ::'<'_ ~_ ~ ."_~'c:.l. • "';"':' '{"-.t~: ' ,'<~" _, :' ~ ''',''~'''' ' .. ; .,,·1. • 1 , ',> 
~., c~~ 1312/20. 
.' ~ , ~ ~ .,. f '" ' 
., 
While i~iu; Pa'rk~~' doubted' if the University seats would be abolished in 
theO'~~~'~ent P;~li~ent, and,' therefore, ~dv~atedthe abo1ition~f the 
registr~tion' f~es" ~d the e1:imination' of ce~'ta~ malpractices at University 
", .\:" ,. ," ,. .' 
elections; (10,,) The'last contribution was an impo'rtant 'One in that it 
epitan'is'eathe 'Labour Party's attitude of'~cmprcmise '~' the' political 
;. >';" 1,' J , • 
situat1m" of 194;"fP&~ker' s :refe~ence to the IIp~esent" Parliamentary 
s~s~i~' i~:~so '~i&niricant:C in the light of later cla:im~' tha't th~re"o was a 
"bu.g&~" b~twe~n~'the Parties'on certain questions' before' the Speakers 
C~~e~e~ce'~' '.~ th~hP~:rker' ~ contributi~~" was '~. 'personal' ~ather than a Party 
One •. 
: .'.i'"'~ c •• ·~~ J.~. ~ ",~~>;-~,~ .. ';' .• --:<~ 
,,~ "To examiD.e;·'~d if possible, submit agreed 
""::: ';. resolutions, on the following matters:- t,.c. _,', c' 
o ~ i ".,(a).r"Redistribution of Seats; i ., ',' h-"""~. ') 
(b) Refonn of franchise (both ParliamentarY 
\ :': ;'., ';".: 8.ltd,'loc8.l. governnent); ',. ';;., t,' (, .' 
".. ~". """'" (0) . Conduct and costs ot Parliamentary """f >:, 
" ',,,. ., elections, and expenses falling upon' ", 
" i:'::'~~'.<~ ,~,oa.ndidates and Members~,,~a,~~iam~nt; i; 
. (4) Methods of election." (106) 
, ... ;: •. ~ :"'.;' :'~,': .~ ~<~; _t~::_:': ,:.1 f'~~' l~ .. r·,:.':;~). >'~ ~;" ~: :-.... , .... ~~_.:~"~ :'~ ,,;" (t .-~~. ~ I 
The Pr:ime Minister reminded the Speaker that the Heme Secretary 
~\ ! ',:' .• ~- ~"'""':~ ~>'<"'t. f:,,,;"'-,')' ~~.' ~:- .-~"i,. ; .. ~:.:, .. :" ,. C:': ... : ':"":.:,'.-~ :;:~: . .::\~.:.~ -':. ~fO 
. ha.d hoped the Conference woulci submit early reports on redistribution" 
.. ,:: 
.. ~ the question ot assimilating the Parliamentary and 100a1 government 
-.(.'I'!, '~,:-.~ .... _~ ~~~.:' .." .. ~,; t':. ';J-'~~ ~J'.~ .. ~" . .,.-.:,"':"'" '''1''' ::.:~. ',:. ::'.~'.~ ..... :>-'.1' <1 . . f.:,.~ ,~':!<;~.': .. _>:.~._.~,:; ··:-c 
franchises. He also expressed the Government's wish that the Conference 
.• : :,.' .: ~- :<"',;,;" ~.:.- <~I ::'-",~".,~_:' .:J.; "-r';" i:} ~~ :f:~;. ~ \ .. ~~. .L; 0;; 
shOUld consider these views on the question of redistribution anci 
~ -,:,::: x''::,: ,,~: t t:f ~. -~ + •• : >;. ~ • 1<.' ( ""<':', i-". f~y'~: :,"1 t) <' .. :-'~ 'C.;: i.;. ! .~~ ~ ,;f 
the. reCCllllDem& tions made' by the Departmental Canmi ttee on Electoral 
:" ., ~ '; .:~ :; 'I ":"~~.'. "1'3; ti,~ v ~~" - ': '; ~ :~ ...•. ~ i':! \ 'd" - (. ''; .' ,', ~ .. "", ~. '.: ';:' ';$ ,-; .~C-~ ~ ':.~ ~ .... ' "')-'\ • l !: -)"-- ':'~ i: ,;.- :~ 
l(8.0hiner.y and the required machinez:y involved. (107) ., . 
~ -: ' > '>: ''':~ • i. '! J-~ :, 'V. .... ; ... ~ ~1. '.:- ,~..~, , . '" ,:: ""; ;I ~~~ '" -
*'",' 
-
»See Note 17. 
% j;~ ••• < .... >",:: ~ ~~:: l .. :<:: 
9sd. 653ft., Loo. oit. 
4ll 
" L'; ,The Conference, however, felt that it oould not report on the 
question of'the redistribution of seats and the assimilation of the 10081 
govel:'2lment an~ Parliamentary franohises until it had settled the question 
ot.the methods of' eleotion, in part10ularwhether or not to adopt 8.D3 " . 
, .... '" ,< 
measure,ot. ~~oportional ,Representation, but also because redistribution~,· 
... ~~ like13 to be affected by their deoisionson the business pranises" 
- ... -. .' ,"- ~ ." ". 
qUa~:i:f'ioation and on University, representation. After five meetings r)': 
,. . ·'.v· _.~~ '. ~ < ~. ~ • ~-c' .• ~ 
4isc:u,sBing the question of Proportional Representation resolutions.in '.' . 
J l' ~", ." _""" _ - ". < 
~~vour ot. scme fom et P.R. were defeated 25:4 and 24:5., (108) :,~, ,).:~, ", 
. "" .... ~ , '1.'~ ~.' ~ _,' "' . 
; .... , The Labour Party Members appear to have voted unanimously against 
~ " ". f'o ~ '_.'._' p; " '" "~~'., _ .. "'~ ~_ .... ' ,,'\'" "-: ~_ ".'_ ,_ 
the ohange. A further resolution advocating the alternative vote waa also 
~'!',.. !; - <. - .. ,~.,.~" .. ' ", .. ",.;.., '. ~ ~. ']C;" ." '-. .~ ,;'" '.1 ~ "" ; .. ; • -., 
heavily deteated by 20 votes to 5, al though two Labour. Members. abatained 
: ".' ~ ",. •• ' e" "J ",-, .. 1 ~", ;f.-, '1,." ."" .. .,~ >' • ., -' - . • 
t7C1n. voting on the 'issue; (109L· Z'.A > ~*' "": 
'.,. - ';;;v;.'-, .t!~,~ -.;. 'f··, 'W~,,~. ~." '" 
..... -""'.,. 
, ~; 
Aa tor the franohise the Conference reoanmended the ass:1mila. tion ot 
the Parliamentary and looal goverrmenttranohises, the rete,~tion; of ,the;. ;' ;;, 
.•. ~ v "'.'-:.~ t<_~ -f',If >4" "'.' .: ','". ,~ . .,.-. '.' ~"" ~ .... 'r ' .,' -.. "'. ~ ~ 
;' ~. ;. " 
.t_.;. '" 
''buaines~ premises qual it ioa tion for oooupiers of" businesses, ,but not their 
, " i > ;.i . ..., ",,' ;" ~.; _/ ~'", _~ ,'.:. ~ , '. -''; ; ,,4, " ~ ./ ,0 " ~. ;.~" " , " -" ". , • " ',<:,-. 
SPOuses ,and, the retention ot University representation and methods ofr"I;. 
~ .,', '," • :; J~.:.j .. :: .... 4,,~.-,~. ..,":. :.:- " !1. '-.,. ,,:1., ,:.. '" "",,' ;" ~ > ~ __ ~ • to " -" ,." .c· ..... "-- >I" -
eleotion, provided all graduates were autcmatioallyregistered and, that. 
" , , ;.,."". ~ \to " .. ,,4 i. ':,'~ ,~ ,,',,~ ,.,.-::.~ .,' \," \ ....... :' ;\0- ,:. .;",~, ... "Ji ,. _,. • '1'. -, , ~.~ ,,, eO.j"." < 
ll~ tees . were oharged for registration expenses. It also reoamnendedby" 
:"''; f,::~-:~.:t ~ . .: ¥i.",~ . .l,~~ .. ", ...... .:-'1 1,':.- ::-:-..:.:-<-, . ..,~ .h·:...· .... ,'e,:f$ .' ,,-.' ·.A ... ,' ........ ~'._4 ,.'~ ..•. ,;." "". ,;. 
~ 
, all\8.jority of 21:8 that persons be restrioted' to one residential and one ), 
, .. -', -•. ,>~:i ".'t." . ...•• ~.~ "~'\:l ;.: ~ . .....:.,...~:; i'l .. '" _ ,'._",; .• , 0)' ,': .... , • ...- or .... - ,'I 
'bUsineasqu81itication onJ..y. A resoltuion to abolish plural voting was 
.. i .. ~'t. .,< -,' :....: ,_.; ~ oi-. .. ," •. ,-' ~._ .. ',_ ~._ ;.> : c! ~:. . '." .. ,,~, ,. "" "., •• ' ~ 
Geteated by 25 to' 6 and one reoamnending the extension of the tranohise to 
" ,.,'''. ,~ .:: ;- -. (',~~ ~,'~:' :.., •• ~.~ •• ' ".... ,',. '" : .,,~;._. '. ,~, ,. ~" .... \1 '. 
e1ghtee~~r~a:-~~~~ ~~s~~~~~~~e~ ;.by. 16 to 3.~~," ~.:".. '._ ~ '.';" ';'>~ ,~~ ;.: .. :: 
, -
The rest ot,the Report aealt with the question of ,redistribution whioh 
;,.'- :c.,;'. {~<;_.:,~.>\ ... ;~,~.~; "::;:","",,"'~"'- "'itt'1,~;'';, ·.,.:..'S ,"~~~-..,..:-. .";'- '. "- q, .-- .~y.,~~ -' • ~ ... --~ .-.,.. ": ~ ~. ~ 
. the Conference favoured "aa' soonaa _.praoticable". and it provided t~porar,yrules 
., ':' ',,-~. ,:'t'~';,,' '~' f.:A.··;:'_~·~.f\"~"'::~ ;',;:.:.~ ........ ,;: re?'.""'" ,"1,,"~.~:,~~,~:1 ~ ' .. : ;i~'h ~..:', ."",0<'" -'/-. ~ ·0 ',".' , 
", ~hel'eby "abnonnally large" oonsti tuenoies, i. e. those whioh by .1939, had grown;: ". ..' 
':- ·,·t'··~ it-r'1 ,,':':.~ ~ '~:,:-·.:...t«~ ,,;~ . .,(il-: . .4. ,~:":"~ " .':.;:, ""~" '*:'1 "-,.,. ... , ~.t:,r, >~., .. -~,-~, .. ..,. -~ .' '- "'~"~'.:" 
-
~., p.8. 
Loo. ott. See Note 18. 
"t~ mOre than 19~ of the average size, were to be subdivided, up to 8,' total 
"of twenty ;fiven~w seats. After this subdivision the Boundary Commission 
should prepare a full redistribution scheme. The number of seats should, 
{the' Conference,.recommended, remain substantially unchanged and in particular 
, th~re' sh~uldbe no 'reduction' of the nUmber of Members returned for Scotland, 
',' \ ",. 
, W&lea' or Northern Ir~land~ The quota for' each seat should be ascertained 
by dirtding 'the J total 'eiectorate by the number of seats ~her than University 
': ~eats); , with' a tolerance of 25" for existing boundaries.' Double-Member, 
constituencies should be divided.< Parliamentary boundaries should; where 
con~enient~~' coincide with local go~ernment bounda.:des~ On the only contested 
'p~~posaJ.' it ;a.s decided by 15 to' 13 (with' all the Labour Members among,the 
, minoritY) that 'th~; City of London should continue' to ret~ two Members., The 
, COnfe;'~nce aisOl)rOp~sed tha.t there should be separa.te· Boundary: COmmissioners 
"'for' ~l~d,; Scotl~d~ Wales and. No~thern Ireland; with the Speaker' as ex-officio 
. 
Chiurman of ;e~h •• ,: The periodic' review of the Boundaries should be made "at 
. 'r'interV~lsoi not' les~ than three or more than ~even years, with the right to 
,; ~in1t ~~ec::i8J.'r~po'rts ~t' 'any time.' Their reports Should be laid before '.<' 
..• ~., Pa.rli~e~t and the' cha.r;ges ma.a.e by Orde£ i'n Council open to modification and 
Subject tdaffirma.tiveresolutions. . 'The first comprehensivescheine of':·' 
lov:.. • " 
. redi~tribution: should, howe'ver~'beeffected by "an Act of ,Parliament not by . 
J .". 
" order in Council.: ,~,:~ The redistribution proposals followed were clearly'those 
recollll~~ded by theD·epar-bnental'Committee.:';~ ,.,~ ';.",,; :r" • 
/.&.·s·e~~nd 'l~tter 'from. the Speaker to ;~~e 'Priliie Ministe:r..'wS:s 'published;] 
- -". 
in ;JUiY1944~fCThis d~alt 'with'the"questi'on'of "the conduct and costs ~of 
,. .' " ,.. . . , 
Parliamentary elections and expenses falling on candidates and Members of" "~'."" ... 
.. 1 ~~li8me~t, .'which'h8a been ~dedto th~original Gov~~rlD1ent term~' of,'X'9fere~~e 
" c._ . .,. .. :.,'\ ....... ,"': ... , ... .,., .. _""~~" <.,'>";1..-, ...... ',: .. ,._~'., .. n~ ~'.,~ ... "~·.·.~· ..... ',:7"-" of. • _ ~ ••• '-'~~?J.'.~' ", 
. ~i 
·owing·to the ,views expressed in the Deba.te of 1 and 2 February 1944.(110). 
The Conference put forward a number of recommendations which can be divided 
into two broad. camps •... ~. Those dealing with election and candidatei' 'expenses 
and those dealing with wider electoral questions., .... ",. : "," 
':; O~ the one hand it proposed to reduce ,the candidates' 'expenses to £450 
PluS,'1d~'per elector in the boroughs and 1id. per elector'in the'counties; 
t~ include 'agent's fees in the ma.x:imum 'electionex,Penses and allow thepS\Y1Ilent 
. . 
ot speakera\. exp~nses although these had. to be included in the expenses. The 
COnrerende~also 'proposedto'amend Section 34 of the Representation of the People 
.\et te i~clude . exp end.1 ture incUrred by'poli tica.l and other 'organisations;'; or 
. indiVidUals, for the purpose of promoting or procuring the election of a'x 
°8.ndidate or o andidates .';:' This would not ,'as Darld BUtler s;~Sl to"think;~ 
. hi."e m8.d.e such' eXpendi tureillegal, : as much a.s ha.ve "bro~ht ; i t:~ll'Punder the 
Control' of th~ 'Election "~ent. (111 ) ~ (, Oth~'r ~recomIn~~dations "conoemedwi th :A' 
eXpenses 'included.' theprov1sion 'at'a'~inimal cost of state:":sUpport~d school~'" ,:" 
tor' election meetin€s, a, slight modifica.tion !in" the' co'nditionss~oUnding the 
, , - . 
. P"ent and forfeiture 'Of de:po~itsand. :provisi~n"to';b~~e foiiea.sier"'~elf~i'~~ 
fro. "venial' errors "Ji8.de .:in returns'of 'election" exp~nses~':' 'The Corifere~ce~;';'''';'::;/':';' * 
lIloreo~er,plaCed' on 'record. its 'd;preciati~n . of the pEiYm~ntbycandid~tes"to 
, '" . " . ....... ',' '. .''', 
charities and 'other' organ1satloIliwhioh specifically benefitted'the"oonstituencies, 
. . . ..' .
... well as . eXp~essiOg' its stron,g disa.pp;,,~val: ofoontributions made to party 
,"7 ; .... ong·its ;iderHreoomm;nda·!;ions·"ere~th~t ·poli~ca.rdS 'sh~uld., be issued ~y . 
th.t';~tUrrliri8'-Ofri~e;"'onii. f'that ~ the~e ;h.ould'be ig'r~ater ;~~vision ,of ~oiiing" 
. '. '." - ,", , 
.~,.... ... ,., __ .< ",' "_,,, .".", • '.1 .• ~" "'~._.'. , ..... _~".b ..... .... "-,. ..... ~, .. "'. ' .... j .. "' •••• ..; ........... ,." ••• , ........... -"":'.--"': • .... ~··~-.,·~ .. ~-"I~ . 
. i: 
taoili ties , especially in rural areas; that local variations in the hours 
~ - ~ ~ 
otpolling should. be abandoned in tavour ot,a 7 a~m. to 9 p.m. national 
_ standard; the broadening of the Absent Voters' lists to include invalids; 
" ... . ' 'v,,, .' 
,the outlawing of broadcasting by British subjects from outside the United 
. ..... ~ - ',:
Kingdanin order to influence an election, while finally the Conference 
"". -~!, ~ , ~'. ,'" ., ,- , , ," .' ' , 'I,,, ~ .. ~. -
.as~ed the Government to keep the whole question of Service Voters -under 
. ." ... " ~ "~ -
re,v~e;' and recanmenaed that the existing method of registration should be ,'. 
.,~ I," ,- :: ~', ~ / 
,improved by the introduction of e.utanatic registration. 
~-' ' ; . .f' 
_ All told the Conference t s recanmende. tions were a victory for the 
~onsistency of the Labour Party for clearlY, as David But1e~ shows,' it was 
• " ',~' ; l}:;' .? J '." ~'., 'if .. , .•• ,_, .,,,-): .- :.- _, :. ,~ " ~ '" • • 
"~~~ Conservatives who had dropped their objections to the restriotion of 
,\-, ". (. "'" : _,", __ t:.- _> "_ ,_ _~ .;.,.!.~, ", " /. i ~~ i·:: 
eleotion expenses, primarilY for party political purposes. (112) Most of 
'",.-," ,.,' .. 'J.'-~"> ', ..... '" \..... :::/; ... J '1..-' ~;i,C ~,.;:·",.".~::;'~:'·.-... r t- ~ ';,::;." ;' - ,. -.:.--. :. ~;. {,.,' ... ';- ~~ .,~." 
:~he reoamnendations, however, were the embodiment of earlier Labour < 
,~ ::.;, ~ ~ •• 'l" ··:z ... .;lA'~;: <:;., 'oi ~.,~ :;:;"_~~';'$ ,'" 't - \:;~J 1.."<' :"'''" .!--,~." ~"'-<. "" 
po1ioies. (113) Yet, as became clear later, _the Conference was an exercise 
'-' ~ .. < ••• ::,~ ~.".'. :::::;~,.~,. -,} .:..:,: ~.',:. ,,- ;:1." L;:.;.;;' ,"'i:,'" ',:!; .~'l.'::";;.:';':' ':)'~~'A'::N ;:"::,,,,,,,,,; 
in canpranise and oanprarlse was not always easy to achieve even in a war-t:ime 
", "' : .... J~ 't-,·"',·,, : . .e... ... t 1,' ".,::-, '.~ ".'., :,:... ~ •• '.,.,;'::' ~~.:,.'.: .1,>.'~ ",'," ~)., 1, ";', ... ;~ \, ~f.· .,~" ;,~,'>;:; ... 
. ·}'11tuation. Resolutions reocmnending the abolition of the deposits ~d to 
.. \. ~-:r~ )" '",_. J .'0 .: ,._ ... ," "'''' .. , ,_" :: . ~.. "". .. .,~.: .;, ~ :,:. -, '~':, " . . f,_ .~~ -,.: ..... _.,.' : •• : ': >~ ',; ;,-. . ,:. ~"',.' 7. >',~ '", :\~, : ~~ "'. : ..> :~_ 
. reduoe it~ conditions to.one-tenth of the poll were defeat~d without GiVi~ion, 
····.c ':',-'; "~"< ""lit .~.~<.- ;;-,\,~;;. ::':,'- ,~.".' .. ~_~':": ':~.~;"'._ ~.;;', "',:.':;<; ....... :.' ~·;·~:·;...:.~~t·;"~-' ',:.,'; .~:.~~_>:;:~ .. _. t,"'-:.-,:~,r·;-',·.· ,:'.: 
;,~hile-·another designed to reduce it to £100 was defeated 18 'votes to 4. More~ver, 
' , , ':" -',I.t ,..,.~ ~'''~'<~ .~ .,J,.' ~_;'l"; '; .':. I':; .. ~.,,:_:,. " •. ; .. ··;r:,.·.·,·,;:,.:<~, .. ,'~.~_ .. ~ '", ",:;,:\, .• ~< '" ", i ; 
the Conference oonsideredthis "the regulation of broadoasting within the < 
-- .. '-"''C: ~~,~;t''--);'~'''i; ,~,"+;.;:",':.'.';' ''':",.i"£.,, ,,:~,~ ",:<","'J'~'_""''',,,.:S.'i:' -', ,J .. ;' ',,";,' o~ ':-,,,,," ~.t, ;,;,.'; 
. .tJZlited Kingd~ for e1eotion purposes" was beyond their terms of ref~rence. 
, ,. - ", .' I': <:" ::; .. ~:...:~-< . -i"t ;:. ~ :--- ,,' ~:':.""" /.;' L.:-~ ';:".''-~.~ 4,~"':-,~ ~- ~ It:.:' .,; '~ >,.-." </" - .:. ';." 
:~e o~ear~~ .. t ;r~:'~~~~' ~~tthe rank~ ~o~ tt~:~ )C~~~r~ce, ~~e' on a <, •• , ~:" ~' 
~esolution reoommending "that same additional limitation and regulation 
~ ,;:, L"". \:\~' :t,;-,"''],,,:,:.,:: ~:,~' '< ',l ~'.... .. ,,-,' :.-~:'. ' <,"" ~ ,~'~'" ~:,{ ~':t:,',: .. 
},eimposed on the number of oonveyances p1.Y1ng with voters to the 
, ...... ,.~, " . 
. ~ol.l~··b~oth;~·~··'~·it~';~; defe~t~d b; lS;otes to :i'~"--' The 
',' ;"'('< _::~~> .. , :~·,:)31 <"'!4'~~'J; ill 'J'~ ,~\.~; t~~·'·.i ,'(,~;_:'''t~' t.'~~\ -t '~",_ 
-
. .~ • • I. ~",-. 
Butler's assertion (p.96) that -"the Labour Party,- feeling more.<,_':':', '/,1-
afnuent -thantormerly, and' conscious of the need. for oampaign 
publici ty in order to oounter a predominantly Com.servative press, 
.:: ... '. Were perhaps not so eager for a ohal:1ge aa they had been.~ is pure ':" :.. ,': 
:. spMulatim. the baais of whiehis destroyed by his own footnote. ::<:i 
"InaMitien ~bune did report ... "a' great deal of dissatisfaotion . 
expressed. by Labour llemb$rs with the Report." .. Tribune, 9 June 1944. 
deoisions otthe Speaker's' Con£erenoe were.to become oontroversial but in 
1944:the mainr~sults ot the Con£erence were two Bills incorporating a large' 
.. part '. of its recommendations. The Redistribution Bill was given a Second 
Reading on 10 Optober 1944~(114) _ It was based on the unanimous recommendations 
of the COmmitte~on Electory Machinery, and followed olosely the detailed 
recomm~ndations of the Speakers~ Conferenoe. The Bill provided for the 
appOintment .. of permanent Boundaries Commissioners, periodical reports and the 
iJlmediate division of constituenoies with more than 100,000 electors. By ',. " 
aubdividing the 20 largest constituencies the Bill created the maximum number' . 
• 'V ! ' 
Of. new seats (25) recommended by the Conference •. The Government, whose case 
wa.s presented by, Herbert Morrison, also took the opportunity to announce its 
IIli\pport for the Conference I s decision, how:·ever close, (115) to preserve the City 
of Lond~n as a separate co~stituency, although its right to return two Members .. ' ." 
WOuld be open to debate at .the time Parliament debated the first general' scheme 
of redistribution. ", Although given a free hand in coming to their recommendation, 
'WhiCh 'ooUld be rejected ,or amended by Ministers. if neoessary," the supremacy in 
~l' these ,matters lay WithP~lia.ment which besides settling theba.si~ prln'ciples 
, 
'll\1.st deal wl th the Commission's, reoommendatio'ns itself.' : ,1 
,:, ; In his ap:eech' on \ the Bili, Arthur Woodburn dealt with the questionef ,.:, 
, . - . ~ 
to.promise. t> He recalled the abortive nature of the last Speakers' COnferenoe 
("which 'he meant the Ull~&ter Committee)"whiOh had fa.iledl:)~oau~e,of:~he', .. 
. . • elfishness of,thevariolls 'parties - an attitude alien to the tolerance basic' , . 
g~C.Deb'.' 403;' 00;1610. <eteseqeAt the time the Government 'was considerill4l: 
i ',~ Viv:1.&tl.Committee
'
s report they decided to introduce separate Bills,:for 
. r"iltration and.representation. It was not expected that a tlredistribution 
oa.rriedout for' the purposes of the first' post-war General Eleotion would ' 
r"a1n. val1dfor 1001, s1nce_substanti~ obanefes in the. distribution o£ the 
popu.la.iit\)nare tt\) be expected during the post-war 1ears~tt,C!B66/38t·W.P. 274. 
25 June 1943." See .Al.so C.AB 65/34. 89(43)6.28 June 1943.. ".; ,. 
?"~' ••• ,-•• ;."-~ ~:~._;._,.."~._~:<.~ ... ,,,: .. ~ _~'.:_'1 .:;. ~-', > -,.: . 
~e Cent.ranee hadrdeoided in favour of two-member City representation but 
KGrriaon warned the Cabinet. to expect oppoai tion from the Labour Party on 
th.'isn.e~:.CA:866152: IT.P.(J.,,..') 39U; .. ' ", .,.. . ..... 
, to the Parliamentary system. He was proud of the Conference's achievements 
and looked forward to the full implementation of its recommendations in later 
,:Bills. "As for the City of London and the University seats he looked forward 
, to ,these returning Labour Members in the future but he did not regard this an 
- . 
'important issue.(116) Frank Bowles raised doubts as to the wisdom of too 
frequent reviews. (117);, -, 
:" - -to, ~. . > 
The Libe~~is~ -h~;e~~r, m~ved a motion rejecting the Bill 'on the grounds 
.' ( ~, . 
. that it g~~e "n~~s~';~ce ~f securing 'fair 'r~p~esentation in this House of the 
s . ~ , ~ • 
(l' -" '. • - •. _,., 1>.,,' -:". .: 
elector~te in ~pro;~rtion "to the~ot~~ ca~t. ';(118) Among their supporters were 
-~Si;R~~erlt~~~'t~~~6ne- ~the; i~~~ M~P., J.R. Lesli~ WhO"j~i~ed;tho~~';'in 
-, ,~i:'" ~" -:""',' ': ." ~'"<:.;.,. "Z":"-, {: .' ,.,~~",~. "';;' ,.->'t "~' ~ .:~~'~" <.:;l·' 
.f~vour of the motion which was defeated by 202 votes to 18. Both these 
.ll'I." ~i.T ._-'~, ,:;-~ ::.. ~~ .i!' ,:'1~.( '~.: ;;'~'::. ~ .... ), ';~}; '."' :.'.~, :,-"i "' ~ '1- '''4~' <~-i:'~""Ze-~;>. 
Xembers spoke in the Debate in favour of P.R. as a fairer means of representing 
:~ .,', ~" '>'. ~~. "~./- !~. ~,<.""._ -?';.:: -., ,<, .. ~ ~ ( 1 ;;:: " ~~ : .: ::4; ~. ~,-'. ~".:' r"'._!" ':., ;f.. t' 0: :._;~_~; -: ;:- ;! 
.the electorate, while Pethick~Lawrence spoke at length about the difficulties of 
t:.,,' ,"', .'·f~., ,-. "...)' -~.,~,._ f.""::;; \ .. c '-'~_'._'" ",_, "".' .. ,~., 'd! " _. ,,:~.,:',"\l _~,:,<" .:'~"":;'::"><:./'-".>~: .P.R.'(l~~; ~~n;ti~;~~i~s;com;i~te"ios~ of touch between M.P. and electorate, 
., .~ '{ ~ ~ ,:, f . ~.", ': ,::: "',,: . :. ,:.}: ~ j!' _ ,r.,:';" t ~: J" " ~.' 1 ;,. ~ ,~ ,,' .fI .~ '" -: J.'~ !~, ·"';.i : i'-~ 1 "". :~~ ',: --;' > .. ~: :; '\ 1 ,~; -\ 
:he by-election problem etc.). (119)" All three spe~ers ,frankly recog~ised the. t 
the 'L~o~' p~~i~~S ;~~n~t .~ .~. "; The Annual iie;ort ':i~l t moved t~ ';e~~~ the:' 
.- '- •• - <'- , • ." -" i! J"", \ '"'- ; #> L : ... -~ ',., L -I ;:";(,-, " j ~i "_ '''-': ".'~, ;~:' ''!' ~~" ., p ,,",J,,;_,;~: .~ -y. :~2 1~"·:'·;_::<4-:i~:~:.;",,,/ ;::'!, .. ':-"":' ;~.<, r~-:;.;,::,;,,;,"', __ ~",.~ 
_, arty'S challenie to P .R. (120) The only other Labour Party contribution came 
, '""" "'~.~,~,.;;,-,'.;,; ~ .. :;' .. ~~ '~:-":~'.~,,>,~ :'~_-.:.:;:-." ;~; ~::~.~--... ..:.'-:.: .. _ .:J.,: ,."~':, ' >. 'C _'; '~;,:,':: .. ~.-t-j /~Lr-::;l~J ~,; 2.i._:~ 
from George Strauss who attacked the priVileged position of the City of London. (121) • 
v "".~, "'~~Y~'j:;:...':':r "r:"":>~'t~~' ,,-~-·c;·:< ~.~'<.'-,' ~,,:. "_ ;,'~.' ~~~i-_/:?t ~,-'-,,{"~;;..,':,~.,':_,,:,:'~":..i,;:::_.,,< .. 
J.R.',Leslie also ~ttacked the privileges of the City in ,his speech, as had Bowles 
.. -.. - I' ", ··t ..... •. i . . :.~ ',_-:, t. ,~:,!",,:,.~~ ''''::',1:/ ~:; .,<".") . .,. ",~"';, ~l:\, ..... /:~ .. \._~.".:.-;, "",~> ~", -~ ':-\:.. .... t.-:.; .. -.. ".~, '<"'«: .. ~ ~_~,~:' ,r' 
earlier in the Debate, but the sum total hardly justified Butler's blaSe .~. 
1. "~' ..... t:~ . >_;--,~~ ;', ~:,~~:, .. _, '.~ "t.~'c~.,; .' ;~~:t'!, ~< ': ~,~ -.~\'~,";':.o ". ::"~:";,~., :,;" :L~~-.~~-_·"(,X\~"~,>::t·).,1i_'~:k' 
statement that "A few Labo~ speakers protested against the privileges of the' 
.' ... ," ~.,:,~, .... ' .. ·:::·/t"~·',.-~:~·"·, ~~.:. ~_>'~,:j. ,<:-,,_~:',\:- '<:"'-!"'i,;~:'~";',,, .L'~, .k~ ... l.>,,··.·:·~t~~,~··/ 'i;( .... .-;:~U,' ........ lI''''')'~ '.~ ~:' ; . :':: :r~,,; 
,~ity of London and against university representation."(122) The protests were 
'~:'::";", •. " "',., ".1-: r·lfl.·~ ,...1 .-~ -~~ .. :.i'~ ....... :'"'~ -c', ':;,'~ :...~:~. ,VI. > ~::.~ 'if:r,t,:~: \,,~;~~ ,1,' ,7."· ... ,, ' ... ~1\.::<- .~ .. ~, ~ . , ... ; ~~ -.~'~:.~'~':-" 
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Obviously deeply felt and widely held in the Labour Party. 
When the Committee Stage was taken on 12 Ootober further disputes arose 
oVer the City of London whioh was the liubjeot of an amendment eliminating its 
privileged position. Morrison reiterated the Government's view and added that 
, , he, 
"personally, as a Londoner and as a Member of Parliament, 
but partioularly as a Londoner, would feel regret if the 
politioal and Parliamentary identity of the anoient City 
of London was oompletely abolished."(123) 
" John Parker attacked the provision for two Me~ers -fOI1 the City and seemed to 
. imply by his abstention that he felt bound by the deoision of the Speakeis' 
. ' 
COnferenoe, while Woodburn noted that "what this Parliament does oannot bind any 
'. , 
future Parliament" and indioated that'the question was in effeot being deferred 
.until the next Parliament.(124) Other Labour Members spoke against the 
',Oolltinuation of the City except for W.H. Green, another Londoner, who defended 
ita oOlltinued representation in the House. The amendment was defeated by ,163 
votes to 38 with the bulk of dissidents belonging to the Labour Party, inoluding 
, W. Foster, who apparentl~ felt no obligation to abide by the deoisions' of t,~e 
, Speaker's' Conferenoealthough a member. , On a debate to rejeot theolau~e,whi:0h 
elCClu<l.ed 'Uni versity oonsti tuenoies from. the Boundary Commissioners' oonsideration 
. the diSSidents num~ered only 16, of whom 1 0 belong~d to the Labou:~:Party -' all of 
lIhOll1,.j' had voted aga.i~liIt the previous amendment. Notwi thstanding favourable 
, OOllments in favour of the oontinuation of Un! versi ty representation by lvor' 
, .•.. ~GlIas and Pethiok-Lawrenoe (both or whom were University~oters) only three' 
P.t.P. Members o~ed side~ and voted against the ~endment •. 
11.3 •. B,C.Deb. 403 00.1993. Morison wa~"in favour of the restriotion of City 
", representatioll to olle Member, (oa:a66/52. W.P. (44)~91, ) but the Cabinet 
.... .' decided to leave the .issue until the Boundary Commissioners had reported 
' .. (gAB 651ft- 94(44)2 20 July 1944) and ;',later to the House of Co~ons 2.!! 
65743111 44)5 28 August 1944 and CAB 66/54 W.P. 460. '. "', 
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The ~epresentation of the People Bill was introduoed on 13 December 1944 
,~~ given a Seoond Reading six days later.(125) It provided for the assimilation 
7
of the local government and Par1iamerlary franohises, modifications in the' 
~le~~o.ral mac~inery and the resumption of local eleotions which had been ' 
,suspend:d throughout the war. Among its misoellaneous provisions was one 
,setting.the date for the Boundary Commissioners to begin ,their enquiries on 
150otober,1946.(126) In the week prior to ,the debate Morrison had announoed 
the Governm~nt t s reoogni tion of the unsatisfactory nature of the services' 
,proX\Y' vote ,and had set up a Conference under the Chanoel10r of the Excheq~er 
(Sir, John ~derson) to oonsider the practioability of extending postal votes 
~Om~mbers.of, the servioes and war workers abroad.(127) In the debate Morrison 
~ded> that. the Government would do its utmost to table Amen<il"Ilents to the Bill 
~n ,~he p~int ',before the Committee Stage •. 
",. • ,<= 
" Mor;rison had oharacterised the' Bill as "the" oulminating' point in the , 
.se~~esof.electoral reforms which began with the great ,Reform Act of: 1832 (in 
. ~ . ',- ',. ! . 
t~t).~t~xtend~,.theprinciple of/universal adult suffra.ge •••• ~tt(128) and used 
..;~~ asa,n exouse.for the fact that some "misoellaneous reoomme~dati~ns" of the 
S ,: . " .. ,..',' " , . .' . "",' , 
peak:er'sl,Confe~enoe wer~ not inoluded'in the Bill. >,John Parker, who had been 
"'.',-, < ,.:, >; ", ... ,. ' • , 
,~~.~~be:r,~ of the Conferenoe, expressed the personal view that, the Speakers •..... 
. , ,~. "'" c... .,' ...... • 
propo~aJ.s regarding the abolition of the qualifying fee and the automati~. 
. -', -,." ~. . , 
~e~i8tre.~io~ of. all gr~uates should be adopted in the Bill~ ·He also expressed 
125 •. I.C.Deb. 406,oc.1263 and 00.1646 et.seq. .~. ,\' 
126; 
" 
,·t .'.,;.", 
~;~~~~dt~ti6'nof 'the People Bill (Parliamentary P&.pers 1944/5,11:" 105) ~ " 
See R.C.Dei~ 406, 00.165376. Cf. Butler, op.oit., 1'.99. The date was later 
, :,. bro'U€;ht ·foxward by 12 months. ' . .. . . . ' 
127 • AaO.Dei. 40~", 00.1335/6 .14 Dec.mber1944~ The' Daily Her&1d 'hS.d· alrea.a;.': 
complained that little progress had been made toward ensuring that the Armed 
Forces were registered for proxy vote. Servioement had not been informed of 
their rights. 2 June 1944. 
128. H.C.Deb. 406, 00. 1646., 
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the general view of the Labour Party that the university seats as a form of 
double voting ought to be abolished. He also claimed that the Conference's 
suggestion that no person should be entitled to be registered for more th~ 
one bUsiness premises if such an arrangement was practicable, ought to have 
been included in the Bill, and wanted, to know why. the suggestion of ther , " 
~onference on this point was not being carried out., As a final point Parker 
ra.ised the question of making sure the registers were kept up to day so that , 
a Parliament might be returned on a fresh register. (129)· Other Labour >, 
I . , 
embers,attacked the retention of plural voting while certain of the arrange-
, ments about the registers came under fire from both,Labour and Liberal Members. 
~e question of P .R. which was originally raised ,by a Liberal Member provoked, 
an ariUID.ent between Pethick-Lawrence and Pri tt over, the Conference's 1, :: 
d . ' -
ell.berations. (130) ,~,;, Pethick-Lawrence stated ,that he was ~pposed "to plural; ';" 
V1>ting but ,that the Conference "came' to an agreed compromise" on the issue. (131) 
Like Parker, he wondered what had happened to ~he proposals about the University 
francbiseo 'JJ : Overall, however, the P.L.P. welcomed the Bill, wished that it had 
gOne furth~;~ and: aid. :~~t :";o~~' ~ 'd~~ision.";' L ";,~":"~ <' :, 
:;~. ~ -:" :' >. :,' .~ •• ," j:: +",0,"'" "-.;,"t '1', <~ _: "' :;. ,~. ':.:~; ':.: :~ .:":\ . 
At the COm.mitte~ St~e on'17 Janu8.ry 1945 the Government moved the new 
olause it had referred to at the Second Reading enabling' servicemen to olaim,:" 
both, the busin~sll'fr~ohise and postal votes", the ~atter. ,along the lines.', '~,'", 
s '.'
uggested by, the Committee under Sir John Anderson which had reported, earlier,,' ; 
that lIonth.(13~) ~' The Committee" which consisted of 37. Members in addition~to 
........ -
~~~ __ ~ ____ ~ ________ ~ __ ~ _____________ d~____ '_~. ______________ ~ 
~. --... 
129: !b~d., 1670/3passiDl.· n • , ', ',>p ", .', , , 
be ~ ~~ , , 169 3~' '" -: ,",; ",; ~ ~~" ";: '", , ;::::; 
131. lPi.s.., 1694.' ,.' 
lj2~ ,J!portoi>th~ C~rirer~nceo~Post IVoti fo~ the'Forees S~a.inen"arid War 
!Qjtjkeri Abroad, -t.Cmd.6581:. ParliamentaryPa.pers,.19445 J V, p.51. 
;"'--;"'$<.';,,,,;,.~,j'~'.' .. ~.:. ~ '" ~ .. o!p.-"'~,-,...., 
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th~ Ch8ncellor of the Exchequer, (133) had unanimous~ recommended the 
SUbstitution of postal votes for proxy votes and had drawn up a scheme to 
" " 
effect ·the changeover.(134) These were included in the Bill with little 
dis~ussion.· .. 
Considerable discussion, however, occurred on a new clause to abolish' 
. PIUz.al ~ting, moved by Lady Meg-an Lloyd ·George.· Pethick-Lawrence reiterated 
thcit the ~"retention of plural voting was a compromise, a modus vivendi between 
. th~ Views of the.Labour Party and those of the Conservatives wh~ had'conceded 
the abolition' of the' spouses" quSJ.ification in respect of the business vote 
,,8.I:ld·of the'registra.tionforU~iversitygraduates to vote.' Hefelt bound by 
the com:prOmis~ at t~t {'stage. (135) A number of Labour speakers supported 'the 
clause 8J.though Liberais were the most prominent partiCipants in the debate 
with Independents, Communists and the I.L.P. all ex:pressini opiriionsin 'favour 
of a.bolition 'Of pl~al-votini." He~bert Morrison stated his position quite 
OlearlY. :,;"'.' '; <'~".. ,.. .' _ .. , ;~ .' , 
,:: "It i~ 'n~ us~·mY standing up and seekin€ to <defend 
..... , the prinCiple of plural voting. I cannot do it , 
. beoa.use~ •• ~.I'do·not·believe in plural voting. I;:'·:..., 
.. , would abolish it tods¥ if I could and if I had a,.." .. 
'. Parliamentary majority.""> ... ". " .. '';'' .• ".' 
!l.'he'·retentioD. ~ of pl~SJ. "voting 'wa.s, ,'therefore, a c,9mpromise made' by' responsible 
P&rties; . ~like the '. LiberalS . who . were not in : a position of responsibility,' and' .. 
thOse who'a,greed.:to th~ comprolIlise;~ststB.nd by it." ,tlI'quite agree;tlhe went 
on, ttthatthatdoes"not bind'the Members of the Labour Party, ~~d 'theY are free, 
.... 
.. 
. . 133. . . The Labour MeJrlbe~sto~':it 'were'," Arthur Woodburn, ~w. Glenville Hall,-· and 
" . '. George Shepha.rd.. ,_. ,.,' .~. "....... , .. , :.',." .... ". ,,> .'. '"'~''''''' 
. Qio.d!·65a1,:~QP.oit.:e~eCiallypara.22. p.6. Cf. H.C.Deb. 40~ cc. 267/70. lis: LC:~b: '~07; ·~L~5/8. 
,. • ~ _ : ". : .. -,' j '.: 4/> 
, .. <. 
,. ,. 
, ' •• , < .; ; •• ~. ~ '" • ;, l-' ~ 
'
1f they think it right, to vote against the compromise which their representatives 
o th " t n e Speakers' Conference accepted."(136) He wondered, however, whether' 
they ~Ould have done better. Forty':'one Labour Members evidently thought they 
oOUld~ and Votf3d with the minority as the clause was defe~ted 123 votes to' 51. 
'\ " .... ~ 
" . At th~report stage the Liberals attempted t~ give l~cal'authoritief( the 
,~ '" 
option of using the S.T.V. at'local 'ele~tions.' P~thick-La.wrenceonce again 
'Spoke,' this time against, the' claus'e while Ma.cLean Watson' spoke in favour of 
P.R. but refused to vote for the ClaUse' as it stooda.nd a.bstained o~ the vote. 
Ollli two Labiour Members were to be' found' in the min~rity as theclaus'e'w8.S 
defea.ted by 208 vote~ to 11~: Th~s in 'these deba.tes' th~majority' of the'p.L~p. 
'(,. ~ 
stuck' t'o"'thedeciared principl~s of '~qual votirlg which the LaboUr pa,;ty' h~';' 
COll~'istentlY ao.vocated:\since the Fir'st Wo~ld War: This'is not t"~'s~tha.t'th~ 
Ll.b'o~ representativea'onthe Spe~e~''.' Conference 'were not rei>resEmtat1ve of 
'the' pa.ny b~t' it' did indicate that; they~did not produce t;ms~hl~h ~ere binding 
upon thei; colle8.gUes~ ,r· This h~ in" fact obtain'ed whS.t 'they could i~~'a. [",l,:;;;';.'" 
'difficUJ.tp'olitical" sit~tion~ , 'The Bill became i'~win' F~b~~' 1945';(1'31)" \; ,;::: 
".-, 
The ~arlY~noUnc~e'nt of i;heelec':tiond~te'effecti~~ly"po's'tponed~leotora:i 
'q-Qf;stions,' othe~ t~ tho'se oonde'rned w:ithth~"efficiie~t i c~llation' of the' 
regist~r for 'som:e'v~t'e~s.'~ The 'electi'~n' it'~eif; '~:pa.l:t 'from chU;~hiil' svain 
, '" ' 
&tld fOoliSh' atteinpts to' revi~e' the ,jspectr~"of the Soci~ist L~~e in'theguise of 
the"·:·La.Ski 'contro~e~SY'J was," in iact~ proof 'or' th~ varieties and limitations ~f 
faith iIl'd.mocr~y bro~ht about'by ~,;"a.r fOu8h't i~·~it~'nB.m~.(138)':) 'The':~boUr'"'' 
~ty' antioipated th~ir ret~nd t~' office' f~om; the 'bY-~l;ctio; resul ts ~hich h~:'; 
Continued'into'~e&rli 1945 ~ ( 139) )"; The ;ealls'atidn'; of' their hopes'!' ~o~pled with:'''~; 
...... 
• 136. 
:: 0 ~. " ." ..,; 
131. 
< , 
~ii., co.309/12. paSsim. 
" '-;... .:.. ',~ 
,AS "g + 9 Geo. 6. Ch.5. 
Se.' Note' 19: ,i;. ,':~ ': ,c,,~, ',. 
See Note 20.. "..'~ c, ., "',', ;C i , 
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, ,~he¥e:.Xp~rience of strong government during th,e war ,had successfully dispelled 
,~h~" identification of the Party with extremism and vindicated the Democratic 
--"', '"' "" , ' .,., . 
s ' 
" ." oC~~~~t view that the transition to political power was possible. On a 
,.n:u:mbe~ of ~ccasi~ns the Labour Party had. stated i ts bel~ef in the power and" 
P~~~~ige of Parliamentary institutions, and even Churchill fS attempt to raise 
~. , .",', '" ' '. '., -'" ,-' - ., - "., "> ~'. - - - <-
t.he ~aski bogey during the campaign of 1945 did not destro; that fa.i the The 
•. ~\, ",,::' '< ." . "c, ' , . ,"> , 
" ~!xt, five years was to prove the acid test of Socialist theories. (140) , 
~,' '.c-" ,_ .... -A ,.,;t < ", ,. "~:'. 
" ':" .Among the problems facing the new Labour administration was that of , 
, ," ~ . '. "~ ." .<. - 0 • ~ -." • ~ .' • 
~,le?~oraJ. reform, of which the war-time measures had been clear harbingers. 
, .; ..c, '" _ • ' ~ , "." '". ,>~ ~ 
Perm~~nt problems of· electoral reform obviously required permanent legislation 
"'" ""' -,~. " ~ 
, ~ut i~~h~ ,~nterim period a number of mea.sures were~ntroduc~d ,to deal with the 
Probl~s arising from the ~ar-time situation., The response of the Conservatives 
'" ~ ~:;- 3'_ 4'{ h ',> ~',c, ,-. ,.,., ~ _ ?", • ' '.~ "." ~ -, ".' "_~ , 
t. th ' 
" e,B:~ necessary measures helped to stirt~e!le.~dle.ss. c,on!rov~:t'sy which 
>'~ ,,.c, _~ ~.;., '_.~ i_', .. ~~ ,:;;' ~~'" 
2I1.rr~unded .the later debates on the Representation of the People Bill., 
" .' "" '" '-. """~~ -. ., • ,,< .... • >, , •• ~",' ~ .;., ," - " " ~, • ''',;;'' """ ' 
",~e Elections and Jurors :Bill provided for the continua.tion of the existing 
, '~':'" """'.,,,- ;"'~ ;l"'.~ .~,,-t., " "',,, ,: "~,, .,', ,~,). '~ ' •. ' " .-." ~ 
r~ist~~ ,until the end of 1946 and the extension, of posts;l:v:~t,ing ,.t:.ac~li t,ies. (141) 
~,~~sue, ~f~'a' au;~~e::n~'~re~i~t~r in Feb~a;,194?Yf~~ld .11,elp to keep the '. . 
'- 'i;.", ,.- '-'", '~ __ .,. "''''~_'' .' ~._ ' .,,- ," 
" reeisterup to date but it was the Government's intention to return as soon as 
' ""." I ''', 0, ,<~,_ ", ~' .... " 'tf, ... ',,: <, " '; .' ""'" ,.'l. .' '.<, >Jl:'- .... f. '; '.'" ~-- ~- -~ ... - .".' .•.. .., '-;-,.. /'" 
, " " ' , 
POBlilible; to the traditional praeti~e of register, by ,~~!a~s.(142) The 
,Conservatives~ttac~~d t~e Bi~'l' on two po~nts;' the "fact' that it ~nored many 
'''''., ",,'>I .,",.... .~'_*.:, .~ .. ...,~., ; '" ,..~~,-.,''''-.,. " - .. ' "" ~ " -, -, ~ ". ,' ..... 1 
r· , ' . 
, eo,o~endati~ns", ~~" :the Spe.a.ke~s I ponfe~ence".,~d ~ts, pe,rpe~~tio~,~fth,e, wa.r7:~ime 
,ay~~~ 0: ?:egistration, ,which they 'Cla.im~, wu,in~f~ic.ient, ha.d~~ly: be,et,l, intended 
~ '-" .<~" ,,' ,-:' L '_', " .. ,- , 'j!' " • 
as a t' " 
'i", Ulpora.ry, expedient • The Government "and ,the P.L.P. ",were as one,inpointing,,: 
. t~,.the, administrative difficult;es involved ,in ~he .tra.dition~l. method .o~,canvassing 
~- " ,.'~ ) . - .. -
'-., 
Se. Note 
e """ ~o 
•• ~ted'~s 9 + ';'0'(;80.'6'-
!LC.D.b4~ 416,00.447 et.seq. '21 November 1945. See speech by Ede cC.447/55. 
at a tiJne of reconstruction when man-power wa.s severely strached. (143)' One 
~~ ~, 
Or two Members spoke of the need to ensure that Serv'1ce voters,' many of 'V'Thom., 
- ->:,-, 
hadnotbe~n' ~ble to exercise their voting rights at th~ election"of 1945, were 
given tull oPP~:r:tunities to regi~ter and vote.(144) Many Labour Members also 
" int1lla.t~d th.eir' awareness' of the widerprohlems 'of 'redistribution' ca~sed by the 
t-p~ra:t;. na.ture ofa demobilising popula.tion •. 'In genemi'~" however, the salient 
. fa.cts'of the discussio'n of th'e: :Bill'ce;tredaround' the cOll't1m;ation of" the war-time 
'" ~ , , "" 
regiatratio'~' proo'edur'e which, . all sides agreed,' should b'e revis~d When' the Report 
· of 'the' Roin;' Office Co~ittee' on-Elect~ra.r"Regist~tion was rec'~ived~ .1 In"faet, 
Whe~ the' Rep~~t was issued' i't came out in favoUr' of the' pre-war method "of canvassing 
a.s·a€&1nstthe Na:tio~al Regist~ati~D.' system: of compiling the registe'r' a.n:d~ more 
itn···.· " ,l •... " " , . 
. (Portantly /'reported against the 'requiremen~ of a qualifying period in favour of 
thesysteniwherebY&l'l pers;ns 'no~~lY resident ineach'constituenoy on a given 
d~' ~oUld' be' Yncluded in' the~egist~r ":wit~(t~~regist;r~ each year i'o e~~ure 
. ~~atit.wa.s as up' 'to d~te a~ possible~ (145) "Tlle Committee' which had been" " 
COmPosedofoff:i~i~l" eip~e~ts', M.P~' s and the' Party a€ent~,' bYa.ba.ndo·ning· 'the'" 
'. q~1;Yidg :pe:ctdd in the :lnt erest ~f efficiency, ~piici tly'cri t:ic:is~d 'the 
Wherea.s· th~ !a.ttit~d~'otthe L:ab~~ pa,:;ty"rerdained cor;sist~ntid p;ino'ipleand 
~~atic 'in a.Ppiiea.ti~nthroti8h~~t~;:' This' i~" ziotto d~ny,'that·there were ;~erta.i.n 
-.. ~ , " -
IT tt III 911 l1li 
>;" ;,>;:, "; (:. : ~1~ <". :";, .'~ ~.' ~, tH;". _~' .,{ ,~. 
.. 
~StunPt~~z:~ made in connection with the expectedleg~slation,of electoral 
:~fo~, not the least of which was that it would derive its strength, if not 
" • ". ': • r. -, , " 
it ~ w~ole being as the Conservatives were to contend, from the recommendations 
• ." ,i'. ~', \ ,~> , ' 
. 0,:, the ,Speaker's : Conference. 
" .' >0-"'" . 
The Reports of the various bodies set up during 
, ' • • " "" • .cc <" " 
the,~w~ ,and :,ex:~ed by the Labour Government, because they reported on ,the 
• <.'--' • 
~.el':lll.S of reference. set during the Coalition, nat~,ally reinforced these 
assumptions. The two Reports of ,the Committee on Electora.l Law Reform, for 
~,:.<. ,"" ~ ',' ,-,_, J'j - < '" •• 
example, de&J.t with' det~il~dquestions ~n"dorrll.pt' pra1tices and administrative 
4 ~-"',_;." > _._, ".' _ ," ... 1 _ ", ' '" e, >, 
'changes a.r~.~~~'o~t, .o~ the Spea.ker's'IConfer~~~e~ (14,6) , •. ~";~~he final Report 
'ref "" , .... . 
',. erred to University electors, expressed its views on election expenses and 
1~~ _ 
" motor vehicle~ (the latter with some division) aSiithe decision~ 'of "the 
Th~ pr~tism 'of the' Labour' Party'" and tilee'xtraordinary ;~ensit':i.;i ty of" 
the Conserva.tives ;~s' 'shown inth.eGove~nme'~t ts+·~:ro'posa.i:i~·Novemb~~'\946rto 
-end th~Iules g6'.v:erning the' dr~win8 of cons-iii t~~ncy bound~ie's t:o p~e~~'nt""the 
di2lnembe~ent 'of' old e'stablished co~iti;~ Which: 'the' ri8idi't~oi'th~ i~ld\~le~ . 
i ~- '-'" .' _,f-. >:;,- _ " _. < .~ "~ ,.'; ~:: -~~ •• <;,. --",~ "'''~'~~" '.~<.--~ r',), i .<, .\" :',:rt,' 1". :~ . .t' .'" 
, threatened 'to bring about. The amendments of the rules,. which were both 
neQ" ,', '.,,:,. " .. '., ", .,'" ,"f ;,' I· .. · ," , .. ,',' ,~ ., 'd"'; ".. .. : ~( ,f ,),1' ,'" '; '.,: ,,' ", 
, ess&.ry "and reasona.ble were'subjected to a vitriolic and ignorantatta.ck from 
~.'.chUl:'eh:ili~ Who"~as":ge~tlY repr~a.nded by'theSp'eaker i:~;' ~c~sin8' t'h~HoIn~ 
S '"., ,., , , .. ' . ". ..' '", " .. "' .. '} i,' ,;~." " .:;~".~., ;" '.'." " 
eOretary (Mr'~ Ede)' of ~ezTYma.ndering.'i He (the' SpeSker)hS.d'ob'served the 
i1ellied';."'that the''''amenwnent was the'result'of: 'politicSJ.'pre'ssure. ""Ever.t-th'e'·' 
, " , "iIap~ti~it;~PtheCh~ri h~;;e~er',oo~ld' do' l3.t'ti'~;" i;~'~es~ra.i~ th;c~ri~~;~ati~es' 
. .'" ",'''~; ~ ••• H ' ,. .""" +', ,. ". .' "'~ ,.. . ..': '.' , 
POliti~~li~i~~pired"~er~ (147)'::, The~odYwhioh' marked the S'e~?ndRe~ng 
-,..~,'. -"~ .• "' .. ".~,_ .• /;.: .•.. '~;,.,f' :";~'~ ''''''.' .. :.;< .... ,""~' .. _ ~._.:.~:.>~."_.":'--~::-.'.~,.' .. ~i., _' .. ,:~ .':".:~: .''-'" •. :: .. - y .... _' ,'-·~c __ :.: __ ";'<:--':'-':' ...... ~~., ... _,. ,':',~ 
•. 
terimRe rt of the' Committee on Electoral La.w Re:t'oibi,t\~ Cmd. 6606{~li 
:9a.rliamenta.ry-»apers ,1944 5,.v) p' .. 59) and Fina.l Repo::t't.ofthe Committee ~'t~.toral·L§W' !¥Jform •. Cmd.7286, (parli~~nta.r;:'rape.::t'cs.}941/~i'~' ·P.T21); 
.. ' .... -t·· ... ;,.~·~ ... c ... ·.; ... :~· .. ,.~ ..... -""!~,..;}· ......... ~',. ",:,/.'~,:~'.'-" "": ~:.~>;.";"''"' . ..;:"'.jIo ":'.:'-/ '7,'- .;,--~, £"'., ". ;","91-,'> ~ 
See, LO,D!12 .• 430, oc.77/86. 
Of'~the Bill a month later, attributed by Mr. Peake for the Conservatives, to 
Oonsultation between the parties/was indicative of the consistency of principle 
and pragmatic practice of the Labour Party as well as the paucity of the 
c:; ",' , 
onservatives Qrigina1 arguments. (148) ,,; Dand Butler, whilst admitting that 
• . ', -,- • i-
,,"~e heat a.ro~S~d by 1U-. Ede' s first announcement was obviously fanned to 
IL -'-'.~ :' _.' , " >C; , 
•. _ • ... _, ","" "'r_. • 
,~ecessa.ry heights by Mr. Churchill ••••• tt regards i~ s.~ply as, 
i. 
-
"a significant indication of how explosive an issue , ' , 
" redistribution was; It was well known that the Labour'; 
Party would lose seats by an equitable redrawing of 
boundaries. " The Conservatives were very rea.d.y to 
suspect that Labour would try to evade, inflicting this 
hardship upon itse1f."(149)"'·' ;" ' , .~ 'i ,.: 
~n my est1mS.tion Butler pays \ to~ high' a compltmEmt to' Churchill for the 
Conservatives tended to' take their lead from their leaders' erlre~ism 'Onoonsti_ 
, , 
~tional lIlS.tters for which Attiee' s terse COmnlEmt "he will ~ beha.ve like a child tt ': 
se' .'. " '..' '. -.'. ,,' , " ' : ," -'. " 
," Enn, appropriate. (150) , The process of redistribution meanwhile continued with' 
'the ~ publications of' the reports of the 'four Bound.a.ry;Commi~sions· in 1941/ which 
, propOsed quite a number ofalteratio~s to' the existing c'onsUtuencies.(151) 
,the Case of England th~" Commission justif'ied the ?ontinued' eXistence of' eight 
In 
~ "" .~. ~.;( ;: c,_ 
1 boroughs 'over 80,000 ori' the ground that, if' they, were,. divided special claims 
, '.. "-,'" '. ,: i,.~'. ::~, ~ :.. "';:',:. - _:.e •. _' t ' " '.,".'1- - - , 
W~u~,~ be, made for boroUi'hs just under 80,000 and that, the divided seats would 
><.",,,] " \. 
be' a.bnormally sma.l1.' ,They took the view, the s~gnificance, of which will become 
a.PP~ent la~~~," ~tha.~ the c~~~t~~n :o~ eight add~ t'~~na~ ': s~ats,' in these case~ . 
~,":" ~.; . ~.;:. -, ,"'--. 
, -- j~... ~'"","., 
148. See H.C.Deb. 431~:~C.1557 et'~·seq. 13 December 1946~';:The Econoiiust'in 
endo:t'Sl.Ili -the principles of' relative equality of Members and maintenance " 
Cf. "lccal communities had 'tho~ht Churchill's, or,igina1 p,rotest ~'pOli ti. caJ.'''~''~ 
horsepl~." 23 November 1946l826). ..,' .... , ..... ~ •. ' . 
Butler; op;cit~; ~p: 104/5. ' . ' . 
See L.ra.:C»:oran:'Winston C :urchi11 The St le f'or Survival 1 0-1 
(London: Constable,. 1966 p. 717 •. See a1soCh.30 .. ttA :year ,of.recovery'! k. 
Pp.306/317 f'or ChurchillVs general state of mind dur~ng 1946. For the 
implications a.t loca.l level in one constituency at 1ea~t see LordWiu, 
g,em W1g· (London: Mioha.elJoseph, 1972),Pp.148/9. ,.' >" .", • , ..•• ' ,',,>,' . 
td.'-'72J{-N. Ire1a.nd,Cjad. 7260 En..land; Cmd. 7270 Scotland; Cmd. 7214 Wa.l.es. 
All .1947/8). The N.E.C .. a.uthorised the National Agents Department to make . 
. the appropriate representatives to Ministers as soon a.s the .Report was ..... . 
'.pub1ished. N~E.C. Minutes Vo1.94. E.C.2, 1947/8,14.27. ~5 June 1941. '. ' . . . 
I 
! 
1 
! 
I 
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W'Ou'ldd.o little to solve the general problem of equal representa.tion ••••• "( 152) 
" In the King's Speech in 1947 the Government announced 
::: "I ,; "a measure to reform the franchise and electoral 
procedure and to give appropriate effect to 
:,.,:" recommendations of the Commissions appointed to;, ',.' 
consider the distribution of Parliamentary seata."(153) Th" ' ..... ;;~ .;' .' ...., .. . '. '.," " . ,., ". ,.' , 
e publ1ca.i;'i~~ of th~ t'~~t of the Bill in January. 1948 reVe~led. a 'comprehensive 
,'/ (, f";--: "; '~" .... ' '-. _, ".,' ~''''-~ ',' " .. " ',' ~ .(,"," re~orll1 of ~lect~;al le8isl~ti~~, most' of which was the re'-ena:ctI!lent' of existing 
statutes. Jmong its p;o'vi's'ions were the ab~li tio~'~f the quaJ.ifYing period.' of', 
;'.id~n~e 'k eleoto;al ;egistrat1on, the '~~in.titution of t;'~ regi;'t.~. ~y.ar, 
the g;a.nting of postal voting facilities ~'t~ ~ 'l~ge number of citizens~'the 
ab~lit~onoi'pi~~ v~ti~·:a~d. th~ 'redu~tion ~~ expe~se m~illia, thel~giSlation 
~tt . ', ... -
ol P~;nt of' sp~a.ke;~ aIld ~ ~o~~lete redistribution of seats.(154) In short, 
the :Bill embodied the; P~~~iPa.i refo~s the Labour part; had advo~at~d~ince the 
, ;, Fi:r~t Wor~d War. I~ the Debate'on the Address in the Ho~;e Of"Lords'~:i~October 
~.947, the Lo~d Chancellor: Lord. ;~witt had declared that \he :aiii'\voUld not 
in~~~~~p;OP~~t1~;~ rep~~sent~t{~~"b~t ~hat it w;~ld.;l ::':; i;lc;, 
"con~~n pro;i~i~~s'for the elec~O~al ;:~fo~\a;i~l~ .,. 
,out of i the recommendations of, the Committee of 
Electoral Registration, the Speakersi Conference 
ac.d. the Committee on Electoral Law ~eform. ~ 
JOW1tt the'';';} ~.., ~;:. f; 
n ; added,;;: 
t~~,.,,- ,,,,,.'" '. .'r', { .. ,r ,'" ,., • ,t. + '.~' "1 < 0'< ,-. ~ > " "1": :t>·f.r~~ vr,/:'. ':~ :"'~". ~, ", 
"If; as I 'fullY' exPect;' the noble Viscount (Samuel) .' 
is£a.miliar with all the proceedings in these, ~. < 
COlllmittees,'which I am not, he will know precisely 
,.;whatthe.J3ill;is going ,to do."(155) ,.';~,; .. :":~~n ;"" 
~a Was not intended, to \ indicate that, the Bill would be based exactly on these ,,, .. 
~: :726Q.~~~ ~;;;!: 15 :;:,~ ~. 
f'-?-~"_;-';." ~ '!'~" ,;'" '~ ..... ".' ,co ~ "," :-" ~':- r:~ ',.(, ... ~ .. :- . !.C~De!..',:,443; e~~6. ,.~ ;., 
\:,... .:~ j~:~ .,} ;; r {5' ,\ ;',: ,t, '" .. ~ <':':"; ~;_ ;. _'c ~. " 
inacted as 11+ 12 Geo. 6. Ch.65. 
g:l.~~:i 15~'~~: 70: Butier, op.cit:,· p.108. has apparently reWO~d.ed the 
quotation. ' .. ' '" 
,<,; 
!! 
I1 
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COllU!li tt 'I . 
.. ' . ees, recommendations but was, as Jowitt himself protested later, 'a 
1i' . 
iht-hea.rted remark, (156) nonetheless it was seized upon by opponents of 
reform as a way of avoiding an examination of the merits of the 'changes: .' 
propOsed •. ,. DiE!cussion of . the Bill, therefore, revolved less around its 
. provisions as upon the question of whether the Labour Party was gull ty of a 
bre~h' of faith in departing from the recommendations made by the Speakers 1 
. COn.ference. ,- . It has already been argued that the Labour Party was consist~nt 
in itsdema.nds since the First World War, and it is clear that the agreement 
" of1944~ the nature of which will 'be discussed below, was a'recognisable half-
mea.SUre dictated by the circumstances of the time rather than a negation 
p~ineiples:~nWhi~h t~: L~~O~';~; b~lieved. - ". 
of the 
'1 ~ ,'< j' ~j; -: 
It was claimed by'the"oonservativ~s that the' "bargain" was in fact a 
gentleman's agreement whereby the'franchises'for l~cal':ele~tions had been 
&sahlilat~d to that'ina.de for' parliamentary pur:poses and the vote given'to· the 
·Po~ses of business electors abolished in return'for the cessation of Labour's 
. d.~d.s regarding the abolition' of the business ~d university franchises •. By 
breaking·thisagreement"a.nd departing from the custom' ,. 
"that matters' affecting the interests of riva.l';parties .. 
, .. should •••• • be settled •••• • by an agreement reached by" 
: either between the leaders of the main parties or by .' ;' 
. . conferences under the impartial guidance 'of Mr. Speaker •••• tt( 157) ',. ' 
th ':: , .,..... ,:. ,"' .. ~~." . ' : ....... : ,.' ". ,... . .:' .... , . '. '. . 
'<~ Labour Party w~s guilty of bad fa.i the The Conservatives,· it wa.s claimed, ha.d.' .' ',. J.:;.,":,:"':.~' ~. -: :, ,l', .~.' . t;'';;.. .. " ., . 
'0 kept their part of' the barga.in,~ despite having been in a position in which 
" '.~ ~ ,-; l? ," :,:; "" ,.~, ',"" ;- ') ",.:' .' ,.. .. : .... . ',1,: 
H·L,De:bi,157. cc.303. In fact the Economist commented at the time-of the 
Bill's publioation, "Since much of the ground covered by it ha.d been:. , 
. oarefully prepared by the' Speaker. 1;: Conferenoe of 1944 it might have been' 
". expected that the conclusion -reached would have been embodied in it.". . 
7 February 1945. The' Economist had thought that some .fo~, of pluraL voting 
weuJ.d be maintained.' (See 25 .October 1947:,',. p.67~ .'. '" ."' . 
. ~?~eJl.~ ~··'447,cc·:859/60~' (Churchil~).' , " 
-... "': .. ' .. ~ -:;,. .., "-;." 
.. 
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'I 
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. they-could have thwarted the will of the Labour Party. Now that the Labour 
Party was in a similar position it had allegedly broken the rules of the 
, Parliamentar,y game, out of malice against their continued rejection by the 
ed~ca.ted electorate of the Universities and for party ends. They were 
SUbjecting' t~ied Md. proven methods 
unworkable<: ~bsurdities. (158) ',' 
',' 
of electoral working to logical and probably 
.'. The, question of whether there was a bargain or not was confused by the i 
int i . 
ens ty of party exchanges in the House and the differing interpretation of 
What, did or did not const'itute a "bargainlt., According to. David Butler, 
. 
. , ", .,. "there can be no doubt that there was a bargain • 
. In the debates in 1944 and 1945 Mr. Wo odburn , 
Mr. Pethick-Lawrence and Mr. Morrison all. referred," .• , . 
to it, and in 1948 no responsible Labour member 
denied that, there had been a , 'bargain' • ,,( 159 ) , 
In lIl: '. . .' 
' ... ' Y estimation Butler,is wrong in usingtheterm~tbargain". It is true that 
Labour', spe~e~s in" th~ 1~44' Deb~te made certain refer~nces to the conclusions 
l.rJ:.>ived at~y the Speakers'. Conference,. in what was occasionally, very loose ~ 
.. l~age" which the Conservative Opposition readily quoted out of' context during 
the deba.tes of J948.,~ \There may well have been an understanding ora.ccommodation 
. . The atmosphe;~of the Speaker's Conference had~ bee~' one' of conciliation;. 
,,' aQa, , 
'. comprOmise, a recognition, heightened by the war-time atmosphere of the 
ele,ctoral truce;~that ,,-the philosophy of ."all or nothing" was 'the philosophy ':'. 
~e.ins~ WW.Ohid~~!;;~i.w~;\~fi~hting:(160)~';: In~~~~ .. ~ ~atmosphere it was . Pos~ible ' 
~~" .~,,:-, {>~<-j'-"-',,~".-~,-- t:" ;'»:,->:1, t .:,,~:~ .':~,: "'! ::. tt ~ ':"~",< -f""-;' - -:,-:.,«,. \ .. ~ '/-!.,'.:,,·-i':" :'f",'-:'"i.57 ' ~ "'"" 
..", 
s~~ . t~e" s~'~~~h:~:'d£>iCh~hill,'ibid:;,' 85iI72,~P;~~<996/1011,"b~li:Fyfe' . 
.... 
1093/5. Cf. Lord Salisbury H.L.Deb •. 157,cc~295/304~···":' "">"""'~J .. '>'" 
'., ~ 15'~ : 
'; ~' 
'1'Q., See, the '~;~~h';~; Arthur Woodburn, H.C.~e~.' 403, cc,1622/3.',' For a. 
COIl.servativeview see Kargesson H.L.Deb. ,157, :c.307/11 , , The authentioity 
, Qf, the Labour view-PQint is supported by . the brl.ef references in . its' " ..•... , .' 
Report made to the questions raised. See, '., for example, L.P.A.C.R.1944, 
p.6S. ' ' 
I 
I 
" ! 
:to 8:rrive at what Pethick-Lawrence in 1944 called "agreed solutions" which it 
Wa.s thought would survive. 
, out that 
Yet, Herbert Morrison wa.s quite correct in pOinting 
·"all these concessions and ••••• a.ccommodations were 
within the political circumstances and the politica.l 
'. facts of the Parliament of· the day, and could not be 
within the political circumstances and the political 
facts of any other Parliament."(161) , .... ;', .. " ' 
Moreover, there was not, nor could there "be, an exchange of the aSSimilation 
Of the franohises for the pemanent maintenance o:f, the plural vote as this 
.'. WOUld' be tant~oUll~ to cia.imi~ ~h:t' aJ.l these items ~~~e in the oontrol of 
the ConservativeJ;~t~ ~hi~h'pia.inlY, th~;we~~·:no~.(162)'. Furthermore, Morrison 
tJcplioitly d~n~ed .~~; the ;9~8 de~ate~~hat there' was a bargain, either at the 
;, j ,~ <- • 
Spea.k:e:cla' COnference or in the' Government, <impl;ing 
"that any pa.rt~' which was ret~ed" was obligated 
to oarr,y out every one o:f those recommendations 
. in the next Parliament ••••• " (163 )", ", 
John Parke;, who was: a Member of 
. &lnl>hatic When he said~J. i; .;,' , 
the. Speakers' Conference himself; was quite 
" "there was certainly no idea' of any bargain being 
made between parties, beyond thefa.ct that we were 
, " t;ltj"ips' to reach some kind ofweement regardiIl!{'" 
le islation that mi ht be introduced in the life-
"',!!me ,o£.thela.st Parliament."164,;'~· 
4ttlee int.~;~;t~d ~ch~llill"s~~~o~;us atta.ck on the; La.bour Party to explioi tly . 
~ of the 1944 Redistributi~n 13ill' 
"we ,were dealing with legislation to beintroduoed 
in that Parliament •. The proposals came from the' 
,Speakers' ~ Conferenoe; ,they~ were agreed by,that ; 
Government, and the Bill wa.s introduoed. '. There was· ' , ,.""" 
.,nopledge whatever with regard'to future legislation. "(16S) ",';\ l; .. c;j; 
439 
~utler's assertion,therefore, that in 1948 no responsible Labour member 
denied that there had been a "bargain" cannot be substantiated. 
,,".': The essence of the 1944 Debates had been summarised by Morrison himself 
when he had vai~ly attempted to persuade Labour Members to support the retention 
'" of plural voting. . Asking Labour Members to consider whether they could have 
done better than the representatives who served on the Speakers' Conference" 
he' observed, , 
"I would say, if ~,the men and woman we had on the 
Speakers! Conference had done (good business) and, 
! on . the whole, have, done well, ',' and have come to an 
accommodation, I think the right thing to do is to 
• stand by them when it comes to a vote in the House 
of Commons. I have not got to do so, but they did 
· well,' they served their principles well, they came 
· to an accommodation, and I am going to stand by them 
. now :.that it has come to a vote in the House of 
Commons. That is the spirit in which I would appeal 
. . to my honourable Friends ••••• "(166) ..... .., •. 
. ': ;'~. ;\; ,;;,..;;..;,' ~': ~~ . .' "~: ~ '~, './ - -. -- . '. -,. 
The division list showed that his appeal fell on deaf. ears. 
, -,. '.' ",.) *-'1 ... .., . 
During'the 1944 Debates John Parker had not been prevented from arguing 
tha.tthe City ~~ .. L~~~~:. ~h~u.ld betreate~ the same" as othe~ constituencies even 
'though with one specific exception, a.llthe individual Labour,representatives,: 
'. 
QQ the Speakers' \ Conference voted in favour of its provisions. '( The main 
P.t.P.argument in 1948 was that by doing so those repr~sentatives, . whose views 
. .' -. '. ; . 
did not bind .. the Labour Party as a who1e,ha.d. discharged their obligations to 
the oompromises' agreed to. ; It was not possible for that Parliament to bind. 
its SUccessor," especially as the Pa.r1iamentof 1944 was patently unrepresentative • 
. ~ for . the notio~ that it was customary for such matters "to be' settled by 
acreement between the parties.that was not. the case in 1928 when Baldwin ha.d';~~'"K'~''''' 
eQ\l8J.ised. the franomse.(167).' " .:t'.:. 
• ...... ~"~ ~>; -.-~-';~. C ·:~~;~t t{·:;:7:n.'~: t" ~ :~~' -!:..,'::~_-~::: -t~-:';. _~}';,O" .:~~ ;':' T~. ;' 
• 
.. 166." S;e :a:.C.Deb~ 407, ~0.312. Ironically M~rrison' s argument' in co.310/11 
(whioh.he .admitted to be hypothetical) was indi~ative of the bargain. 
'. m.entality and was inevitably used against him. 'j 
.' 447, cc.1050. ~ka.yand,. co.lloo.Morrison. 
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Th~re is, in fact, little doubt that no "bargain" as such, existed but 
that informal agreements not to press certain claims were made in order to 
'\ 
~Ils:ure that the 1944 Speakers' Conference should be more fruitful than the 
-., .. ' -,' " " 
~ort~~e Conferf3n~e of.1930. This was more important during war-time as 
. Churchill had announced that no controversial legislation should be introduced 
'duriC8 that session., To reach agreed compromises was not, the same as demanding 
'\.. .w~_...,... ' }< '. '\ ,. ~ • ,- ~ ., ";.. 
a barltain and in claiming that .. there was a bargain Butler is clearly mistaken • 
.., .-' ." t" ~ -, .' - . , \ ~ - -.. 
The Conservatives for their part m8\Y well have interpreted their "concessions" , 
, JI - "., '." ~, _. , • -.' , ~) 
in tems of a barltain and drawn strength from some careless remarks by. Labour 
',-<" t ~.... f~' ,-' ~ f ~ 
IiPO~eliilmen, but their pleas to the Government to change its mind, were based on 
-~." ""~~.': '''' .. ~ ',.J "0'' , ,.\,~. I .'~~ " -,-' ,.- _.~ , ' ,~ , 'r' ~,'< ' 
~PPosition to change rather than' constitutional principles., WhenOsbert Peake, 
,¥.,,..,. ,,'-. -:; ;:,;'< ~;: ;l·,~ "t ~ ~:::.",~ ,-,: ".,. "" _.~, -~ ). "C c', " , , 
tor example, asked the House .. 
K··... ',. . . • ': • 
"Is it not clear that what has happened it that large 
numbers 'of the Socialist Members of this House,'newly 
elected in 1945, have failed adequately to appreoiate ",. ~'; l> the extent to which their party had been committed in ' .. 
1944 by their representatives on the Conference and by 
''';.:< the action of the Lord President in 1945, in securing 
the fulfilment of his part:.' of the bargain?~'(168)."" <Z.;'.> 
A'." ~~." 0;,' ,,: '. '" ~ •• -' ,"C,_ ~- -, - :" .. " -.''1 
What he~as really asking was that the opportunity, fo~ change should be deferred 
. , ; ., l '.
, until the Conservatives were once more in a position to thwart it." "".';,. 
- -~. :,: ':', ~ "" ,,~ '~ >. ><, t,. ,~, ">., " ~ '/"':.r, • ". ro .-,' .~ <, .::."'" • '"\"., • ' 
,It has been arped above that the main features of,the:Billwere; the., 
;. ~. '~"""f '(.;', ;;), "" ... "~.:. ~ J ,'~ ,.' ' .,' ~\, P -'. ""', ~,." \,,0,"".' ,0.., " -I. , ," 
-bodiment of measures consistently advocated by the Labour Party.," A number 
""," .. ; c'" :~"\ .. ,.~,~;,f t.",';1;i ,"":::-T' '-.:". .~.' ',.' -:""'" < ,,', • ",'. ,",t ".' c "'-',' .' ,~". . . " . 
ot Labour Members reiterated this point during the debate. "Ronald Ma.ck8\Y in his ~ ,,~ <, ,,:~'.it t ;.' ",,~,,:. \:;;~ " ' .. ".~;,:. > :,.', ,:;.'~ ~" ~"'" -, ,. ." L'> , ,'~",~ ," , '. 
lIpeeoh On the Seoond Reading declared, '~The Labour. Party have stood for the 
"', '<~" \f .~ .. --,.~~!;.:_: '-.;..'",. ·b·,: -;. '~~ __ il--"""': ".': ; ,,~ ;:*" ..:. "" -l'~ ,','.. "',;~ ., >-
proposals in this :Bill for ma.o.y years, It (169) while Chuter Ede reminded the House 
.-
16$., rui.. L co.1 009 ,~ for a Labour Party view of t,he role' of their representatives 
at;,the COnferenoe seeLeN Shephard H.L.Deb •. 157, 00.315. See Note' 23.' . 
• '. , , . t, ,- ";;;',¥r~~~, . 
169.' . iC.D'b ... 447, o~.1047. ' 
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th~t "In 1931, I voted for the abolition" of university representation. I have 
,alw~~believed in it~"(170) Underlying this was a difference in philosophy 
concernirig"deniocratic ~articipation. These differences, as we shall see, in 
r~f~r~nc~ toth~ Second'Reading, were"incompatible and one is reminded of the 
tactic~ ~f Sir"Willi~ Bull in the attitude' adopted by the' Conserva.tives towards 
th~ ';'~ileg~d ~tbargai~". Th~ co~tentious items (plural voting in particular ) were 
, i~defe~~Sibie '~~~i;s ~d. to divert attention' ~wai! from tha.t fact it 'was 
?, ' •. 
necessai-y that the' Co~se~ati;~s liho~ld concentrate on the tactical limitations 
.( .>. t ~.~ , -'-, ',_"" i' ~ ":; '-- (' "'), ,':" ;;. ," .' , ,~ . :.'~ 
a.tforded 'the Lab'om. Party in 1944 Parliament. (171) The passage o~ the Act 
~~~h;the'colDlll()~S~' ~he~not~o~cerned 'with ~rUlonious ~xchanges' about the 
~l~dged barga.i~, ce~tred' u;~n f~ilia.r arguments. 'The most' c~ntentious iss~e 
~e_s to'~;e be'e'n t~e abolition ~f" :pl~a.i ~oting which iex61ted lette~s in the 
!..he.!, fro~ ~nterest'~d:' parties in the Universities and the appearance before the" 
R~~~~ began the ~~~:'d~" debate on the Second Reading" of: the, sh~riffs of the City 
, : . (I ...... ',"" '.' "'," " ,", ,'. '. ,.... . ". ",. 
,of London in full"regalia,' exercising their' ancient privilege to present a 
, '" . ~ ~ , 
,",lIlaintained. (172) 
Opening the debate Chuter Ede described the main provision~of the 'Bill:' and 
~ ~ , ", -. .. ,-""~' , • .,.- f"'-"" <f'{ -4{'" ,,_ , 
deli'berately,emphQ.sised, where necessary, the differences' between the Government's 
, <:"' '" ." " .,' _ ~ < ':. ;!' 
proposals and the recommendations of. the various committees upon which ,the"" 
", ,- " " ,'." r, ,,, ,',' .. " .,;. <., ,i. " ~~:';'" 
. proposals were originally based." During his speech. Ede stated . that the 
.' j., '.~ , j.. '".,~;.... ',.' ~ < '''''t' -', ~ f'" , ';~\4:: "-.,,,~, 
residentialvQte_ of the City was only 4,600 (one-eleventh of the national average) 
- - ," .,,: ~ / ~ ." .' ".1"'" 
"' 
i 
R.C.DeR. :447, cc.925~ " }. 
.111 •. A:sudI~Si~a.tion'ha.d, of o'ouxse, arisen in 1925, when the Conservatives'. 
'. had used the tactical < limitations of the 1924' Labour Government· as an 
. emuse for resisting a Labour, propos8J.for,electoralreform. See a.bove. 
J.P.W. Mallelieu writing in Tribune called it "a most distressing 
. performance'" and'likened the "intemperate tirade" to the . "Gestapo rampage"" 
of ,the :1945·Election, 20 February 1948. . . \;. 
R.C.:Deb~'441~' ~c':801/3: The S~cond Readirig is to be found in cc.839 et. seq. 
and·993 et.seq.;.16/17 Febru.ary.,1948•. ". 
, 'j, " 
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'a.nd~ons'~quently coUld not be defended and gave a great nunber of 
historicai·e.x8mp1~s to prove how politically unenlightened University 
'~ ,'-~',. p .' , -
electorates had been in the past. (173) Both these themes, particularly 
, 
the ,.la tter were emphasised by over half of the Labour speakers. Mr. Bing 
y • \ ,-!> '1' Dj _ i:~ [.:" , ,_,,, "; , " . ~~'_ " 
curtly reminded Churchill that he had voted for the abolition of the 
_j '.',: 'j : 4- "\ ' ./ ,:'. 
University franchise in the 1906 Parliament but that it had been defeated 
then by the House of Lords. (174) A number of references were made to 
~-- i~" ,\,,"- • ;r, ";.", 't-~- ',: .;- ',:_ ",~~. ; c,. <~'" r <:,', '. .r, • :, .- : •. '/ ~>< - -:. ,;' ,:. ,', ~:~ ~ 
t~ereactionary political views of the Members returned by the Universities, 
>'.:..¥:,.~~--- -l;..i~ t ;- '~.' :.;, ,,,.-~ '''. '" ~_ '-:' ." '-:.:. _,,' .. , .~, ,_. ~,' 'ii --;1 ',~:, '. _,._'" " 
AJ.though most of the Labour Members who did refer to this fact went on to 
'!v.-~".J <. ~ 1 
Inake more fundamental points against University representation. Mr. Wells, 
-';. ~ '- <.- ,." "., - , ~ ," , '_0' _ ''', ; >.~. "'- " ". 
, . ¥, ,,~ -" ,,. " •• '. ~ 
fo~ example, claimed that "there is no a pri~ri case .... for the maintenance 
'7 -. ..,,- • ,,,. :c 
.;-l,.,,- >"< -'1 "', ), ;li ": ~ -, .. , . , __ , 
ot the representation of any particular interest •••• It (175) Mr. Titterington 
--., .. .f .{ 
'f . .... 't_ 
that he was 
"unable to see why there should be a:ny discrimination" 
~<<<;c:S·'::for voting purposes betweelll:the miner and the medical' 
man, or why a member of a university should have 
;1.;::: preferential franohise because of, the faot that' he 
has be~ assooiated with an eduoationa1 or aoademio 
institution." <. (176) 
. -
. ~e umrlerlying philosophy. was the responsibility~and right of individuals in a. 
camnunity to participate in the administrative tormsof. that camnunity. The 
Pr:inciple' wa'a "one ot" cme man, one vote; It In reply to < this only Mr.' Strauss, 
:-t -lInber far" theCanb1ned English Universities, put up any. theoretical defen~e of ' 
; . "" the University franohise .ula he cUd so by quoting, at length, arguments usecl ori.~< 
PreVious occasions by Lo~ Hugh O8Oil ana Eleanor Ra. thbone~;:' He alone reoognised 
'~\~';~~'i-;~ 
;. 
'1'.,:,> <'';',(·: .. -1>C)? "" ~:" ~\ '}. -; t t ,,:~ ':1 '" ~: c~ t 1;; ,-, > .' ~ >',; ", _ _, ' 
173. .!2!!., 839/57, p!ssim. Eae haci earlier pointe« out that although. 
the iill included items notreoammended by the various caarnittees 
0Il:l.y i nine recamnenaa tions proposed by the Speaker's Reports and 
.. ~ the., Report of'; theOanmittee on Electoral Registration ana of, the 
. Report of, the Ccmnittee on lUectoral Law ~eform ha« not been 
aciopteci':in the Bill, Ibid.,. 00.: 542/3 • .. < ,. 
4"~t ~. ,'1,.'", ~'<"A-,-A a,~.".,.",.t, ~.'"." _" ~ _~, .,,' :;"'" 
17~ '.:·;~C." Deb:~ 447~ ,.~: 872; 
. , ,; , - ... ",' ~.- .".' ~ ... ?:", ,'.' ,. /.) ,,!" ~~. >, ~- j ~ 
~115. . cc. 892, M .. P." for Walsall. 
~ ';-1..'" ~ , _._ h " • " 
,'/' /-
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. that the Labour Party 
"object .to the university seats because their 
existence conflicts with the Hon. Members' theor,r 
of Parliamentary representation ••••• that (it was) 
a ground of principle."(177) 
..• Othe~ .. speakers iiere unable to produce one substantial argument in favour of 
. the retention of University representation, a fa.ct which undoubtably led the 
., Conservatives,when finally returned to office, to abandon their declared policy 
of reintroduCing the University franchise. The only Labour Member who spoke 
in favour of the continuance of University representation did so as a . 
"traditionalist. "(178) 
Apart from three Labour references to Proportional Representation, ·two of' 
· which ,were hostile, and P.L.Pe' demands for the introduction of 'legislation to .;' 
, limit the use of vehicles at elections the main question with which the debate 
· Was concerned was redistribution. (179) "Indi vidual constituencies were refe:r:red 
· to by the representatives while a number of Members thought England was under:" . 
:represented and accordingly called for an increase in the number of seats allotted 
, . 
, to the country. (180) John Parker also made a strong plea for ,the 'sim1?liry~ 
and consolidation of the disqualifications for Membership - an issue' not raised 
, '" 
by ,the Labour Party since the 1920's.(181) Mr. Maokay added a plea for compulsory 
,votins. (182) In his winding-up speech Morrison'reitera.ted the Government's 
:rejection of. proportional representa.tion;' '; It was,' ):~-;,;,,; .. ~ .~ . 
..... 
· . . . .". . 
· 177. c IbiS.. , . cc. 1 035 .',,,. sU; John 'A.nderson did "venture to put forward the view~<' 
that as a matter of theory and principle, there cannot be anything undemo-
cratic in classifying voters according to their personal and indiviaual 
quality." Ibid., co.881. 
178. h. Sk~;~~~t~~-Lodge, I~id>" oc.1089/92. In the' tradition of Major Church 
no doubt! . 
-
, 179 0 Macka\~/wh~ had' just -~i tt~n': ;'Cou e~' or Free: Bei .' a Stu iD. E1~ctoral .. ' '. 
!iefom SAd Represg.tive Government· London: Seck er & W"arbe:r:'g,1943 'I a.n~,was 
a Jlembe:x: .of .the .P.R .. ,Society,spoke in. favour, of.P.R. ~., cc.1044/56,· . 
Berry -oc. 918 and Morrison -cc. 1111/2 against. -- BothJ ohn Parker co. 906/7 and' 
Greenwood oc.1081/3. referred _ to. the., ~?tor vehicles qu~,~tion. ..... . 
See, for ~~Ple Tit~~~to~~' Ibid., . cc.882/5, P~ker'905/6, 
Da.1ton co.929743 and Yates 945/7,,·· 
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"not oonducive to the best form of Parliamentary 
government. We have come really to believe that 
after years of argument. There used to be a, 
strong body of opinion in the Labour Party in 
" favour of it, but after years of argument that is 
, I our oonclusion. "(183) 
R~ca~ling the "~fu.a~i~ 'with ~hiCh he ha:a. d~fended the retention of the City of 
"i"~ 
if l .0. , .",'-." :: ~ :-:: .• , _." _0 < ~-\",' ,. .' 
London he fortuitously found a saving sentence he had used on that occasion 
~ ,'," ,.~ , , ' '.' .'. ;, ;. ',', ,. ,. ; ; ; ,.,.,,~ , . 
, ~It ~a.y be in the future the davr will come when the question will have to be 
. k :,-?;,..:,\!,:' ,'. , F"; .",., " "".:': .. _ ~loo~ed ~t" (Oificial R~port 12'Octobe~ 1944, VOl.403 ~c.1993) "Sir, the'davr has 
.; -<, ),~ : •• 111 .:. \ .' c" '. ~~ 
come.
tt (184) Suitably admonished the House gave the Bill a Second Reading by, 
'.,;i-~ ~ "-: ~_'~~"',~, 
318 v'?tes to'6. 
f .' C,", ,~ •• ~ ; " ; ,.;:} 
The arguments about the bargain also pervaded the Committee Stage of the 
:,-l~~·~·.; -,:~:--:.. 7" _> I 
On the first day in the Committee an attempt was made by the Conservatives 
to Save, ~~i~~r~i~Y-represe~t:tion 'on ~he ~ounds that eduoation proJded t~e 
'- w 
Value to enrich the "one m~, on~' ';'ot;1t pri~ci:ple ~hich was ~~t p~r ~.~ ;ufficient 
. ,1 t>~ ~ ~:; i I.!" , '. ~ ,~'".,' t, 1'" "./,; ~ ~.' ~ < 'Z . . ,} 
t? stand alone. Apart from the notion that independent represent~t:J.~n 'b~~~d on i 
~du~ati~::~~~~~io~ti~n;; ;a~' a good thing the only real defen~~'o~ c~~tin~ed 
.; ";, \ L,";;. '; ':, "'c.: '" , :"., ,), ,.";';',;,;, I :' 
university representat~on was that it had been reoommended by the Speakers' 
:onfer~~~e, ~d that¥ it~ a~olit:i;~ -~as a. blow to the professiona~ o~~sses~t The 
;.~ ' .. -;~ ;", ~:l,. -:"~ ':. ~~ .. ~;~ :'t~~~~~; -:, ~.:' t, .,.", ,:~" -~ 'f ' ... :' ~ :~' ~ A; 
tabour Party reite~~ted its opposition to the principle of plural voting in general 
, < 
!f fr:!,. c~.!.~·~,~:"!-,,~'" ~ ;:,~ '-""0_ 1/t:.'-!>t 
, a.nd specia.l. representation in particular. Morrison oogently expressed their 
, .... ~r' ~~. ,:~. '~.] ~ ~~ ,1, ""~.:. ~~, ,. >. '~-~ e "~~ . ·_1 .} ,~, ,~. : 
View when he' said; ,"the objection we" have is that this means a plural vote and a 
- " q i', ">"", .,~ ;~ ':~ :,_" ~ •• ' _.":._ :~. ",:-.,2 ," _~' ;~"." :~; 
type of Parliamentary representation whioh is not 
"'c' :,.«; 
ra.ti~na.l.lY (or) ••••• 
t ~.:. ~:, i: ~> '1:~. ~~ ,~_" ~- .~~ :~".'~ :"''::f .::~ ': "', .~' :-'.:: 
Oonstitutionally" justified. ,,( 185) J';.;The fact ,that there was an ever inoreasing '" 
183. Ibii., oo.1111:Mo~ison, of oourse, had been a ~trong opponent of P.R~ 
. during the 1920' s when the principle had some noted a.dmirers in the Labour 
Pa:rly. The New. Statesman 'review:iDg Mackay' sbook: had,;thought; the 'A. V •. , worth' 
?onsideririg. ·5·February1944. . ' 
<; 1,.), ~~.J. 
184. H.C.Deb~ 447,00.1113. There is little doubt that Morrisonwas poking fun at 
those ,who had read too lllUoh into his speeches of 1944. 
" 
H.C.Deb. 
· proportion of graduates to the rest of the population was irrelevant, it was 
a matter of extending the democratic principle of equality against an elitist 
and class institution. Apart from Mr. Skeffington-Lodge who declared his 
intention·to vo~e against the Government (which he did) all the Labour Members 
· Who participated in the debate asserted the principle of "one man, . onl; vote It. 
Winding up for the Government Chuter Ede said that he reg~ded the Bill' as 
ineVitable and one which the Labour Government had amoral obligation to 
introduce.~ The Government felt free to deal with the contents of the Bill in 
a.ccordance'with its inte:rpretation of existing circumstances. (186) , 
The same pa.ttern of charge 'arid defe'nce continued to characterise the rest 
~. , <~, "_._ j; c ' 
of the Committeets"delib'erations.: To prevent serious discussion of the 
prinCiples of priVilege underlying plural voting Conservative Members tried a 
~"!,_~..(;', "';'~:: -;,,,,,~.) <,-/,.: ,. __ •••• ~ , ' ,,<, ,r,. 
· Variety" of tactics from the reductio ab adsurdum to the quoting of Morrison t s 
, ;.' :;:'" L"., .,L ... ", ' ',,'''' • < _.J ".. -, ", , ',;,_0 T ".-' ." - .,~ ~, 
.. • ,. .. ~ • ~ • • " • - < : • • ,~ ,,' '" 
· sentiments for the City of London which he expressed in the debates of 1944.(181) 
, . '.,. . :,'., .~, _., ,L ,i ~!., ;~, ;:-,>_,.; ... 1<;" '~. .' '. <~, ~_" ,- ',0" ,_ 1 ,'". ,< ,~ 
It.~as frequently asserted.that logic was not in the British.tradition and 
, "" " ,i '.' \', • (. t l·o, >. "":'" .,'L <'.. 'H' > •• ~ :1<.." ",'" - ~-' \. .," " ., 
Bhouldnot be applied to the oonstitution, although it did not appear to be 
- ~",_ .-": ~ '" ;~. -~> -:', '.~ 't_ .. ,: ~ ... ,1' ~', • - ~ ,', ,,'; "'-
· understood that the logical applioation of the"one man, one vote" prinoiple ' 
'''''. ' •. ,') -;\.' ~.-J ,. '"I -> ,"." .i., 0'" .-:" ," , ',. \," .• ~)' , .. >'~ <.' ..." 
need not neoessarily be enforced to the point ~f a.bsurdi ty. Fo~ the Labour 
~"'-'. t " ..- , .. ".t..~,. i$'*"-~'!'" .. "-', -~\ -'. .' .""',,, '~"'-. • 
Pa:tytt was not, only, a matter., ofprinoiple but of· empirioal practioability. , 
f ~ '~<;'-".:.4,·~,<.,.~.i'\-.• v .. , ~, •• ~,,_. '.' ." '0) '.",., /" ....... ~.:r,·""'C·"'", '_~~4.,,_· --< < 
"J."We deny," said Chuter Ede" "that .'the number ,of, ": ,~, 
, ," 4, 600 people •• ': .'.justified the oreation of a: separate 
',oonstituenoy for ,this one borough (the City of London) • 
. We feel', that it is a.ppropriate that the eleotors here '. 
j, should be joined with some eleotorates whioh will" '.' " " 
, justify the return of a. single Member of Parliament."(188) " " .,,is_ 
. :i:bi<!:z;:~~~.' '2003/1 O~ 
',
187.' s~~~~;iror e~i;, Ca~t'~h CrookShankts' o'~~t~ib~tion.lb"id., '2105/21\6: 
;, ',~ ... 
1ea~;"Ibid." co." 2145/6:-":8ee also 00;' 2148.··~·'"~''' .. "~~''''''''''''''''''''''''''''' "'~"""'-i"~'_A""~_~'"d'';''_~''~~' ' 
... 
;.-, ',. '" 
, :' k ~- ... > ,1 ,.-~, '", <to 
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The debate also raised the question of the relation between the 
_~xeoutive and the, House on the overall point concerning the function of 
, ,~ Speakert s Conference. , As Mr. Naylor pointed out, to accept the view 
,that agreement between the parties at a Speaker's Conference should be 
," ~" .;. , "7-' ' 
'..;{~~~,:n~"on the Hous~, of Canmons was to undennioe the role of the House 
aa, the place where the final decision had to be taken. (189) As a matter 
, "*~~'of J' -! 
:,of practice inter-party agreement might make otherwise controversial 
f1f.-<'*"",<,~;~,~' ~.' '''/' ,; ",,"' ",,- l ~. _~> 
legislation more acceptable to the major political groups in the House 
( 1 ' "., .... ;.;",:i ':' \ ' <.; ~t ~ _'_. ~' , ' 
which is what Herbert Morrison was getting at when he said in 1945 
" 'I'" ,~_: ,':'",_" ~ - _ 
,"It ,;hen •••• compromises (are) made, everybody 
':":is 'going to act as if there had been no Conference, 
it seems to me that the utility of the Speakez's 
Conferenoe will not be so great~~, (190) , 
He h8.dmade the point~inorder;to illustrate the flexibility of the 
, British parl1.8mentary 'system, which had by' tradi tion found it politi~ally ," 
expedient:to prevent'politicalolashes over constitutional questions. Yet 
Gisagreement 'was • :inevitable on ocoasions, and on such oocasions ' the, House 
. had 'to be 'the f1na.l'arbiter.',:·:. Thus under no circumstances did the Government 
- , 
... er 0 laim "that: the "decisiOn. belonged to the Executive' alone, ' al though no 
attempt was made ,to leave the matter' t~ a :t'reevote ... In the Gladstonian~> 
~tl"adition 'the Government gave the lead' which the Hous~, in practical'tems 
"the Party, oould accept: or reject by their attitude on the Floor,o:t'th.e 
liouseor in conversation-with the Whips. ' Neither freedan nor ~oercion 
<. '; 
, entered ;1nto the 'question; it was the traditional working of the proceaaes;.i'~,\ 
iisoussion may ,have ,been held,wu lost when it was learned that the Govemn~t,;"."" 
, ' , 
'."\~ .i:--; .... ;~'_~~."" .. " ' . .4.4f~ ~" ... ;. ~ ... _;",.:.~~~ 
16°. ~ ~.,l2!t., oc. 2194/5. 
19O. , .' R.O. Deb. 407'- cc. 310. 17 January 1945. 
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, , hada.sked the Bounda.ry Commission to sa;y how those eight seats with more 
• than 80,000 electors should be divided in two and how the boundaries inDine 
of the largest English boroughs should be redrawn in order to give each of 
them one more member.' Consequently, on 24 March 1948 Mr. Ede moved an' 
amendment to increase the number of seats to 625." The seventeen new seats 
Went. to England which, as we have seen, was regarded by a number of Labour 
backbenchers as being under-represented while certain constituencies mentioned 
, in the .Amendment (Liverpool and Bradford, for example), had had pleas submitted 
on, their beha.l.f' during the Second Reading.. Although Ede made no reference to 
" '- ,'. 
ba.ckbench opinion it was clear that representations had been made, considered 
&.nd'a.ccepted. 
"The Government's procedural approach to the matter was severely mauled by 
Churchill in his mo;t vitriolio manner. Ignoring the merits of the scheme the 
leader of the Opposition attacked th~, Government's conduct as "one of the 
shabbiest p~i.iti~~~- ~~~~u~es whi~h we' ha~e on' ~e~~rd. "( 191) The procedure 
;" i. ".:;~ :,(.;:,;.::' '" 'I. ~ ,,' ,'; ~,~ ~, <:' ~" , (.,' ~~ _~ .~ .. , 
, Was indicative of the arbitrary regulation of. voting and the shaping of 
, ~ :' A: ~ ".-~ ,\~;,.. , • 
oonstituencies, in order to secure the pexmanent demands of the partY in power. 
,'- ... '-;,-)! it ,,:~, ' .. ~, ,:. " t~; 
-The a.b~sive tone ~d content. of Churchill's speech buttressed by the claim that 
the Bound~,'~o~ssion had" oeaS~d;:'to- fun~'t~:i.o~ ·a.fte~ the, Re;orts of the previous 
'~ctober, wa:'s Cle~l;'- d~~i~ri~d' fO~" p~;;'P~{itic~t'~~oses and to divert 
a.ttention awa;y from the merits of changes.(192) ~-:,., i; 0;', 
.. { JiePlying\o 'the charges Morrison pointed out that the :Boundary Commission; 
, -
"were a per.m.a.nent -bOd; empowered to continuously review, the redistribution of' 
. ,:". . . 
, , !he Gove~~nt b.ad': take; the' best advice from the Boundary COmmiSSioners 
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on'the question of revision. They were within their statutory rights and 
not guided by.the partisan motivations of the Conservatives. Morrison recalled 
that he had asserted, at the time of the House of Commons (Redistribution of 
Seats) ,Bill in .• 1944, the right of the Government to ask Parliament to mOdify 
the Commissioners' proposals and the rights of Members to propose amendments 
to the Bill impl~enting the Commissioners' Report.(193) The debate was 
- . 
Punctuated by acrimonious interruptions from opponents of the Bill and general 
" approval from Members in affected constituencies 'though the bi-partisan approach 
Was vitiated by party considerations. Not satisfied with the Government's 
-
,GXplanationthe Conservatives continued their objections to the White Pa.per 
" . 
still further. In a subsequent White Paper issued by the Bounda.r,y Commissioners, 
the Commissioners themselves settled the issue with a firm rebuke to the 
, COnserva.tives: . .,," 
" 
, "One.of the representations addressed to us came 
from a political organisation in Manchester which 
opposed the White Paper proposals for the division 
of that borough on the ground that they were not 
free 'from political bias. While the decision to 
give e,rlra representation to the borough was taken 
by the Government, ahe scheme set out in the White 
Paper was one which was prepared by the' members of 
the Commission and. this fact wa.s announced in the 
House. We regard the suggestion that the scheme 
was dictated by political bias as offensive to the 
members of the Commission and we take strong 
, exception -to it. ,,( 194) ", 
The actions' of the "Labour Government were those actions which any, 
Government woui~', have' adopted;<, Ha.ving agreed to a policy sta.tement they were 
~"': , 
prepared to'aJ.low'representa.tions from interested parties in the constituencies 
. which i~Lthi~' ~ase :h~pp~~ea. 'to be in 'the majority of c'ases t . :r:epres,ented ~bY 
,- ;'- ~ •• ., " <'v " .. " .. 
- .t 
-- ". - " 
H,C.,Deb •. 44~} ~:;.~~47/56. 
194. ' 
, Labour Members who, it should be noted, frequently spoke with local inter-
, PliU'ty/ support. (195) It was the classic Executive/Legislative relationship 
at its democratic best. 
, At "the COIll121ittee stage a number of amendments were moved implicitly 
Oritioising the procedure followed by the Boundary Commissioners in arriving 
at,their oonclusions. Mr. MCLeal.fmoved that the Commissioners be obliged, 
c, to hold a local. public enquiry if requested to do so by the local authority 
in the areas affected. i, The amendment was well supported by a number of 
Members from e.l.l sides of, the House but was resisted by the Government on the 
groundscthat the speeches in the Committee would give some guidance to the 
COmmissioners. The rest of the Committee stage followed the familiar pattern, ' 
01':1.l.l'lllecessa.:ry opposition on technical matters designed to obscure the' 
, principles involved. a.nd,"fromthe division lists, motivated mainly by party 
On~~;W~i~h.·was possibly n~t i~ this category :was a Conservative 
a.ttempt suppo;t~~\~'y :\~e' i~be;als to. reduce the percentage conditional for 
,', 1'0rfeiture of the deposit to one-tenth of the poll where more than . three ,'f' 
Oandida.t~s were standing. . 'The proposal,' which had. been recommended by; the le 
Speakerst Conference,' was resisted by the Government on the grounds that it 
Would encourage' splinter, parties. (196) ", ' 
'; A number, of new olausesto the Bill were moved" A. Labour Member, 
lfre McLeavy, for example; proposed that' th~ use ~f cars to take electors to the 
palls should b~ '~rohibited. (197). "Under the clause there would be a pool, of 
.... 
~~5, See H,C.Deb,44a,oc.3077/a. Mrs. Castle, and cc • .nn;3 Mr. MCLeavi for 
.; Labour" 'and .oc~3078/9, 'Vice-Admiral Ta.ylor for the Conservatives. 
19~. 'H.C.Deb~T;i449,~o;'1650/6; :~" ;, , 
197 ;.'"'' nid:,' '~C;"'1923/ 44. 
Oars under the general direction of the returning officer who would allocate 
the vehicles as necessar,y. MCLeavy received solid support from Labour 
'baokbenchers on the issue, which was sympathetically received by Chuter Ede. 
The' clause :as drafted, however, he regarded as incomplete and he promised 
to"~ee if anything could be done along the lines suggested by the time the 
lieport Stage was reached. ,:,' :' 
When the First Schedule, speCifying the new constituency boundaries came 
before the House at 'the end of ' April 1948,(198) the Conservatives announced 
tha.tthey' b.Qd asked the Boundary Commissioners to "consider certain other j~ 
oOnstituencies where the quota was too high, a fact which the Government 
, received with apparent" phelgm.- ; John Parker, however, attacked the Conservatives' 
aotions; ," 
i "there was a' case for the Government, of ithe dSiY asking' 
the Boundary Commission tO,look at certain proposals 
',and make reports back," but it becomes a different thing 
when groups in the House ask for the views of the 
/" Boundary Commissioners upon certain schemes. "(199),' , " 
!ne atatement was illustrative of the general view of the Executive/Legislative 
" 
, re1a.tionship~:heldthroughout the La.bour Party; the Government governed, the 
" RouseC;titicised~:: ';:Yet the ult1mateauthority to accept or reject thei 
Ooauni~sioners' R~port; lay with; the House, and consequently unless the House 
\--.' " 
a.eoidea otherrlse it'was 1egitima.te tor Me~bers or groups of Members to make 
~, 
representations to the Commissioners who were 8.fter all an' autonomous and" 
"independent'body'. :"In thia respect the~Laboui: Party's acceptance of a strong 
elt-utive lead 'in Government was traditionar in, a situation where new "interp-
~eta.tion8otits ~elationship"With'pa:rliamenf w~re re8J.lyn:ecessa.rY. ' 
Wh~~ thes~ ~~;r;senta.t~o~~~'to th~ C'owdss~:ners' were he:.rd, the ~ouse would 
~ ':-- < - , 
t'" ,. 
,'; 'i, :t 
. 
198. B.C.Deb.~ 450, cc.38. et.seq. 217 et.seq. 26 and 27 April 1948. 
S99: ibi.ci:';: 00:46. ,:., :;~ .. 
make the final-decision. During the debate on the First Schedule, a number 
Of' a.m.endmen~s were made in pursuit of local representative interests, 'often 
on an inter-party basis.(200) The debate,'in fact, illustrated the operation 
ofthetraditiO~al method of raising on the floor of the House matters which 
had 'been the subject of representation elsewhere. ~ Where such matters had 
been SuQCessfully advocated in private they received offical legit~isation 
iUParlia.m.ent itself; where not, they were resisted by the Executive which,' 
of course,: dominated the legislature.' The Government was, at this stage at 
leaat,still prepared to c~nsider grievances aired on the floor of the House 
if it was fe~t necessary and make adj~stmentsatthe Report Stage. -
. When' the Report Stage' was taken on 14 and '15 June the Government introduced 
" i. new 'clausedealingi with the use of motor> vehicles for .conveying electors to 
, the pOll'. (201) ,t The' claUse&.1.lowed the c~didat'es to register one car with 
,the Retuming Officer for every 1,500 electors 'in the counties and 2,500 in 
, the boroU,ghs.'::For the"pur,Pose's of election' exPen~'es each car would" incUr £2 
, election 'upezl'ses/-' Introducing the ·cla.Us~e the Home Secretary 'sa1d tha£ the 
latterp~'rlSio~wa:s~'desi8n'"ed to deteltcandidates ,. from using' cars unnecessarilY, 
;~ ~ 
" while th:eratio r;i c~s'to" 'electors was'lowertliaIl that 'prOVided for 'in the 1931 . 
]3ill,'(202) bdt" d~nditions'~ altered sign1ficantlysince then,i'particUlarly in 
the p~oviBion ot:p'~iiing fa.c11itie's'.' "The 'generai' effect of th~ Ciaus~,,, he 
, deciai-ed, "will :b~~trictly 'to' limi t'th~:'orianised use of cars on behalf of a 
Candida.te;'>";';ith;~t '~ttempting 'to"prohibit th~ir use by'p;ivate ':lnd1viciualsfor '~, 
t~illi tll~s~ive~' ~~ 'th~ir 'ram'iiies' to the' ·pOll'~ "(203) The"obje;t ~~i'the 
200. 
,. ". "'".: "' ~ - .... , "-,, -:. '- ,>.~, ".~'-"<- ,'" '" -,' • t" <;~ f-" '. 
See, for 'example, the debate and vote on. the ,Commissioners' proposals for 
, Plymouth. "Ibid., :,cc. 68/86:,,' 
, ",~ ~ -loi\, .,.' '~" '; ""~ .. ' 
R.C.Deb': 452~·cc.49, 14 June. 1948. '. 
19!d.~; ·cc.52. Ede mistakenly ~efe~red to the Representation of the People" 
A.ot.1931~· - 'f ",<~i" 
203. , Mte.oit.,.Cf. fArthu;r; Woodburn, "The Bill only seeks to re~ove the undesirable 
use of -cars and not any legitimate or desirable use of cars." Ibid.} cc.103. 
) 
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.", Clause was to introduce fairness between parties, or in the words 
of John Parker, "to see that the advantages of wealth are ranoved •• !."(204J 
~s theme of political equality was common to most of the speeches made 
~ by. the P.L.P. , _who frequently asserted that cars gave unfair advantages 
,t()the ~Tory Party. One or two Labour Members pointed to the real 
c~i1'ficulti~s of ,enforcement involved in the Clause ,while one Member thought 
t~e,,~un of £2 an insufficient deterrent to the illegal use of cars and that 
,it diminished the' amount available for 1egi tj,ma te expenses incurred in the 
:;~i~~~g of' an election. (205) During the debate the Conservatives argued 
c • ~ ,,, ~' " • ,., > 
, ,1 . 
. ,t~t \,theplaus~ ~~inged the agreement reached between the parties at the 
}lpea.1cer~s Conference and later, ~ the Second Reading of the Bill, ,which 
< i :~' i' .~ _.J ,. , ~,. ~: . , 
.were being discussed between the Agents, to which Arthur.Woodburn replied 
• ~,,, ,'~ • '" '"' , "~ " .,.. • >" , • " 
,bl,8.rguing that cars represented a loophole in the otherwise unalumous 
~ ~ -<' ,,,'. • > " < 
{agreement reaohed, on expenses. (206) The meagre. amount. invo1v.ed was, in 
" }, : - '" ': "'>" ,,'. ., :~. '-::', ..... . -:.; , . ",' ',..~. ,1' ','" ." , --" . ," ~ ;';, ",! ' , ' 
;t~ot,eventuaJ.1.y abandoned by the Governnent,. (207) and the Clause, despite .' 
': ' ~ ..." '" J '.' j'." , .. ' ~,.,." " ' .' " " . . -, , ,! ,,",,," <. , ',"~. 
'. Conservative taunts that it was a reaotionary measure, ,.was passed by 269 
,:, ',' "', ,;; ;i: .,i,' ;,~. 
'
Yotes'tOI14. In the event the Conservatives were right and .the Labour' 
f, " ", '." / > •• l :,,, ~ ~,.~: .,:~.. <~, '-, ';" .r -1'\. _'" 'if .,' ',., ~-. 
,~a:ty wrong in attaching so much' :importance to ,the ~se,of' vehi?lesat 
, i; , S". p: ..,. ,_, (;. _.'. .," . . !.~ " . ..:.' ' ~ ... • , 
eleotions. In the past such a Clause might have been useful but. themmense 
<::~ " .. '~"- .<., ,.::'~;: :" .:. _, <1 -;. '.','.:;" <- :', "'I"'" .... ~ """. '" ~;t~·4_",,_.~ 
. s~iiu changes that were taking p1aoe fully justified ,the repeal of this' 
;_; _ ~ ~:. '1 
,l'estrictive legislation in the late I fUties. . ", 
t,' .,', ': ;,:( ~ [ " ",; ".;, .l'~ " " '. 'I, .:",;' /' -~.; .... ~ < < "I., f ~_f 
Notwithstanding the .various procedura1',c?ange~ made i.Il1946/7 to inor~ase 
~.'< ..:1, -'" '-L j"'" ':)J.' :-"':'~:" -+.~" 1-:" .. ' ... -,1.':"" •. ': 'i"'" ' .. _ ,~".' ~'-' ~ tJ:"""f " 
of' the House of Carmons the 'obstructive nature ot Parliament ,still 
.~~ I 
"1', ~,- .,', "-
.!bid., 00. 57. Ct. Mr. Co1~(Taunton) "this olause' puts right an 
'-",7" '.injustice under whioh"the Labour Party has suftered for a long 'time. I. 
e cc. 62). .: . ~'. ',.... '.' .•...... ' . , ..... . . 
llr.Bramall (Bexley) ~., oc. 67 •.. 
206. 'n. ~., 00. 
made ,it possible to hold up Government business as the Report Stage of the 
Bill proved. Amendments, of which all save.one, were resisted by the 
Government, were moved by the Opposition in the alleged hope that they would be 
listened to }thaugh mainly to make debating points. It could be argued that 
the debates did serve.to analyse in detail the practical aspects of the 
..... Clauses under discussion, particularly that concerning motor cars. However, 
. the diSCUSSion which followed on University representation and the City of 
'. London ~ere in fact only useless repetitions which wasted Parliamentary time. 
In all, some two-and-a-half hours were wasted on these.two issues. (208) . By 
, \ ' ",' , \. - 'c 
Contrast the transfer of ,the City of London. from Shoreditch and Finsbury,to 
Westminster, ,and the ,increase of expenses by !d. per elector to al~ow for 
intlation since the n~ scale had been proposed. in 1944 :vere the product ~f 
.•. 
d.iscussions between .,the • Government and represented interests,. and. in the latter 
-, <>", -, - -; '0'" . 'I'- ' 
C&Se, . three-party agreement, and were' presented to the House as fait accompli 
and in an informative sense •. ! They met no, oPPosition from ,the Labour benches. 
'4 ConservatIve: pr~p~~a.i ~:~~ '. cre'~te .~. fUrthe'r 'fi~~ consti t1l:encies was greeted by 
the Home S~c'ret~ with scepti~ism, ai~'hoU;gh he promised to 'listen to the.·' 
" 
d.ebate before ~ing up his 'mi~d on the merits ~f·t~~'6a.se ;hich!'lf ge~~in;, 
repr~s~~teci~'a m~r~ r~~6~a~i~ us~ ~f th~ Comm;~s- for 'purposes gf det:died 
~iscus~ion:~/\~;'appiicai:ii~;~f cert~itl'~~neral pr~rioiples::~ >it" ";'",;: 
, ,," ,;" . \".''';i ...•.. ~ r. J 1':" ;'!;.~ :;" .';",~. '."'. ;1.' :,,". ". "-,;,<. .~ ".i', "': ,-. J, .i. ~~ ~' .• "," , '~;;. '~r,', ~. ~' .. t",' 
In some w~s this ·',;a.s 'wruit th~ refomers of the • thirties had envisaged 
and, indeed, the Rep~~:r'St~e \ended\o ch~~terise the: Ho~~e "~f C~mmorlS ~~ the 
register'O£ apedhl Executive which was ,not deaf to th~ pleadings of those who 
Were adversl; affeoted by th! general principles approved of by the legislature. 
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The floor of the House remained the place where grievances were aired, 
questions raised and where the Government was obliged to answer or be 
condemned for its silence or evasion. 
Was never in doubt • 
The ultimate sovereignty of the House 
. The Third Reading proved to be as acrimonious as the previous stages, 
.' ". 
although it did provide the Home Secretary with the opportunity to discuss 
'~. "... . -
some of the practical consequences of the Eill, su~h as the new form of the 
, : ' 
i} '" 
ballot paper and of ~he official poll card. He reiterated the Government's 
basic pOliC; w~th regard to the controversial questions of University ~~a~~~ . 
representation of the City of London, the disparity between the size of borough 
~ . , ,- . .:' ~ ~, ~ 
and county seat~ in England and the use of motor cars at elections. He 
,~ ::.. 
reminded the House that he had listened to representations and had dealt with 
~"'. ., ", ~" . . 
, them on the basis ~f . merit alone. This claim was denied by the Conservatives 
~ . 
Who moved a resolutiondeolining a Third Reading, 
.~. ". 'i ,'" ~ ~.v ~ 'f~ '.~ .-< " 
"to a Elll' which repudiates agreed' recommendations " 
of Mr.:Speaker's Conference, 1944, and disregards 
for the purpose of Party advantage the findings of 
the Eoundary Commission ••••• "(209) 
, During the debate which followed one or two Labour Members prot<ested' at,>, 
their ,oonstituencies' treatment under the Commission's proposals but the Government's 
~ority was hardly'dented.(210) The Eill sped t~ough'the Lords where it was 
t:t'ea.ted by the Conservative'Peers as "of more direct oonoern to the House of 
eO~ons than to the House'of Lords" and reoeived the Royal Assent at the end of 
. J'llly 1948. ',,';;; ",'" 4' d.:: " , 
, Da.vid· :Butler ,. takes' the. view, 
, ~ 
: _ ~ :.. ~ '1 t, 
.... re_M U· = 
209. Ibid., co.' 1367; et.seq. (1377) 23 June 1948~ 
_. -,;' ,: ,~, ,- ;', .\:, 1"'_ 
210. 
.;: .~'CO 1;.~;_ .... ,J". 'I- ' 
Neil MoLean" (Glasg~~, ck,ven) and'Mr. Medland (Plymouth, Drake)' for ,,' • 
exampl.~'Ibid.,;cc~ 1402/4 and 1427/9. " ' ' :·>.c 
.) :~...-...- ". -> ... ,. .. 1 ' 
.- ...... 1; ",. ".A-" ..... _, I '~~"'f'-"- >, . r,. ,". : ," 
, .~ 'Co 
_ -i 
.. "that the whole passage of the Bill might have been, 
:almost equally transqui1 had it not been for the 
question of 'good faith'. The great majority of 
: the changes effected by the Act were the product of 
inter-party agreement and, therefore, unlikely to 
~. : 
, "provoke much comment." (211) , ' , 
y - ' 
et as has been argued, the charges of bad faith were largely the tactics of 
, obstruction; of unreasonableopposi tion to reasonable measure~ a conclusion 
surely'borne out by the total lack of opposition to the re-enactment of the 
lot of 1948 in three consolidating measures in 1949.(212) Whilst it could 
b " ., ' , , 
e Claimed that the conventions of the constitution prevented the re-opening 
, . 
of the :question after so short' a space of time the obvious conclusion; seems to 
be that the • opposition 'to the meaSures of 1948 was ~insincere po1iticing for, 
as the EConomist ;'noted when the Bill'first clWle out, 
e; "ThoUgh' the abolition of the"business vote'was not " 
,recommended by the Speakers' Conference, it ,was 
'perhaps too much" to expect that a Labour Government 
,would preserve, something which looks, so much like 
; acapi talist vested interest and i twould be ' 
difficul t in these d~s to defend it on any sound 
political principle."(213) 
"G" " ". ' ' 
loVen the general commitment of the Party over the previous twenty years to i, 
, the establishment of "one man, one vote", the journa.l's reference to"th~ caprices 
ot political opportunism" indicated a g~ner~ unwillingness to accept the 
, ,- , 
principle,or more likely the Labour Party' sright to implement it. The Labour 
P' '~-,'.. .. 
',' arty was, of course, fortunate to be in 'a position whereby democratic change 
WOUldappar~~tlY bring political benefits, but this was not entirely a matter 
. . .' '-. 
, ,,01' good fortune; the Party's principles ~ important. 
$ 
211. :Butler, op.cit., p.137." ," ' 
212. The House 'of 'Commons (Redistribution of Beats) 1949 .Act, 12 + 13 and 14 
Gee.6. Ch.66. ,The Representation, of the People .Act 1949" 12 + 13 and ,,14 
'''Geo.6.0h.6S and'the Election Commissioners .Act194912;13and 14 Geo.6. 
Oh~·90. The effects of the .Act on the 1950 General Election see H.G.". "', 
lichol8,s' The l3ritish'Geseral .EJ.ection of 1950 (~ondon:. ~millan,1951),Ch.1. 
. .. " .. . /. "', "''' 
Iognop1.t '7 'Febmary1948,' Fe-w'doubteci'the 'p:r!neiple behind the reform; 
See ,for example Sua4,g Times 1 February. 1948 and Daily Telegraph 31 January 
",1948.;~ , 
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- ' , 
Yet the opposition of principles without taking practicalities 
into consideration would have been futile. Hence the Party's appearance 
'" -'" 
ot duplicity in 'its attitude towards refonn.The Party's aim never 
" ~ .' ~ r '. '."~ 
al. tered d~~ the i, t'o~ties ,ai th~ugh its tactics varied.' One man; one, 
'H" ' • ";. 
vote, wasj,theult~te ideal, th~ details were negotiable. 
:; ~~.'>:" ~ ~.:Ie .:~ ~ ~ • '''. ,",~'.~., ; <~ ,. -, >: '., .,.,. 
which ,cauSed 'the Government ,to use the 'opportunity for Governnent' 
ret~e~~hnent ~ In 1at~ '1949' to' ~b01ish, the '>~~t~ r~~isters for which they i' , 
had f'~~~t s~ 'long:;, {214} Si'gnifiC~~ly ,.too the Gove~~~tt ~:':esiste.n~e . 
- • . ~<" ~ t;~ ,;: ",>,: 
'" >', , .. "", f·, t·· ... ~,. : .. _k;"'·~ <.\V ,-<f,-:{ '.'>"J;.; .~, , . to'pr~~s~~~b~'L&b'~ux'- backbenchers ,t;'~int;oduce a clause to'faoi1ita.te;' 
~"": .",. -.~ 
th~:~~i?-~tion of.'~ s~pp1~en~';;egister at the cost of ~~e.6.5,OOOj, 
,,<' '!N !'.,. ~ ?~. .' ~_;~ ". '~t.~' '\.-;" .~ ",:t:.:;;r f:'.' '_. -, _.1'''- " _.7 -,-'. " .-
out of, the .' es t:ima ted annual saving of '£800,000. secured by the abo1i tionof 
the ,second. regis~er, was in the tradition of the Labo~ Government's 
deter~mce:fJ'ri~~:;;;~tal ad~ice on te;hi{ica1, matters and 
. - . . ' . 
;:' ;: " . ~'~"'''' -~"'.~.<.:" ~:~ f"'t '1-. +- "> .':', ',.,:., .~~: .;' ·c _, "I' 
.. tt~ti()n' 't~'detill~ 'in '"8.1ieaedlY p'eriphera1 matters. 
~ '~~ 
. ,"," t 1" 
,;-'>-'<~:":; f 7!- ~):,,:,~,,,;,~~"(5':">~l:. ~ .. ',;.~ ,.-,,;~.; ~1, .. ,J" < '-;" ,"- .~ "'" ?,' ,:~'<" 
H.O. Ditb. 1+70, cc.' 223/41.' (Seoond' Reading) and· 00. '1044/58 
(Oama1ttee Stage) ,22 and 29 November 194-9. The demand for 
&ut'WDl'l registers seems to have remained largely unspoken. 
Only once did the matter reach the N,I.C, Minutes Vol. 74, 
1.0.,14, (1936/37),28 JulY 1937. 
'. CHAPTER SEVEN NOTES 
1. The bo6k went't~~Ugh" twenty-se~en . editions in one month 'and £ts banning 
by all leading booksellers caused Hamilton-Fyfe to comment that "the incident 
shows how p,9werful might be the forces behihdaFascist Coup a.fterthe French 
.... model " :Britain's War-Time Revolution (London: Victor Golla.ncz, 1944~ p.79. 
Not only.the.Left wasconcerned:however •. On 26 June 1940 S. :Bradley "raised 
' .. , the question of the inclusion in the War Cabinet of certain memberlil who had. 
formed part .of ,the late Government." .... This was followed by "considerable 
• discussion~., and a decision to consult Attleeand Greenwood about the question. 
· .!t.E.C. Minutes VOl.82. E.C.5. 1940/41111.79 •. J .T. Murphy had stated. the Left-
Wing, attitude, at the 1935 Conference, when he said,}'There are times"when . N 
negative action is positive •.... There are tiriles when it is well to remember'" 
1ia.t.~ ibe 1X>sithre action of fighting your enemy' at .. home is great er in value. than . 
fighting the negative disaster of defending youxenemy abroaa.· '~; enemy is 
here.",,..L.P.A.C.R. 1935 p.197. Cf. his speech at.the 1939.Conferenc·ein the 
d(ebate on.L&bour's.attitude,to the Popular Front. L.P.A.C.R.1939~ pp.291/299 
Debate)p.293/4(Murphy); The same theme runs through.theLeft-Wing contri-
butions to the. debates in the following year on Labour's entry .intothe War 
· Cabinet and~.onthe Electoral Truce. (See L.P.A.C.R.1940~ pp;; 1 ~3/34, 141/3.) 
. 2 •. The Ca.b:i.net~~~j~ct~d ~; ~ari;ty of ;~~nd{e~ts : t~" ~~~~ the law; ;~ch.;a.s 
lj 
. !l 
appointing Ma.cDonald as a special' envoy. ..•. Instead it was successfully argued 
that "It is much franker and better to come to the House' of Commons with a ·1 
",. straightforward :Bill. to regularise the past doubtful cases and to provide I 
machinery whereb¥ the House, would in fut:u-e. be acq:.Uai., nted ..... ~,th .. ~h~ .. ~rUe .facts. 1t I 
CAJ3 65/17: 16(41)8. 12 February,1941. ~"'"< .... ,;.> ';,,:"."~.< ",."" . ; .• 1 •• ,,' .' 
3. k:e~:i.~! Be~~t: f~~ . e:x:a.lIl~le, e.1tho~h he' considered the Gover~ent' &J attitude 
to the :Bill,. to be wrong, told Sidney Sil vezman that if the Prime Minister 
regarded the ,issue, as a matter of confidence he felt bound .to accept his 
epinion.: Ibid., cc. 716.' The New Stateillla.n asserted that i.Cthe matter had 
been left to·a free, vote. the :Bill .would ,have been, defeated on, the Second . 
· ~ea.ding. 1 March 1941.. ""'" . . 
,·f ~'.' 
.. /~:">'~ ~ ~, ~ l't }., t"'''.;:-'?:J,.~ 
4. '!'he Seleot Committee on National Expenditure aoted, throughout the ,war; as an . 
irritant on. the .. Executive through its investiga.tions of current administration. 
It carried "the weight of an all-party Committee with full access .. to i the facts" . 
!tew Sta.tesman 31 M&\y 1941, and as such was generally accepted as .more effective 
than ,the .Select Committee on Estimates ;' or the Public'Accounts Committee. 
R.W.S. Pollard How to Refozm Parliament (London: Forum Press, 1944) ,p.15 •. 
Its aotivities oa.u.sed.oonsternation.evenat Cabinet'level. See Herbert' 
l4orrison's evidence, to the Select Committee on Procedure. H.C.Dab ... 189/1 p.107.\ 
· ,'1. 3229; and :Morris on 1 s subsequent comment s. 
. ~ '>",,""~ '< ~>~. j,. -_': :" ,: : ~ 'r~ ,,<.;,~:' ,,-~,~j~~-,:::+ .' - " 
Arthur G~~enwod' (The Mi~ister' without Portfolio) "tOld the' House, "The' 
Government. desired this debate :today in order that there should be. an 
. OPportunity of (their) learning the views of Members 'of the House •. We have : .•... 
given some thought to the problems arising out of the recommenda.tions, and we 
have arrived at oertain provisional conclusions, and it seemed right, before 
we put the :Bill before the House that we shouldta.k:ethe. opportunity, of 
collecting ;the voices in the Chamber today • "cc.1323 •. 1. : . 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
lQ."'~ 
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Thero was 'no opposition to the re-enactment of the measure in 1943 
but great resistance to it was expressed in the 1944 Debate. "See ' 
~.C. Deb~ ,396, cc. 1971/2002; 2086/2112, 10 and 11 February l~ 
.ainly in protest at the Goverzment's sauewhat perfunctory" 
presentation of the Bill. See also L.P~A.C.R. 1 ,p. 68.' The 
Oabinet had decided' on 13 February 1941 when, the measure was 
first discussed) that it would be annually renewable but would not 
continue iD foroe atter the emergency was ended~ CAB 65/17. 17(41)4.-
,For th~. ~ebate,~ in, 19,43 see H.C. Deb. 393, 109/.54 and 813128. 
Butler attributes the opposition to the Bill "partly to, the attempt 
to enact constitutional legislation so hurriedly, partly to the 
retroactive provisions which obviated ,the need for the re~electionaf 
the four ministers primarily concerned but mainly to fundamental , 
objeotions agUnst the ending of .. ! system which had" so long exposed 
goverraent. to the constant criticism. 'of the electorate."", In a. footnote 
he argued that 'in practioe the effectiveness 'of this control was minimal. 
The nearest' he' oanes to recognising; the existence' of 'political motives 
is hiscamnent that in 1926 "in the Labour arguments it is hard to find 
8llJrthi.lig :more than'obediemce to the maxjm that the duty or the 
Oppoaition iato oppose." (p • .54) ~ ,', "; ",',,' .' ,1, ' 
~ "",;,;' i , ,c', ",' '" ' 
Cf~ N~ State~'s canmentthl.t"J~dg~g by th.r&piditY~ithwhich 
the Tories adopted delegated legislation wben'theychangedthe 
ConstitutiOn and 'the tiscal system in '1931 "the 'rights of' Parliament 
only play an important part in their thoughts when vital matters like 
. the financial orthodoxies are at stake." 11 March 1944. 
A' c-•• .J..-~ -,; ~,_ '.' " . / " <". ,p , 
It'8hoUld be 'not~dthiat 'Labo~ Mambe;s 'aid "suppo~t c~anpl~U;:t8 against 
1ndividual'piecea of delegated legislation.'In the New State8ll1'All 
31 Kq 1941."; Laski had pointed out ,~The House is stUl •••• a pla.ce 
where ,the detills of administration mq be scrutinised by. inquiry." 
Tribune ccap1ained ~ that :"A diaturbing aspeot of" this affair, is, that " 
the LaboUr Party which should be ; guardian of civil liberties has not 
taken the 'initiative. ,,-, They a.nci not the Tories should have been 
f'~ in insisting that Parliament' a, control over delegated. 
legislatiOn'shoUld bestrengthenR. tt,· Tribune, 26 ~l944.' N' ' 
,.~I !,t~ ~""~, '''',*" '" .+ 1-~ ~,,: ~ :.. '~: " .... ~,,' 
MorriSon' hacl ~t.:t~ ;;inthe eo~~e d on~ Debate'; ,~The 'Gov~x:nment have 
. their point of view, "Ih.a.ve my point of view arid 'seae Hon. Members 
have a. different point of view. 1t.!2!9..;" cc. '1668.;" Morris on , had , 
presented a Memorand\Jl1 in'the Bane Policy Cooaittee arguing against, 
the .I8Ot'ting up of a Standing Camaittee CAB 75/1.5. H.P.O.(43), 5th 
Meeting;' 16 February 1943."·' ,',,', I , " " ", ' 
,I ," ..... '''''~ ~; : .. "". ",,; •. ..., .,;-, . .,;. 'f' 
Themotionw~loaned 'the 'aettiri'g'liP of a'Seledt Cclnriu.ttee ,"with()Ut ' 
power to seft4for persons,"papersor,records ••• ~ (but which should) 
carry on a continuous' exarninationof all ~tatuto~ Rules and 'Orders" 
and other inatrtments et delegated legislation presented to"'} ',".i, " ' 
Parliament' •• c~ ... f According' to ,the Eoonanist '. 26' February, 1944 the 
earliest draft of the motion hacl 138' signatures (p.269) .<' " , 
• :' • ~ " ,3, '",,~ f·~ .. _'....-,,_z~: •. ; >< ~ , -: ~ ~ .,.«'\.-).. 
, ~'. J .' c '~'.,- _'--f' • .:. ,- .~- ",' ~;, " ~ :~~- .}.- .,}!", <,. ,if" i: .,~,-,', .~.< ,,~, 0~~;': :.'~ 
"The Parliamentary Report to, the Annual Conference stated.,that "The 
Party, supported "the principle of the motion, subject tooertain 
conditions~ which provided that the rights of private Members shOlUd 
not be, diminishecl and there should be no, delays -Which would hold up 
the work or the Goverrment." .. ' L.P • .A.C.R. 12Wt", ~.7~. '~' 
In a speeoh at Bradford in March 1944 Morrison had called tor 
,'~ changes in Parliamentary procedure to speed up legislation on 
the .mass of post-war problems~' "Parliament must be prepared 
to'leave to the Executive the task of working out the details 
. within the policy (that) Parliament has approved and ~plement 
'them by means ot departmental regulations. and orders." DaUl, , .' , 
i Herald.,' 6 Maroh 1944. See also the speech at Dundee, , Daily 
Herald, .3 Octo~er 19437" ' .. ' ~, " ' 
14.····.ith' w1dert'enns' of reiereD:ce W~Ch were apparently based upon ' 
the Don<:>ughnore Canmitteet s recanmendations. ) H.C. Deb. L.Dl,' 
00. 310~ As Morris on was to admit later this, was beoauseof the 
,strength of feeling in the House of Canmons.~H.C:'182':189-1., 
,Q.3683~' In taot only three weeks after the House approved the 
.'. setting up of the Select Canmittee the Hane Secretar.Y aQnitted 
'··to, the House that owing to a Departmental oversight a: number of 
'regulations had not been placed before' the House sane years 
earlier and tha t it would be necessar.Y to rectify, the er:-ror and 
,bring in aJiAct to relieve him of any consequenoes whioh he ')"w ,.;, .. > 
might possibly incur fran the failure involved. H.C:,Deb.:402, 
,00., 761/7 ;"1207/S1. "Morrison regarcled it as ,"a good, example of: 
;the wa:y in,whioh;' even at a time of national emergency~' the. 
; supremacy ,of Parliament remained 'inviolate. It Morrison, 
AutobiographY;' p.l84.~' ' 
_re:. .-;;--c,'''f • ., ,:~ d" -,.I ~!,} ~ 
'(Following I the Speoial ;Report~f 'the Select Canmittee the 
Government 'introduoedthe Statutory Instrunents Bill (enaoted 
as 9 • 10 Geo. 6.""' Ch. 6) which among other things provided for 
,a UJJd.tonn period of 40 days during which instruments had to'lie 
'on the Table' of the House. Previously this' period had varied 
fran '20, to 40 days. ,4, See, S 80ia.l R ort from the Seleot Oanmittee 
,on Statutory Rules and Orders, H.C. ll~ 1943 4 and H.C. Deb.4lS, 
• co. 1095 et.seq.'" ~~ Eaves,' gp.cit., pp. 157 160. " ,~"':, 
'" \p -t-' ',' .... :.'~,'_<-,,, . ..;). ,<." -" 2--q 
'. ," This':was'C~anl..Y 'caJ.led the Vivian Canmittee;'iAt a. Cabinet 
'),{eetingitwasdeoided on Morrison's suggestion',:,"After the, 
:prolon~tion'Billtadbeen passed, the HaneSecretar"y should 
:take steps,to'instigate an Inquiry int,ot~e.'working:that would 
~be necessary'if ciroumstanoes should render an earlY Election 
,desirable. -, The Inquiry should,' however, be darried out with· . 
theJJdn:iJm.ln of publicity. 11 ;,CAB 6W9: lOO(ljl)16 Ootober 1941. 
:. He did not think that failure to make changes in' the franchise ~;' 
~law . would .make it impossible to hold an election likely to return 
.... a House 'of' Oanmons tolerably representative of themation~ .:; 
, ~'.9.A.B 61L~:; (WoP. 41' m.·'lo6)~ '3 Ootober 1941~. The Ca:nrnitteets1:,,~, 
'; tenns , ot. referende' had been "to consider whether for .• effecting 
. the purpose. ; of' the 'present system of eleotoral. registration, .. 
-" improved methods and maohinery. can be devised,' having regard to'~. 
:,~he' oircumstances likely to. -obt&1n 'in the period following theU,' ": 
'cea ... tionot hostilities and to examine the teohnioal problems' 
~involveQ in in.r 'scheme' of' redistribution of Parliamentary seats 
,by. '!8Y' ~ of preparation for oonsideration of, the' principles. in which 
'&nJ"scheme'shoulci be based."" ',.' .; .. ,', .\, .. \." ' .. ' I'; 
_ -~ ;';':,:;~ :~; .• _i'-':"? ~~~1 ,:",' r;'- .,"'.,: ~:;, 
Le·her' tran ',the Pl-i!lte Minister to " the Speaker 1st Febru~ 19~'~' 
. QuoteQ Cmd.' 62~;' onpp.2/3 •. The Party had called tor .. :,~A Canmission; 
to inquire into and report on all aspeots of the working of the " • 
Election System sinoe the last war, with a view to suohreforms" 
as experienoe shows to be desirable" LaP.A.C.R. 1943, p.171, 
but its approval was toJ:'tll&l and its mover signIficantly , 
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.. 17. ;:. ' .. 
(cont' d.) la terbecame a permanent Transport House Official' (H.R.Underhil1). 
,," In addition, an all-party motion in' the Canmons calling for the 
20. 
'. appoin:t:ment of a Conference received, the support of sane 22 Labour 
;~ ~M€mbers.,: See Manchester Guardian, 13 May 194.3. The Labour Organiser 
-,: had been: critical. At the time of the appointment of the Speaker's 
• Conference it posed the question, ~tjustwhat is Labour's policy on 
,Electoral,'Reform? We have said elsewhere that Labour's policy is .made 
~~by,Confez:erice~' Very well, trace Conference decisions back 40 years 
P and all' one gets is a' series of unimportant, scrappy and even 
., .. contradictory: Friday' s resolutions. ' The N.E.C. has never once " 
,'" reported,or,presented an adequate policy, bn this important matter.' , 
Conference has' had no lead and no chance to approve form or frame ,,' ",,, 
a policY~And ~ the Speaker's Conference will' have almost finished 
,its'workwhen' the Labour Party Conference meets." Vol~ 24.' 266,,"""; " 
. (FebruaryJ ,; 1944) "~pr 4 .... Its.1ics " in' the Original ' '.' ". ,',: 
,'.' ~',.. ., , ;': -:...o~. • ',>-- ,._ ," • - - :~~ ~- "- '\ " ' 
'James" Griffi ths': and ", Jorm Parker (lette~s t~ auth~r). See' also N .E:C •.... , 
.,' Minutes, 89; 57E Elections Sub-Canmi ttee; 9. March: 1944 and New,. ",' 
, . Statesman 4 March 1942.J.S. Middleton, the Party Secretary, also 
:favoured P.R. See N.E.C. Minutes, 85, E.C. 15, 1941/2 M.217. ' 
, , 4 February 1942. ,Labour Members on the Conference had frequently 
· <consul tedTransport House Labour Organiser Vol;' 24,' No~ 272""' 
. (September, 1944) p:9 •. The New Statesman was 'critical,ofthe " " 
Conference's conclusions 'in general and the retention of the plural"> 
vote in particular., . New Statesman 10, JUne 1944:' 'Neither was""'" ,e 
Reynolds' News::impressed, 4 June 1944. ,l' . , • ,~ , ; 
f/ '",: .:-. 
" " 
.,' TribUne;' canmented before the Election "If' d~oc~acy' sur':;'ives in thi~' ; 
;,,~country;it will:be' in spite of Wins ton Churchill,",18 May 1945. ';'::"~;' 
Churchill t s actions" during;' the campaign only.' served; to reinforce the 
trend 'towards'his'defeatand he canhavegairied little'satisfaction1 'J 
out of 'the humilia tionof Laskiin '; the Libercase ; the. t arose from an' ,~. 
ilicident~ at' Newark;l,;,"AccoUnts,- ot,~'the t campaigrt-','can ~be,~ found in-R.B~ "'.. ,~ 
MacCallum and .Alison Redman, .. ' The British General Election of 1 
.' (London: OXford University Press, 1947, Ch.7 and 8., and of the 
, Libel Case in Laski-v-Dai E ress Newark Advertiser Co.Ltd. and 
r Parlby' (London: Daily ,Express 1948.' C ; -' ,';,q", "",'."," , ,,' ;~:. ~ '~ "~"'¥ r:;,~. i'0~'~ "~'_:"~' .. '..·,~, ... ti <,~ tj:;·:. ~:1>.L'_';,~:i" ;~,._ '. <~.;,:'~ t.I.'.,:_~~, .. , ... " 
t The Left had:10ng demanded the 'return to 'the no:rmalworking'of'>:";: 
representative government. See New Statesman 12 February.1944~;::,·,The 
,:t. Party, as a. whole, " hung on and asked;that the,.election be postponed: 
until the autunn partly in order :to ensure that ':improvements couldbe":,"""<'''~' 
· made in 'the Electoral Register:~: See Attlee' s(letter to Churchill': 21 . 
" May' 1945.:'L.P.A.C.R. ,'1945, pp. 87/8. ", Cf.':EllenWilkinson' sChaipnans 
'., Address, Ibid., p.78.,;. ", .~, f :Ok "i' 
~' ~..,& ~,--~.~::: " ''',f t 
:' Lees-Bmith had"asserted on 23 October 1940: "!,believe thatParli8l1lent 
stands very high'in,.the est1rUate:of,the people/today: It was' never '. 
higher, in my life-time." ,Z R.C; Deb.j65, cc.1065.,of. "The flexibility" 
. and poise of the British Parliamentary ins ti tu tion has been a beacon to t 
democrats everywhere throughout the War. It is of the highest :importance , 
that when in so many countries democracy will be striving to rebuild its 
. institutions, the'BritishPar1iament should continue to show an example 
of temperate control and cool efficiency." Daily Herald, 7 October 1944. 
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22. The Speakers' Conference had suggested that a Committee should be set 
up to examine certain detailed suggestions for the amendment of the 
electoral law. The Speaker had elaborated the points in question in 
a letter to Herbert Morrison who sought and secured Cabinet approval 
for the Committee to be set up. See CAB 66/56.WP (44)591 and CAB 
b65/44·1lM 144(44)1., -
23.:. The vague ~ature of the alleged I agreement' is well illustrated by the 
. speech of Sir H. O'Neill (a member of the Conference) who told the House 
"Agreement was reached in the Speakers· Conference on certain controversial 
matters. It was understood that if one party gave way on one thing the 
other party would give way on another. This was, at any rate, my under-
standigg of it ••••• I think it is not denied that there was an agreement •. 
~e .only,thing that is denied is whether (it) binds this Parliament. I 
maintain that it does, or that it ought to.". H.C.Deb. 448 cc.1943 Italics 
mine. In view of Sir Hugh's apparent desire to have it ail ways, one Can 
~pathise with Mr. Erio Fletcher's (Islington, west) wish to have all 
future discussions written down, recorded and published. Ibid., cC.1958. 
Minutes of the Conference were, in fact, kept and Butler,op.cit., p.116, 
.refers to them but unfortunately the documents concerned are ·not available 
for inspection. . ' 
24. Not the least of which was the Conservative majorit~ over all other Members 
. combined. See Economist 19 February 1944 (pp.234/5). The New Statesman 
. asked, "Can it be ·true .that the Labour Party has agreed to be represented 
in the Speakers; Conference on electoral reform on a basis corresponding 
to its (strength) in the present Parliament? •••• ~e House of Commons, 
elect_d in 1935, cannot possibly be trusted as representing rightly the 
present state of public opinion; and it is entirely unjust and inconsistent 
with the conditions of Coalitions, as we understand them, for the Tories to 
use their war-prolonged majority to force electoral changes which suit them 
at· the expense of other parties. Surely the Labour Party ought to insist 
. on full equality with the Tories as a necessary condition of taking any part 
'. in the Conference, which will be settling the conditions not only for the 
vital post-war election, but also presumably for some time to come." 
.J 2 February 1944. . 
; 25. According'to Ede, ~., cc. 3023/35, ·the first indicators ~r how the '" 
constituencies could be divided was received from the Comm~ssioners towards 
the end of 1947 although the information was only published the week before .' 
the debate in the form of a White Paper. Representation of the People Bill: .. 
Sent an' the name contents and electorates·of certain proposed new . 
..QQQstituegcies. Cmd. 73 3 March, 948. 0 ac ve recommen a on or a 
. division was made by the Commissioners. and the final decision was left. to 
the Governmenta.nd the House •....... The Text of the letter from the Boundary . 
COmmissioners announcing . that 'they .. had prepared a scheme for . implementation . 
should the House decide in its favour can be found in H.C.Deb. 448,cc.3114. 
Cf.cc.3121/3. The Government was not completely blameless ·for even if the 
substance of the changes were 'acceptable the method and timing were 
objectiona.ble. Economist 27 March 1948. 
t~' •••• " 
, , 
THE POST-WAR YEARS 
!:!-r1iamentary Conservatism. 'h 
, If' the a~hievements of the Labour Governnent of 1945/51'~ the 
. fi~lci~f'pa~l~entUy representation ccmpleted the triumph of its' 
. ~ -~ ~ oo~~iste~t adh~renoe to the principle of "one man, one vote," the'other 
measures' it' took 'in' th~ field of House of Ccmnons refonn represented the 
, .~ ,,'+~, '.:-,' ~ ,: ~ '0 ~ . _ ,,'~ /' ,':" ,i .- :""; :' "'; ~ I' 
Pursuit of a general outlook whieh was different in degree rather than 
~d fran;t~th~l~ by its' ~p~nents.d. Th~' role of individ~is; in 'this 
.:". L . " ; :,'::' ~'; t . .!l ... ' ". 
process was vital. There is little d~ubt',forexamp1e, thatthe'tn:fluence 
,< 0: . ..0 
otP~riia'mentary "lit~ had a melloWing effect on most ~bera of 'th~P.{I,.'P. 
T~ cas~'clt Da~ia ici;kwocXl is':Well':'kn~.' (1) Fenner Brocb,~compiained 
t. ~ jj,. ", 
of' tb.~ 'blunting' infl~;n~e of PS:;lhment • 
. -...,:~;" ti ., ,t .>. '.0)',' -.... <' '(~ .. '"'J~ 
, . "The House of Ccinmons is more than a scene of poli'heal 
conf'lio t; it is a Olub,· and if one is human at all one 
cannot live izi it tor years as an' enemy' of the other 
side ••••. social contact was inevitable and very often 
one Saw Labour M.P.' s falling to the glamour of the 
", ;:" < .. social lite ot, the other side, steadily leaving their " .. 
'own class behind them and beccming conditioned by the " 
~ ~ ameni ties and atmosphere ,of the class, which explo1 ted ~·.l~"~ 
the very men and wanen they had been sent to. the House 
~. of' ,,,Ccmnons to represent.~, (2) " . '. ' 
~ ", 
SUch views were not, COnfin~ . to.the' twenties. " Bessie,Brad?ock, lamOllgst 
.' others, found Parliament confusing at tirst. 
l< tHIs it an It.ma Parliament •••• doors.here·~d doors 
there tnd sudden~ a curtain will be swung aside and 
;Blaok Rod appears ,telling ,.us to go to the House. of",,; 
Lords. All this soulless ritual will have to be changed 
because it is obstructing .Socialist legislation. ~(3) '" 
" Yet by;the,,,,endot\the Attlee Government she had apparent~, beocme accustomed 
to ,the . pl~~e., (4.)'HerbertMorrison had .long since A became accust~e~ to-the House 
~ - ~. >!'. .' .,.y " - - ,. 
of' 'OClllmQnS Referring to the new influx of the P .L.P. in 1945 he 
. - .' - . . . . , 
1. D. ICirkwooa,' Iv Lite of Revolt (London: George G.' Ban-op, 1935), Oh.17; 
. >', 
, ~t . .A.F •. Brookw~ 6' Iuide th~ Lett; Thirt Years of' Plattonn Press, 
.... Prison ana Parliament London: ,George Allen & Unwin, 1942 , pp.222!,. 
;- ,:; ••••• --.( , ,. > 
. i{i:ul;~"~o~e, ).{rs:iBe~~i~Br;~dook MP: A. BioaraESl (L~don: 
Hale, 1957), pp.1377a.. . ... " ..• " •........ ; ..... ' .•.............. '., " ' ..... ". . , 
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wrote, ·On the tirstday ot assemblY they broke the rules by sing~ the 
'j' 
-. 'Red F1ag~' Sane did not know the' words a'nd soo;~, j~dgirig by the 
"'rendering,' the tune. The briet p~rtorman"ae horrified sane of th~ ~rie~ 
,; and I must a~.it:it mildly disturbed me. These youngsters still had to 
.!9sorbtheatmosphere ·~f 'the HoUse;; •• It (5) -
~,i~,' There were other occ~s1onswhen the' Labou; Party failed tOo remove) 
sane 'et the deadweigh~ ot parlia.men.t~ry'tradition.When.th~' ~House :~f 
(CC_ons was banbed in 1941 the TribUne called tor "a cOOlplet~lY' n~! 
t bUUdilig, with every modem device'." ,,} (6) It went Unheeded. Churchill~ 
,~' moving the motion for the acceptance of "tile ReP~rt ot the' S~e'C't' , '"I, 
'Canmittee which had mirrored hiso~n des'ire tha. t i't' shoilli b~"b~ild in" ;~ 
the, oldstyle,'fo'Uud 'opposition frcmMr.' Tinker and David: Kir~6Cx1 who 
~ishedtheGovernmentto pay more' at~ention to the' housin~~{orCthe"p~ople~ 
" " ," 
:rather, than 'the' people's representat'ives'. en.) Their'<'~upp~rtcani:etr~'" \' ' 
: the l.L.p.'and indePendents ";"the' rest o:c:'the P.L.P.~hobothe~edto" . 
. ~ , ','" ~ " -: " " j . 
In 'such a situation' it:Wa~: iIievitable that the'jindivid\1al~ whose 
" ".~. _ '. '. ": .""- '- ,'> '-'K' ./' ;C.-", ~ <. j Cot 
,( taalt itwasto'formw.ate~govermental p'olioy'on'the'question of 
, procedural" and' other .. ' retozma. ' 'ThB. t'i tOdividua1 'was' He;b~rt Mor~ison.r,':~' 
': ~. 
1 !hose oUtlook was to 'opera te ," the';1nsti tutions ai~ad.Y: ~'ex~ t~n~e ':·:"<v 
' . 
\ rather than' to ohali:ge them ili any radical ~8.Y ;' that woul«(le~d 'to . 
, '. , .
lC"., ~--. j;:. ~t "_'~,~'~. : ", __ ~:_7/'~~"3~ 
. }'{orri8cm, ·AutobiOirSBl, p.25l, : '.;.;.-:;:==-== 
16 :May 1941. ' 
'1 f. ... ;-~.: :-'-;: '~, -·~~,'f ~ ,~. ---"".' 1}, .'"' .. < -~. , " 
Report frca th8 Se1eot Ccma1ttee on House ot COOlIIlons . 
" (Re'bu11ding). H.C.102, (19lt-3/44), and H.C. Deb. 4D7,' 
'1003 et.seq. 25 January 1945. 
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to~retoDn. Traditionalist to the core he described marching through the 
Lobbies as Ma ~seful~and pleasant occasion.n(S) MOving slight modifications 
, , , 
in the hours ot the meeting of' the House, Morrison oo~'tered suggestions that 
t; , 
, , , 
t~damental changes should be made in the role of Members ot Parliament, saying 
' .• ' .• ",' i:. , '" / ... , . ,<,., " ..... '.... < ,.' _ " "" It " ~,., ~ .. '. ,~ , ., ,,: " . :' ,~:, 
~. do not want Parliament to becane exolusively a bodyof' full-time Members ot 
, / '.!. '_,i: "'J '" ~'.' " -. .' ".. ~'i, < -, { •• .: • .1 ~ 
Parliament, "(9) on the ground that it would be is~lated frem the day-to-day 
, .. j: ;:;,.~.:: , ~ "l, ,.' ~,= ~.-' "L"'"~ _,;_.. : •• j .~.- "'._~' j',. ~,< ~ «,,' ~." _ ,_.~ . 
1~e ~f ~he nation. His oonservatism on this occasion contrasted with his 
;;) ;. '"',-
attaoks on the P.LJP. in the early 'twenties before he entered Parliament • 
. "~, '.~"" ',~,:.; :.:~,,:' >..." ",', "', " ".. ~ " i.. 
Part 'o~the general, though not specific, oriticism made in those years was 
\," ~ ~ , t.:;: ":,,.~ ; "'.¥' f'" :.-',',: ~ >'" '''. { ., , 
against ,the dual role of' P.L.P. Members with additional Union responsibilities. 
lIorria"':'. at oourse.,";'~ ;"'t the only indiV1d~~~1t~ tl»_ ~:Sin ~~'~r~serv. 
f 
the traaitions of' the House ot Commons. 
::;:~ .,-',:, \,,>. .to 
The famous expuls ion of Garry 
~ i" - "j L:. :-'1ff "'" :~ 
.A.:lf.i.gba.n, Member for Gravesend, fraa the House in October 1947 showed that there 
-j. ,'- - <, '~,~ ~. ~ 
~r~ many ,who believed that the tezmllHonorable Members" haa sane meaning. (10) 
.' ." ~.;.,\_"~,,, --ft,. (: ;dZ':'", ~>,~ .: ~~f.-~'.ll~·~',~,.:" .. ,:, i" J, t'. ~:- . ':.;..,J:'~ t'; ;""':~ :ti--,1·J:~, .. ~~ ~'_,; . 
The nature of the incident, however, the revelation of confidential information 
"..~ ';., "-,,-"~: r '.» t;,.l ,~" .. -' ('t;- ~ , ~. ,> ~',: k! \ ~.:.; 
·rEtoei-ved as .. Member ot Parliament for gain and the unfounded allegations that 
'~~<-1,.-.:.4~i~' t, ;~ :,? :,.;f ""'-~~,L ~~,'f-V .::' t» 
o~hers were so occupied leads one to the conolusion that the eventual outceme 
, ~." 'c' ,;,i.~ ", ~ ~:·of~,"r:..,~~>t ':_; J~".,," '~,\I'J. .. t ,':" M"1 ;":;'¥'-', .~" ,'.: ; '-f< .::;",\; ~ " '. 
- ,;, f 
w ... a refleotion of' internai P.L.P. wrangling as much as the maintenanoe of . 
p~:1~~n~;y';r~·~~i~~'~a.nd privile~:.hdee~, th~~~s~s~~nce of the Government, 
" .',' ,!;. ~', .. -":t.,. ";"<; ,<;:. <t t."h_~<·... ._~i i: t c,;) $ ': _ ' 
t~ pursue the matter in the House, against the advice :ot the Opposition, and " 
"" ',\. :$.:4 "~t:' ,~<"< ,.",' ~~, I~' :~ ... ~':"~~'-" .,. ','. ,\ ~, .. , t' t:'!- \,'_ '~'?~ :;. ~0: "'; :~ ;"':~ ">!I ";",.~: 
after All1ghan Md made an overfull confession ot guilt in which he exoused his 
, ':',,; '" "~. -:-'; ~~; L: '~J.;~:~' ;'" ,- > "~" !' ~~ }.-;. ';. ~' ," ";.'~ :'~" l';'f'" '\' " ;~ ,'< -'" ~ '{ t ,- , 
a:~ions as errors ot judgement rather than breaches of privilege,ref1eoted an 
.~ ",~ ,.' \.~~':~~ It",,~,;.'J,:: .,:' -: ;,;. :~~ ~"~;~ <" ,; /~,'" .: ~"~t~:;"\t-~\.;·,; ~~~_~~;~,f~' ";,\.;;. ~;c t ':r ~>_1~' 
,'exoessive respect for backbench opinion.(ll) Once the Government's motion 
":>d,,·itr.>,,;;;' ~~--~ z.:·f··~ .~J" '~1 t~:·~;':~-.\:':":"i~.·~}~A1:' '~::,.;~.:;;,~.~ 
H. 'Uorrlsan,' Gover:raent and Pariiament: A'Stud 
~ Oxford University Press, Second Edition, 1959 . 
~". ',: 1~,,--)-_ ""+ \.-,.",,q \ :~ :;: " ~~ , 1>-< '.:~,< t; .", ;.~~ ,'), -'/'~,':':'." ,;~. !!:C.Deb. 42l, cc. 2217/.58 (oc.22.55) 12 April 1946. 
",,;v_.,opposed by 17 Members mainly Members of the P.L.P • . 
~~ ~ !I.C. De~~ 443 ':.~:-i~94"~t. s~~:~-'-30 Ootoberh." '1·'''9~4"''''7··'·.'' "":"';'*''''h_¥~"y.""", •• ,:".""." 
'11. H.c."I3§·(~rii~~t~r;Pap'ers 194.6(7 ,'·;ix.,~:56l~'" Se;~' Note l~ 
457 
deeming Allighan to be 
"guilty of dishonourable conduct which deserves 
to be severely puniahed as tending to destroy 
mutual confidence among Members and to lower 
this House in the estimation of the people~ 
had ~een approved in a relatively straight party division over the 
?onservatives who had argued that the motion improperly extended 
. P~~~entary' privilege .. (12) by proposing to P~iSh an offen;e w~oh 
""- ,r, 
'".--... ,',. > 
Was not against the law t immediately cha~ged their views. They began 
; ;"1 . .' , v • 
, to argue that as the House had taken its decision the only punishmeIlt 
-;~ J\ > ), 
worth;r ~t the offence was e~ulsion, an argument which found favour 
, ~':' < '~' .'" .. , ~ .;:-; ~ ", ,_ , ", :. 'c '_: • 
amongst the younger Left-Wing Members such as Harold Lever. Morrison, 
h~ever~ ~.:,., Ythe)d~f~nd~rrather th~ prosecutor of parl~;n~ary' 
conservatism,a~gued for tolerance - ex~u1~ion was too severe - and ~~ 
gained the support of ~ nllIlber of backbenchers who called on their 
." ~.' •. ", _" . " ,i ,- " , 
t~llow~ to su~p~rt t~1r coll~~~es: ' It was all to no avail and Allighan 
~ . ,',,~ .. " ", \ 
'was expelled by 187 votes to 75. (13) 
.., > ,'" -, , .-' 
The P.L.P.' s action seemed to ref1eot internal divisions for no 
. earlie~ ;b'~aches 'Of privile~e~merited such severe action at all.(14) 
"'- .:::. " ' , :- " 
The oontext of the A111.ghaltcase in 'the hi~tor.Y ~ of 'relatively poor 
, ft" ." ' .t ....... , 
relaticms be'tween' the P~L.P. ~nd the Press ~lso indicates that on 
J ..... , • 
this occasion Parliamentary privileges were used as the means to seoure 
a rather unsavoury end. Its singular ocourrence raises the 'question 
as to w~ the Labour Party made no attempt to re~pthe outmoded role 
otParliament as ~ developmentfran a kingly rather than, a ,dem~ratio base. 
, . '-
.... One can only suggest that 'its unwillingness t~ do 'so reflected the conservative' 
llatUre both of the persons who sought to gain and keep power and the oonservatism 
.' R.O. Deb. 443, 00. 1095/1159. 'See also H.O. 138, and the related 
case of Evelyn 'falkden. B.O. 142. 
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ot the,institu~~on itself. If, as Laski and others contended, it 
was true that British Government was essentially a matter ot consent 
, and that the:~onsent' ~equirea to govern meant the willingness' ot the' 
.i " , 
. Parties not to adopt hentrenched positions 'but to proceed pragnatically 
then the real way to secure" change~as' t~ make Only small! changes. 
To secure the >agreementot as~bstantially large proporti'?n.' not only 
otthegoverning Party but of the Opposition too. Thus demands tor 
,-. ~ 
the broadcasting ,.ot, Parliament were resisted as tinnly by Labour ,_ 
, '.,:,;, '- .) :, ';' '" '" , ~" > 
Gove:rnmentsas their Conservative predecessom(15) Ot course, there 
• ~ ',., -". ';'..-: "'-,.J >, ~> '",' ~~. " • ": ",.- ' .'" ' 
~ere occasions when ',one Party telt able 1;.0 proceed, despite,.the 
, > .. ,' > ;;. '""""", ~ '.. -10/. i 
, OpPos~tion ot its,opponents, butusually in such cases where agreement 
-" ~ ",-.' q;._.i,~_ ~. -.: j " "."; ". < ;: "., - • r -',~ '" 
has pot.been. torthcaning the governing party has had the backing of the 
'~"~ :~ ',~,'. ',.<1>'1 ,.~, ,_.,._",:~, ~ ~':.:,«~~~:~ ,::.:... >, '.0<"'" ',"_ -'. • :. 
electorate. ,This ,was ,the case in 1945, although on the questions of 
..... >. \ .' i~' ~ " 
procedure J pe~~()~i"~s'~curityand the constitutional~~la:ti~~shl.p betWeen 
~:' • ~ ~\,'" '-~, ;.~. _ "'_ '.... "'W:"'- -: ' ,7. ~.~ , " _ ',;' ' '" -, ~,,_. '. :;', : •• ~_.~ 
Parliament ~d the' Exec~tive the La:bour Pa~ty followed' rather' than 
~·.\-t ~" ..... ~ ~<:,'_<'~. c. 
~eparted fran "established procedures, largely because. of, 
.h • ~ ~~, _~' .,. ,_ 
.• <~,,~>,. ..... ,>~ "' ,-' 
i.n'\7~~ved- Herbert ,Morrison and Hugh Dal ton. 
"'L< '-"',~, ' )' ",. ~-.~ ". : -"",_ >, .' 
'1';, ",; 
.; , 
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l:arliamenta~ Procedure 
~,) ". Acc,ording to Hanso~ and Vfiseman, 
, ~wha.tever goverrvnent might have been in power, it 
,', '.'s inevitable that parliamentary procedure should 
. receive an overhaul at the end of the ,Second World 
;,,' War."Wi th a Labour Government in power, the need .... ,' 
was all. the greater,. because the large-scale , .... 
programme of sooial and econcmic change to which 
'.' Labour was canmitted oould not but impose new, 
'strains on an already overstrained 'parliamentary 
~achine. 11 '. (16) "j.. ' , ',', ',: 
there had been little referenoe 
" 
to .. ~he subjeot of, the refonn of Parliamentary procedure during war-time. 
,"'I '" .' >,~ - ~ ." 
.W'h:ue 'the Party-leaders were generallY silent,~. however, there were 
. 'J,',,-,~ ~ < " • 
, ft~;·'f'~ ',' 'C:~"'~ \~'i ::"'? "' :'" f~_-'-' t::~,.", .:,q.:"~' '~i'-,~., ~ 
occasional ref'erencesin·acadanic.and party publications ,to. the 
, .~"'''' ,-,<~. ~ " ,~ , ' 
desirability<~f'" ~~t~!;:.~~~uei" Sh~w~ll~~"f'or 
_ ,c '- ,'I.. ~-" .• t. ..". - "-'~. ,_.... '" i~ 
:boOk When the Men Cane Hane that, ,,'. 'C: : 
\ .. "There must be a speeding uP, of the parliamentary,~ :,," ," .' 
"'maohinery .;~ •• (beoause) the business of the genuine 
"believer., in parliamentary institutions is to create 
,.... in the pUblio"mind a healthy respeot for the supreme 
""', executive of the nation." (17) ;', :.;.' ',,J . ~ 
, '.' ""',,': ~-.'.-,", ,~ ~ ", '. \! , ' " .' ',' 
" ',', 
"'.,_ 1 
The Dul,y Herald did advocate increases in, the number of Standing Canmittees 
'~"""''''o''-~ . ,. " ~ ",,' _~ '..;' 0'" '0- " "",,~.~ 't"".. ". 
So as 'to expedite the detailed examination of. Bills. (~8) Its.; m~in response, 
~-:;. , .. ~~ ;, ~~ :~~tYr,"1nOid~~: ,(19)' 11' ,. 
, "This., trivial yet significant episode,"- it argued, :' 
~ "W1l1reinforce (the people's) desire tor a striot' 
re~xamination of Parliamentary prooedure, .. so ,that A 'j\ 
.l' anoient rituals whioh are out of da te with' the . . . 
., ... ~,._~« ~:raotical.needs.~ of "our~ age mai ~~be. set aside. ~.; ( 20) .......... '-,'~~,"_. ,*", •. 
; ;-t4' {,; ;'" 
, A.H';Ha.nso.n:and H.V: Wiseman, Parliament at Work: A Case-Book ot . 
>1!arliamentarz Procedure (London: Stevens,1962), p.315.. .... 
,~;~'. ,.,~~".~ 
B. Shinwell, When the Men Cane Hane (Lond~u Victor Gollanoz, 
1944), p.52. . . ........ . 
. !!ailz He~ald, 17 January 1944~ .' 
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In the House of Cammons itself the question of procedure ~ raised 
, , , bUt mairu.y by Conservatives who wished to set up a Canmi ttee of the House 
"to investigate the internment of Manbers. In one short adjournment debate 
Earl Winterton (21) raised the question and gained sane support fran Aneurin 
" ,Bevan, who argued for the rights of the House vis-a-vis the Executive. "Our 
difficulty is not that the Government cannot act. It is that we have not 
", any,means of making them act." (22) The loss of initiative was, therefore, 
l'lotlIlerely legislative, it was inherent in the inati tutional arrangements, 
developed fram despotic government, which had not became as responsible as 
it might appear to be at first sight. In the same debate Ellis Smith called 
tor a ,Select Canrnittee to be set up in order to 
"have a pooling of experience and ideas so that we 
can make our Parliamentary machinery as efficient 
as it can be made to meet post-war problems" while 
preserving the reasonable and democratic rights of 
Private Members. "(23) 
l!:ibUl]! 'too detined the main problems as that of " (devising) rules which will· 
apeeCl the passage of mmerous urgent Bills while preserving the right ot the 
, ordinary Members to criticise and amend them. "(24) 
A.pp~ent1Y, hC1Rever, it was not until late into 1944. that the problems; of 
" Pl.t'liamentary procedure were considered jmportant enoughtor the War Cabinet to 
t1lkeactU;Il. In J~U4ry 1945 the Whips; who had been asked to souna out' 
llElnbers about the possibility of the AppoiIltment~' a Sele~t Ccmnittee on 
l? , . '.' , ,'.' , '.-
arliarnentary procedure, found that the Conservative and Liberal PartJ.es w~e, 
t ,', 
,eJ,rly evenlydiUded, were against the idea. "On the other hand," they said, 
'.!!..c. Deb. 400,cc.1070 et.seq. 26 May1944. 
'1910..:., ~. 1098 .. 
"l1>¥!., cc. 1077. Ct. Smith's question to 
cc. 2167/8. 6J.pril 1944. 
I "Labour Members were generally in favour of taking any steps which would 
;., l-$. - t";. ~~ 'iI' ~, ~ '"' '-,' ~ ~ , 
1ead,to a speeding up of the Pariiamentary machine and for this reason 
,). "- "':iv. r,;..;. _}...' 1-' __, . ~ F" •• , " • '. 
~~ou~~ .. support the proposal for a Select Canmittee. ~ (25) Consequently, 
, " ,0., .... ..,' ... ~J " . .'" ,. ; ,.:: " ... ' . ~ " .. . ~" ' .. 
;' th:,war-time coalition deferred discussion of a document produced by a 
" -:,,' < ... ,,~ ,. '\ "" j,. '. ," ,,' ',. '. ~ ., ,~. ':.", '". ~, -,." .. I <. , 
Ctmrnittee,,~f~:~isters which had been set uP, to examine possible 
procedural reforms ot the House of Commons which would ease the burdens 
:; . .i,.{,.., ~~,~ r. :.':;',",,: '" .~' ,/ ,.,f,: :'" :.. f" «,' ,fr 0 ;''''~', "/ ", : \~ , •• ,.' ':;. ',,' r" 
o~ the period ot reconstruction that would follow the cessation of 
',~,~:..-.;." ;'-.~ __ , ~ '.~> ~ r~-'" /i ~> -.:; ~; e, 
It was this document which was to tom the basis ot the 
't;--i ,l,·~· ".' .,,_ ;',"-,;.~.~, ::'" '. " , "'c ;"",- t :,' <.. "). ~e' i ''I, 
'xj ,Labour Gov:ernnents ref orms. (26) . " .'" 
.. ,,' 'i", t ,~ .-J'; " '~}' .;-~':;, .. :,_. ,.~~_< 
'_"- , ~,.ii_':;"'; ,,' 
' .. "There was, however, a second reason for the apPointmentot,a ~'''''''4- :"';.:, -,~~!.k.,: ,"" ~ " ... ;',,' "l"'" ':';... ","v" '<~":~} ~> ' 
" Select Canmittee as Herbert Morrison pointed out in, the debate. on the ! 
< ; :~- ;,~ _:~ ~ :~< .::.: '" ~"_y.,. .1-.;-, :.~ t,. ~_, ,.t. "\ :,~ \ ~ ': 'I' r ", ,,' .. ", ""' 
motion to set up a Select Canmittee on Procedure, namely that it. 'WaS . 
,';;;~ {;-';": ?,; ;': ~ :~_ .~ "~; 1: .:..',' ,;,. kl " ... : i-' _ ,,3, ~". ,~;:, ,-.--.. ,#, _: !I ,;: 
fifteen years since the last Select Committee had been convened. (27) 
~: ~.,: ~"" ,~-._~:~ -_~~~~1 t::':;~ . .,,;.~"""~.i-';'J. '" ~~'~~i0,~'.!'l:~'::f' 
:,;, ~orrison may, ,of course, have added, ,that, the, p'arty~d lo~'since 
'< "" -.: ~ ~ "t; '.:~ ... ,.. ,.. .~ ",~::~, -Zft ~ i' L ""~.1R<~,,, '. -.> ~~ -.::: / '_~ ,,-.,; ': ,l.'~' 
, declared its intentions on the refonn of procedure even if he had had 
:,:,,,~,, ,;" 4 ~< -iJ, ~.:_.:.,t a ~:<,\.'~.,"".~,> ~f-<'{'Y' :: ~':'t .. ; ~:;:..i+"!".";;. \--' ,_~.i 
to be reminded ot the fact. At th~ 1945 Conference Sir Stafford Cripps, 
::,.'" ;~'''-''::-·~::::'_.;~r;:< .'."-/'F ",,_;.:.~ 7.,..-~;~~ t-,~:, >.,' ',. '~. !i~' ";;-"- ... ,.';' "':-',.:",dlf ~_.<. 
addreSSing the body for the first time since his readmission to the Party; 
..... , :' ': i ~ :j,':; ~ ,C" ,>,b. ~;. -:/" ,{,':j $- " l~ "'~ <. " 
;' ~ade reference to lithe need that, there will be for expediting our 
• l\ '-'£ (. ,;_ i. .~" ,":-' ,.. ~ ~~ .',~ \} . '~J-~' 'f ~j/>." ,"<'~ ,; ,~' .} 
Parliamentary arr~gements," (28) an allusion which was taken up by 
. .~. , ,;. '. , ;, 
,l{0llni Zi11iacus in a
1 refe~~nce t to the possibility' of House' of Lords ' 
i), '-, ,. .10..' ..... ,'. ' ' ''", __ ... _' •• , •••.• ".' ,~" ,'.: '~:. ' •• , .' ,~. "~, -." """(".':" : ;. ,J ',;; ;~~~.~ .,:.:.: 
IV .; c~ J¥ J.. ,.':"-"! . -"-, . ,~-~.o~s~ction. Morrison could not ~~oa11 off-hand the, details of Parliamentarz 
" ", . .,.,. (!:':'~~ ,~ "_.~'."> 1:'1 '"~"'''\ ;,., '1iI ~ ... " .. p~~It~ ~J. 
h,Qb1ems ~~d Proced;~:" but he stated his own position clearly. 
'';~ ." '. '::'C~ ; " ::t ~ i~~ ~"4'~: ~>' .~_ .( ·;'\L '~~ l' 
"It is perfectly obvious," he said, "that it 'we are '.' 
to get what we want out of Parliament, the:r:~ must be .. ,_"., 
a mcdernisa tion 'of Parliamentary procedure, provided '. 
that it is consistent with the House of Commons ';; 
having: the' essen tial control over finance, policy and 
, the prinoip1es ot legislation. It (29) ........ . 
,'. , ; . ! ~.,;.~' :..",,,",f' :}"-~ i"'.'!,"< . ~-'~~ , 
"- -{i", ;I'~ ~ ,~~ ,,:-~,"~"-;-f', }-t::~--'i-' ~. .,-, '" ~ -" '" ~ ," -",~"!- '*~/:k 
"""",>,",~",,~, ... ",-10< .~~,"~, _~ '," "''''''.-. ~ "''''''''''''''''i'' "."'~~,,~-C< "' ......... """ lO...."."" A "'~ +< " 
~. 65/lt:2: 7(45)10.22 January 194~ •. 
£!.B. 66/53: "p (44-)4,24. 1 August 1944-~ 
B.C. Deb. 413, oc. 987. ~ August 1945. 
, k.P.A.C.R: 1945, p.95. 
l'b1.!., p.132. The onl,y other referenoe to the subjeot in the 
war-,.ee.rs appears to have been in the N.J.C. Po1ioy Document ' 
"Labour's Hone Policy." See L.P.A.C.R. ·191Q,pp.19115."The,; 
proc&clure of the House of Camnons must be reformed to enable it ,. 
' .. to grapple with the prob1eas of· the positive State." . (195) . 
, , 
It Was for these reasons that a Select Committee was appointed shortly after 
p " ,; '. ' ' ," " ,,:, " : 
a.:t'liament met in August 1945, "to consider the Procedure in the Public 
l3usiness of this House'·a.nd to report what alterations, if any, ar'e desirable 
for the efficie,nt despatch of such business" and with instructions to "report 
a.s 'soon as possible upon any scheme for the 'acceleration of proceeding~ on 
Publio Bills which maur be submitted to them' by His Majesty's Government. "(30) 
This the Select Committee did, but in so doing they were u~ed by the Gov~rrun~nt 
as a means of legitimising the Government's ownproposa.1s by discussion, even 
"When negative, a.nd that the major proportion of their deliberations'in fact 
sel:'Ved to merely 'refine the Government's ideas. In addition, the personnel 
ot>the Labour Government acted as agents of the Executive first whilst Labour 
l\{ '.' ",,', ;',' ." ( , ~ ~ ",;," , , ' " , 
,embers on the Select Committee'conceived their role in terms of the interests 
ot the'legislature. Neither acted as agents of the Labour Party per se, 
a.J.thou8h'a,s will'be' seen,' certain well-definable party positions ~~~~ 'ertdent. 
" '. " In order to 'facilitate a speedy response to' the wishes of the House the 
'Seleot COlludttee was permitted' to meet during the Parliamentla.ry"recess; a 
t:reedom ~hich it used to suc~ good' effect" that it produced' it1' first Report' on, 
, 16 October 1945. (31) Tlrls"Report"'dea.1t with proposBJ.s whiCh had been"o:t-1ginally 
, , 
, dre.rtea. by' the "Coalition C~binet CoIDinittee and which' the' Go~ernment" ha.d S'U.bDrltted 
I ' , , 
to the Select Committee~ The proposals were not,ther~fore, 'specificSJ.lY thbse 
to which' theL8.bour P~ty felt committed. 'In' th;ir preamble"to' the Memora.nd~ 
.' the Government sta.ted that, 
1058 • 
.. ~/ :.<?,. .. ' ..... ~ I> . _, r. " 
'ltrstRep'ort of t~f{ S~le~t cominitt'ee'i~nPlX>cedure: !I::C.9~'~(1'945/6). 
~". "the present Government, whilst not thinking it right 
. to cOOllllit itself at this stage, feels that, the scheme 
. covers a number of proposals which are eminently worthy: 
of consideration by the Select Canmittee and fom a ' 
useful basis fran. which the Canmittee may canmence its 
,discussions. "( 32) ~,"~ ,,~, '." t,; 
,The proposals w,.?re, not, therefore, Party proposals ,of ,:the Executive and as 
S~Ch reflected the Executive's desire to ensure ,institutional change to 
1'aoil't 
. 1. ate .the passage of increased . legislation.,,' The Governnent, for a variety 
'- ~ -, ~ , 
of . ' ," 
reasons, notcthe,leastof which se€ms to.have been fear of an adverse " 
Parliamentary reaction, recognised, that, any modification in Procedure would ; 
~ .. ' 'f ;, 
\ ha~eto be made."on,anexpernentalbasis."" The Select C~itte,e respo~de~ 
'. by stati.r"., • 
--0, in turn, that,:<!L 
"it would follow;tbat any ,alterations in the Orders, 
governing the procedu~e of the House which the 
adoption of these proposals may ~req,uire would take 
the fonn of Sessional Orders during the experimental 
period. tt;; (33). ,~ ';,': 
~\The Government's most important'propos~ls was,'~that"su~stanti~~y+a1.l 
B . 
ills: Should be, referred to StandingCcrnmi ttees and" the passage. o.t'Bills in 
_. ;; ,< . ' , .c:! ,;' ","... ,," '" "'~ t;.:·' 
, St6.tJding ~c:rnmittees.accelerated. ".(34)~To:achiev~ thisobjectJ:w~ich in 
}(orrison t swords, ,. "involved. nO,more ? than ,a more, extensive apPl~c~t~~n of ;,.the' 
~ p "."',..,' " ' ." ' .. , 
'" l'QceQure;already"provlded for in Standing.OFder~~(35):the,s~h~n;~,p;;,P?s:,~,:,yo 
e.7tte d ' ~ , " :' . " 
,',' c,' n:thesitting,hours., of:Gcxnmittees, ~o, increase~h.e.I?:umber ,~~;;reduce~:;!~:,~ : 
, liSiz.' ' . ' , ' • ". 
, e of Canadttees and to make amencments w, the procedure, and practJ.ce, of, the 
:Debate inCanmitte~. The over~l'purPoie behi~d {the S~h~~W~s~:'$.;e ,\,.~" 
<, '. _, ' •• ,.,~ "",~., -,t." .... ~...,.;,. }.' •. ' "~"'11). "';'.~.,~ ...... ,...,,;~ 
~liarnentary time and inceaseits,ef!iciency~ ~iL: ,i"l ,,' 
Jg. .' ''''t-
.... "".,,£b:l8.J, (Appendix) p.x., 
l:3." '.ll?:iE..:, p. ii~' pa~a. 4.: " The wording of~: this paragraph DS • decided' on the' . 
'O&.:ii.ngvote of the Chainnan (Sir Robert Young) after an 8-8 vote along 
: Partilirles:' The abour Manbers ' alternative wording would have been less, 
" •. ElIaphatic in its claims. See Ibid. "p.xvii. ,... .' 
. } t ~ ~ l' ~ .~ !i" < ~'" .' ----
, !!,.o. 'Deb. Vol.4J.5··· oc. 2346 (Morrison). Cf.' H.C. 9. Report, 
,'. - c4[ ,'~ .,.' '. ._.~; ".' 
1'.208. " See Note 4. 
·{; 'The Committee's reaction was, in the main, favourable. They approved 
the proposals to refer all Bills to Standing Committees and to increase the 
n'l.UIlberof Standing Committees from the existing' maximum of five(36) to as many 
as were: nnece~!3aXy expedjtilJlul1' to dispose of the Bills coming up from the 
House ... ,,' n(31)' 
••••• Whilst pointing out some of the practical difficulties that 
su.oh a change would involve as regards accommodation, staff'recruitment/. and 
the strain 'on the Law Officers, the Committee agreed,· that': apart ,from the 
Soottish Committee the composition of which should remain unchanged, the size 
o~ each Committee should be reduced from 85 to 50 with'; a permanent nucleus of 
2.0 (instead·"~~'30-49). " Tlle;'alsor~co~end.~~ ~~at:th: ~:ber of Members added 
.' "~';' " ... <', , -- .,-, ; • '. - - ~ ~ . , 
for each p~ti~ularBiil S~Ou1d' not' ~ot~l ~ore th~"30 (instead of 40-55) and 
, , .' " _ ,41 '!- 4, : ~ .' "" 
that the qUO~ Sho~d~~e ~e~uced from 20 to 15. 
,. ~ ,;' 
';,. :,:-~ 
to the particular hours 
, 
in:V0~ved; to 'the Propos~l that the Standing 'Committees , should meet for 2i per 
" <; ~ ':.. \ ;~ ". L~; , " '" ~ ". ,.' .-. '~~' ':' 
o~casion, instead.'of'tw~ hours as prerlously, but viewed a proposal that.the 
'C'''''';'' ......... :~.,.; ~:: ,,,).'. ':. "i:;. ,,» "., .,'",,; ",' ';' ,>:; ;'" ~'''~<; . ,',':':"', .. :' 
C~ttees should meet on three days a week with a common disfavour. ,It wa.s 
;" ., '.1 .¥' '<~r" ':'-~:; . ./",.;~ " • '\ " J} / 
felt by the Seleot Committee that such a procedure ought to "be regarded as an 
,."".j-~,\ '. ". , in '~- ;;~ ::~~~Y.~->;>i;>:' .'; -.-cJ' .<-'"} '~" ,.,- ".~:_".~f1t ~'''t''';'~~-::~ 
eJtpe?ient to relieve congestion, rather than as, a nOrIn!3-1 pra.c?tioe.~ ••• "(38) .' .' 
~. ';:;a :;"0 "':~. ~'_, ! ','~'~,.~~'';" ,,~'. '1.\\;, 1£_:" ~:.::;.: ~,,:" 
!rh~ Select Co~itt~e agreed w~th the Government that Standing Orde;49Awhlch 
had b~e~:rep:~edoas obsolete in 1;;3 should 'be re,-enacted to a.llow Standing 
C "". '.,' c,"'"'' . ,,'·'C.:, 1ii::', ,.:. . 
°mmittees to sit concurrently with the House in the afternoon, but did so, 
't-",;.., ' .... ;~, •• _'!\*'~'" >C' """."";,,, ... ~. '_','-""',.~'''''_'' t-", .¥"'~_ "'_~" •• "...... ",' h' ..,. <':?~I!"':' y ~ ... ~ ,'~'~< '1: ;,~.- ,; , j' ...... ', .!', ," .- .... :...'- ,~~ 
~~er a divisio~ (39) and with the proviSO "that there should be no further 
,""'-;.' .' '.-, -" 1:., . . . ' ,',.', \. -, 
~ad" ~to"th~ td;e~ ;~;~relY curta.iled·~im.e aV~~~b~~~f~;:~~iv~t:" ]4e~bers ..... . 
~ "'-' ~~\:, ,,~:,'.: ;.i-·,f ~;_:~::. t :: -; .~~":;_ :/,;. 21::'~':<lY:-_-<:-J"'J:_ , "',,_\;~'_ ~:--A/·. 1; j>~? :rr) ~~. ,_,~, ~- ~,",- '",!~ ,~J; -j ~ 7~ ,,'-~~ >': '{;"/'~ ~,'iJ:- -3' f· '-. ,?".: ~\~-:,.:,\f,;:, _ .::-. '~"~:';~?~- ~'i{~~~ ~~-, ·i-:~\"'<:.::~l-,r;> 
~ lit_ 
,' .. 36. Which includedi'the Standi~ Committee o~·'ScottlshBiils.};.>%~~~n .. ,< 
37_, 1i:C:·9~1;p:v. para.a., u. .~: '. ,c •• 
. 3a:i'~ .~, . ,<, !bi~:, p~ Vi. pa.r&.'14;o/~' 
~:x:x. ~LU. 
;"- ~'~~, ~ ;' 
~::/.:,'-.,.).~~' ""'~!~.;> 
"to raise matters. "(40) 
The Seleet Committee, however, disagreed with ,the Government over the 
latter's proposals for prescribing andenforcsing a time-limit on the 
" ~ " 
proeeedingSin Standing Committee.(41) The Memorandum had advocated a 
j. ' 
, ~ , ..... tt', ' ,,' . ~ . ' ",,' " " , ' '.' , 
,special type of guillotine resolution, tI specifying the total time to be made 
;:~~a.il~ble fO; the Commi tte~ sta€e o~the~ili', ~d a Speci~ &erge;c~ , 
>. '::- >¥ ''1~.'~' <' '\ • ,_ " ,~ >. .' "~ ~ , , 
Business'Committ~~ to ~ubdivide the t~e available on the Committee Stage. 
Morris~~ i'at~~r ~ote that t'he' Go~erruUent had ' " 
, . 
"hop'ed'tha.t by r~O~ing'~ontrol of th~Guillotine 
,within ,the overall ,time limit from .the Government 
and placing it in the hands of a tneutral' 
Committee, we would ta.kepart of the political ~: 
edge off the Guillotine and make it less objection-
able to Members. "(42)'" " 
,By' Contrast the Select Committee ,took the view that the guillotine should do 
110 more than name ,the date by which the ,:Bill should 'be reported and that ; the 
It ' , ' , 
. detailed. allocation of si ttings to parts of the Bill" should be, the .~ ," 
responsibility of a sub-committee ,of the Standing Co~ittee itself consisting 
Qf. the Chairman and. seven other members nominated by the §'pea.ker. (43) i" ,The' 
, " 
Gove:mment t s scheme ;was rejected ,largelY on the, evidence of,the permanent': 
Qfficia.ls ~f the House whilst the Sel~ct Committee's vie~ was accept~dby the 
Go';~:mment as an improvement on their~wn. (44);""7 :~, 
,e ';', 
't,,:',., , The Select Committee also approved.,f ,the idea,', 
.... 
<.41.,.uthO~h' ~ technically,this was not the Government: s propos~,the~r a.cceptao( 
of the Select Committee's alternative proposal as ·an improvement on the one 
.;: Which they put forwa.rd~" (Morrison: R.C.Deb. 415)cc.2349)J'justifies the ' 
assertion. ' , . " , , . ' 
, 
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" ' ," that fuller use should be made of the prooedure by 
" whioh the Minister in oharge of a Bill oirou1ates 
to the Committee notes on any olauses whioh are not 
, readily understood without exp1a.nation"(45L, 
',an~ agr~ed, SUbjeot to ~he preservation of the right or. any Member ,to object 
;;~O}he taking-'of both St8€es ona.ny one da.y,to the abmdonment, of ,the rw.e 
wlli~, pre:vented two st8€es of a finanoia1 resolution being .taken on the, same 
,~. ,~e ,Government a.ooepted ,the reservation., ,"i 
, o.n the other hand the Se1eot Committee rejeoted, two further prooedural 
~~es Suggested by the Government.(46) Firstly, that on the Report Stage 
of a. Fizla.noial Resolution the Question should ,be put wi th~ut ,amendment or, ' 
~eba.te. Seoondly, that Committee Chairmen should be empowered to disallow 
'~el1>a.teon the, motion,,~'tha.t the Clause stand part of"the Bill" if, he was of 
t ' 
" he opinion that there had been adequa.te disoussion about 
'Ala' . , . ' " ' ," 
.' enQment ~efore the Committee.) 'l'he,latteritrejeoted as neither desirable 
140 ' , , 
r nece~sa.ry and regarded the saving of, time on the former as "negligible". 
f' 
140 ' ", , " 
:t'r1son on behalf of the Government announoed that it was proposed ,"to ask::, ;-i;:. 
, ",th " 
" e Select Committe~ to be good enoU8h to look at these points a.gain ••••• "(47) 
and " , 
," ' ... will be seen, had determined to insist on, its wa;y when the occasion 
t.:t'O fie. -_ 
,~'. ~. t ,,,. ~~'~ ~ .~ /.1 i l-C~: ",:" 
i •. Superficially the Qc)vernment ha.d~rofited by'~he'Seleot Committee's ~epo:rt 
• -, ,lrhio ,', " " " ' ~ 
" h it quickly translated into Sessional Orders. (48) The Committee's' 
l>:t'oeeedings, however, revealed a somewhat different story. , AI though out . of 
~» " , ,', ' 
; t.ragrtaphs only 5 ;were contested" ,those that were divided a.gainst were 
f -, . /., ,',' ._-
, - " ; /' '- . ';; ~.- - - - '.< ,,' - .: -. . 
-
. 451 C ' 
", !,.:iU • 9-1, p.viii. para.20. " ,,' 
',;\4~. -~~~;.~-~.tiii,;ar&S. 21/2;'-"~.::~. , , 
.' ,"47. LO:hR.. 415~'cc·>:2350. Se~ '~'~{;i~'£o6t~~ti; 6$.: >i' 
46"· ...•.•. '. " '. ,', 
'>. On 15 lfovember 1945. H.C.Deb~ 415",00. 2344·et.seq. 
Ol"lh . ~.t'osed along party lines and represented same of. the most important 
"'" ' "':. 
f '/ $' 
paragraphs of the Report, while scme alternative paragraphs were highly 
;, >' -" :', ' 
oritical of·the, GOverllllent' s optimistic est:imates. o~ the tjme which would 
>. '" .... ' • ".:..<'i' '. 
be saved. Given that the Government mem~r~dum was only "a ~seful basis 
tran~hich·the;'"·CCmmitte~ 'may commence its discuss:io~s" ~d was; as su~h, a: 
lnoderate 'doCume~t 1 the proceedings" ~ugured ill' for i the future. Moreover ~ the 
tact ';r,em8.ins~ithB.t'theGovernmentwas· roundlY defeated to sane' iSsues upon " 
. Which i ffel t str~: by an overt8J.l-partY Opposition of leglslat~rs. This, 
, ItishOuld'also be'noted that'there were specific exceptions'made' to 'the ',: 
:Bills "to' be referred "to Stancung Canmittees~ Y;In addition to Bills excepted 
~er Standing Ol-der46 (Bills f'or<:imposing;taxes; Consolidated Fund 'ana 
, Appropriation Bills;' and Bills for the oonfizlna tiOn ' of Provisional Orders) the 
, Q.oyernn~t proposed ;to keep on the Floor' Or the HOU1le; tone-clause' BUlsnot 
l'eqUiring detalled 'examination in Canmittee; Bills which it might be necessary 
........ , topa8~ with great ' expedition a.ri.d Bills" of first-olass consti tutionalimportance •. 
lh the case of' the ';att~r Mo~rison made it perf'ectly'clear that ,he ~eant 
"pOliticu" ratherthan!ecOnanic measures.: Moreover, the GOve~ent ~tliinea 
the right, subject to rules of oonv~tion,; and accepted by:the Seiect: C~ttee 
.' to 1l0"1e
4
that th~ Ccinmi~tee Stage of anY important Bill'shouldbet8.k~n on the ' 
Ploo " ~..' 
r of, the iHouse.; (49 ),.:,~ ,.'''; .. " 
In the :shortron, however; the Governn8'nt saw no reason to provOke::;' 
'0 " '. " '.' . . .' 
, -troversy with ,the Sel~ot Canmd.ttee, perhaps because the cry,of "Gestapo" 'D.8 ~ .. ;".,~ 
. t',··· ~"., ,;J,. . .•. "" ~, ., .'. "< ,PI" r'.'\:~":'Y' : .• ~,." .. ;' " , .. '" ;:.. .. 
,11 ill t'oo close ~f'~~'~~~ort'b~t moreprobab1.Y because:,t~ Sel,~Qt,panmitt~e,was 
- ,. "-"' ' "'- -, - -, '. - . ~ ,- "',:,- ~ 
- , -< ".' ~ • -~ " • , c' ~,,- -.; ~ ,. ~ ! 1. > f"''';: - <;.';.( --:1.,-:~::: .. ~'<-.~ ~~:':.fi,.~S.t~.U:~>~,·:".~~,,} 
, ;(:'-~r .~,.{' ,~~:~)_-~ 1~.:'; T~) ~,:~~:;. -.:; £~_~:':~r,:'~, ',,---+'_~ .:~ ,'<1, .,' ~ ~ - ,,,,",~ ..,-' 
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st,il~ d;l~be,rating and could. still change its mind. (50) Moreover, .as such, 
"the problem (of) how Parliament can function 
best, how it can do its work most effectively;" 
~ though' consistently maintaining the essentials 
.. of control in its own hands, "(51) .' 
,. r9lnalned' the' aim' of both the Government and the' Select Committee. It was 
Only when'the Select Commttt'ee h~ ~e its finaJ.' Report that it became' 
&'P:parent t~t the two' p'a.rtie~ had different ~~tionsL of "Parliamentary control If. 
. -
> ,,_, ,>% <:' __ -< ;c ..7<_ ,- ,,,"'" -,'" , ... 
However, before those differences became apparent· the Select Committee had. 
.. L 
issued its Second Report.(52) This Report was devoted entirely to Questions 
and DiVisions~"aridthe G~ver~eritts' ~espo~se was restricted. ~l~selyto a very 
'J :.- ""_' . . ~a.t'rQv/ p~inV' ~i:proced~e.' The Government t s ca.se was ,~oht;U'~ed in a' 
. ~~r~d~ submitted' byW: Gl~nvill Hall, Fi~ci~l Secretary 'to the Treasury, 
in-whic~' it';:;i~;·Suggested. t~{ the p~riod of noti~e recii:ired 'for ··o·~a.i answers 
t' .. ~ ,: . t", . , ........ '. :A' .. . t ';'" ',. , L. :) , ....... ,,' • 
o ~estions sho~idb~" e'rlendedfrom' 24 to '48 hours in order to "economise both 
t~e <&.od effd~t in' D~~tme~t's'8.nd 't~ i~crease the 'efficiency .'of"the service for 
th~ i~divid~~' M~ber.·tt(53)\"Thi~':' ~~Uid"~ppl~ p~tidul:a;..lY t~6~as~~' w~~re 
'Q' ",'--t ,'- , .. "1'''i< '-'!!~";;:'~:: "" >'v'~""u.~~: .. _'.~ ~"~_'_'~~. " .-~; >:,.~ -~.,,;'; 1:,!. --':/- .. ~.-" ~ -:, 
, onsUltations' beke~n:-d.if.ferent~ Departments or widely slparated branches of 
7 . . • 
c. th~ Sl~e D~p"arlm~ht ~ were i~~~i~~d.~eC~mmitte~ aO~~pt~d' 'th~~ G~;eri1ment t s 
~~~nt ~~~ ~~int~ ou~ t~t 'pa1;t of the ~swe; t~' the probi~;' i~;oi~~d l~y in 
I':,' " • -. th:-~:">:'~ .:; '~-'~'''; ~'. -0t ,;,c~, ~.~ .:-0 ... '-: ~ ~ x, ~~ -~:"3:> ~ ;).~ " ~, y' f ~.~ ;'" I ~ ~ .' ~.~ ~l 
e willill8ness 'Of Members to ~restrict their activities in this field to essential 
~ 
~tt'e~B: 'In ~~de~,·"to e~~o~ageMem~~~s'i~' thi~: ;~~p~~t~ they r:~~lommended that 
~~~tions '~ot~~qui~i~'~~al~;s~e~~:4~h~uid re~eive e. r~;lY withiln se~en:days" 
~:,,~':<,t,;, \~")..,'~\.',f ",'1 ",' ,c~ 'if;" - "~"~t~_~-.~"~j';~ .. ~:,~, ";.:," '::~; •. :.-"f.il'::~·)·:."--",::~.~·'~':~··.';5_.,~, ;:'-.;~ 'r-".,," -1"- "'~"",,,,<f 
,- ~ - ~ ... "" ~"t~'",,' .... .', ,.';~;' -;\,.'y ":~I"~~ ,.:.,..," 
.. d-" " '* " "'l' .'- T • 
,'" ',,/ "~,\- .,' t.· • ': ~,' .' -. '0 ~~, ':"'~ .. " ,,<': <'. J! ":'-: ", " . 
. Al thou8h" Churchill' smiscalcu.lation' during. the electJ.on campaign had worked 
in the Labour Party's favour some Members of the Opposition lost nQ~ime in 
attributing to the Government some of the misrepresented 'implications of Sir 
Sta.rford Cripps' follies of the'tbirUes~. ~ee,· for exa.mpl~f; the Speech of ., 
Quintin Hogg. R.C.Deb. 413,' 00.1,037/1046, 24 AU8Ust 1945.'''' ." .' .~. 
" 
,. '""": ,.., t' ~ ',. .. " ~ c , , " 
011.24 'JanUary '1945.'S~ond Report from the Select Committee 
LC. S6, 58-1 •.... ~., ' .,' .. 
of their appearance on the order paper and that Departments should be 
~:X:P~cted to reply to Members' letters within a fortnight. When 
, implementing the Canmittee's suggestion on 22 March 1946 the Government, 
again preferring to use Sessional rather than Standing Orders so as to 
, ,- "' 
< 
Emphasise the experimental nature of .the reforms, voiced their agre~ent 
, Wit~ ,the Select Canmittee's point of' view, recognising in particu1~, 
that the system could only work with the. "cor,dial co-operation ot Hon. 
M~bers.n 
There .~. nothing to suggest that the Labour Government took or 
.!anted to take a radical or distinctive Party stance on these particular 
.. ;"-, - '... . 
" issues, confining its suggestions, as we have noted,to a very narrow, . 
'" • < ~ v ;:' "'", .,' ,"~'_<J ,-,p._ Y, -',~ .,,' '. "\;,- '~.', 
Point ot pl"llct:lce. .' Indeed the seoond part ot the .Report, ~hicll, dealt with' 
and rejected a variety ot,proposals, includ1ngmechanical methods, 
y • , ... ~. - "" ,.. .,,, -, j- ¥'. ,.'" , , - , '"' , 
designed. to, reduce the time involv~d.indivision merely eohoed the , 
" 
conservative view, of,the,Goverl1l1ent ohief"Whip, Mr.,\:,illi8lIl~hiteley~ (.54) 
·a:erbertMorrison later declared that,tI~oving through .the Division, 
. -.;~.. f . , -~,' " ,," .' " ' 
! tobbies",is ~ useful and pl~sant sooia~, occasi~n" ,:, an~ttitude ,quite, 
. ." . . , " -~ . -,.' -. - -, ..... , 
representative, of the Governmentts expressed views. (.5.5) . Moreover, the 
, • " .,." ., -"' '.~ -. ' -.~ <" ,. .-', ~ ,. '"" • ,. ," ,-
GOlfernnent's presentation ot its oase" to, the Seleot Camnittee was basically 
.. ' ~-. . ......' , .~ .'~ I ",', ~ i!' ~~'\ " '.,._ 
,that of' the Exeoutive. It was the Select' Canmittee whioh forced the 
" ~ . _' .. \ _, ~ I" ,. \ -<i • , -.>(." ",) ,~ ~!. 
G~lfernment,~ithout muoh effort a~ittedlY, to consid~rthecompl~entar,y 
Ohanges'~~~' 1";;~ ~V~l~~d iIl~~e p~oposals W~~h ~~ey advo~a'ted. ~ ac~ePting 
, ' ' , .. - ;', :" _II!. t" J .,,.' , '- -, ,,,. ,~,:", _ - ,,}+ 
>'the~elect Cmmittee's oonolusions the Lab~ur, Government's Ministers were actillg ' 
::'--'" ' ."" _ ~ _, • . 'J ,'''-,,- '~, .''; "'.: ,- ~,,~. ::-; _ .,"", Jf,. -, _,~.,,,-.~_.,.,~_,,/_.:~";::';§:~.~. 
PartJJ ~ut otExeoutive self-interest Wit'h the' consequenoes.forPar~~t as an 
..... :- ~ " ... ~, ~. T, ",,!f .• 1~ f,'- ' ""-'~":":" 
Cancnons was being reformed 
pp. 1766/18Q4.. " 
llorris~~ Government and Parliament~ 
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in the interests of the Government, in order to facilitate their legislative 
pr,ogramme and to make Parliament a more willing instrument for Executive 
rule. 
: , 
By contrast the Select CO!1U1littee, including its La~our Members, 
"ern;~~ised the c~i ti~~l' role of' Parliament and' sou~t t~ incre'ase its 'power 
;. , 
in ,this resp;e~'t b; ensuring that the responsibility of th~'Ex~cutive was ' 
'te ' ,":' :,'" " , " fg " 
sted as often and as quickly as possible. On one occasion, however, this 
", , ~ . .." '.. } "- ",' 
,'Ilimv' ~s ~eve;eiy tested when a move to reduce the number of questions to 
~,!; "';<~ ; /' :"~ :~-. ;-. .t' 
ba ask~d pe~ day frOll three to two ;on a !emporary basis, until the volume 
of ques tion~ de"a1~ed to ~ormal,' w~~ d~f~a tea on ~ vot~ ~hich wpli t the 
tabOUI' camp ~ tw~;'three' in fav'~~: t~~~:ag~in'st. ' Most, Members apparently 
t ';':": ,," ",:", ',', '; : :, ',. :!,,' .. 
ook the view,that the initiative ,had" to come from the Executive rather than 
th '" 
" e Legislature. Hav1n,g'taken that initiative it was up to the Executive, 
. ,;;: 
not 'the L~gi;laiureJ to~use ~t':t~ ihebest advantage. However, the overall' 
: inipre~si~n( ~e~~in~"thatLabO\l~'~~;ty Membersi~ Executive and ~~g~Slati~~ ;~les 
~doPt~d 'th~priIMI·./ at~it~de of th~~e "~~i~~ rather't~ the ~rog~~e, insofar 
, , " ~ 
" as one eJci~t~~;! of th~ pa~ty"' ~s a ~hole. Nowhere was this more apparent than 
, on the 'Seiec~'Canmittee~'~ Tirl~ R~po~t. " 
';. ,~:. '~"">",. ';0;,' ~~_.,: .:. '-';., _ :'>- ':!\ ' .. ', ,_ _ ~', '-;:i " f 
The: Third Rep'b"rt ~of:theSelect Canmi ttee, which was issued on ,31 
Ootober 1946, 'd~];i~~d ~ t~ :'ge~e'raJ. 1'80 ttern 'f~an a M~orandum on :proc~dure 
-', J, ," " • 
'W ' ' " " , ' ",'" , /,", , " 
:ritteribYSir~ilb~z:t Campion, Clerk to the House at the Canmittee'. s' 
~~itatio~. (56) All the witnesses were asked ,to make,canments on Sir 
, , ,-
~~bert'~ views and the'Select C~ittee questioned witnesses, .including 
, . ~e~bert Morri~on and Glenvil Hall for th:Government~ both on the~' 
:r~otio~~to ~~~'~~orandum and ori" any, alternative s~gestions they 
~ht (ha~e~"J:r;~vi t~bly': 'ther~fore the'Selec/committee acted as a 
c, , , , ' ,', ' 
.ti-ibun~i:for c~~t~~< i;eas where~s the Government appeared as thepu;"eyor 
set of ideas. Inevitably, " too, the Select C.~ittee felt free to accept 
,,' 
, ':>"'~; 
, ,; 
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or rej~ct ideas from the point of view of.the multi-functional working of the 
Rouse while the G~ve~~n~ ~tres~~d its ~tiv~ i~gi~l~tive: role. 
) " ~~'..:,' .;' - 'f - , ~ • ~e Sel~~t Committee recogriis~d thS.t\ts task~wasto'i~dicate "how to adapt 
procedure to':':~e:grOWi~ ;~~s~~e 0'£ b~s'i~e~s"~w~Ch w~~:;~.fu~da:mentallY the same," 
: th~l1gh more ~~te •. ~t~at'whi~h h~faced it~(iprede~~~'so~'in 1932. The back-
-!- ~ -
g~und, however, was entirely different. ,+' ,~, .;'" "'} ,r In 1932 proposals 'were made which 
WOulithave changed.the charactera.nd functions, of Parliament, which as, an ' 
inst~ent of government, was under severe critical pressure from several 
qua.:rter~ "whereas in" 1946 the country had emerged from a, war-time situation" 
z. ('/~~ <:\·tj"~-(~·~# -'-, ~-r '-', ;;. 4 -
"in which'parliamentary activity was maintained and 
contributed a large measure tO,its successful 
prosecution. "'s Consequently. there" is not .. at. the .:., 
.' present time any strong or widespread desire for , . 
t Changes in . the 'essential characlter of,. the instituion.;, 
" Indeed, the prestige of Parliament has probably never 
""4 been higher." (S 7) 
did not consider proposals thB.t would, alter."the essential." 
. ' 
, . ·~acter;of, the House of Commons". The Sel~ct Committee further recognised 
'llat the danger to par.liamen ta.ti~~~ernment lay more' in the burden which. the 
as 'such.:' t Conseque~tlY, -they concluded "t~t'YK'~;:"w;;.\c i' 
, ~.,' nth~ 'problem •• ~ ~ ~ is how, to adapt 'th~ 'proc~dure.:. ',:;;c 
of the House to enable it to perform efficiently,; 
" all'its functions in relation to present and " ',' 
prospective governmental activity."(S8) 
~ ~_.~_ t:~t;: ~ ,'I; • ~~~":!r ~'<J f">"·:;::,· i ;)'1~' :1 ~:}. l ~~~ ,:~.F'~.t 
','" ih. Government's' atti tude to the problem was set out in their Memorandum 
t . ~ ~~. ';~~'i.;, -~:::. ~ '". . 
• the Select Committee. (59) "The GovernmEmt, tt it began, 
,,~ :. ,:>~~ ",," " ' 
.3:. _ "~:, ,.!,.,;,·'i 
, .-....-~ .. r;,~~.:i.'~"-;~::i,-"~' -,~ ....____ ' .:;:.;~-: :'~-;..,~ ~ :'\;,." ....:.';\~-"0"';';j-',l;1.':"+:':"':&':;",,"~:'i'f';';"; :...:>...:~;.,;;' ;'i:;..' :...~~~~~ ........ "~::-~=~=:;~"--:'""':~'":""'_-....~"""':' __ ":* 
_, ___ ~--',:.~' l$44CC QA3"t;l 
, ' 
,.i, , 
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.," "in~~i'tablY appr~ach this matter frOn a ';~int of 
" ;,view different fran that of: the Clerk of the House. ::' 
He is concerned with 'the general improvements of ' 
" the machinery and fonns of, the proceeding of the cO. 
House so as to provide suitable instruments for the 
discharge of its various functions' ,the, Government, 
on, the other hand, must be constantly mindful of i 
,their legislative requirements, and proceed with the' ' 
main objective of facilitating the passage through ; 
," ' Parliament of legislation which the G9verrment regard 
as necessary for the well-being of the nation." (60) 
~h" ;,: /"i7',:>' ",;'" "," ,,;,' ,; " .. ,' " ", , ," 
:' though Under' questioning Morrison said he regarded this as' a matter of 
eatphS.sis (61) he made his' Own pO~iti~d perfe~tly cle~~ • 
• ., .' - ~ - / '>:" • '. > .... ,-, },' 
"The Government 'is/responsible to' the House.' 'On 
.the.other hand the Government has to try to ,lead 
'the'House~" (62) , , '.,' '" 
';"" " ,. j 
, 
" , 
}( ; ~ '1,.:- ~ ~ . ..... ,~. ~' -t; t' -; t\-'> ;" '. ": ~ " :- i- ,;t ,;).. i', <C'... !-, '~. 
'i Ol:'eover, Morris'on; as we shall see later, took the view thatParl18ment;'f 
%th~ugh ~it:hnat~J.y so~~reig~'; ~dno pre~~rip'tive right 'iie 'U:;itat~"th~"';orkb;~ 
or, .I _ "" 
of th~; E~~cU:ti ve. 
\Si~tGUbertC~pi'~nt~ ~ost ~portant proPosal ~~~\o re~rg~nis~\he;' 
,It. ''' •• St I', ::~('.~ "'.::' ~.' ".,~:', f' ~, :"'~' "':: ~. ""'.... .' "'>''' .. "I. . '> ,;- _ . ~, .. ,.V. ;\ ':' -~'~ , ;' ,-'> 
8.nding Calmrltteesby' giv~g\th~ responsibility for the Report as well' as 
':the 'Canmi tt~e '·s ~~e of Bills /a ;;~h~~~;hl.~'h he '; juatif ied "o~\~~~ groun~~ 
\~t::i.t w~dspeed up and s;~~~~e;;~h~'l'egiSlat.ive process. i,'; 
;'Go";'" '> ,:,it '" ",'" ... ' " ", ", '~' 'Vel"rlnlent, "for the'ir part, Jdisagreed,',for several reasons, but mainly 
l~b:'-~'-' :-''',.: -~ -l,,;\' " p-:;.-'W-",,<~ ,. . ',,' ~ "'~~ ~"'., '. '~ ':"';"~~'''''''-' 
.,,< 60ause i t1zltrodudedaddi tional <~tages'into 'the'legisla tivep;oce~ure 
"b'!,! ':~" .. -;----.~.~-, "'~~'~_~' .. , \-,:."'~" ~,,,.,.$ ....... "' "1-.~r, ~:~t,'d': .: ,- "0..,,.:_. :,. ,I.,., -~,- , c:_~.,-o..{.-_< ,~",~.-!<\~ 
"Y -king 6'stag'e's inst~~d ef 4, which involved "a co~r~spond~g"extra 
bUrden on y~~ te;~; W' th~;~~~:i.6us :'po;~'ibii;t;th~t '''bot~{eneck~" might 
1'"f' ',_ _ \,' 
c:1eyelop ~d bec~use : :', :, ,: \'" ,;' I' .'.' ';~1;\, 
.,. ""C~'~"""~ __ "the whole basis of thework'of Standing Canmittee '_' __ k'·'~_'''''v.~.'''""",., 
... would be. altered j if any Member had the right, to 
. attend and 'speak theY would lose their corporal. te 
identity, and their proceedings would almost; , 
certainly 'take longer than under the existing, 
system." (63) ':"' ,'" 
~ c,_, ," ,_, 
lb=i<!., p.97. Government Memorandum, 
" ,,' ~<" ." ... ~.t>- .... ;: t' or 
. 1hiq~:"'''Q~jlBl~;: Q;31B4!3is6.' 
,: '2. ,,:J:·J.b14. ~.,:ij;;~;;. 
'. , 
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" The,ir ~t~r.nativesugge~tion was ~hat at the R?port stage debate should be 
rest~ic.ted ,.to a.) Goverl1llent amendments, "b) ,points .left, aver ~00l the Ccmnittee 
< ' ; ,., -"~ .-' "" '- ~ ,. ~, -1, ~ '<. .'> 
ste.ge".EU:ld c~ newpo~ts, arisinga'ter,the canpl~ti?n of :the ,Canndt,tee stage.(64) 
The S l' ,t ' 
.... ~~ct Canmittee whilst it agreed with the.Government that bottlenecks 
'- . ~ .. , , ' '" , ,- . . -'," ~ ., -. ". '" 
~ight arise rejected their schOOle as well as that .,of Sir Gilbert (65) In 
• " " .~ ,', "~,.' ~'..' " 1'. "':. ;_. _,., -.-. ,. 
Particular it accepted ,the Speaker's view ~hat it would involve "a drastic 
, , _r _ ~ '" . " ". .~. ~ <\.- • "! ~ .,' , "~.' '--, ' , 
1nte~erence, wi th the rights of Private Members." A further proposal, to send 
• ., .' "'- , -" > 0 n'. '-l'-' .'~ • "",_ . ,~ _ ,_. 
IIlll Scottish Bills, if the House wished, .. to ; the Scottish Standing Ccmrnittee was 
-, . ," " . , 
&.lso."turnedd,?wn~ (66) Ironically, v the Gover.nnent ".which ~d ()bjectedto th~ 
,- "...,. , -. ,.' ., < 
Proposal on the same grOWlds as to the other, changes, with, .. the ~laim! that ~i t 
(. ,~', . 
. "OUld be, unpopular and .be regarded as.treating. ScottishBllls,as second class, 
'.c . ~, 
"e~, to pass" measures \,very, similar to, this: two , years ;la ter, owing .. to pressure' 
'. , et). legislative, t:ime. (67) A 
. . . 
Sir ~ Gilbert Camp ion 's. Memorandum, was especially~ cri tical,of, the exis ting 
. g' . . 
PlUoedure;whereby;:the House cc:mtrol polioy, ,.especia113,,~ Supply, ~d he 
. prO,pos~" that, the the spent on Supplemen ta.r,y. Es t~t~~ ~: in, ,.~ov:in.g .~he . 
a,ea.k:er out ~ t~'c~i~"s~ul~be included in Supply Days" ot, whichthe~ 
,_. ~F ."'''': . ;~,_., '_. ',0 ~.f" . .-, ~ " , .... '~.' ~,-' ' •. Il '.~ "-",<[,' -.--";, . .",,-.:>",,,".<-.-, ... ~ .,.'; 
Shqud.~b~28, spread evenly. over the whole Se~sion~HH~<.alS() s~e~t~dt~t 
l;>.." ,) .. _. ,", '.~_ 1.' / -"I- ",- ," ,='" - " ~ - ,..;;t., 'c
o 
".'-' {' ~ .', 
., there ~hould be a fixed d~ each week: for taJcing .~uppl.Y~ The Government 
> " ." '._ ~'~~.~ " ,_,. ,'. ' •• ".' "!,' • ,. " .• e-,'6 ...... , r 
·,"~It.&reed., with:~t~,~ugg.s~ions.., The. latt~r~ i~ ,thought 
the ,f'Ol'Jaer f too ma.ni: propOSing 26 instead, ot 28 days. (68) Further 
.~.' .' . '. " ... ,,; .. ' ,.,' . 
, -.ndations~adyooating.the relaxationof,restrl.Otions on the introduction. 
h. ~, 'c' • • .-
. ............:. ~~--~~~--~--~--~----~--------~---
' .. ~ .. ,two. c1qs' ,c11:f'terenoe,: .. however, can b~ found :in theGaV~rm~ntl s··· .... , .....  
, l:'e~ection of' the idea. of a Publio Expench.ture Cc:Jlll!dttee tor whioh the ' 
Ilel. .. t Oamdttee bad, set aside, not more, than 2 allotted d~s • .!!E8., ' 
~. 98 para. It.·and p •. xvi para. 44-' '. .. . 
474 
. en Supply; ])~s of the Motion "that Mr. Speaker do now .leave the Chair" 
'Were "treated cautiously by both the Government and the Select Canmittee. 
. . 
Tbe~ la~ter, however, agreed with Sir Gilbert over. the number. and 
1:1 • " • 
0' l.atr~ution of, Supply Days and with the Government. on the inflexibility 
, .. 
ot ha ' 
<.; Y1ng a f~ed. day each week for Supply purposes. (69), 
';, A fundamental conflict aros~, however, over. the question of 
'Parliamentary. supervision of admi~stration. Sir, Gilbert suggested that 
.~ ~,~:: • <. -" ~ • 
theterma of reference of the Select Canrnittee on Statutory Instruments 
, , -. - ". ,>, '! ", • • ~ .~ 
~hoUld " .~~. extended to enable i tto. question the, efficiency,. of Orders so 
., '> •• ~ -'. <-'" ~ ,~ ~'.,~ 
instruments ,of. policy, aswell as. their legality •. The Select Canndttee on 
Procedu~, ~ow~ver, .thought the question of delegated legislation was 
be ' .' .. ' '. 
Yoncl its powers and reccmmended that a Select Canmittee or Joint 
, ,e .~ , t 
o .:'..-'i;-~;.~·9 ~-:.:. ~ }T --;<"'-._',olh<, ~."i •• -_~~:~ y '-; -~. b ~-."-' 
-.u.ttee be set'Up, to~ inquire into' the wh()le matter., (70) The Government, 
- -. "",--.,."-,,, 
b.owever,· tOOkt;t.o~g ei:cep;io~ to the idea that Parliament should interfere 
~ . 
1n ~iniit~~ii~~ \i~t~;. (n) Parii~e~tt s role1-sh~~d b;:/ one '~; .. 
8;~~~~io~"~d:'not;'~ti~ti~e:",~t "iI ~por~t'~/t~t thl;:;~bOrdinate 
l~;-l r _ ~- .~ l';-:;;~::: 'Y.':~:'" -~~,_ ~,,,.- . ,.,-, '~h.;~ ,~",.-,'}.,,".,"~--..~ '~: ~_~'!-'. ~ "':; '''z~: "',,,,,; , .~, £, . " eil.Slation~ shoUld'not'''go'o~tside'''1;he'authority given by Parliament. That, is' 
th;:' gre~t'; thing .. iJ.ct'Ol ~ to be w~tci{~d~ ~ / (7k)":~ Mo;;over; Morr~;o~'idisputed" 
1t. _ ',,' 4' ,,"', . ' , ~e~~i8dan of demand~'~~~tb~~/~i;te~~' :~,IT~ ha~e to def~/~h~"'poiiOY , 
o~i>," 1 i; . "",-;r :,: :>.:"'''''' Y., , .. ,: ?, ;,.: ; y . !;'",,/ 1!~A~', -ta.ine~ in'suborainate . legislation before the Select Camd.ttee. (7.3) , As he 
_~f" :2' ,\ " " ,",' _", , \ ' ',' , ' • 
to s~ elseWhere in'eyidence, 
- '" ;;.-:' , 
,~.~ t<.:" '1:" :~ \' !;f ,~'''''''.''~ \ ,:~ ,+~ ~_; f~: .. , .~"~ t '!-) f ·P.;,:;;- .) ';r,~) 
.. ItI"ao not say that the House shoud not be ~ , 
, " ) nuisance. to Departments. ~ ~ One of ,'~. the funot:u,ns 
,,> of Parlument is. to, be so;; but nevertheless, , 
~"Pa.rli_ent has a'ci1uty.to,;talce account, oft ,the . 
1".l'lmDing, of, Departments. It (74.) . ' .' 
.!b~4., pp. :.xi/xii. paras • 
. lP'd~ ~ p. ~OO. para." 12. 
~he Speaker, was M?rrison •. 
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.. This view of the role of Parliament and Government came out more 
'fully in the proposal by Sir Gilbert Campion, which was accepted by the' 
Select Committee, to create out of a merger between' the Estimates and 
Public ACcoun}s Committees one unified Public Expenditure Committee. (75) 
. The Government strongly resisted the idea claiming that the 'existing' ~. 
C~ttees perfonned essentially different functions which could not be 
~ead~ merged without sane duplication of effort and loss of 
adzninistra~t~:e efficiency ~hiCh was~t pre'sent avoided by overlapping 
• ' < ' 
membership and consultation between the Chainnen and Clerks •. More~er, 
it Was not Parliament t s job to interfere· in administra tion~~ "Parliament t s 
'bUSiness" said llorrison, . 
· ... "is to check. the Government, throw it out if it 
wants to •••• but Parliament is not a body which 
is organised for current administration '- not in 
, this country." (76) . 
'" • "" -.<'" . ~o: r~ ~ '.  .'.... '. .' '. '.'~ < ~ . .._ _ . '" . ,,'. ~o~ing' the'C~tio~'~xperie~~e ;ith the investigatory powers of the 
S~lect Canmittee ;,; N~~~~nal Expenditure and' asserting the deterrent 
~tte?'~~f'; ~he2 Public A~c~unt~' C~i tt;~',: Mor~is~~ ~ec~ared: that " 
~- t ''; 'c" ". , > ,~z ~. . ,_", 
&.lnal.gamation wouid b~' "disturbing~ highly inconvenient and will weaken 
th~ . ~ftic.ienc~~·:wt.t~~ll; adm~ist~;tion." 
~':"';~,;:; , .. 
p~aoe a very hea.;y burden on serlior officers and inevitably hamper the 
':.:.., J; ~ \ ~ , <'« ~ -'.., - - j, ;'.-," ,,'-' ".~ ~ ",' < .... '/, f, '. <', ~,~ \, ,,~' -'1, "'~ r"_'1" '~;A·::;.:o.;, '5':~ f.:» 1 
efficiency of e~e~~t:i.ve aoti~nby'importing deiays and cramping 
~ti~tive' •• ;'(78) . R~~~ll~g' th~\;'~alition' s ~xP~~~en:e he said, 
,~ ~:: 
Itth~'" Goverrim~nt' had '~oipc>we~ to order the Select 
Camnittee about, - quite rightly. :Itwas a·: ' 
canmittee responsible ,to Parliament .~ •• only 
. Parliament can pull a Seleot Canmi ttee up. Of 
course the Government can ask Parliament to do 
so." (79) .,,' ,.,' 
.!biq., Q;.33lt-S. ' .For Korrison's opposition to the resurrection ot 
'. the Select Camnittee on National Expenditure, seeQ • 
..!bid., p.98. . para. j (o)~< 
....... N'eedlessto say, Morrison did not point out that for the' Government to ask 
p . 
&rliament to restrict the power of one of its investigatory Committees was 
Politically dangerous •. ' ." Yet the truth of the matter was that Morrison and 
the Governmen~. had. attained the Ministerial, taste for a. quiet· life, . it was 
ipower i.-a.ther than responsibility they. were, interested in. Morrison said as 
lnUch When in answer to one question he· said, . 
.• ,.; tilt is· the business of the. Government to spend 
the money. It is the business of the House of ) 
fCommons,to stop them spending the money or to catch. 
" them out if they are held to be wasteful in public 
j expenditure. tf(sO) ~. ','; .... 
01' ' . . , 
. course, if, by ParliamentaI.'Y oontrol was mea.nt to be exercised· after 
-inistrative 'errors had been perpetrated there w~salwa.ys the possibility 
'1;" .." . ." .. 
: hat 'the Minister conoerned would have moved on. To be fair to Morrison he 
did POint out~tha.~ Parliament had itself g~ven up control over Expenditure in 
te. ..: ,... . 
YOur of debating policy and supply, while he never denied Parliamentts 
. 'Iltimate . sovereignty ~ (81) ;,; x, ;~ .. , ", .'! c.' ", ,. ~ ... ' 
,;:;~'::; Yet thedif£erenoeofopinion' between the LaboUr Memb"ers on ·the Select 
" . 0' .• '" ".' .. : c·.·,.' ....... ". ...•.. .:' , 
,Olllllittee and those in the Government are direotly'attributab~etotheir 
o'<l)QQept':ton iand: practioe 'of their ';;les 'as. Member~. of, the Exeouti v~8.nd ,of. ,the' 
• ~isla~e.:, :~ Rathertha.n 'reforming th~' '~~chaniC's '" o£· the' system' by which. the .. 
··~~le.t:ion betweenck;vernment'and ~9.1:~iament were es~abl:l.shed, within' a hie~ 
'~hiaJ>£rameVlOrk: derived from hi st oricaF struggles;' between;the Cr~';n and the 
. .. . ~ ,;' ", . 
~~ons,' th'ey'were : "in fact ,; "actin8;' a.ccordioB 'to, traditional pa.tterns which by 
I . ' .' ',; .,' ,'.. ,"1' ;.' '. •..• .• 
;'~~'ver,ynature had a oonforming e£feot.',.".In other,word-sin . the, post,:,:war 
·.;:i~se ot'C~~oni'th8re waS:~~not a,UZlifi8dLa.bour 'Pa.rtr;~w o~ how ,the 'House 
<' r> '~('k-; 0: "'J:~< .:,'; .t. .;,;,:~ ~,,;;! "',, ::.~ ;<~,:::,,~: <f'-:-~ i~~ \-;: :; <'"'.:"? ~ ::. ~~ :";('f' ,~, ·:~ir~>.'~- y?; ·:J.:':~L~. :~' }»t:~. <"', 0\-,,:--
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, should be retonned but a multiplicity ot. views which, though initially 
. diverse, wer~::~anpl~tely divided' ~s a direct consequence of the structure 
> .,:- ~ '<: ',' ,'. "'. 
. Of the political sye tern. ' ;, ~"~ "c-.,';, - " 
," ••• " "! 
The Government's detennination to ease the procedural road tor the 
, passage ot its:: le~islation Wasittested-on '~th~r .. que~tions' to~. They 
, " 
".} 
Proposed tor ~x~Pl~,' to tonnalise the Report Stage'ot the'Budget . 
'- ~ R '" ,; - • 
~solutions, a pr~osal which the Select Committee rejected on the casting 
.~o:e~ ot ~~e; C~i~lUl, stressing th~ rights ~t Private Ment~ers as they ~i~ 
: '1',_ ;~. .C' 1 .~;<".j. -:-" '-·l':,. ._' ---~. 1> 'K ' .. ~..' ' . -: 
so. (82) On the other hand the Government's attitude on Private Members 
f' 1: ~,,':' -t",~ 
. to treat the subjeot as an academic one owing to the Government's 
: '" ":'" i. ~ ~ , "~ :~?:i;t:E ~~J,-'~ ';~>~ t ~,~.;f ,J; 
absorpt;i.on of all ~uch -, time" at present, while Morris on made' no seoret of 
his oontem~tt~~r ~~: iegiSlative role of Private Member~. By oontrast 
". the Sel~~?~~ittee adv~ated the speedy restoration of Private M~bers t 
t J\:t, "c' .. ~ 
ilne and"chose to retain the Ballot. A. lone attempt by a Labour Member, 
lr'" J, . '. '; i' ":. ~ 'I' , 
aurioe Webb, to have the ballot replaced by a Committee which would give 
,\ :,.k .•. "'''''l''-''~''' ,,~~ ,} ~'. ~:~. ".:: " .. t ~ .. "f ,~" r~('<~. '!':'~' ",',1'".; 
Bills p~ec~de~ce' on m~;it w~~ he~virY det~~ted. (84) A ccxnprehensive 
." ~ /' ':i:;;~ t ~'<', f} 
ot Priv~te Members' t:ime after reintroduotion, 
"', Which Campion/had:;prepare~, w~s ao~~p~t~d by th~" Sel~ot Canmittee. (85) 
'; ::: '~~':)" >. .', ,.~ '.' ", s' ,1:, ::.~ , ... ::~', "..... "', Y",~ ~"~"f,. , 
On the question ot Adjournment Motions under Standing Ord~r NO •. 8 
a. t";;-' '~,t.'\::~ ./,t i:-t _.,',; ~. M";" ,',:' 
nUlnber of suggestions' were heard, amended and adopted but, f'rcm our point' 
'<, t·-. ~ t .4.: ;~~ ~ "'T" ~!~ :. ''';, . " ':~ :~ :1 «~ ~ " &' ~ '< :.. ~ , 
Of view, the most illuminating statement was made by the Government in 
,;' " ". 1.~,.,~, :.: ", ,. 7 " ~. 
, ~8.:'agraph 7 ot' their Memorandum", 
~£ " , ~"':~ "'; :~: : "; ,~ .. ;- , ~, 
, .lb:l:4.., p. xiv. 9 votes to 1. ' 
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"no reason to alter the present procedure' or to, ': 
take any steps which would have the effect of 
making such motions more frequent.,' In particular, " 
they would not feel it right to accept the proposal 
: that the urgency and public importance of such,,' c, 
motions should be deoided by the Member raising the 
. matter and his supporters~ .. The Government are,. 
unable to agree that their time-table should be at 
'the mercy 01' any forty Members who have thought ot 
,a motion which could go torward solely on the ground 
that it was:sutticientlydetinite to be accepted by 
the Speaker. ",:(86);' 1 " } / 
.. , 
~e again' the House' of Canmons' was s:imply. regarded as the, instrument "tor " 
the legit:imisation ot,Governmentpolicy while the Executive remained the 
", 
ilU.tiator and provider of all legislative wisd<m~ The Seleot Canmi ttee,:t ' 
, ' 
Yet again pl~ingits legislative role without deterence to parties, 
" 'l"ec . , 
· , CRlmended that, any" t:ime spent on Standing Orders should not. be taken ' 
'~t ~t suspended; time. " (87) It ' con tinued . to plq .. this" role when it, once 
,&.&a1n.rejected the "two Government proposals which it .,had rejected1n its 
t1rst Report. : (88)~:;:,;:.<:<' ;<., 
The Government's attitude tewards,the Select Camnittee's report was: 
Olle ot,;t~~disgui~ed contempt. ,Instead, of dealing prOOlptlywith the 
. Report as they ~d. done with its twop redecessors ",the ,Labo~ Gove~r:ment 
1nfMi~ no , refereooe ,to ,it until 17 Ma~h.1947.,-almost fi;emonths 'after,,: 
th" ' " . , . '; .. . " , 
" e, Report, i tseU., had ,be~n issued, i and it, was not until, the tollow1ng,,~ 
.. "1i .', " . ,. " . ' 
, ~-ber.that Debating time was made available." Obviously, .; it must be 
. " ' " ""
'~e· . ,',. , .' , " 
", OO&Uised,tha. t ,the Government. was extremely. busy ,and; tha t it; n~eded 
,to 'draW' "'P,.the ~~'essary' amendments ,to B,tanding Orders that would ,be ' ' . 
l'eq~ed.,,:' Yet', the Gove~lment mIlde it pe~~ctl.Y cle~r thati ~ had no 
~t~ntrOn :.~iall~in~Ct~~·.~~se 't~ "~iscuss ,the merits of the S~lec~ 
O-.u.ttee'JJ proposals by choosing"to restrict its discussi~n to proposals 
"'1''''' . > .... 0".;" • ...' _, '~' 
!b~4~, p.99. Italics mine. 
xviii, para. ;6 •. 
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. which the Government had decided to implement, whether or not~ the Select 
COmmittee had accepted or rejected such proposals. ';; Thus when ·the Question 
• "that the Third Report of the Select Committee on Procedure be now considered" 
'. ; Wa.s introduced, Morriso~ on behalf of the Government moved, 
; "that this House approves the proposals'contained' 
in the statement made by the Lord Privy Seal on 
:. 17 March 1947, arising out of the recommendations 
of the Select Committee on Procedure. "(89) 
; ~s ta.ct~ic cau~~~ Sir' RobertYoung to~a.y ~ha;~:i~s~ead' of r~ing "arising 
, 't-: ",~". ;~' ~ ':";: .' , I: .', ,~"<. u ~ '·;'!":.o '.,. .. ~, ' 
out of the recomm~ndation's Of' the Sele~t C~mmi ttee on Procedure" th; moti~n 
L .", 
. ~ould have ;ead 'H~isingout of the Government t s proposals to the Select 
:,.~\~. t>"'1< . ' '( Y'~§ CO~itt~; 'on ~~;e~~~;. "<'9~) Notwithstanding, the fact the Government had 
. aocePted'J~~~;~~"jecti~~ ~~ c'ertain reiati~el~ un~;o~tant' P~O~OS~~it" h~\ made 
", . ~ " '" '.., . .' " 
• ..., .~, ~< ,,;, ,~ 1; } 
t,o;he Select Committee it persisted in those whic~ it asked the Select Committee, 
:i~ ~orrisont"s ~Ords, "to '~e good en~~h to 10~k at ••••• ~ain."{91f 
' .. " O~~~te~ ~~ving {~~~:~J: 'at the quest'ion of the establishment ,of a.nemergency 
, :t, ~~.; <:;.",',> .... ~ 'c' ,e;,-,. ·~,r":: ,. .... '., ... :··v ~,.~),"; < ':~J'-' .. ; ,j;';:~' .. f' ": ~",::? :au.sines~" C~o~tt~~ h~·;ej;~~ted it on the grounds that it was substantially 
t" ',;', ,,'lo' .'.,; .~..' ~:.: : ... ":,. ";:: : ,,"I . . ' .. , .. '~ • 
he same a.s one whiclith"ey rejected in their first Report. . The Government 
t: ,::' '. ; :. 
ook the view that the proposal was essential in order to deal with the 
• '?/f.. ' ;,' ,.' 
.' a.llocationot time oriers'~hic~ ;tclld not wish towri;e into th~·· Gu:1iloti~e 
.. ', .;, ,,' " '.' .,:. . >: "i" ..' .. • . ..'> . 
. lZesolutions whioh dealt with the Committee Stages of :Bills kept on the Floor .... 
• ~" " -f " ' 
... &t the House' and" Jieport stag~s of any 13ill, ne! ther of whioh had b~en oovered . . 
'b' .... .. :. . . . .. ... '.. ........ . .. 
., "the new &rr&ngement whereby a.sub-oolnmittee of each Standing Committee. divided 
• ,'. .~ > ., • >" " • 
,:\\Jt the :Bills with which they dealt.(92) . The Government also insisted that the:. 
\ ~ ~. , 
"', .,...,'-
'1 • , • • r_ 
t~hair.man,of C0mmi~tees; be permitted to disallow debate on the Question 
" -
'. ,.th~t,~~e ~lause stand part, "if he was of the opinion that the prinoiple 
, 
, ,O!, the ~,la~s: and ~ll matters arising out of it had already been adequately 
d.isoussed 
, . Unlike the Seleot Committee the Government did not think that 
, '.",' 
" ::!~hiS placed ,too muoh onus on the oocupant of the Chair as the matters were 
,'7' 
"one,s or, foot. (93) 
" .'- ," -.~ --
";,:,,,00. other points the Government broadly adopted those proposals which it 
""''' \ l ' . , ; " < - ".;." c ,.<, 
, •. ~ submitted to the Select Colmnittee. The number of "allotted d~s" were to 
' '- <~ '< " - ,.'. ~ • t .. _ 
:b~ 26 n~~,28. The .formalising of the Report Stage of the Budget Resolutions 
',." " '"' 
i.e., ,that the ,resolutions were to be taken without a.mendm~nt or debate, was 
"to b~\"~b~l~te~ "fO~ ~'~'t~~ judgement and decision of'the House, n(94) though the 
- Y-.- "'. ,..,', '.', •• ,_,': , ._ ./ "',<, ," ' ,,: _. ,", 
div:i.sions :,lists showed ,the predominance of pa;ty ties." Even on points which 
0. (_ • • " 
the Go~ernment accepted they asserted the primacy of the legislative programme. 
.. '" " '" \' - ~ > -I' 
,'rhus whilst ,they were prepared, to a.llow a wider use of' the moti~n. "that, , .. 
, ~.Spea.ker ,'~o le~ve ~ the chair" " they made the proviso ,that ,the m:t:i.o~ must be 
, ," . ~ " . " • ._',' '. • • ~ • - ' " : ,".' , "\ ·1 "" ~. 
(: -Ved by, a Minister of the Cro~n after arrangements thr~ugh' the usual ,ohannels. 
'" "-" ',,' / "'''~-r ,", " -' 
.Y 
. "The Gevernment (feit) that' they must: in this w~ ..... 
,retain oontrol of, the number of, these debates since 
, otherwise there mS:y be too many of them and not .,' .. 
eno~ time given to, the actual Estima.tes themselves. n(95)· 
, !"';'c',;':y.\,, ;",' ': ~, .', ',,, .... ; " . .• '" ~ , " 
On the'que8ti~n~t del.gated legislation the Government ef.fectively 
,'O»Posed the est&blishment of an inquiry into delegatedlegisla.tion, not as a 
" , -, -. ." '. ·l· 
II&tter,ot,prtno1ple (thoUgh M~rris~nts-erldence to the SelectCommittee,raises' 
'. 4."ots&\lout-this) but "ontheground~ OftheeXt~a.ordina.ryn~tur~~of the . 
, • '.,.... -<' .-. ., 
er. -
i"O,Deb.' 443,CO~156o/61, cl; Sir Robert Youngcc.1576-and~huter-Ede'<· 
oc.1605~'-·' ,~ .. ,~ .. ",~",., ~, 
~ " ", 
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eXisting situation, that the present machinery was animprovement upon 
. ' 
the situation which had existed at the time of the Donougrmore Canmittee 
"on Ministers Powers; that there w~s adequate safeguard in the working of 
'" ~ ~ ~ < 
the Select Committees an Statutory Rules and Orders and that it would be 
b '. , ' i
etter to wait until the Statutory Instruments Act (1946), due to ,cane c< 
',' , -' ' :r -> " " ,>, < ' ~, -" ~ _ ,,' , , , -:-' 
into torce on 1 January 1948, had been in operation before making such an 
, " . :;, ,'- "", - , 
'< ~qUir~. ('96) To these reasonable arguments might well have been added 
lierbertM;rrison'santipathy t~ ~ossib~e ~~nges in control of current " 
.:", .~: ",>, .--' ~, ,t_' <. ,<}:~ , , : ". " ~ _" " .', "~ ',,~:v, '. "1 
, aQministratio~ in favour of Parliament. 
- , 
'-, i . ,,' ¥" -'" 
, . It would be unfair not to point out that the Government did accept 
'. , t., - '.; ',', _,':". -," '-:' .'..., ,';"> ': ~ ''( : :. ';., ~:' "". ~,' 
t~~, proposal tor' making up time spent on Adjournment Motions under Standing 
". >r ':,.' , Ord .. ." " " 1,', 
., er No. 8 and agreed to adopt the Select Canmittee' ssch~e,.tor dealing 
:i. "" ~""'" ' 0" , 
; Ylith"the ~ll~ation of Pri~at~ Members'time whenever it was to be<restored 
(Which Was n~t '~til l~49:)~ Yet the~ general approach 'to the Select" 
C .,1 " i;~'.::: ' ,:' ," '.c ':"'" ":" "".; ;;': "c, "',, ;,'. '::, ,.; ':"c'" 
CJllrzl1ttee's Report was fran the sectional point of view of the Execut1ve ... 
SU-'Robert YO~~:Cha~~'Of the s~~~'c~ ~~~~tee, mad:;'~~: ;~~t~:er~.' 
t~rcibl~ Wh~~ ~: 
y 
<e" ,/ , 
"we (the Select Canmittee) approached these matters, .. 
as Members of the House of Oommons seeking to came' ;, 
to decisions that would be in the interests of the 
business' of, the House, of Oanmons ~ and, for the :, .• 
convenience not only of the Government but at , ' 
( ,,·.Hon •. Members themselves." (97) ,,' ... ( , . ~ .. 
'1'4e In.stituti~nalrolesof:t~ Government and, the Members were, "therefore,' 
ilu'l~entia1.· This was 'illustrated by. the speech of Sydney Si:!-verman,; 
::: 
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"did not delegate ,their powers to the Select.~, 
Committee on Procedure. They asked the wSeleot 
Committee tooonsider evidenoe and to make recom-" 
mendations, but they were not delegating the duty'" "; 
'~"~ ': of legislating to the Select Committee on .' ':", .,' 
Procedure. That is reserved to the House on the ~ 
'. ;';.',; Motion of the Government or on ,the Motion of other 
Hon.Members."(98) .. ~. 
~.,,<." , ':" ~",~, ;,';.....; ~:',: ';2 ,: :"'cC:,,': 
" m, suoh a view Morrison would not have dissented and technically 'the House . 
, ,,- '0' ,~., t-Was""" ;: ',,: " , i." ... ,"."" " ' .. ; ".' '.. . " . 
taking a free vote but the issues ,like the diseussions' on the Select ' 
C ' ".·C !. ,7.., •.... ',' " ': 
.. OlDlnittee, ha.d in fact become party issues, ;nly' Sir RobertyYoung :fr~m th~ 
Lab\';"': ::',.'i;.:,", c.',;:: ;\:~;,: ... ,j ,:?' i.," '",,: .• , ""i' ," 
, ~ur side jOined the dissenting minority when'the Governmerit'smoti~n was 
. P~sed 219-118. ~Oiher Labour Memb~rs who jOi~~{1n th~'Deb:~{~ preferr~d t~ 
a;r~e: s~~~t~e~: b~'tw;en t&;~;;i~~s~' ab~ut, SUCh\~Pi~;fa.~ ~ the oPport~i ties, 
: .. Ol' ::::, ~:,:~,r: ~s', ': ~f":" .. j c~; , i 
•. , ;.. lack of them, available to Private Members. (99) . 
> ~.t:' :,'''-' Fe 10, t '-~.·}'.;"l ·tr''''·,,-: .7' " i"'":!" f~~"'!""'!;( "~_:; A,,-,.J'7' 
The gener~ debate openi~'th~'Motion was followed by "the :introd~ct'ion 
and amen~ents to existing ones, so a.sto give effect 
, to: tl:te .pr~~~~ed .pro~ed~~'Oh~~:: Some of the Orders*involved "no more ~::n 
th~' , ' ~.,' ::.'", ;; "" .~ '. ' ." '~', . ", :~ " ;'.J. ", " . ," .;". 
" .~ermanent incorporation in Standing Orders of procedure already operating, 
'b" ~,{ ... ":;Y '~.'C ,,:,':-:''1 .... ";'~ .. ,' . 
Y a.uthority of the Sessional Orders first introdu~ed,. on a temporary basis, 
b . . '::"': ,>,~ , 
,: 1 the Goverrunent on· 15 'November 1945 and renewed each yee.r~' 
": ;1rhiOh took Pla:'~ on:~ th~j:'New ~er; ge~er&J.iy, though not. always rigidly, 'follo~ed 
o· '" ~J ~:"" i't :: t-"( { -~. " -', '_." <', c'· '>' -l~.' " "<,', 
" )~ty li.es though si8'Uicantly, Sir'Robert Young ex~epted, no Labour Members 
l'c' " ,~ ;', .. '.i ~~: ,.; "cl, , ;;~:;. .'. ...;." ',::: ,.,;;~,.:' ""'" . ;" ." , ;, .. '.'1 ,\ ,':' 
tea for any of the Amendments, all of whic?- were move~ by Opposition Members 
1rho t t, ,:', ~, J <~ . .:·;~i f;.. '::: l" ' , " 
\, y. ~ontinued ,to muster supporters until 4 a.m. 
'f', ~ ~~ ~:_~~, :?"t,,,J ',.,' ~',;<_>,~ :./,:: /'c') '~~,<_,>:/'~>':,':":~~ .. '>:~ r;' .~.'L:.~ ,-~' _ -. 
........ 
,_ ,"i,» _, '~;"',~ ,'~~ _________ ~ ___ ';""' __ ~:-=-",== ....... " ... -",,,,,=,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,=-... ,,,-,,,,,,,,,---~"""6 .. __ . '~' __ ---
'The changes in'Standing Orders were 'so SUbstantial 'that the' 
Go"'ernrn~nt haa deoidec1 to set up a. t~hnioa1 canmittee to examine Stanaing 
Order " " " , .' '" " ", ' 
:; 8 tran the point of view of drafting - a. fact to which Morrison referred 
his speech ~f ..l •. Nov~ber 194;. (100)',~011ow~the 'precedent of 1933 it was 
• ~; < - ~" '- ~: '.-' .>r ;.,. '. ,~. ,,":}. " 
~~est~~that the camnittee should be infonnal and, un~fficial and, shot.1lcl 
. }- 1: <',<, , ~ : •• _ ,0, !.,. _ - o!r' J ",' i ~. '\c- r 
,l'eport.in the first instance to the Goverment. The Speaker had agreed to 
. '> -.:, ' y. \_ . fI- ~- ".1 . '-'", ;-_,' ,!,,' 
Presi~e OVer such a ~anmittee - a f~ct w~ch ~eems to have muted all Crit~Ci~ , The" ;, " '", < ' • .. i ,' ,. 
act~vities of this camnittee remain a mystery but a Depar1mental one 
;·htttiahAttaU=s: A'MemOrandlml on Government PrOfos~1s. It amcl. i 7208., 
De.ate 28 April 1948. H.C. Deb. 450," cc., 400/458 • . ,A,nexaminatior:, or. 
the change. maee by the Labour Government anti thel.r subsequent . , 
" e.peration is to be found in J.H. Bums "The Scottish CQM1ittees of 
the'liouse of CCl8llBens 1948-1959. It " Politioal Studies, .!ol~ VIll, 
No. 3. (1960), 272-296. ' 
;1, 
Party::isense; and Bills 'primarily of Scottish interest. ',. The Government also 
, a.C: 1. ,'. I. '\ 1 .. ;" ':.:, , 
cepted Conservative proposals .''': '. 
f ., " '< .' ~ ,_ 
. "to"refer to the Standing Committee cbn·Scottish'~· 
,Bills for oonsideration on specified days, the 
" whole or part of the Estimates for which the '" " .'. '" ' .' 
" Secr'etary of, State for Scotland is responsible. I' (104) 
'" t<, , ~, 
~s discussion, of Scottish Estimates would be l'1.mited to . 6 days (in fact, 
. \.. .. .. ,'., .. .. ".,"', ". :' .. ,,' ..,.. ,. ,~',':, " ' ' 
~r~~ngs) in addition to the days normally given to the discussion of Scottish 
~~t~~~s~n~ the Comm~ttee :f SUPP·lY.:, ., .. ", 
, '" ~ \ ",. ,"",. ~" "-,,", "of. 1 '. ~. c" 
~: passage, of" the new, Standing Orders through" th~ House was relatively 
n, "" "'''',-"" ,~'r, '"'_"", v."."-..{ h'- ~ ,"'~~ *,:,:,-~_, ; • .';' .' .', ,;'->; j".:- _.'; ,.~'.\_:_";: , 
,amO,oth, although a squabble developed between some,Labour,Members who were in 
. .~.,: ~ ,,," ',,' " "~'l: ". -I» .. } \,. "r , ~.;:(, .. :'~',\ __ :~-~.~_';,':_,:: "t,,_':;? '"4 :~J.~".. i.;-r 
teilfo':U' and others who were against devolution. (105) The Government, whioh like 
,'. """ ~~""""' ,. ", .,,~, ~", ! '/' '."' ·--.ii ~ • ".' :' ~ . .., ",,, ':_ :._ t " . . 
.' ~,~elect Committee had previously rejected, the idea o~ transferring the 
"'. ""'-~', ... ;~_c",,, _, .. -,;~ .~:\,.,,,, '," ".t:"'""_'- ',;;"" .>;:""'::.'O',"'t'_~ .).:;i;' J>';'~<-"i-·"s.: ',,," 
'~?0n.~~Reading of Scottish Bills to Standing Committee, ,in vi~w,. of its alleged 
, ,,,,, ~;' o,c, .,." ..., .... ". _"" '"; '" _.: ..... ~, .~_f "".<",,·..,l':";~"if' ,'~"~ ~;i_~ 
\Ulp0pularitY,with all Members",litad,beeninfluenced,both by,pressure from its 
. "SoO:tiSh su~;o:~:r:' ~~,~the. :xtrem:' ~Ong'~:t~~n'in the'parl~~~nt~ timetable • 
.., """ I "',.. .' ,,' ~ - ' ''" ',,, " .. ' ,> .r', 
~ . .' , 
. ,!!he :proposed new Standing Orders," the White Paper, stB.t~d, ," ',,' 
... '. ' ,.~ ',"- " -... T; ,:; "r_ • " c ..., • "._ .... ,,' _ .. .,.., ,'< ',' ','" "" "," .,., ' •• ,~ -. >, .' ". ('~ ,i;, t, ,: 't 
, ,,''would give more, timefo~the discussion of Soot~ish A:' 
~a.rfa.irs by Scottish Members, while preservi08 the' ,,.. 
control of, the House over both legislation and 
Estimates; 'and they axe suffioiently flexible to 
enable the a..rrangements to be va.riedaccording, to , •s 1 
the importance of the legisla.tion and the sta.te of i, 
the timetable in the House of Commons itself. "(106) 
T ';...;,... c 
lzlone res:peo~,: ,the right Of. ten Members ~o pre~ent a Bi~l bei.ng:ref~~r~d :to the . 
• O:-:~sh .Standi,ng ,Committee in the, first place"the G~vernment had guarded,8€ainst 
\~ :POSS;~ilitYO~"engendering feelings of inferiority, a.lthough O~IY'atthe oost 
0'<::': .... , ':.' _. <: _ ."', ·1;"', ( _" .: '-'.'., .. ' :_, 
........ 
c'~~ See, for example, the"~;~~~ of William Ross • 
. Of. David ICirkwoodoo. 447/8. '" .,,' 
~d.';'""7JOa;,!"(~a;~:7~1 :j. 
'. of' a.:Hena ting its more vocal advoca tea of devolution. The Government 
l'Ihil'!", , .' , '. .... . ' 
, st it was "anxious to do everything poa~ible within the framework of 
th~ Brit'ish Constitution and the existing Parliamentary system. to meet 
S~~t'tish dEmands •••• "rejected the dEmand for a general inquirYint~ 
c1evol~tion~d other issues. (107) The Econanist which had weloaned the 
~ha.nges in Soottish'Prooedure as'"a ~eDsible minor im;r~vam:ent; of 
. P~rl~eritary maohinery" althOugh the Government's at'tit~de' towards the 
)OSllibility of an inquiry into dev~lutio~ c'N~S,curio~~."Th~ ::attempt to 
, clOse an.' . . 
"". ,l.s.8ue before it has been properly ventJ.lated will,QO the Government 
noth1ng but ha:n.n.'" (108) By oontrast the New StatesIlH~'wasccmPlaoent, 
11 "'" 
,those ,.who want Custans posts along the Bord~r, 'a Soottish Seoretary, for 
it' , .' 
ternaJ. At'fairs and so on will not be satisfied, ~,it declared, "but the 
PI' " ' 
. an goes a. oonsiderable way to meet most reasonable aspirations." (109) 
All in 8.11 the changes in procedure ~that were made in the years' 
194 ' . 
' ... 5/50 W~redesigned to faoilitate .the passage of Government legislation by 
. the r . .. ',' ' 
. etuova.! of obstruotive and arohaic devices. r, Significantly, these oha.nies, 
!c.\tol\ted time-saving rather than changes in, pr~ctic~ •. .As la.te, as 1960 &nson 
ln4W: . '* ~." ". 
. iseman noted the faot that, there}'lIld up to, thatt~e ; been no adjournment 
of' the I:Iouae at the canmencernent. of public business to enable Standing C .,: '. . 
". ~ttees to meet s:iJaultaneously· in ~he a.ftern~on, while the procedure, ~enabl~i 
". i.ba.t . ' . . .' . 
. , ~,on an amendment. to the motion'"~hat Mr. Speaker do now leaveth~ chair" 
-!.Ql. Su.ppl,y d~ (provided that the motio~ is move~ by .. Minister) had been 
. U..d· " ,l'arely~ (1lO).,~ ~:' ;;t 
1'he conc1usion'that seans 'o(;thepollt1oal 
'--"'; ihe notion. that' the Govemnent gove~8 anciParliamentori tioisesbu.t ~arelY, ' 
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,obstructs, seems to have been accepted by all sides. Yet the fact' 
'remains that it was the Labour Government not the Labour Party that' 
Was responsible for the changes that took place. Writing after the 
"event Morrison said , 
"The value of (the Select Committee's) work is 
shown by the fact that Parliament carried a heavy 
post-war legislative burden without resorting to' 
~ drastic schemes involving a basic change in 
~its procedure and a departure framits tradition ' 
of gradua.l development. 1t (Ill) , 
,lmpression thus remains that the lack of substantial change signified 
~ .,;:: " "" \ . """ ':'.-:! 
the.Victory of the political system, its values and the reinforcement of 
:l;'~ i ~, '". ',:: .''" _~~ .. ' .. i:.~. ,;; 1 "- _"~,,' ,0 n .. _, 
its hierarchical structure over a Labour Party which by 1945 had became 
. ,;~ ~ '". ~ 
than one of structural 
, The question which arises is, why did the Party which had been 
,?!S;':'ed.j£ not ~l{-d~po.ed in~he. inter"':'; 'yea;:. towardschange~· 
~'P~r~i~;~~~~ry 'p;~'edure fa~'to adopt ~ore 'r~dic~~ 'me~su~e~ "S~Ch ~s 
I>epar~ent:l'~'~itte~s ~~ aevol~tion. The'basi~ ~swer is power. In 
" t~e peri~d {9l9-l939 ~~e:Labour 'Pa;ty was a t~~d~~rty struggling to be 
aC~:Pted as a respectable alternative,Government. In 1945 that 
respectability was accepted by the electorate. It is easier for a Party 
OUt of power to advocate changes designed to restrict the activities of 
their opponents in Government. Once in Government, however, its attitude 
, to SUch changes is see~ fran a different vi~oint. In addition, the 
":~;;;:;;M~~"';'t~~;t~';;'~;i British Government tends to reinforce the latter 
- " -"...c:. ~ i ~\ : ,.,; .' ~ ';; 'C:>o. ~ , 
Viewpoint that t~ :~ov~~ent r ~'overns e.ndParli8ll1ent cri t~c:dses butd~es 
v. ,*-'~-t ~~~' ! ,,-' •... ~ ~,,-...,}~. -,~', ' 
Individuals and ideas outside the Cabinet would hardly succeed 
. witho~t support fram within the Cabinet. 
, , 
the real~ necessary reforms were those involving 
4137 
eoanonic rather than political structures. In short, Parliamentary refonn 
_beyond certain minimum requirements eould best be left to those conversant 
. with the details. Meanwhil~, the intellectual and academic Left found their 
ideas had atrophied with the tremendous social changes that had, taken place. 
Thus Laski's suggestions for refonn including age restrictions on candidates 
~, " 
and prerequisite service of three years' local authority or equivalent 
experience was no longer relevant to pos t-war soc iety • (112)" Mos t importantly , 
perhaps, was the fact that it was a Labour Government which held ~the reins of 
power during the ; transition frcm war to peace.", As a consequence.,the 
criticisns.tendedto be muted in a sense that the criticisms made by members 
; , ~ . , , 
Of the rather .ineffective, unaccepted inter-war Party hadnot been accepted. 
Perhaps the extent of Labour' svictory, the relative ease with whi<?h socialising 
, ' 
,.legislation was enacted dampened the extremists fire •. The Victory of democracy 
, abroad'unlike~19l8 was going to be followed by the victory of democratic 
forces at hane. " Whether it actually did so was besides the point, the 
argument was not direct. action .. ~- Parliamentary democracy but" the guidance of 
a SOCial. democratic government along the right lines. 
, , 
\ , 
, , 
, ~r~ , 
. H.J:"asld' "OhOesirig' thedPlanners" 'writes"in G.D.H. Cole, et~al~M'~M>'~'h" 
, Plan for Britain (London: 0Routledge &: Kegan Paul, 1943), pp. 101/127 
CUo) •. ,' Of. H. lSa1ton, Practieal Socialism for Britain p."'U. 
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:!isoellaneous Matters (Constitutional Relationships and Personal Security) 
Ca) The lOCecut1ve andLegislati~e Relationship. 
The Labour Government of 1945-1951 never ful~ solved the questions 
which w~repo~edby the' wa~-time ~acDon~d" .Act which had been allowed 
On a number of occasions the Government found it 
.. ' " 
necessary to create a post-electoral precedent by passing ind~ifying 
t,.,": 1\0>;, \: 
• • '. • " ",;. ~, ,. .:,.' "' ' - • '>l; , 
legislation to relieve sane of its own supporters of penalties incurred 
11lholding minor offices of profit ~unde~the Crown. It was a situati~n 
'1",:. :,t: ". .,-' ,_', ;"'.:_ ~., '"~'..' ", _,." ",' :.",-:" ;~' {,:: .~: ." ~ :," -, " .. _<~, .. '-<~' ;<, ,,<": " 
which necessarily arose out of the war-time Government's failure to 
legi~l~te on th~ matte~~d~d~~d;s~o;~l; ar'ter the S~1~ct'6~itteets 
, . ~ .": .. ,,', -'."," -'. ,,",,-' .~, ,.-,." •• ; '~'-?-~ " -' ," 
Reportha:d been turn~d dmm'in 19U ~Bill'was passed indernnifyingArthur 
';J'e~~:to the tune dt '£2.1.0~.Od.;' in re~pec't offe~'s "he ha~ never 
~ 
received. (113)' 
,1 •• ".f" {.2" . _ ,.; , _"' " "", . ~ i v:', 
. The instances . during 1945-1951 were equa1~ as trivial demanding 
.th~';:~l~ble "t.im~;' '~d energy of the Select Committee on Elections and 
, ,- , ", ," '," ':1 .. '~._ "i" < -; ,;:.t\c'·;, ~ ,~~ , t 
Of the House'itseli'. (114r In'nOn.e of the ,oases ,was there 8.ny suggestion 
of' delibe~at~~~oid~~;ofthe ia~r'arid:it "was accepted,t~t':the p~rsons 
:,~ ,.." ",; .. , '" J. .... _, v""", ~ 1" ~." 0",-" < , • 
: ". '." ,.t--:~... .;r,"., { "'~.-<''''''_''.\'.'' , ,.~.!~ ,',~ ,1 "··,"1..1'."# r" ;" ~ '. ',';, " ~L.\ "; :-: •• :; 
conoerned were tin8.rlciall.i' worse "of(fran holding the offices of "profit" 
~;:, ~ '" -.-\.~ .. ~ " /. ~~ '." . ..."' ,,~ .' ,,~," 
, . ~ ;;"'~~' <. ,"~ ,.," ,,\!t' : "', r. !'"'\"'/ ,":'", .<,:', .. 7' • _~"": 
Under the ·CrowD..~_The{ Seleot CcXnmittees both agreed that 
"<~~.:.j, "fi' :,'_~""""~' ,.'.-,"' ~." <." >~ " 
_, ',', .. ; ........ ",' .( , : :' ~: . .' ~ i. '-. .: ," . _ _ .. " " :::- _ ~" " <:::, ..' ., 
.. ~""repealof the Succession to the, Crown Act 1707, 
- And, the olarifioation and re':'enacting of the statute 
law re la t~g ~o' offices of Vrof~ t, is not only, 
desirable but urgent. It (1l5) ",' . 
H.C~ Deb. 376, 00 •. 1408/12. 
.. ~ . 
114,; The' Coatb~idge aiia Spr1Dgbiu·b Elections (Valid&tion) Act 1945.,,, .. , , 
9 + 10 Geo. 6. Ch~ 3. . The Cambenell; Bristol and Nottingham Eleotions . 
(Validation).Aot, 1946, 9 + 10 Geo.6 •. Ch. 43., Reports of' Seleot 
Canmittee on,_Eleotions, H.C. )':'l,'H.C.' 71-1,. (1945/6). . ". 
First Report frcm the Seleot Camaittee on Elections, H.C.· 71-1, 
~hbrt.lary 1946' Para. 11. Cf. H.C. 3-1, Para.12. "" ,". 
It wa.s suggested by the second.SelectCommittee, 
J\ <. "tha.t a provision might be included in the proposed 
new statute, requiring a parliamentary candidate to 
,;', ' : sign on nomination a general declaration relinquishing 
and resigning from, any office of profit under the 
"~ ,Crown which he ma;y then hold." ( 116) : 
, ~ . 
... ~e,declaration could, if necessary, be condi tiona.l u1?on election., In the 
. oases concerned the Select Committee recommended legislation validating the 
. , elections and indemnifying the Members conoerned. "The Government ,was sympathetic 
to the demand for reform - the more so since the Attorney-General,.SirRartley 
( 
.Sh~wcross, ; was himself almost caught~bytheintricacjes of theJ707 Act.(117) 
.!rhe Conservatives.too indicat'ed that ,they would support a measure of, reform. (118) 
Dnthe ocoasion of~the Second Bill the Government promised ,that ,they would ensure 
, ,tha.tlegislation'wouldbe presented ,to ,the House before the next General Election. 
, .... . ". (119) 
!rhe Government, \ however, never got around,to dealing with. the ,~ituation ,and in " 
1949 were obliged to introduce an indemnification,Bill beca.useof the continued, 
o'bservin8 of ' ,the Succes~ion'to Crown Act.(120) :~On.tha.t occasion the Attorney-
• . I • ~ 
. ~eneral' argued that while, "i;::' 
. ' 
"the 'law is obscure and confused but its':amendment,.;:", 
restatement or clarification is by no means an}' easy 
< \:"r matter. ';j It would •• : •• probably have to be the subject 
of study by a commission, legal committee or body of 
"," ;:;;..: that kind ••••• Previous , GoveI.'tllftents •• ; •• have '.fel t· that' 
, it was perhaps better to leave matters as they were 
'.f ,<~~:':Unti1:a.n obviously better fomula had been found to 
. take the ·pla.ce of the existing law. We have hitherto 
" .s, >, J.: taken the same view about this matter,: but n can add 
',' that we are giving the whole subject attention and 
~i consideriQCwhether there is any more comprehensive ',. '. }, "L ~ .. ';'" 
, w8¥in whioh the matter can be dealt wi :h."(121) " 
,t,l~,: .. ; ~>~i'~~(',f :-l ... ;1' .-1J1.,."i;:~;;tt>:_·~.~:L::I~.:_:...;l. ~':-;,>~~'.- ~'";~;.~:(~,f ,._~ .. _~.·"til,Jkc~',/)_f . . ~;~:~~"~::~'·:~"·;··l,~,~.;,t:~~~:;,·!~: ~'fV;;:~~;~ '-'" 
, i, "," '-. ':','" ." 
~...-7_1:....-.. 1., ,; para.12.~, . 
a;9~;Qeb;·414,cc.566. "'i";' ': ". 
,'Ili!A:'::'oc.'S'69 ' ~d.!;O'~·Deb ~~'420, cc .~J 896.~ ,", ... ,."~",c,,,_. 
>t ,'.... -,'-'+- _. ':;.' .> '''5; .t,,,,. '. -, ". . ,-, /.- >:" ~ ,« . '.< 
=See 'li.C.Deb. '420,co"·-1889.Cf. cc.192~~' Cf. R.C.Deb. 414, cc. 566. ' 
",Th;'llo~e 70f Co~o~s (Ind.emriifi~~tid~;;or CertainMembersAci) 1949',12, 13, 
'and 14 Geo.6.Ch~'46~i, , " ' , 
.•. it:'O.Deb·:467)cc'.';296~12\Jw.Y '19'49~ 
u _~ ~'., . 
,~.1It-';..,: j} 
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The matter must have still been under consideration'twelve months 
later when the case arose of the Reverend James Ma~1anaw~ who had been 
eleoted for an Ulster constituency whilst an ordained member of the Church 
ot Ireland. ~he question of his eligibility for membership of the House 
was.referred to a Select Committee which found itself unable to oome to 
any conolusion about the legalities of the matter and recommended' that. 
~ediate legislative action be taken to clarify the law. (122) The 
aovernment ~esponded by referring the matter to the Judioial Committee of 
Privy Council, saying that they would indemnify MacManaway if· the j 
Committee decided against him. (123) In faot,the Committee did decide 
,that a' clergyman of the Church of Ireland was disqualified .under. an Act ;~ 
ot.l80l which they admitted was originally passed to ,exclude from the House. 
the Radical Member, Horne Tooke. The position was , of; course, anomalous,' 
as it; did not apply to olergymen in Wales and. England in certain ciroumstanoes • 
. Th~ Party, had. supported steps to remove, such di,squalifioations' during the 
, ,twenties ,?ut had made little ett,?rt since tha,t t:1me. to deal with the 
questions which had been referred to by the Select Committee on Offices ot ' 
•.• - • '",' ,~ - -~ " '-,,' >" " 
~roti t under the Crown in 1941., (124) 
> ". , ' ~' ',. ~",,« ~ ", . 
The Labour Government gently urged the House to respeot the Judicial 
-, .. , j " ...... ,>._ >'!<.< ;"-,s' "~'f" "'< ~. < "",~,~ ;:, .. : ,.<1 ,'* f"', C • ',," ",-, ,.,. 
?crmaittee's deoision, (125) and on 19 October, 1950' they introduced' a motion to 
, "':." 'e .:.' • '(:, '>. " "_. / ~ . "" " >, .\, ''',". "<,' ,, __ .' ,. .' "., , 'd ", . \ ';. " " 
exolude MacMa.nawa,y, to which the Conservatives moved an amendment acoepting, 
-; ~ •. , '~i.~ t.>.j-; ",'., "., • ", .• ~ ,,_ ,'i, : ','., ", .'! .,_. ,_ ..,,.'~ .-. .4.- .4' , ',*" "" ~,,',- "".,,~ .,. '. ,"", ' .... ,'. ~ ", ,> ''" c,,.. '.,; . .if,. 
;the e~olusion but urging !'that a Royal Canmission be set, to deal with the 
:."". ·"'.-'i .... ' ... '".·~ ... ..,."" .. ,, ,i.{. '.' ~ <.;,"V'".>,. ~ .... , .. ,Jf.""~'.~' "",,,," .or ,.':1 ," •• :.'~, k' "., " 
.8tate of the law as disclosed in the Report •••• "(126) The amendment was 
para. 1 • ~ p. Ti.', 
H.C:Deb>"476,· oo~;iI..67/84 .' 29 June 1950. 
B.C. 120, para. 59/61 (pp. XXXiV/XXXV). 
H.C. Deb. 478,'00. 1882/90 ·17 October 1950. 
2243/76 (2254) •. 
,. 
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'withdrawn. when the Government promised to oonsult with the Conservatives on 
the question. Although the Labour Government had been,offioially neutral 
on the matter backbenohers,notably Geoffrey Bing,had been active in using 
the opportunity, to rail against the protestant domination in Ireland.(127). 
The hurt tone of the Conservative replies olaiming that this was turning a. 
.non-partisan question into a Party oontroversy was met with reminders of their 
unsympathetio attitude towards the indemnifying legislation of reoent years. 
The only ready .. made explanation that oan be attributed to the Government's 
'failure to de"l with the question' was the' pressure of important legislative 
measures that demanded its attention between 1945-1951 •. Yet this ~ does not 
, . 
,/ ,provide suffioient exouse for their' fa.i.lure to introduoe legisla.tion on the 
~bjeot: '~' Not only were there a number of oo'oasions when the issue arose but 
a. Sele~t Committee' of the Rouse of Commons had provided'a thorough 'examina.tion 
, ,. . " 
of the subjeot' and: there was olearly' an opportunity to seouresome amending : 
legislation through the favourable attitude of the Conservatives", It might i " 
. be thoU8ht that the Government was either laZY or apathetio on' the' subjeot. 
Obviously they had more important legisla.tion to deal with espeoially in view .,'~; 
of the Conservative opposition to the Parliament :Bi;t.f whioh. neoessitatedan JJ, 
• , '., < / 
extr&·short' pa,;liamentari session in 1948:': Yet they' never really. attempted, ". 
to taoklethe' question. . Signifioantly whfm the matter w&s eventually dealt 
'. . "'" '." 
, . , . ,~~. . '" , "i" -
Within the late 'fifties the :Bill was long and detaiJ.eq.,perhapstoo long and ~: 
'd~tailed,fo'rthe"harrassed Labour GOvernment' of 1945-1951 ,to place before 
:Sing had 'earl:Ler'pointea'ou.t ~'the' anomalous position oonoemirig the' : 
,Irish ClerQ. on,the Seoond Reading of the Rouse of Commons (Indemnification. 
"of Certain Members) Bill. R.C.Deb. 467, cc. 298. 12 July 1949. 
:.i ':.':; _~' 
492 
b., Personal Security. 
": .. , 
. , 
It was not entirely unexpected that the Attlee administration should 
take early steps to deal with the question of personal security for Members 
of Parliament, particularly in the field of salaries and pensions. The 
, 
. War~timecoalition had recognised the need for change and indded Mr. Osbert 
Peake,replying to .Tom Driberg during a debate on adjournment which Driberg .. 
.... had. used to raise . the question of Members ,being accorded free' fra.nkaete of~. 
IIl&il, . accepted the need for cha.nses in the renumeration of Members of Parliament 
but .tookthe normal Conservative view that it should be left to a future 
~ , "<"« " , ... 
. Parliament, to: settle the details. (128) . Questions a.bout the appointment of. 
8., Select Committee met with negative answers. (129) • ' i, 
The Gener~ me~tion of ,1945 b::ought a great .. number of ;.new Members into 
. the llouse who found its amenities less than, adequate. 1 There were early complaints 
- t ... ..'" ;>- .,> 
made abo~t accommodation,(130) and the Government responded quickly toexist1ng" 
" oonQ.1tions by moving a motion .for the appointment of. a. Select, Commi tteewi th wide 
. " . 
.. . ' 
terms of reference,to.enable'it,to consider allrimportantpoint~including those 
Of a1.lowanoe~, 'postaetes, ;.free travel for members on offioial:duties. and . secretarial 
,. > ,".,' '" • 
8.Ssista.noe.(131) :;: .. Nine~a.ys"earlieron~6November the Government had made its own 
··Position olear with its announcement that Members sending letters on official, 
__." .<.' .' ' • . iY. " , ,-' 
..•.. lIla.tters ~o. a Gov~nment Department would be allowed free 'postage and; its extension 
'ot'the'right,of free, railw/aiY travel between Westminster'and Members'constituencies 
. ' ' ~ ,. , 
... $."_ - re Iq. _ •• 
\),128. '. H,C~Deb."410, c~.: 2849/68~18 MaY 1945: . It Vias' the 'first 't1ie si~oe~1921 .,that 
.',: .' the ·proposal that Members should get free postage had been specJ.fioally 
'. "'>.'. raised as a disoussion. R,C,Deb. 409,0~ .• ;;.~317{~).~es.t~ons __ ... l' '. ·"h.· .• • "~'.', .d .... , .. ·",··· .•..• , 
.. :.:.~., For example, R,C.Deb •. 407;'1929 and R.e.Deb. 409,cc. 629 ... 1317. 
,.~ 130. ~ H,C.D~b. ,414. oo~ '191/94. "." , ,. : ''"< '. . .. ':. ....." .... 
;, 'l~., The 'tem~ of referenoe were "to oonSider the exPenses incurred in oonnection 
with 'their p~liamenta.ry and offieia.l duties byMembers of,t~s House, '. 
inolud.1nc Members whose salary: is less than £5,000 per annum; their renumer-
. ' .. tion and their,oonditions of work. lt R.C.Deb. 415,00. 2465 et.seq.··.. ' 
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to include Members' hom~and Westminster and homes and constituencies and to 
COVer scheduled air services as well as travel by rail. (132) , 
. 'The Select Committee's Report (133) not surprisingly advocated a number of 
" important cha~es in the salary arrangements of Members' of Parliament, including 
'" an increase in ,the salary of Members from £600 (£100 of which was freed from 
; income tax for expenses)(134) to £1,000 (of which £500 was to be allowed tree 
of tax as an expense allowance.) The Committee also proposed to extend the 
£500 allowance to Ministers with"salaries of less'than £5,000 per annum and to 
the Chairmen 'of Ways and Means/and Deputy Chai~en whose iSa.laries'shoUld be 
" 
reviewed. (135) :~, Among the other recommendations mad~ by "the~' Commi tteewas one to 
set up a small informal Commttteeto' assist the'Speaker in matters affecting the 
., ' P~ent' and "concession: for 'free' travel; to Members~'therecommendatio'ns of which 
wOuld'be accepted by Membersia.ndbytheTre~sUrY.(136) )The'Seled't" ComiUittee, 
on which 'the Labour Party'had. a"ma.jority, :r:ejected"claim~, which came ~nlY 
f~m various "groupsof Labour Members "fO~, exten~ion of the' pri~ilege) of free 
)tr~vel, allowance 'for the use 'of a. ~otCJr~ar 'andthe'gre.nt'of free 'postag'~, 
.' ,'. tel~grams 'and' telephone ·ca.ll~'. (137) <;;' Most of th~ eVidence ;'subm1tted'from" the 
, . \ 
,L&bour 'groups appeared to be more'co'ncerned with the convenience of Members 
ra.ther thlin the' privileges of the institution. 
, . "" . ".r ", ~ , .,.' ~ ~",' " :r., .{.~. ".' ~,~" ~j 
:-1 The Government aocepted the majority of the Select Committee's ,proposals 
on 30 April :'1946(138)'~d a motion' to that 'effect ~a.s' i~t:t'~duced "1nt'o·the House 
....... 
• • F .w . 
Ibid., 00.' 1085/6 •. The motion approving the expenditure involved was taken 
immediately after that for the appointment of the Select Committee on 15 
November.' 00.2417/86. " . ,', -, 
, Report from the Select COlllmittee H.C~ 23,6 March 1946~ 
134::"" 10;(<1: ,~"para;:'7 :""'~;~'-"'" ~.'~''-''~' '."~' 
~'135'. ' 1o!d~, rp8.ra~ 11'~· " 
".' 136. Io:!d.ii para..12. 
, -137." , I9:!dt,~ paru. re and 9. See also:4:!>pendices VI,IX,X (2) and (3). 
,.,138; , 38/42. ,"" . <",.' , 
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., on 29 May. ,(139) A separate Bill, to deal with changes in Ministerial 
Salaries, ~lightly different fram those proposed by the Select Committee, 
~~s also dealt with on the latter date. (140) The changes made by the 
~overnment in .~he Ministerial Salaries ,Bill did notallow the £500 tax 
tree allowance, a concession also denied the Private Member. These, 
~ J::, / ~. -<_" ~ ',,_ ;',~ 
changes were made, tlnot only on the merits as we see them, but also in 
,:"" •• :,' < '" ' •• \ 1> __ ~ ~ ~_. 
the light of what we consider to be the general opinion of ' Hon. Members 
'~',~"A ~. , ';,_~~. 
in a number Dr,different parts of the House. "(141) There was little 
J{ ~~. ' '\. J e,. '" ' • t- .. < ", 
dissent; of the 26 dissidents fram the motion none came fram the P.L.P. 
, ..... ,' "": . 
The only real point of substance worth noticing was ,Tan anith's statement 
'. -'; ,," , '.'- .' 
that the ~animity of the Report reflected acanpranise and that the 
.,.~:,~ "'" - .. %0' ,.; 0'. '" ~~',",,", ",-. _,'t-O '" ; '- ., " ~: " - ,"~l' '~ .~ ;' 'r .. ,:,.- ,; .'--" :;... .. 
rejection of ,suggestion for free postage, secretarial assistance ,were 
"'. " ,~ • - +- :.'J :\ 
;~jected "because we knew tha tin, pract~c~ ( they) !o~d be,open to abuse. "(142) 
• ,". ,. ~ ~ .:,. .,',' .> ; ." , .- ;;_ ,f • .' ,1'", -:" " '.' " , ' .,;},. ;..:;;: 
Exactly which Honourable Members would, abuse them ~as not made clear, but in 
, .. < "l" :", ",' ~,_;.: ,-. .... "" , ••• _, " :;' .f. _. '" ,,-.'~: 1~ "1 -..,"< ,! '':'1 :.'", ~ ,'." 'i .' .:;\ }'. 
view of .the later scandals investigated by the Iqnskey Tribunal perhaps 
i,;,",/. ". ~._ !, ',' ,;; It.,_",,-,,~ ..... , ;,.' '~;_ • " :~ > '~. _ ," ; ".~, ""'.. :: 
&nithts ,view was the' correct one. However, ,one, suspects that the argument 
N>C , 1- .~ .1..:: 1,.".3 '-<.."'~ .' •• --,.;< l ·'t"'\. ~'" ~ , .. f 
Was that of the seasoned conservative~inded Parliamentarian rather than 
~ -", .; '.,0;. :t .. ", "'/ ~'" \ .,ol.(;,'j • ,'.-i ,. '" ~ :>. .: f, ".) ., f .; 
, t~e prophet .. ofdoan in'the age of 'austerity. 
~ ,(" 'i· - •. ~, ,'« -,,. 
- The other i tan of relevance to the personal security, of Members of 
, +-~ . ....,"' ... " " ::/ :,,-,,,:,_,~, -';t -';: .. " '."" ~ '~,"," ~- ,-;,'" ;-i~ . ..,-::,."-<,/.~{;JL ",-';,,'. 
Parliament was the House of Cammons Members ~" Fund~.Act (143)" which was 
". " ~ '.~. ," ~ ,',I., ':"'," ,,_:1 ;:'. 1~ :'>' .~,'.. -,' ." ".. ... ~.~~ ,. ,,' ,. '. "~~ .,(, ~)~ .;, '~,,,,_,,, '," "":':,.i. 
~troduced follOWing ,the Report of a Select Goounit~ee ?f,,'the House' (144) 
. . ... <.""- ...., ~ ',," ,,1 - "L', t '-" '''. - \ A,,"- ". ",_., •• ' '/, 
which reoanmended,that the Act of 1931 (should ,be amended in order to' 
. -.' .;. <" ~',', "i~··r:. -;' '" ' ... ', ,~>,: .~." '('0 ....... "'-', " _ .', ,:., .. ~ ~: t I. '." ,f ,', <-. ,:~. '.' 
. e~tend its scope and provide for" increased, payments and altered 
- :'" ":'"", " ""-<"~"'I"'T~ •• ;, .--t, f~,., ~ ~. _" 1·-,', :~ • .,-::'-;~ -.' 
-
. ,; 139. 
l4o. 
li.J.: 
l42 •. 
inception 
:- ... -' 
:,H.C. Deb. ,423,. cc.,; 12:51; et~seq. 
~., cc. 1300 et.seq. 
, l" :. I ~. t . .,: .... ,~ ~ ' .... 
..!2,g., l235 Hugh Da.l ten. ,., . 
;Ibid.;cc~:1257/60' (1259). 'On the need for 'canpraliise"see 
~Leslie t s speech, cc., 1268/71 , (1269). . .' ' 
':En~oted:'as j 11 /12 Geo: 6: "Ch: .36; ~/ 
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Fund had managed to secure a balance of same £50,000 and it was hoped 
'by the Select Committee that the maximum yearly sums payable to qualified 
eX-Members would be increased fraIl £150 to £250, provided that the total 
incooie of the person concerned did not exceed £325 as opposed to £225 
previously. The maximum pa.YDlent to widows should be doubled fram £75 to 
£150 with a total income limit of £225 instead of £125; and that the 
-contributions should be reduced fraIl £12 to £9 per annum. (146) The 
Government, however, quarrelled with the figur~s, presented slightly 
different figures and allowed the Financial Secretary to the Treas~ry 
to argue that although it was a matter tor the House the Government in -
effect did "not agree with the Select Committee's recommendations to lower 
the contribution and to raise pretty steeply the amount of benefit paid."(147) 
, When the Bill came before the House, however, the Government included an 
e~Calative clause to var,y the contribution and rates of benefit (t~ obviate 
the need for amending legislation) and left the contribution at £12 per 
annum. (148) The Government steered the Bill shakily through Canmittee 
with sane difficulty, winning one diviSion by only 2 votes, but secured 
Victor,y in the end. (149) 
" In these two instances, salaries and pensions, the-Labour Party 
had shown i tselt to "be keenly interested in the removal of, tiruuici8.1 
insecurity on the, part of Members. However, its:attitude was not a 
s~le matter ot preordained ideas rigidly applied, but rather the 
canbination ~d reconciliation of diftering and opposing interests 
and views~ Consequently, the Labour Government hardly acted 
-
l46. 'H.O. 110, paras. 18/24; 27/9. 
147. H.C. Deb. 445, co. 1795/1804 (1804). Glenvil Hall. 
l4-8. H.C. Deb. 450, 00. 1393 et. seq. 5 lfq 1948 Seoond Reading. 
1!Ea., 00. 1897 et •• eq. 10 May 1948 'Canmittee Stage. 
49.6 
differently from their Conservative predecessors. Members of the P.L.P., 
whether in Select Committees, or as Members of the Government, acted out the 
"'j .~ ~ 
traditional compromising roles accorded them. If they were not deserting 
the class who elected them they were certainly moving in step with the party 
that opposed them. 
" '.' 
i.; ... 
"' ",." 
! .. ,-i. 
~, : 
,":'. 
;".: ~.' ..... 
. .; 
"',, ~ .. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT - NOTES 
1. Allighan did not help his own cause by lying to the Committee. 
The Clerk to the House, Sir Gilbert Campion, argued that Allighan 
was not guilty of a breach of privilege but the Committee found 
that Allighan's charges were " •••• wholly unfounded and constituted 
grave contempt. In the case of Mr. Allighan his contempt was' 
. aggravated by the fact that he was seeking to cast suspicion on 
. others in respect of the very matter of which he knew himself to 
be guilty and that he persistently misled the Committee." Paras 22/3. 
This appears to have been the crux of the matter. 
2. In 1926 Dr. Salter, Labour Member for West Bennondsey had accused 
Members of being drunk in the House. The Conservatives moved a 
motion describing the action as a "gross libel on Members" and 
constituting "a gross breach" of the privileges of the HOuse but 
Salter refused to apologise and no further action was taken. 
H.C. Deb. 199, cc. 561:709. In 1930, however, Mr. Sandham, Member 
for Kirkdale, accused his fellow Labour Members of accepting bribes 
and being drunk in the House. The matter was referred to the 
Camnittee of Privileges which found the charges unsubstantiated. 
Subse~uently despite the seriousness of the charges and the almost 
total absence of support within the House Sandham got away with 
mere admonishnent from the Speaker. H.C. Deb. 242 cc. 42/6, 309/330, 
cc. 741/769. 
3. MacIn~re was elected as Scottish Nationalist Member for Motherwell 
against the official Government candidate and had refused, when 
presented to the House, to accept sponsors. The I.L.P. proposed that 
he be accepted without sponsors but the House led by Churchill and 
with the support of many of his Governmental colleagues from the 
Labour Party refused by 273 votes to 74 to accept him. Next day he 
took his seat with sponsors,. and under protest. See H.C. Deb. 410, 
cc. 34/48,17 April 1945, cc. 222~ 
4.- As Morrison pointed out the relevant "order (S.O. No. 4~) had been 
in operation since 1907, but it had been the'practice of previous 
Governments ~o retain on the floor of the house" the great measures 
of the Session," as well as certain short Bills and Bills urgently 
re~uired" Ibid., 208/209. "The practice of past Governments in 
keeping contentious measures on the Floor of the HOuse had been 
based mainly on considerations of expediency. They f el t it was 
safer to keep contentious Bills on the Floor of the House because 
they had greater control over their own majority there." .Th!£., p.209. 
5. The Economist wrote, "Mr. Morrison wanted parliamentary procedure 
to be speeded up and made more efficient, so that more and more 
legislation could be passed through the Commons. The Select . 
CaDnittee was mainly concerned with the rights of the private 
member. It, and its spokesmen •••• were less interested in the 
House of Commons as a legislative machine than in its duty to 
criticise the Executiv~ on behalf of the people. !t is an old 
old issue that is of the very essenoeof Parliament. Hl5 November 1947. 
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6. The Economist's support for the measure was part of its protest against 
over-cent~alisation. "As state control over economic affairs extends 
and widens the executive becomes more irresponsible and Parliamentary 
supervision gets harder and less effective." 27 March 1948. The Executive 
Committee of the Scottish Council had pressed for an independent Committee 
"to enquire into the administration of Scotland to make recommendations as 
to whether and to what extent legislative devolution on Scottish Affairs 
is necessary, practical and advisable to improve the legislative procedure 
whilst retaining the integrity of the United Kingdom." N.E.C. Minutes, 
VOl. 94, Policy Committee Minutes (8)24 March 1947., .. . .. """" 
. , 
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Ultimately it was the impact of war and the electoral success that 
~ ~ . 
followed it that account~d for the defeat of anti-Parliamentarism within 
the, Labour Party. Whereas in 1919 the Government of the day had expoi ted 
the"euphoria of victory to secure the return of a ,Parliament generally 
unrepre~entative of public opinion in the years that followed, an attempt to 
" , 
r~eat the process in 1945 failed conpletely., Churchill was unable to play 
.... c:: 
, ' 
t~~ Gestapo card with the same success as Lloyd George had played its 
\ " , ", :.." -. -:. , . ~. 
BOlsh:vik predecessor. There were, of course, many reasons for this not the 
;." ..... " •• :' ~. ~~ -'t • 
least of which was Labour's massive contribution to the war effort and the 
" ; 
increasing political awareness of the nation that the stark realities of 
d "~ __ .. :;'(.~_'. ~ . '. "",' -~ ;. 
Conservatism or Bolshevism were merely the untenable postulates of party 
. ( " '.:> i~~ ... • ~ ,_ -" '.-.' I , H -! • • ,'. ';~;, • ' 
propaganda. Throughout the war the vascillation of the Conservative Par~ 
, .>. ~,.; ',~.>.<> '\:: .. - f;. , 1 :r':~~. .. ,~=; ~;. ,: ~ "". :: >, 
towards social and economic refonp contrasted sharply with the Labour Par~'s 
, "', ... ~ ~-, '~. :,'~ w 1 .":~ .... \~ ~<>-•• , t'" . " / .. . ~ .. ' lo." .. ; - ' . 
dfnands that there should be no return to 'th3 social inequalities of the inter-war 
,'-:f. 
, 
period. Thus in 1945 the electorate was provided with a clear choice between 
", "; "' \~ 
two parties of equal stature in a way which was not evident before the outbreak 
. "'.. • f'.~ ".r:' \ ":" ~ '. ) " ;" :~.:~ l '. ,; ( -:( .\:'. I • - ~ • '" ., 
of hostilities with Germany. Moreover, whereas during the First World War' 
,..,., !;J '. ~ ., .. , "' • .-t' -, ~ , ,', ",".', . 
.;; , 
., . . ... ~ 
, the Labour Party had been badly divided on its morality and open to the jingoistic 
~ 'f,' . ..-:<~_.x;.it.;;: .... <'·:-~?· !'~_~~-~"~~~~:.';, ;-, < .. ~_ .~ .. ; .. :.,~. -<. '., i : "<'_;""', •• ~ < ,:- ~. '._ " ·-~i.~·;. . _ ... :-. 
charge of aiding the enemy by opposing hostilities (a charge which brought about 
the ~~;f~at of, MacDon;J.d J Snowden and others in 1918) throughout the war against 
~: ·1', -: " •. ~ ~_ . ~ " .... .'~~ •. ' ~ '1.-' '~ ". I, "~~ -.';. + ~.:; ~: '~:' -'~ .. ' '4 
Hitler it wa~ the Con~ervati~es who -had to live in the shadow of appeasement 
> -". ,:::.. '.~ i· .: ,~. 
,and its' consequen~es. _ -C~n~;q~en~-1i:lich were frequently regurgitated by the 
:.J ::,' 1- ::.:~ ,':".:: ~ . " "" t. "~i <. ._,. :_:.>. ,.~" '. ~ .,,"," 
Left in inexpensive books such as Your M.P. ,(1) which were widely circulated. 
-
Gracchus,' Your M.P.', (London: Victor Go11ancz, 1944). 
" :c. :"," 
• -- "'"'''- ''>' •. ..,..~.'''' - ,.~., 
Thus the result of the 1945 election greatly strengthened the advocates 
of Parliamentarism and had the effect of reinforcing Parliamentary institutions, 
L,"· j.. " '" , . ' ", " 
by changing the area of conflict in two ways. When the Trade Unions had, 
" t ' .... 
Oballenged the L1Qyd George Government after the First World War on the principle 
Y' <',~ .,. . '.' .,. ' , _, _', ~ . _ " , , 
that,it did not represent the people they were, by implication, cha~lenging the 
'-'" .... j I" ~ .,' of_ ' ':. .. ~ _ ,., • 
basic assumptions, of Parliamentary democracy. , The theory of direct-action by 
'C."," l:-' ~ , .~'.. '_."",, ~ '" • _ i ". _ . ,", . .', .' .' .~. ,," . 
"its very looseness gave a credence to _ this, challenge which was only destroyed 
.• ' :~-." _,' .,:. .ot q '-., .. ,;: "f ~ ',' '" ...< ,," ~..' ~ '..', ~ '" • 
by the events of 1926, which prov~d the case for the separateness of political 
•. ,": .. ~;.. .. ;.-~-., ~ ,j,,; ,~ .,,"' .. :, .,,- ," -~>' '. --," ~ ,-'. "," 
and ,industrial action. Yet, the events of ,.1926 only confirmed the trend to 
• ,"~",; ~'~";" _~p~ .'!.., '.~ -: .= ~.~ ~,._,. "l ... ~ '_~', '_. >'" ~. , •• "l,. ,-
SP~ci~~~sa.~!o~~ w~ ~~i~ :t~_~ Labour Movement that was alre~ apparent. WheX'eas 
, it was not unusual as late as 1922 for the Trades Union Congress to pass 
... , ~:-;: ~,._\:).~-...-,;: ; .. ~;: .• _l-,,>t~ ~,.';J_" .~' _. . '.;, ,- ," .I.{ •. '-~ '" ".; 
resolutions, on the reform of Parliamentary procedure or electoral reform,by 1926 
·~~ .. t;:~·!.~· J~ .. :" ~. _",'0"';' ;,'"', i ' .. _ ," :;... . '-t'" .. '_,_ ".,'" .'" J".-_,. ,-' '.," • "_., 
Such questions were left to the Labour Party _ while .the Trade Unions concentrated 
-,. ' .. ' <¥-,r" ~> :,., ,,;' ~'~ ~1.'.'" • ,-+. .: J , . ..." " ~).. '1', ?~~ ,," "'- .,',.... ~ .... ,~ •• f ',~ ~ "," '" ,;-
on those questions which directly affected their members and which demanded 
" }\ .,."l ~~. il.-"', "~"'i~~~ • \,'~ ; : v , •••. '.. ,~ .... '... '" " 
The trend wa.s a natural one but _ the G.eneral Strike provided. an opportunity 
'- ... ·;;~:~:F.'·.;,. l.t·---<,"~".l. l\; ... _'=",,~. {. ,>.1 """.~" ;". "'~-l"'~-~V'" ';:"':". ,,_,~ '''.. .c,>" 'c'", ". ~ .• ' ,',' ,< , • • (.'.... ..~ ~ 
to give it formal expression. Thus Arthur Pugh was ,merely, restating the, 
:,. ',~, ,,:'1 ."",,: ~.; ''''::'''''~~'''".'_'':'''.) \.:', .. ".:- .~'.,.,. .' c.' ... ~,> •• ~. :"".- :".j.~,)_"... '::':~",., .• ~',,: -,,'- ,""'" " ~ ~"" • ~ ,'.; 
empirically recognised position, not admitting the revolutionary implications 
~,'1. "''-,',< ,.~~." ...... "" ," '/"",:;_, ,., ..... '.;1 '" _ . i." ....... "~'~ ,., ...... ,,'.~' '. ' •. ,' ,-,j.,,! .-~" ••. -",<.~.. '."" ".:t·,l '.' 
of the nine-day st~ike,when he told the 1926Conference during his Presidential 
',.,., .... ~~".·,; .. r. ;.,' ,'~ ........ ,.'.j .. ,_ ~,"_ ":.":,,".~ .. ,' .• _' .:". ,' __ .~ "C:-', ;,.~", •• ~;,"~.- .. ~;, "C'",' '!'~."._:>/ ~<,.,{,.;."J";''''.l., 
S h' . 
_ peec , .-.~ ._ '" ., 
.• ~.. "" ..... ~ 1"~' '" 
, "The :British working people have set themselves to 
.. -i"' • 'aohievetheir aims by the method of democracy, which' 
means politics in the parliamentary system,. and in ',' 
economic life & system of collective Trade Union ., ,_. >,' 
._~ .. effort, '. that has been pursued as a manifestation of . _',' ; 
··""'the Commonsense and practical spirit -of our people. "(2) .,' 
.: ~. "'. • . F. ';, 
~ ~:. .' 
~, "" ~ x >, ;. __ -' ~;. , ~ ,! .• s.. ""f" -: ", "-<, ;,: ~',,:: ; ~L -; .~. -.; ':;. .N;_." ,~,,;,. It >;i .••• ,+ 'to' ,.0' .'!' "<, ~_:.' , .. -. _ 1'" ~ ,t, 
';'.;" The-second'way in which the area:of confliot was changed by the result: 
., ~ 1 ._ ' '''' ''t •. . '. ~:<" : .,. '_".,' .. '~ ,~~ ...... ,.~" -'" "'\1 ·.I·~ :y .. . ~ .... - ,. . '~ ~_.r 'the~ 1945·Gener8.J.;E1eotioriw~s'thatit effectually internalised the conflict 
- • I~' "'-=r Sf 
. \ 
T.U.C. Report 1926, p.74. 
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between the Government and its allies both in the Party and in the Trade 
,~,., ~ 
• t: .•.•• ... 
Union Movement. ,i Whatever difficulties might arise with the factions over 
• specific policies the bulk of the Labour Movement stood solidly behind a 
, 
. '. \ 
" Government wlrlch';in their'eyes faithfully, pursued' :its electoral mandate, 
'0: 'f, 
including the earlY'.;ep'eSJ. 'Of th'e' much~hatedTr~e Disp~tes and Trade Unions 
? ; 
~t. In such circumstances it was not surprising that the Trade Union 
Movement fully supported the Government even to the unprecedented extent of 
agreeing to wage restraint. 'Such support'directly'strengthened the foundations 
of Parliamenta.rism within the Labour Movement by accepting 'the limitations and 
restrictions "of Government control. ;' . 0," >.' 
The speCialisation which had been evident in the "twenties was just as 
-, -,"--
evident .in the '.'thirtieswhe'n the Parliamentary idea had been attacked by the 
, .~;;.,..,.;\-~ f::_',,-).~>~~.~~,. ~>_.l."_:--: '; .~;.', ,,.., .. :'. :,." : ,,~::~ '",:: .-::.'.'"-,:;:~ •. :,.?' ! .. 
. intellectual Left/" In those 'intra-party' struggles it 'was th~T.U.C. which 
~.'~--; ~~~_ '~~l~h t· "<i .~ :)": ":. ~'.-;,-,-~;, .'-, _. " "r. :.,y . .J:' "'~' \.-~ ~#:;.' \~ ~"·\'o;·~' 
dealt with the 'fundamental" question of the philosophy ~ot 'dict'atorship and the 
,., ..... ~.;,.,;:~ .-1-. .. ,.::'i"" .i·~· c" .I"~' _, ,," s··", ..... '.' ... (1'7 "":~'"l.; ... :;"~'~~-;): 
Labour Party'which 'd~a1t with its political implications. This is readily 
Understood ';h~n: 'it isrememb~red that it was the' Trade' Uniot:i' Movem~ntwhich had 
SUrfered'sodramaticall.y under dictatorship and which had experienced the impact 
.' <101ft ; ,," • " , , _ ",' ".' -. ' ~'~,," 0 " ' 
of Communist tactics in the International Trade Union Movement. . Clearly on 
_"- r~. ,:i. .:..;.., .'::. "",,:-~ ',. ' . ;, -::, ,.,~,.i., <~ " J, \'4 .~ :r.,~ 
Such importatit-que'stions 'there V;as some degree of ',oierlap ~but; that was largely 
(! ~ ~ _ .. '~.~~, ~i .~",' ,- : • ~ ...... ..,(1" '~Y",~: f-,'-;'" ~ . 
because of the 'Widespread atta.cks by the Left .;1., Th~ affiliation' of the CommUnist 
, " : "or ). ".t.' , .' . . • .. • ~" - ~ - - y '" i" , 
" Party,-' the Popular Front both arose from the' fundamental question 'of democrfl.CY 
and dictatorship and on' that issue it was the Trade Union view, reinforced by ~ 
POssession of positions of pow~r, that pre~ailed. In part this was a re~tion 
~ainst the politicians who had in the trade ,mionist t s eye's forgotten and even 
.. despised. the origins of = the Par»' .,\ ·-This is wha.t Ernest Bevin referred to at' the ' 
~''''l'':<'' ..• ~~"~F .... :._<~~~,.~~ ..... ~ ~,:: t: .A'.r .-,~ ',.~'':- . '''"," ">.;"~~<" .. ,,,,,,..., _<:~'''''''''''~ ",_: '. , .' _ ,~. 
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"Everyone of us on the General Council of the 
.T.U.C. feel that we have been let down.' We have 
bad enough of it during the last ten or twelve 
years as Trade Union leaders - a ver,y stiff time • 
. I' want to' say to our friends who have joined us in 
, this political Movement, that our predecessors 
"formed this Party. It was not Keir Hardie who' 
~formed it. it grew out of the bowels of the 'Trades 
. Union Congress. It was a struggle for equality, 
., ,for Labour representation leading ultimately to 
. power.'" (,3) ,..., 
It wa~'the wai- whichconferr~d t~t power and played a major part in:' 
securing a dramatic ~hange in the status of trade unions and the Labour 
P~rty .,,': AlIUl BullOck" describes the si tua tio~ ~. the following' te'~s~ 
',:,;, ,;"".:< ,.:r"Art~~ the~General Strike Berln ana Citrine had ~ 
... ',. ' ... "both worked to convert the T.U.C.,.frc:m revol.utionar,y 
.L .. :" 'i '.1 dreams of overthrowing ~ capitalism or the piecEmeal' " 
'. '. extraction of concessions to a policy of demanding "~t' ':, .,;,i'.: a voice' in thefonnation' of industrial, econanic , .. 
. ", ~." and social policy. The war gave them the chance to 
.. ,~, .. , '," achieve 'their objective 'and they made' the most of' it.,· 
Between the. they secured, an influence for, the trade 1 (~t.\: .;,~:,·'J'union'movEment·onj·theformation of government polioy' 
which it has never lost sinoe whatever the party in 
, .. :, .. '-'. ';;. . power." (4-)' ,~ ,,' • .,.. J;'., ..... " .. "" .. ' , " 
," JI l,' ~ ," - \I"' . _. • ."< ")"'. 
It was'/ so Bullock asserts,' this accession to econemio power that' laid 
-
I' •. ' .,' , .'. '., ...., , , 
"a major shift ••• ~ in the relationship between 
Yolassesin Britain/as a result of which the .. , 
- ! '.-' 
" :'working-class majority of the nation has begun.' to 
. exercise in the political system a power much 
':more 'camneftsurate with its numbers." (5)':'" •. . .l.,::;:. 
,"t "" ~~V, "" 
'';';;.~ '. ~.-,~ " ... 
t. ",,- '.' .. 
. ,'-' - 1~ -. 
:... : H. ".' 
~ Bullock, .. The Life and Times of Erneet BeVin1 n. :Minister of 'Labour'l29P-1§S. (London: Heinemann, 1967 , p.l,36. 
r ).~ .", 
\!!!a. ,>p~ 137'-" ,c 
~ ... ~ ',,;" .. " "'-'. 
..;, ~. '. , ., ,-"' ~~- , 
:-.,. 
.', 'ill J' 
<.,: 
~ J..,- . 
; . 
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"in a limited but important sense, the syndicalist 
thesis was vindicated. For it was initially not 
by their votes but by their control over instru-
mentalities necessary to carrying out vital national 
purposes that the organised working-class raised 
themse,lves from their old position of exclusion and 
. inferiority. The Labour victory of 1945 •••• (was a) 
1at7r phase of this general process ••••• "(6) . 
The validity of this interpretation at a general level is compelling, 
" ~though perhaps jtdoes. not attribute enough weight to the pace of social change 
generated by'the war itself, but the supreme irony of it is that in securing 
~ ..,( )~ ~ ~; < -:: ,.. " 
this change Bevin returned to his stance of 1918/22, a stance which de-emphasised 
. 
:. ~he ;ro,le. of Par1iamen; in, the decision-making process. Despi~e his Itlany 
qualities of loyalty to colleagues Bevin tended to see opposition as wilful 
., ,,' ~ .••. ', ., ":> ," ~ c ' r .. ;;; ;: .. : i :; -. " ,-: ", ~ A , 
.~,i,~~~edi7~c~ too~vious truth. ., Constant 'opposition tended to irritate him 
~~, '-, -' ..... 
. " , , -,. '.;. 
T~U.C. to accept his view that such 'a regulation was necessary B~vin proceeded 
'. : "'l "_'~".;: •• '~ ..i.~;,.1.. . .- .:- f ,'~{,~:,.._. :- ~.» ..:~'.,,,,, .... ,,:-.~~,, .. ,,_.:~, .. '~. ~:., "' ...•.• ;'. ~~'\"";' ... : .. ~""J .'~,' • ','",. 
to have it implemented py Order-in-Council. On 28 April 1944, Aneurin Bevan 
~ ~;:;; : ",:.':" ~~ ... ,~:~.':.i. .. ,:.,.~ .~ ! .. ~ ... " !;':'~,:.: : .. ,./ - t- • 
. moved a pray'er' against the 'regulatio~.' '} He accused the. Government of 
• ~~ .:-.. ",~ (\,,: "--,'If" ,;. '" r ;, . /! ,,~ \ '-, ':, .,' "i "~ .. :~ -.: .:,:.: ... ~i ,;,:::,.":: ". " ~ ", ~; ... ",,;," ~. :~ .• 
< "going behind the ba.ck' of Parliament,' and 'reaching 
understandings with outside bodies, and then 
->.presenting Parliament with a'faitaccompli."(1) 
.  '. ..: ... ~ \.. , 
~ The very strength of the TrB.a.e Union Movement' wa.s apparently dependent upon ','. 
;·the oontinuing'weakness of Parliament. ~'Thi~' is what Bevan meant when he' 
. ,. "this: Regulation is the enfranohisement of the •. ,., ,,', " ." 
corporate society and the disenfranchisement of 
."",,.,.,,,,.- the individual.' ,It gives sta.tus,to the organised 
bo~, and destroys the status of the individual 
,"".' citizens."(8)';, ,: .. ,..,.;, 7'~ . 
", • ...... __ ..;.....;... ________ ._._. __ ... L£ ___ U..;...----'"-M-( .... -FbW-.... --, .... ~-.--... s __ .""'., .. ______ ._._._ .... 
~ ~".!, 
6.:Seer~' op.cit.;' p~215' • 
..... .., 4'" 
7. :' H,C.Deb.' 399,00. 1061. 
ibid:;·oo. 1012. Furthe~ disoussion of the/debat~ and its oontextcan be ' 
found in Bullook, Bevin 2, op.cit., pp. 298 309 and Foot op.cit.,pp.440/63. 
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Thus there was a conflict between the view of Parliament held by Bevin and 
that owned by Bevan. Bevin was happy for Parliament to remain the grand 
inquest of the nation as long as the Parliamentary body could be effectively 
killed by executive action. Bevan wanted Parliament to influence executive 
action in a positive sense. In a famous speech describing his fruitless 
search for power he said, 
-, ,.-.;' 
, • - "We were convinced by our institutions and repre-
sentative democracy that the House of Commons 
itself was that instrument, and,that seat of 
power; but the'se Debates ••••• (have) convinced me 
that the House of Commons is becoming irrelevant."(9) 
What Bevin and Bevan represented between them were the dual 'th~mes of strong 
} :.; ';'. ~ r' 1 > • " t • , 
government and representative government, ,that were integral parts of the broad 
>~ j-. /'.;: .~ .-: • ! > 
Labour view of Government and of Parliament. 
'!, 
The fact that the leaders of the Labour . Party were involved in the, 
. ::.' ~ :." ,," ,. , . ~ ." ,,",,;'" ~ . ~ . ,: t " ;..~ < • ' ~ • ..', < " , 
prosecution of the war did not prevent the Party from expressing its views on 
"'" ' . ;' .: ,t \. :1'.: ~ i.. r. '.,. ." . . '> -.' "., ~,- " ,-');, •• ~, 
t~e",fu"t~e, role of Parliame'nt. Labour'" s Home Policy", for example, a.sserted 
: •. ':'-', ':'.iOl. \~:::; ,il:'::- " ,~. '~ ,.'c ". "_';' • ",' •••• _ ' •. " • .:," , ~' • _' •• ~' .'~, ~ ;-, .:; ,'. " ,j ';,:.: 
"we are confident that the historic forms of 
" c ;;:';::; Parliamentary democracy provide a highroad 
" along which the nation can pass peacefully from 
'; '~':. an acquisitive to a Socialist society."(10)·' ",,", 
," As for"' the"Electoral Truce, the N.E.C •. claimed th~t "the'Party (remains)p~rfectly 
, , 
• tree to carr:,-on its normaifunctions as the' offici~l Opposition in P~lia.ment and' 
its politic9J. &ctivities' in'the cOllttry •• ·.:.tt(11) \"In:practice,of course, the' 
tabour Party pl~ed a rather niuted role in ~sert~ng' .t~e rights of, oPPosition; 
. , . :,.: J'~" .~' ~:_,; r. '" ',:," " :. .,' .',' _,.~ ', ... "" .~ .... ; .·f~"'" • ,4' ;,~ " ", 
Jnore often than not accepting the'views of theexeoutive~ , It was~ in fact, 'the 
,,' .~ '""'" ;':: ", \. " ,'"",,.~/~'.o'_">'::':'~':'~~'~'''~~'''''t_·_'·_:',·(o'" .. , '_,"~"i' .' 
".e 
H,C.Deb •• 395,cc~1617 15 December 1943. 
. -
L,P.A.C,R. 1940,p.191• 
"._ ~.,i" .: .... 
'~ :',.; '~' 
.l .~' ..;" : t.~ .... 
,.~, : -"j' ,~ ': ' 
,,-'1,., ,.' 
, .. : 
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Left who contiI1ually asserted the rights of Parliament against the 
needs of the Executive. David Kirkwood gave early notice of this 
~ . _ ," i 
,'attitude when iri' protest against the decision of the 1940 Conference 
,to curtail discussion on whether the Party should accept office under 
Churchill he told the Chainnan (Barbara Gould), ''lv1adam Chairman, you 
., !,' 
have denied us a hearing here. We will get 'it on the floor of the 
House of Commons." (12) Aneurin Bevan asserting the need to end the 
Electoral Truce insisted, 
, I 
,"our systEm, here, consists of Parliamentary. 
institutions on a democratic basisj it consists 
,_ "of the right of the populace to send the people 
, .. it wants to the House of Canmons." (13) 
" "~he~ failhreOf the Pa~ty to accept this view in the sho~t-run 
.'. .'" ~.. ;. ,$.,;" ",;, f- "'. . " .. " •.• 
weakened'the tenets ,of Parliamentary democracy but by producing a 
'0 , 
siinifica~t! g~pi betw'~e~; '~' ~rogr:~ssive public opinion' ~d increasingly' 
, : ' .. - ,.' .~. .. - \ - f 't " \ .' >, :, "- " , ' 
unrepresentative Parliament, it strengthened the belief ~f the Ler't'~' . 
'<" > ,<' ~ '-' ." ';..~_.~. ,~ u ~ • ~ " 
, ' 
the possibility of electoral victory in 1945 and so helped reduce still 
f~th~:r: ~'n~tions'- that Parl~~nt~ri~':~asd~~'E;d 'to fallU:~~. 
N~v~~th~less~'\h~ Party' di~' r~6ogni~~; the :importance of respond~g t~ ~ 
'~hangfu~t~~bii~ oPW~. Whils't'rejecting the application of the 
Ccmm~i~t'pa;tylf6;' ~fiiiation in' 1943 on~, the t gr~und~ ~~t " 
. , 
":, '., " . .r: ,'. ' , , _. ' ';. 'j" ~ ," ."':. ', .• ,: ",';',' ". ~ ~ " . ..," ,- ; ~ ~ -', ',-;: , • ' ..... 
, ;>,:' ,'" ,H / "it is canmon lalowledge tha t the philosophy and 
'."~ ",; " ," . " . methods' of the two parties, are incc:mpa tible., The ".' 
·KC!." .,~;",' ' . Labour. Party has developed_·~. ~ •• under the influence 
. ", ,of the British tradition of democratic consent. . 
- '. ·.1,~, ~ ~ Its belief in Parliamentary Government is ~ 
fundamental to its conception of orderly social 
'change." (14) "', ... ,'.. "" " . ' 
.. t~e Party did assert its own policy. 
~.., " ~;-",~,"" ~ ,'~'''' ",,"- ~"~ 
-
12. 
,~, l" '.1 t,' ~.- ',' ...... ; "- "" '" .)".{ .. ' , •• < ,-" '- ';,,"'; ;. 
L.P.A.C.R. 194Q, ,p.131. 
L.P.A.C.R. 1942, p.148. 
, 
i 
L.P.A.C.R. 1943. p.19. See pp. 9/19 and pp. 227/31 for full· 
treatment of' . the application and the Labour Party's attitude 
to it., Italics are mine. 
"., ... "!- ",. 
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- ' 
ttThere'must be great strfdes towards a new Social 
Democracy and as the National Executive Committee 
calls on the Movement to reject the Communist Party 
affiliation it also calls to renew its faith in the 
. Labour Party and to revitalise energies, activities, 
and devotions by which the Party has been built and 
:' by ,wr:ichaloneits great purposes can be accomplished."(15) 
, The Party refused affiliation both in 1943 and then again in 1946 when Haro1d 
,.. <. ~ ~ ~ ~ 
,La.ski.wr~te The Secret Ba.ta11ion (16) on behalf of the N.E.C. to help refute' 
,the . Communist plea. for ttunityat' the workers. " 
. - '.... "'" ,'.", . "<-'" " 
.. ,,' , The relative closeness of the vote indicated that there was still a 
, , '.. "" 
,significant element of, the Labour Party who were not convinced of, the efficacy 
. '''''. ", .. . . .", :-;.-- ",.\. ~,."" .. " .~ 
,of the Parliamentary method and it is possible that had the Labour Party failed 
I • '. " • • ",. . "'.. , '. ~ 
to win the general., election of ,1945 the Communist Party may have succeeded in 
-.,~ , > • ~ 
,its plea, for;, affiliation. , In the event, however, ,the debate immediately swung 
~, t, _ . ~ ¥,.,.". _ ,,"" " .. ", ,., ~ 
: away from being that of socialist method,to one of policy, difference. 
~ -, < ' '," <" >-. - " , 
Had the 
I, ._, 
'Labour Party lost ,the election it.isprobable,that it would have ,been prey to 
- ""."' , ", . 
" &11 the int ernal divisions, which weakened it in ,the int er-war period and not-' 
" - '. " 
,withstanding the success"of the ,Trade Union Movement in raising its status much 
of the newly found, strength would have gradually been diSSipated, in ~action 
fight~~. As it w~~' >~e'b~ili~~~' agai~~t 'th~~ pa:;t~ lEu;.d~rship·~e~e' anti-Government 
::.-':.'\.;: .... ~ ... '--; """, ~'" ,'·r" ;.~~,."'. 
not anti-Parliamentary ,rebellions •. :" ;" .-, ,.)- ._ 't 
'"$,y~.< '.;' ",' ,~,s.' .,.~~~;.,.,; J' -: ,: \. . ': ;:; ~ :.or ; .:, ('.~' ~ ~ "r ; - -
Within Parliament itself the traditional roles adopted by the individual 
:'Member quickly reasserted itself against ,the Government's insistence on taking 
;~&1l available Parliamentary time. ;' "Morrison, ,of course, ~ad ,no time for Private 
",Membe~s' Time but, as John Parker recorded" ", "', ", ' 
.. .,.>~ < ; ~- ..."..' " , .";"'~ C''''';?-<'_'_'::'-' • ..,. •.. , < __ •• _": .. ___ ,.,r,"ti-.-'+''''.'O" ... ~_."..:."..., .... _.."·".~_",, ... 't<~'''>''''.,, -;'>-~'''-'~-::'''"~'''';''''''''''''''-'~;<>-'~~-:::'J<''' 
• 1 ... 
"" ':, ~ .. ;~ i' y 0.< t '~~:': 
,_ ,L,' "'-~' ._. ~." ~,: ,...,~/ ' ._ 
'- ':,'~< ,., .. ~ 
.. ,:. 
---;} .~ .•... ~ ~ ,'<., .~:.~::~:' '~ ... v ~ -- .,~. 1"~: "", ~ ~- ~ i 
..,., -r..,'.';"" 
.. (,16., 1I.J. Laski, . The Secret Batalli8S (London: Labour Party, 1946), passim. 
) ..... ' ~"1:' '.-'" - • < , €?' .', • " _' '~<. ". ". t:' . '! 
:.: ~~"1 'i--- -i >:' r ,.~" ';" ;" ,,"; •. -;#., ~ :." ,.,~ • ~.,' "t:~ ,:,~ :~,. ,,': " 
.". ', .. " ' .. , . '>~'-".,~. ",,' ' .. " " ".", -e· . -_ ... , 
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"disoontent built up and finally exploded at 
Parliamentary Labour Party meetings whioh 
forced Morrison to agree to restore time for 
Private Member's Bills in 1948/9." (17) 
M~bers were not satisfied to aot as lobby fodder for Ministers and 
oonsequent1y there was'a oontinuation of the campaign on behalf of' Private 
Members and their rights. In a Fabian LeotUrein 1948 Geoffrey Bing 
oono1uded,"that we should strive "oonsoious1y to seoure again something of 
the freedom and looseness of' debate whioh existed in the eighteenth century." 
As with all parties the Labour Members of Parliament were insistent upon' 
tult ill 1ng ,their traditional role 'rather than adopting some new revo1utionar,y 
8tance based' upon passive support for a Labour Government. " '-
, . 'Although the Labour Government managed to in troduoe many economio and 
8ocia1 'changes 'there were those who saw the period of offioe as a missed 
opportunity. "~ Left-wing critics argued that the administration had suooumbed 
to the influences of the Estab1ishnent as surely as the earlier MaoDona1d, i" 
administrations. 'Miliband wrote that the Civil Service managed :to sabotage 
bO~d socialist plans by ap~thetio opposition.' , 
'~:J ';,"',',:,,'''This did not involve the kind of administrative 
sabotage whioh the Left had feared likely in the 
",.' :"':" \, ' .... ,:;'thlrties.lIhat,it entailed was ,the active dis- ,': 
couragement of bold experiments. Of course, 
I,j., "'~ '.;Ministers usUAlly had the last word .. ~But the last 
, word was likely to be greatly influenced by the 
:, ,,', " '~,;;';" :.:; :. cautious words that had gone before." (18) ," ".: 
Less ideologically ocmn1tted observers took, the' view that the Left-wing 
uterpretation ofs~ietY'h~d been f~damenta11Y at fault.: (19) > ~,' 
'-
. , 
'llemoramum by Parker to the Select Committee' on Procedure: SecondU",~. 
R~ frQl1 the Select Ccmn1tteeon Procedure 1970,a., R.O. 538,. , , 
Appendix 2.,': ~ ,',. ~:" , , ,'; t ,Y!'. : ~, :-;. , ,;, '(. 
18. ' Killband, Par1iamentar,y SOCialism, p.294. 
19 •. ~ R. T., MacKenzie ,,~Li.ski and, the Social Basesof',the Constitution, """"""_" 
" " British Journal of Sociology (Vo1.3. 1952) pp. 260/3. ' 
J.,:,. 
, , ' 
',~ ,.' 
~09 
The Labour Government of 1945/51 was far more aware of the fact 
tmt there were sources, rather thana single source, of power in 
SOciety. The, six years of Labour Government proved to the bulk of the 
. Labour , Party t~~ Parliamentarism worked; that Parliament was capable 
of meeting all the demands made upon it. If Socialism had not been fully 
~lemented it'was because Socialist danands had not been made upon the 
Xi". ". ~ '" ., 
P8.rliamen:tary ·sYstem •. Indeed, changes in representation, changes in 
procedure to balance the needs of the Executive and the rights of Members 
". 1 
had,' in Labour Party eyes, brought Parliament up-to-date. 
:' t 
-, '<'''" ;i ,-
Of course~there ";ere times when Labour Ministers were over-zealous' 
.' ~.< '>~ ". >"1; ." ... 
, :tn"their' d~sire" ~o ,hear the ~posite case, as Ion Members' salaries for ." 
eXamp1e,but this was merely reflecting the fact that the Labour Party 
~ " .,.-.- - -<- • ~ • , , 
Was a traditionalist party with. traditionalist views on the role of 
.' -, Parliament. The Labour Party was a Parliamentary party because its history 
belief in 'the Parliamentuy method. Perhaps in Marxist or even Socialist 
',,,,.-:,.,,-.~.~~,-;" .~;."..- •• ~;:;'~ .. ;"."'.:~ •• ..." > ,.:. -<.' -
tenns they had failed to achieve radical's ocial change but, to the' Labour 
. . 
Party, they had achieved'Socialism: The British Way: (20) The aims, the 
'Values, the very existence of'" theLabo~ Party' was fashioned around the 
. . .'
" ' 
tenets of Parliamentary Government that contributed to the maintenance of 
Parliamentary Government in the' int~~-w~r period. Izi the final analysis 
< - 'r; ;. ~ ,!., -~ ,- , .. <.,.... ,- . " ~' , .' , . 
the Labo~" P~1;y helped to p~eserve Parliament by refonn1ng Parliament and,' ' .• 
they refonned it to make it ~en8.ble t~ their social ~ economic and 'poli tical' . '.' 
•..... demands. ~'rn' short they used Par1iamen~ for no better reason than that it '. i 
was there. ;" . 
. ~ 
, '~ 
See Morrison's Foreword to D. Munro (ed.) Socialism: The British 
Way, (London: Essential Books, 1948).' 
510 
BIBLlOORAPHY 
YIPoBLISHED SOURCES: 
.. .. .. ... ~ 
~bli~'R~~~~'Offi~e: Cabinet Papers. 
!t:~~~;'~rl'HOu;'~; - N.E.C. Minutes 1919/51. 
Counoil of Action Material 1920. 
J .S. Middleton Papers. .. 
Material on the Sooialist League and S.S.I.P. 
~t the British Library of Politioal and Economio Scienoe: 
Passfield Papers. 
Lansbury Papers... " 
Dalton Diary and Papers. 
~tthe Beaverbrook Library: Lloyd George Papers • 
.. .. , '" 4"-
At Nu.ffi~ld 'C~ll~~~:' . . . . .. Papers of 'G.D.H. Cole relating to Guild SooialiSm and 
'''-.' .,~ ........ ,...... some of his activities in the nineteen thirties •. 
'- - ,. ,.", 
. At the Liberal Party Organisation; 
f ~.-
, , ,",,' .. '~ '" ... '~ ~ ~ '. ___ .:.:".. ~ ... ,.. ..... '" ,.. .... '" "- .. ' ••• " -. A 
Material relating to· the Liberal PartY~ in the 'Iineteen 
twenties. 
, , 
At the Unive!rsity of Newoastle-uJ)c;n-Tyne: 
.... ~ .:: . ',: ',: ............... Papers . of ·C:P. Trevelyan.: , 
. .,..? ~ -:or ;.' ~ ". ~"," ,;". _ " "r, .•.• ....,l-, 
' •. At the University of Hull: Papers ~f·MaJ.colm Sparkes (Miorofilm copy) •. 
. :: •• ,~:, •• ; " •••••• ~ > •. '~ • ,. <"." Papers of Maurioe Reoki tt, (Miorofilm oopy). 
, • - ~ ,-.. .,. " -'.', ~ '., ' <1> &' • '. • -.._ --.' .. .: .: ......... ,.,. ~::~.,,,.I~,. " 
. &use of Lords Reoord Offio~';" ':.' Sir WD.llam Bul.i • 
. . ,_ apera 
." '.' .. ~ '- .. ,,": \: ... - ........ ~ 'Papers of .Visoount Samuel •. ' 
22.:rrespogdence: . 
G.M. Higgins, 
G.A. litter; 
T.H. T8\1lor, 
Rt. Hon"James Griffiths. 
Rt. Hon. Arthur Woodburn. 
, Ril.Hon~ Arthur Woodb,im •. :~ 
John Parker,M.P • 
" 
.; " .',. .'" --::.~. ..~ '~'I 
. ~ : 
'" t, ' 
• " '. C,' \ ,"~" '. "::'''''l,~,j''''\ ,,'~""(;j ~'~") -" .. ;;::~;, :,1:. 
.. ;, 
. The Origin and Development of the Standing Committees . 
of the House of Commons, with speoial reference to . 
their prooedure., (Unpublis~ed B.Litt;': Ba.lliol. College,>; 
Oxford, .1953).'~' .~.,'~.'. ,',', ':: ",; ..... 
The BritI~h La.bo~ Mov~ent and its polioy towards 
Russia from t:p.e. First Russian Revolution until the . 
Treaty of Looano (Unpublished B.Litt~, St. Anthony!:s 
College" Oxford, 1955). ;. : '..' .. , ~ 
.~,: .. _,. ;. ., :"-- ~-;.~<;;' ~- .. '. 7·f.',t~, 
Parliame~t and British Sooialism 1881-1901 (Unpublished 
M.A., University of Keele, 1961). .' , .... ' •.. 
511 
'tUBLISHED SOUroES: PRIMARY MATERIAL 
~ooks and Pamphlets: 
"'-:; 
Acland, R. 
'''''''"1 
;'.., .. - t.- " -:' ... 
. Addison,C. 
A9dison, C. et. al. 
i ~.~ 
-.~. ¥ ; , . ..:-
' . .Allen, C. 
" 
Allen; C. 
Attlee, C.R. 
Attlee~ C.R. 
Bevin, E.and Cole, G.D.H. 
'. . '" ", .~ '" "l. ,/ 
- ~. j ;,' ,·r ~. ,.'... .4-
Blackburn, R. 
"'.':"; ~ <:':' i .~> .,. '.". -i :, -... 
Blackburn," R. 
Brailsf~rd" H.N. 
, ~'! 
" t ,;~ 
Brailsford, H.N. 
'Brockway, A.F. 
Brow~, W.J ... 
'. C • " 
. atIJ.n, C.E.G. (Ed.) 
Why I am A Democrat.' Land on: Lawrence 
& Wish~rt, 1939 •. 
Practical Socialism. London: Labour 
Publishing Co., 1926., 
. "'Problems of' a' Socialist Government. 
London: Gollancz, 1933.' 
'Putting Socialism into Pra.ctice. Lo~don 
" , I.L.P., 1924-
. , 
," Socialism and the'Next Labour Government. 
" London: I.L.P., 19?4 • 
. . History of' the Labour Research Department. 
'" London: L.R.D., 1926. 
, The LaboUr Party in Perspective •. London: 
,.: Gollancz, 1937. 
·':.TheWilla.nd the Way to S~~ialiSm~ London: 
.~; ~Iethuen, 1935~ .... ~.~ .. _ .. ::, .. > " 
-" . 
',;'. The Crisis: 'Wba tit is. how it rose. what to do. 
London: New Statesman, 1931.. ;, 
~.':~<~ _ '-"·-"'"':M·~':~;-".'/"""""~~'~'--<'::"+ ,~., .. "" ~:'.."." :.,,; :" '\ t .. ~ ,- '" . ", 
, I am an Alcoholic •. London: Allen Wingate, 1959. 
• - , - ,~ .... "~.;,,,~ ..• :o::-=", ":.~. ,.:....,-:._~~~.'" -~ ~.<. ,', .. ~ •.. 
, . The Erosion of Freedom. London: Times Press,1964. 
"'" ,~. -j ~,~, • I I>' 'i, ,- ~. 
Socia.lism· for Todaz. London: 'Independent Labour 
Party Publishing Department, 1925. , 
.>. i .. "' '" ....;. " .~. . ", . "". '.,~ 
. . 
i ,'The Russian Workers' Republic. London: George 
Allen & Unwin, 1921., " 
.... Inside~ the 'Left~ ~Th1rtz Y~~rs" of Platfonn, .,' 
Press, Prison and Parliament. '. London:? 
~ Georg.e Allen & Unwin,' 1942. ')! .h,;' 
E.; So Far •••• -Lond~n:· George' Allen &: Unw~~1943> 
, • - '." • _ ~~ "., > 4 0_ . -rr., .~~ - ~!.". "',: 
"NewTrends 'in Socialism.· London: Lovat," 1 
Dickson & Thanpson,,1935 • 
.. '3 -.",~..."" .' ',.: I: ::.-
'/ > • '-
#. c, ~ • .;; 
. ~ ~'{.,. , :.' 
'Cato' 
(;, Churchill, W. S. 
1·. 
',. ", .. ~ \ -' ... -' ,,~ ~ 
ChurChill, W. S. 
.... ?lyne,s, J .R. 
- ;:.".~ ~ .. ; ~ ,:.. .; v 
. Clynes, J. R., S:imon J. 
and Amery, L.S. 
' .... "-
~~,"\'';'b-''"' ~.,~ 
Citrine, W.M. 
Ci trine, W.M. 
.,.. \'; ~.; of' ~ : ~ ;"I J 
. ?i trin~', Lord 
~"(:~'-:~:~ ~ r·~ ... ;;,.-.t r~}. .. '; l.>r"'l-
Cole , G.D.H. 
..,. '-i. ,: '" ; t 1,.5- J: _:. -:, -~ :A ~ .:>t * 
Cole; G.D.H. 
,:",".' :\ .,j. ) 
Cole , G.D.H. 
i Cole ,'G~D. H~' 
. : Oole ~'G.D.H. 
, Cole , G~.H •. 
'.:' ~. A.,. ft . ~A' "" 
" Cole, G.D.H. 
Oole~ G.D.H. et. al.' 
';;Oole, G.D.H. 
COle, G.Di.H. 
Oole, G.D. H •. 
';-.~~>~1. Y :'.,:~.,.~ .. 
, .. Oole, G.D. H. 
.512 
.' i '.. .. 
Guilty Men. London: Victor Gollancz, 1931 
Parliamentary Government and the Econanic . 
Problems.', Rananes Lecture, 19 June 1930 in 
Thoughts and Adventures. London: Odhams Press, 
1949. 
The World Crisis: The Aftermath. London: 
Thornton Butt~rworth, 1929." 
AutobiographY. London: HUtchinson, 1937. 
., 
, ~. . ~ ~ -
P.R.: The Ccmplement of Franchise Reform. 
London: P.R. Pamphlet, 52, 1922. 
-'l • ~;. I ~ :~: "'" ': " ;. ,." ~ ::> " ". 
Democracy or Disruption: An Examination of 
Communist Influences in Trade Unions. London: 
T.U.C. J 1928. ':',-, 
I Search for Truth in Russia. London: 
.G. Routledge;,1,938.; .. , ' . 
..... {~~. ·'t,. ~ .. ~ .. ,~ "(,,.~ 
Men and Work: An Autobiography. London: 
Hutchinson, 1964., ...' " ~ 
!,i., 
The Rise and Decline of Socialism in Great 
Britain 18&4-1924. London:" Faber, & Gwy~r,1926 • 
.; t ' "f~ W".. '~"r,,~ ... "" :" ;..;. Y,~: '. ',' ".:... ~<:~. ''r; ",; .,P' 
A Pl~ti:'f;r Britain. Londcm.: Clarion Pres~, 1933. 
. ... : ;~, '~'".~., ... } '''''" (. '"" ~- .... ':.', ~:. "", : r:' -!t ~.":.; 
Brit:i~h Trade Unioni~ ,Today. ' London: Victor 
. Gollancz, 1939 • 
. "- 7':: ~ :-
'::1 ;: ~t , .. ~ 
~.." •. ' • ., ',' -' <-. - .. ' ' •.. '~/ 'i,,-
Chaos and Order in Industr,z. ~ndon: Methuen,1920. 
Econemio Tracts for the Tim.es~ London: '.,."'" 
Maanillan, 1932 •. "," ,l.' • 
Guild Socialism •. Londan:Fabian SOCiety, 1920 • 
Guild Socialism Restated. London: Leonard 
Parsons, 1920 •. ' ".~,,,,,,,~ .. .-,, ,~.>,," ' :~ '1 ' " 
-r.-, , it ~~,") •. ::" .• -,~:~. ",-" '.~~c~;?.:o..,.~~.-': .. t-t.'1.~ 
Mode~ Th~ories and Forms of Political Organisation. 
:.,;j London:· Victor. Gollancz, 1932 •. J.., ", .... 
Plan' for Bri tairi. London: Routledge, 1943. 
Plan"for Democratic Britairl~. London: Od~ .1939. 
"1- ~< .,: • .: :' :. : ~~ ,:.,.".;:;:;:~- .• '''>:' -,' "'>"'~'.'.''''l'~'''''-''.I' ... ",,~, .".,10 .. ·, ,~b,.e r".",_.~~ .. ",)o,_~_,~ ...... 
Self-Government· in !:ndustr,z.·· London: G~Bell,1917. 
Social Theory. London: Methuen, 1920. 
- =-: ': - -~ .. ~, ". ~. ",': ~ ~ :" ~ J ~ ; ,". 
~"., ,." ,., .,," .••. w,." \, /" .,' ,~_.,., ,'". • " ~. ~",". ,.'''.~ 
Socialism:in Evolution. London: Penguin,19'38. 
. '. . .' . . 
The British Labour MoVement: ~ Retro~pe'ct/Prospect.' 
London : Fabian Society, 1951..· '.' 
.-.. ',.-
Oole, G.D.H. 
Oole, G.D.H •. 
Oole, G.D.H. 
Oole, G.D.H. 
~ole, G.D.H. 
:~ > "1 ~ 
,,., -.\..' 
. :r . 
Oole, G.D.H. 
COl~, G.D.H. '. 
Oole, G.D.H. 
;.;:." , " <"' ::-" -~/"t, 
. ' Cc Oole, G.D.H. and M~ 
Oole, G.D.H. and Y. 
Oole, G.D.H. &: Mitohison,' G.R. 
.~ :! .,; ft", '" ~.'. --," 
OOle, M. (Ed.) 
OOle,:M. (Ed.) 
OOle, M. 
" ' , :. ':'.,:",~' " '/' .. ' 
OOllard, D. 
513 
The Machinery of Socialist Planning. 
London: Hogarth Press, 1938. 
The Next Ten Years in British Social and 
Econanic Policy. London: MacM:il1an, 1929. 
The People's Front. London: Viotor GOllancz, 
1937. 
The Wor~-Class Movement and the Transition 
to Socialism. London: Socialist League, 1934. 
The World of Labour: A discussion of the 
present and future of Trade Unionism. London: 
G. Bell, 1913. 
What is Ahead ot Us? London: George A11en 
. & Unwin, 1937 •.. ' co, 
What is This Socialism? London: Victor 
Gollancz & Clarion Press, 1933. 
" What Man Really Meant. London: Victor 
" Gollanoz, 1934. -.. ". . .... . 
~ . 'A Guide to Modern Politics. London: 
Vict~ Gollancz, 1934. 
... ~ -" .; 
~. \- .-. " 
The c Intelligent Man's Review of EuroPe:" 
Today. London: Victor .Gollancz, 1933. 
-'~ - \ ~ .. . -; ': ' . 
;.. . The Need tor a Socialist Programme. London: 
Sooialist League, 1933. 
'f ". - ~ ,: ,,' 
';".;-,' 
Beatrioe Webb Diaries 1912-1924. London: 
Longmans Green, 1952. 
'\ " •• ' ... :' ~_""8:~ '. :. , ".t ',' " .. ~_.,:~,. t'" ~; ;,;~ ,"'~' 
Beatrice Webb Diaries 1924-1932. London: 
Longp18lls Green, 1956., . _ .. 
\, ~ 'j ;~, " .,,",; ~ c 
Growing Up Into Revolution~ London: .. 
Longnans Green, c 1949. 
~.', Soviet J~~tice: c The Trial of Radek and 
others. London: Victor Gollancz, 1937. 
': l< 
""-<r 
~"'~"'1"';;, t"1I> 'to et~~>l~ 
0Cblaunist Party of Gt. Britain. I.; O~istU~iti ~'~v;~ti~n(Oftic~] ·:::H 
Report). London: Communist Party of Gt. 
.~ • < ". 
""." ,,~,"!, 
. c Cl"ipps, R.S. 
o ... 
ripps, R.S. 
R.S. 
c Britain, 192O.';c. >:.c:' -, 
- .... .,.,.., .' 
'" !-. ,. • ,-
~ocr~c'i cUp~to_Da te: Sane' Praotio~l '~>j" cc~i' . 
Sgsgestions for the Reorganisation ot the 
Parliamentary SystEm. London: George 
,Allen &: Unwin, 1939. ... c' '. 
National Fascism in Britain. London: 
Sooialist ,League, 1933. 
The StrUggle tor Peace. London: Victor 
Gollanoz, 1936. 
. Cripps'," R.S. 
, C~anpton, J. 
, ;.. .. 
Daily Express. 
,- f.', 
,Del ton, H-
. , .. """ 
, ~81ton, H-
"'. '''',. 
Da1ton, H. 
Da1 ton , He" 
Danie1s, S.R; 
D· E aVl.es, • 
... ;-, .: ~ 
de J4aetzu~' R. 
Dell, R.' -". 
llutt,: R.P. ' 
P~mn, L.A~ et.al. 
., < 
".'~. :."<-t 
Finer, H-', i". 
Piner, H.', • 
~ '- f.t 
.;. "r f< Y,::; 
Why This Socialism? London: Victor Gollancz, 1934. 
Hit1erism.London: T.U.C. and Labour Party, 1933. 
Laaki -v- Dai1 Co.Ltd. 
anl Par1by. 
Call Back Yesterday: Memoirs 1887-1931. London: 
F. Muller, 1953. 
High Tide and After: Memoirs 1945-1951. London: 
F. Muller, 1962. ... . 
Praotioal Socialism for Bri tidn. London: George 
Routledge & Sons, 1935. 
The Fateful Years Memoirs 1931-1945. London: ' 
F. Muller, 1957. 
The Case for Electoral Refozm. London: George 
A1len & Unwin, 1935. 
"National" Capitalism: The Government's Record 
as Protector of Private Monopoly. London: Victor 
Gollanoz. 1939. " , 
'Authori t Liber and Functions in the Li t of 
,the War. London:, George Allen & Unwin, 191 • 
Socialism and Personal Liberty. London: Leonard 
Parsons, 1921. . 
'The Po1i tios of Dcnoora tic Socialism. 'London a .. 
George ltout.ledge & Sons, 1940. 
Fasoism and ~the Sooia1 Revolution. London: Martin 
Lawrenoe, 1934. 
The Two' In terna. tiona1s. London: Labour' Research.' 
Department, George Alien & Unwin, 1920. 
Fabiari Essa.ys, London: Fabian Society and George 
Allen & Unw:in, 1931. 
Problems of the Socialism Transition. London: 
c Viotor Gollamoz, 1934.-
Representative Government ana a Parliament' of , •• 
, Iniustry: A StuSr of the Geman Federal Eoonami.6 
Council. London: Fabian SOCiety and. George A11en 
& Unwin, 1923. '. . 
The Case Against P.R •. ,London: Fabian Society, 1924. 
_, _ ~ ;-. c. 
:~ :1i' i ~ 
Garratt, . G. T. 
, Gilbert, M. (ed.) 
Gollancz , V. 
Gollancz , . V. 
~reenwood, A. 
~:eenw?od, A. 
. Guest, L.H. (ed.) 
Guest, L.H. 
," ".. -l-;;.,.< -'e"" ,'!, • '" .. 
, Guest, L.H. 
~ ~. 
Ra.J.ea.e, Lord. 
Ramilton, M.A. 
Hastings, Sir P •. 
~tings, Sir P. \' 
" "'-"" ,,'.'., J 
.••. ~y, S.·· 
A. 
J.A. 
J.A. 
~ ~. 
'.1", f 
-. ~ "!' 
>',' ,'.<,'" 
51' 
The Mugwumps and the Labour Party. London: 
Leona.rd.&Virginia Wool1' . at the Hogarth Press, 1932. 
Plough My Own Furrow. London: Longmans Green, 1965. 
My Dear TimotAy:An Autobiographical Letter to his 
Grandson •. London: .Victor Golla.n.«.z,. .1952. . 
The Betrayal 01' the Le1't. London: Victor Gollancz, 
1941 •... , ............. . 
Your M.P. Londori: Victor Gollan~z, 1944. 
Immediate Steps towards the New Order. London: 
Labour Party, .1933.· .. '. ..... 
The Labour Outlook. London:Chapman & Hall, 1929 • 
. ' . 
B;iti~h;L~b;~'D~iegation to Russia, 1920. London: 
T .. U.C.andLabourParty, .:1920.; ... ~ 
'- ." ~ 
Is La.b~ur·Leaving Socialism? London: John Murray, 
1929 .... -.".~ .;:, .. ~ . , : .. ' . : :~ '.:' .,., " ... ' . .. J 
Where is Labour Going? London: Jonathan Cape, 1927. 
The Probiem 01' Nationalisation.;London: GeorgeAllen 
& Unwin, .1921. ' , ...... . 
R~eIl.bering· My Good Friends.', London: .. Jon~than Cape, 
1944. '" •. y • . ) :.' " : .• · •.. :':, ., ,., ........ ". ; .'; :': .. 
• ,~ •. ~<.,,>~ ~,~Y"", ,_, ' 
Uphill' All \h~Wa.y: A TW.:cl' c'heer for Democracy.' 
London: Jonathan Cape, 1953. . .. .., ..... ' .. 
'I' '_ r',~ e~.' *'" .;. ",', '1 ~ .:.-.~' ,,-. ·r '; 
Britain's W~Time Revolution. London: Victor 
Gollancz,. .1944. " .. , . , .. ' : ... , . 
'-r,. , ,. '" '!. , -.,:<.~ -, : ., ~ 
Autobiography'. ,London: Heiliemann, "1948. 
.. ' .. ,.~;: 
"' .... , 4 • ,..,., •• 
Cues in Court. ~o~d:>n.:.~ein~, 1949. 
r-" t!'.'~ "".'" "';."~ ~ ... -~~~.I~ >.'{ ': ."" •. ': ..... ~: . ."~;, :.::: 
TorY MPP. London:' Gollancz,~ 1939. 
..... . ~ ,. .. .. .. 
'-". ,-.. -~'-', 
Labour Md Foreign A.t'fairs. London: Labour Party, ... 
1922 ... '; , " ... ~ ... , .. ~ .... ' 
.. . . .. '" .. "',' -". - .' ~ - . . . ,. 
Problem.s 01' "aNew World. London: George Allen & 
. Unwin, .1921~,:".'~' -\,.:>' ;:~" ".,," 
. a.'4,e Fisht 1'or Democracy •. London: National Labour 
, Press, .. 1917.·, ~ •. ,. " , .. ;. ' 
") 
" i RobsQn, S.G. 
Robson, , S.G •. 
, .. \ ~ 
Robson, S.G. 
RObson, . S.G~ . (ed. Orage ) 
}. '" 
.",:; '",", " 
Robson, S.G. 
Robson, ·S.G~ 
ROllrabin, J.F. 
Roward, P. 
Hutt, 'A. .~ t 
Independent Labour Party. 
- ;;.,,:~ " \ .",: .... ," ,,~ .ll' 
, '. 
. Indep~ndent'Labour Party. 
. ..~ 
."; .. ,r..,!. 
. '{' 
1.~:' 't :.::. ~ 
et.a.1. 
t ·t' 
j. .. " .. ;;1 
Jennings, W.I. 
T. 
516 
Functional SocialiSm; LOndon: Stanley Nott, 1936. 
Guild Principles in War and Peace. London: G.'Bell, 
1917. .."..... "" ... 
, National Guilds and The State. London: G. Bell, 1919. 
National Guilds: An Inquiry into the Wage System 
and the Wa.y Out. London: ,G. Bell, 1914. ' . , 
Pilgrim to the Left: Memoirs of a Modern Revolutionist. 
London: Ed.ward Arnold,1936 .. ' 
The House of Industry: A New Estate of the Rea.1m. 
London: ,P.S. King, 1931 .... , ":., .. " 
Nationalisation of the Mines. London: Leonard 
Parsons, .1920 ... " , . ,,' .... ,,' 
Can Parliament Survi~e?London: World Affairs 'Book 
Club, ,1950 ... ", ... , ..... . 
The Class Struggle.London:Socia.1istLe~e~1934. 
..."~"'~" .. .j-:.< ..• "'_ .... ,~.~ .... -" ~.c t _~ .. <.~' .... ' 
M~n·on Tr:taL'London:Bla.ndford Press, 1945. 
This Fina.1 C:t-1sis. London:, Victor Golla.ncz,'1935. 
The Reform' of Parliament. London:' IndependEmt Labour 
Party, '1926. " , . , . .. ,. 
The Second" ~d Third :tnt~r~ationa.1·; and the VIenna 
Union: Officia.1 Report of the Conference between the 
Executiyes held at the Reichsterg Berlin on 2 :A;Pril .• 
1922 and following da..ys.' London: Labour Publishing 
Co. Ltd., 1922. . 
Memoirs of a'Conserva.tive: J.C.C.·D~vidson's Memoirs 
and Papers 1910-37. London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, ,. 
1969. .. .. : ", •. ~' ',:' '; .',i ".: ..-.~, . 
.. . ,iL. 
The Road to Recovery. London:' Allen Wingatet 1948. 
- ~. .'", . - . . . ", ). - . ;;: . . . ~ 
PEJ.ipent MUst:ae Reformed: A ProgrFme for',,,,, 
Demoorat1cGovernment. London:. Kegan Paul, .Trenoh 
Trubner ,1941.·.····· 
, "" ~ f 
~. I' ",' 
ParliamentarY Reform.' London: Victor Gollanoz,1934. 
,_ • • I '" \0 ... ~ •• • ~ .. 
Memories. London:.Co1lins t 1952. 
Johnston, 'T. 
Jowett, F. W. 
ICenworthy, J.M. 
-.. ' -~. , .. 
ICirkwood,' D. 
Labour Party. 
LanSbury, . G. 
Lansbury, G. 
Lansbury, G. 
Laski, R.J. 
task!, R.J. 
.~.: "-
.c. 
Laski, R.J. 
.,.<; ?', 
' •• 1 
." 
.' . 
. Laskij R.J. 
taski, R.J. 
;-~ ~ ",. 'to 
Laski, R.J. 
: ~~,.. . 1 
~~ .... , h ~, ,y 
taski, R.J. 
• '-"! - Co, .~ 
Laski, R.J. 
" 
. - " ~,. -
"-, ~ 
.: lI:'~ ., 
Laski, R.J. 
R.J. 
R.J. " 
~17 
• The Financiers and the Nation. London: Methuen, 1934. 
Parliament or Palaver? London: Clarion Press, 1926. 
Sailors, Statesmen and Others: An Autobiograp~y. 
London:. .Richand Cowan, .1933. ... .. 
M.y Life of Revolt~London: G.G. Rarrap, 1935. 
Council of Action: Report of the Special Conference 
on Labour and the Russian-Polish War on Frida.y 13 .. 
August, 1920 .. London: Labour Party, .1,920. 
Looking Backwards and Forwards. London: Blackie, 1935. 
. ~ - . . . . - '. .. . ". _. ". '. ..'-
M.v Life. London: Constable, 1928. 
What I Saw in Russia. London: Leonard Parsons, 1920. 
A Grammar of Politics. London: Beorge AlIen & 
Unwin,1925. ' .... ,"., 
"The Crisis' in' the The'~ry of the' State" ~ Introductory 
Chapter·to A Gra.m:marof Politics •. London: George 
AlIen & Unwin, <.1938.: ..... ,. . 
. _. ~ ... ...., 'l' ,,".. ". .. --, 
AuthO~ity in the M~dern Sta.te~·New Raven: Yale 
University .Press, .1919. " ., .... . . 
',' ,; . _. ,d; .' .• ' \ '\ ,~.'~" ~ ~,' ::"'.:~. ::" . ','." 
Democracy in Crisis., L?ndon: George Allen & Unwin, 
~933 .... ~ .... " .... /. '. \- .. ' "',' . , .: ,),j ,'. 
,. ",l' •... <{, 
Is This An Imperialist War? London: Labour Party, 
1940 •..... " . .. .' ,.. '::'.. . 
; •• _"_ .... ~. __ • ....... ",.' ',," -,,', • ", v' "i 
" Xarl Marx. London: Fabian Society and George AlIen' 
&Unwin, 1921. • ,,; ; ,',.' " 
..... \ "," 
*..... .~ 
Law and Justice in Soviet Russi,. London:L~&V.Woolf 
at >.theRogarth Press, .1935.; .. 
- ~ --' "."" - " ",-:',.-.~. ~~ '.~;",,~ ~ . 
-Liberty in the Modern State. London: .Faber & Faber, 
1930 ... , ...... ,. -:". . ",', .:,; ., '.-
,,,,,, .. , -:} .- '( " "" «f' ",: .' '"' "'1 ,,~', '!~ ','<., \'. .~ 
- Pirliamentm Government i~ Ensland: A ConunentBEZ.' 
Lon~on: George Al.l~n &,UnwJ.n,:1938 •.... "., -" ,,:,. . 
_ • ~ ; !, ,_ "~ - ,',' '.,0"-'-";; "'" ,_ ,~ .. -' "'~ .' •. 
Reflections'on the Constitution. Ma.i1ohester:Ma.rich~ster 
"'O'niversitYPress, .1951. '-,' .;. ". 
;."7..~~ .~.,"",_"," ." <,-- .;:Ii> "" T l< '''~.,~:<~ ;:, ,,,;<~, ~ :~~ .. ~> ',.' ~ .-: ..... >. ;~~ 
Laski, H.J. 
taski, H.J. 
La.ski, H.J. 
taski, H.J. 
taski, H.J. 
taski, H.J. 
Laski, H.J. 
Laski, H.a. 
. La.ski, H.J. 
La.ski, H.J. 
Laski, H.J. 
La.sld, H.J. 
taski, H.J. 
La.ski, H.J. 
H.J. et.al. 
518 
Reflections on the Revolution of our Time. London: 
George .Allen & Unwin, ~ 1943. '-~ .. ~ .... , . 
Studies in Law and Politics. London: GeorgeAllen 
& Unwin, .1932 •.. ~ ........ . 
Studies in the Problems of Sovereignty. New Haven: 
Yale University Press, 1917 •. 
The Crisis and the Constitution: 1931 and After. 
London:L.&V. ~WoolfattheHogarthPressand,Fabian 
Society, 1932. 
The Danger' of Being a Gentleman. London and New York: 
The~Viking,Press~ 1940 •... ~ ~'" 
The Dangers of Obedience and Other Essays. New York: 
Harper, 1930 •.... , : . , 
The Labour Party and the Constitution. London: 
Socialist League, .1933 •........ , . , .. ~ 
The Labour Party. the War and the Future. London: 
Labour Party, ,1939 •... 
The'Rlsitionof Parties and the Right of Dissolution. 
London:·Fabian Scci..eW·210,.1924.· .; .... ' ... ' ... 
"The Present Evolution of the Parliamentary System" 
in The Development of the Representative System in. 
Our Times •.. Lausorne:Librairie ~Payot, .1928", 1'1'.7-17 • 
. The Secret Battalion: An' Examination of' the' COnlmunist' 
Attitude .tothe Labour Party •. London: Labour Party, .. 
1946 ..... - . ,' .. : .... ' - .:., .. ,.. . '. 
The State i9 the New Soci.al Order. London: Fabian 
Society,.1924~.····· .".: ........ " '.". 
The State in Theo;r;y and Praptice. London: George 
. AlIen & Unwin,:1935. , ........ "" . 
Where Do We Go From Here? London: JIarmsorth/Penguin,;' 
1940 •... ' ...... , .. , ......... . 
Where StMds Socialism Today? London: Rich_&Cow8.n, 
.1933. ' .•.. , ' '.' ,~ ",' ...... ,<, ~ ... , 
H.J. & Red.lioh, D.G. The Decline of Parliamentm Government. , New York: 
H.W. 
Foreign Policy Assooiation, : 19 31. : .' .... : '. ','" . , 
B~lshevie: A Curse Md Danger to the Workers. 
London: 'l'wentiethCentury Press, -1919 •. ' ..... . 
. !Phis ci;',tJ'sru.rAu :A Vo+uae'of AtLtobiosraphv 1204-42_ 
London: MaoGibbon & ICee, .1963 •.. - . ....- .. ' " ..... :; . - .' 
\, 
:'Lenin, V.I. 
MaclCay; R. W. S. 
"". "'-'C, 
, . 
M,acDonald, J.R., 
-I, '~H' ~ i t. 
MacDonald,' J.R. 
:rvr: 
,acDonald " J .R. 
l.1acDonald;-- J.R. '~~"'~~;:' . "t'", 
MacDonald, J .R. 
0.: .~ '."...: .... ,or; ... : 'J. ..J;"Jf 
MacDonald,' J. R. 
"0 ," '~" • .1 ,y :.); '? ". ~'!'.J ~ ) 
McGovern, J. 
., ~" 1 
Mann, T. 
, ',." J J". 
~artin, K. 
, "< .~..t:; J:, ,} • 
Martin, K. 
,.1. 
~~llo~, W •
. :: '( ):j ... ,,:' (, , 
M1ddlemas, R.K. (Ed.) , 
~ '! ~ ... :: 
J; " ~. + 
Mitch;ison, ~.R. 
9. ,'~ L l' -t' *' " 
Morrison, Lord 
," ~ \' .- ~ -;:1, 
.(~.. : " .. < .~ •••• 1fiI' '" \,ii ",. 
lv!orrison, Lord;. 
.' " Morrison,. Lord 
519 
On -Bri tain. Moscow: Foreign Languages 
Publishing House, Manchester. 
Coupon or' Free: Being~ Study in Electoral ' 
Refonn and Responsible Government. London: 
Secker & iVarburg,1943.-
A Policy for the Labour Party~ London: 
Leonard Parsons, 1920. 
Parliament and Democracx.Manchester: , .", ';. . ".' 
National Labour Press, 1920. 
'P~rliament and Revol~tion. Manch~~te;: 
National Labour Press, .1919. 
S~cialism~Afterthe War. Manchester: 
National Labour Press, 1917. 
S~'ciaiiSm: Critical and Constructi~e. 
London: Cassell, 1924 .. '", , 
, • 0- ">.; ,~ 
,...; .'. ",,/"- ,. M , .... _ .. '; •• >. >' -~, ., ~ 
Syndicalism: A Critical Examination. , 
London: Constable, 1912. 
The Socialist Movement. ,London: Willianis 
& Norgate, 1909. ;, ,~," 
v': ",r, . ",,,"",,} ;' 
Neither Fear nor Favour. London: Blandford 
Press, 1960. , 
.e>' < .' 
... : ,0,' _",~., •. ,">.",.. 
Memoirs. "Lond'on:' McGibbon &'Kee,' 1967:; 
Reprint of 1923 Edition. " " 
" . ~ '<\'''''' , 
. , 
Father .Figu,res: A First Volume of Autobiography 
1897-1931. London: Hutchinson, 1966. ,-'-" , 
"'~' , ., " _ ,. .. ',,_ '.' _. '.. ;~_ ,,"::: ,'. _; "',' " ~ t..,.< 
Editor: A Second Volume' of Autobio a 
1931-1945. London: Hutchinson~ 19 8. 
~ ~ ~ ,';./--' . . 
Direct Action., ,London: Lecmard Parsons ,1920. ' 
, H, '" -," 
TOm Jones: Whitehall Di8.rX. London: Oxford 
-, 
University Press, 1969. '," , __ '. ' ",,~ 
• '-. ~', "',- .. ~ '" ': ~ _'.' T,,.' ,;.-~,.'\' 
-;~ .". "': 
The First Workers t Government or N'ew Times -
for Henq Dubb.London: Go11ancz, 1934. 
'- " ,.-
_ British~Parliamentar~' Democracy. L?nd,on: Asia<,\: 
Publishing House,; 19 2. >' :", " , 
GoVerxmen t and Parliament: i Sto~y frcm the L.:~ 
Inside. Lend_on: Oxford Uni versi ty Press, 1959. 
Herbert MorrisOn: 'An' Autobiog:ra.phy~ LondolU '~, 
Odhams Press, '1960. ~,' , , .. " " ".. ' ,', 
, 
" :. ~_o"~ .. v" . 
Morriaon, H. 
'Morrison, H. ' 
'lI4orriaon, H.' 
~o, D. (ed.) 
Murphy,' J .T. 
National Guilds League. 
; . i 
'c', 
Nearing, S. 
~,! ; t.., "< •• : _! .. ,.. J .. >l' 
Nioo180n,; N. (ed.) 
Pat on , J. 
Penty; -: A.J. 
:Penty ~ : A. J .: '" t 
,:,,_:" .. \.j.,. '-:'oi 
'" ~.'?t j >< ,/,,~ Y 
Pethtbk-Lanenoe, F.W. 
'~Y;'<" -j,,:1. ~~~-~':! .;'. 
R.W.S. 
'-, - '-
.. , !§>" jO.',,"'. -,"-,4 
R.W.S. 
520 
Prospects and Policies: Five Speeches on Post-War 
Subjects. Cambridge: Cambridge ,University Press~ .1943. 
Socialism and Transport. London: Constable, 1933. 
The Peaceful Revolution. 'London: George Allen & 
Unwin, .1949. ., ... , 
My Life. London: Nelson, : 1968 •. 
Socialism: The British W~y. London: Essential Books, 
1948 •... , .. ,> • '.' , ,. , , •• , ., " . • , 
Fasoism: The Socialist Answer. London: Sooialist 
League, 1936. .. ..' 
New Horizons. London: John Lane:The Bodley Head, >.' 
1941 •.. , , .. 
The'Policy of Guild 'Socialism: Final'Statement 
Followins the Annual Conference 1921 to the National 
Guilds League. London:.LabourPublishing Co. ,1921. ;~ 
The British General Strike: 'An Economic Interpretation 
of its Background and its Signifioance.New ,York: ..... 
Va.ngua.rdPress~.1926 •............ ,.". 
Harold Nio 01 son.; Diaries and Letters 1930':'19.l2~ . 
London:Collins, .1966.. . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. " 
The Lion and the Unicorn: Socialism arid the English 
Gen:ius.London: .Martin .Secker .&Warburg,.1941. : ..... 
; "" .. "<, ".~ .... -"; ~:--,,--
Left Turn! London: Martin Secker & Warburg, 1936. 
.... - .. " ... ',. . "" 
A GUiJ.d.man' sIn:terPret§tion' of History. London: 
George .Allen & Unwin,,1920. '" .... , ..•.. " . 
...... .~ , 
Guilds and the Sooial Crisis.' London:, George All~n' 
& Unwin, .1919 •. '" .. ; ... " .. 
, . 
The'Restoration of the Guild System •. London:' Swen 
Sonnerschein, .1906. ' ... ' , ; . .' . ; .. , 
~., ", - -":. :' .!':, :'" ;'.~ :~.~ .. ·:.~_.~./~I ""'~;'<I f,··,.-~':·" -.\I; ~,:> , 
Thi~" Gold·;c-;i;i·~. London: Victor Gollancz,.1931 ~ 
Ky~D;~" ~d .c~;'~.' Edinburgh:. Pullans ,~~ ;~i~~~~,' 
1943 .. ' e •• '~'~: "', . • . , " 
. ", . - ," . " _ .. ' "./:'", <,;:: ',_' " ~.:: J"'~' ~ 
. H~; t~'h£C;:rlll Parliament. London: Forum Press, 1944. ' ' 
, ~., : 
". ~ : .......... _",," .~ ... _...';'" J". ".~,., "~:_ ;: .:: ... ~ 11 '~: ... )~ >1:.> '''~ .. '. < . ,.> 
Reconstruction: Then and Now. London: Fa.bian " 
.' Publioations, Research .Series 98, 1944. 
_ , 1 1<..... " , ,,~ _.':' <',' '" i.-.' .; t , ~ _ , ~ r ~ , • .! ... ;~~~~~lOy Md Diplomacy:! PJ.ea.for Popular Control 
ofli'oJreisn Policy .. London: Methuen, .1915. ~ ... <. '" 
Postga.t~, R.W. 
,Poatgate, R.W. 
~?a~gate, R.W. 
> • 
- .... ' -:.~ ',. ~ 
~itt. D.N. 
, , 
~~~me, A. 
': , ',.:: ,. '.~ ; 
'.~-.'--.. , ;,t , .\ 
~eckitt, M.B. 
;' ...... ,\ .. : ,l 
Reckitt, M.B. & Bechhofer, C.E.' " ',i ,. 
iobbin~', L. 
" " ""'~,,; A&.,_ ~. .,.:" 
iusaell, B. 
o.- '~, t ... ~,., 
iusseil;' Bl·, 
~ssell, B. 
0' ," .... _ ..i\ ",,~ .. 
lht, ssell, B. 
,~ 
lhtsSell, B. C 
' ... ~ •.•. .,'., ..• .;.' "ti' ~ 
, 
"8a.ndera,, W.S. 
- ~'''.''''; ~,/.-.~-,~.+<",¥ 
Scanlon, J. 
J. 
, : ~. Schioess~r, ' H.H. 
',. ~'Well, E. 
.. ".' t '0. '. ~, 'f' 
.521 
How to Make a Rejblution. Londonl' Leonard & Virginnia 
Woolf at the Hogarth Press, 1934., 
The Bolshevik Theory. London: Grant Richards, 1920. 
The Workers' International. London: Swathmore Press, 
1920 •.. , . , " 
The Autobiography of D.N. Pritt. Part One. London: 
Lawrence '& Wishart" .1965 .. '. : ' ',: ' . . ., . ,.: 
., ~ .~ ~ -'.- /. c' , 
The Zinoviev Trial. London: Victor Gollancz, 1936. 
.... , ", -. ~ 
Six Weeks in Russia in 1919. Glasgow: The Socialist 
Labour Press, ,1919 ... , . ' , , 
The Crisis'in Russia. London:Georg~ Allen & U~win, 
1919. ' ", " 
-,.;. / 
.As It Happened. Londo~: J .M:,Dent, ,1941. 
".< " ..-,: .'~ • -.. ;:,' . '; ~ ~ 
, The Meaning of National Guilds. London: Cecil Ps;lmer, 
1920 ,\1.' • ',' > • : .':, ' ,', : "':", '. " • ,", ".; , • , :'" • 
London: Ma.cmillan, 
The Autobiography of BactFand Russell. London: George 
Allen & Unwin, 1968.. . "" " .' '" ,I, ,', , 
Democracy and Direct·Action~London:I.L.p:~:1919. 
-: . ".' ",., '.~" .. 
Portraits from Memory and Other Essays. ,London: 
George Allen & Unwin',1956.,. ~'"'''~ """:,.\,,::~",,,,' '(' 
J,; .~ :'-. .~:' 'l-- .~/ f- ~ '-~ Y:"'; f ;t 
Roads to Freedom: Socialism: Anarchi~ and Syndicalism.11 
London:,George ,Allen ,&Unwin,,1918. ' .. ':".: .. ',',".' '" +; 
-' '"":; ,..- - " f " ',' '" •. 
The Practice and Theory of :Bolshevism., London: George ' j 
Allen& .Unwin,.1920. ' : ... , .. ".' .. -.. : .. ',,:,' v~ '; "i." j 
The Traged.y of Russia. "London: W.H. Smith, ,1918. 
,.;_,..' ,:¥.....:i.-...,. .... ::~.".: ... ~. 1"-'~.' 
,. "';. ;,. ~. ~ .. .. " ,. <' • 
Decli~e' and' Fall' of the: LabOur' Paxtz~ 'London: Peter 
Davis,.1932.'I··;',' . ,. -
Pilla.;S ~f Cloud.~~LOndon: 'Cha.p~& Hall, 1936. 
Th~ '~~~ti~th 'C~ntUrY' R~fo~' Bi'11: ' London: : Fabian ~ 
Sooiety, ,1911., "," '. " , .. 
". ;.".:~'" J,,~'>;" ·/~_'.~:: :':"y'; - i .'~~ :'::1. ,.;.J.-"n: 
Conflict Without Malice~ London:. Odhams, 1955 • 
• ..... ",' ',;",. ';" ~ . ..; .. ~ .,.~:- ~ l'.: ...• :';. ..... - ';. ~- -. . ... , >. "" -,.~ ,}; .-~i~'". ,.~:.; r~ :~. ;, ~., ,_,~ ~ .• '< ,": .. ~ ... 
,< 
,,' i' 
. i 
, 
,I 
Shinwell, E. 
;...: 't:> :"" ?:. ,.~ < 
Sloan, P. 
Sloan~ P •.• 
. Smillie, R. 
-if '<c ; 
-
, , 
. SnOWden, E. 
Sn()Wde~, P •. 
,Snowden, P. 
~. • ~ ~ < • ':...;f ..... .; .'" 
. SnOWden, P. 
SOCialist League. 
S· 
. pender,' S. 
;Strachey, ;'J. 
.;~Stra.ohey t < J • 
.. ,"-~.I>,. ..... ;}" '-. .~ ,J: - ., 
Stra.ohey t ;'J. 
. Stra.ohey t j~:..) 
Str~heYt J. 
, ..... ~< .,'. , 
i' . ~lor, G.A.S. 
J.H. 
522 
When the lI12n Come, Home. London: Vic~or Gollancz, 1944. 
,. '" ..... ~ .... 4 • • ,. .. ~ • .. • • 
(Draft) Constitution (Basic Law) of the Union of 
Socialist Soviet Republics. ·London: Victor Gollancz, 
1937.· :.: . 
Soviet Democracy. London: Victor Gollancz, 1937 • 
My Life for Labour. London: Mills & Boon, 1924. 
Through Bolshevik Russia. London: Cassell, 1920. 
Autobiography.' London: Ivor Nicolson & Watson, 1934. 
Labour and the New World. London: Cassell, 1921. 
'Socialism and Syndicalism. London: Collins, 1912. 
Forward to Socialism~ London: Socialist League, 1934. 
Forward'from Liberalism. London: . Victor Gollancz, 1937.' 
'A Programme for 'Progress. London: Victor Gollancz, 
1940.· , . 
I,"., • f, r ;, . >.- "J ,~ 
The Coming Struggle for Power. London: Victor Gollancz, , 
.·1932 ...... '..*~ ... ,~ -:-~~ ~'.4'.3,.·'_"'~~'""~;"~· .' '~' •• ' •• ~ -;,' .'~,~ "-;; ',} >\- : 
The Menace of Fascism. London: Victor GOllancz, 1934 • 
• • •• • M •• _ 
Th~ 'N~t~e of' Capitalist Crisis. London: 'Victor 
" Gol.lancz,.1935 •.. , . 
The Strangled Cry and Other Unparliamentary Papers. 
London: The Bodley:Head, .1962 •....... ,.. . ..... 
-. .:,.,", ~.,' "". >;.' ,;. 
The Theory and Practice of Socialism. London: Victor 
Gollancz, 1936.' .; ':.: ....... ,','! .,In ' 
. . ... .. .~ '. , ~. .} 
The Attack and' Other Papers.' London: George AlIen 
& ,Unwin,1953 •. ' . , ..... '0' • '. 
, :. ,~. ...(,,~~ . :!' :~.,' -'. ..,' .. ". \:~. '. I"J.'" 
Guild Politics: A Radical Programme for Labour 
Oooperators. London:' CecilPalmer, .1921. ' . " .. 
;,.,;"':"~" (' Th;>( ~iid 'State: It~' PrinCiples and" Possibilities~ '., 
. London:. .George Allen&Unwin, ,1920. ' ". , •.... 
The SociiJ,ist TrB6edy. London: Latimer House, 1949." 
. ; , . .~ .'" . 
KY story. London: Hutch1nson,1937. 
When Labour Rules •. London: W. Collins, 1920. :, 
d' cc ~~,. ; 
":" ",. .:. '."~""~ ..... ' ..... ~ ~', : ' .... ,... ~ 
, !l.'horne ,. w. 
"Treve1yan, C .P. 
Webb, S. & B. 
Webb, S.' & B. 
Webb, S. & B. 
Webb, S. & B •. ' 
Wigg, Lord. 
Williams, F. 
Wi11iams, F. 
li11i F 8mS, • 
i i ',' 
li11iams,' ~. '. .,' , ..
, li180n, I. '(~~.) 
523. 
My Life's Battles. London: George Newnes, 1931. 
From Liberalism to Labour. London: George .Al1en & 
Unwin,- .1921 •...... , 
A Constitution for the Socialist' Commonwealth of 
Great Britain •. London: . Longmans Green, .1920. . .. 
Soviet Communism: A New Civilisation? London: 
Longmans Green, .1935. . ... , ..... ,. ._ 
The Decay of Capitalist Civilisation. London: Fabian 
Society.and George A11en & Unwin, 1923. 
The History of Trade Unions. London: Longmans Green, 
1920 ...... - . . . . . .... - ... 
What Happened at Leeds. London: Pelican Press, 1917. 
George Wigg. London: Michae1 Jos~ph, 1972. 
As It Happened. London: Heinneman, ,1954. 
.. .., .. '.. .. '", .,." ~ .. " . .' '" 
,-. z.., _ " 
Democracy and Finance. London: Labour Party, 1932. 
. ';. ," ... .... : - ~ "" ~ ~ 
Nothing So Strggge. London: Casse11, 1970. 
The New Labour Outlook. London: Leonard Parsons, 1921. 
• '., • ~ ,. " ,'" ~ if 
The Political Diaries of C.P. Scott 1911-1928. London: 
." Collins, .1970 ..... - ...... , .. " . . . .. , . . .. . 
, ,seour party Pamphlets •. , , ' 
.- . ~ 
, . .. ~ ,. " . ~ ... ' 
The Labour Party'and Electoral Reform. ,(1913). 
, L8.bourand the New Social Order: . A Report on. Reconstruction. (1918) '. 
, t .:.: 
An Appeal to the British Nation by the Labour Party. (1920) 
The" La.bour·p~y~~C~st Affiliation. (1920) 
·i.Co~~ro1 o'f F~reign Affairs: LaboUr's Programme. (1921) . 
~ 'fhe,La.bourPartyand the Communist 'Party. (1924) 
(1928) 
(1931) 
Labour's Call to Aotion. (1931) , 
i.ab~;~ Call to t~e Nation. (193~) 
, -.;: 
J.:"-I" 
The Labour Party and the ~.L.P::; The Cl~arIssue. (1932)" 
"~'I' "J,., ,_" 
,I' 
'I 
" , 
-. The Canmunist Solar System., (1933) 
Danocracy and Dictatorship. (1933) 
What is the Fascism. (with T.U.C.)'(1933) 
Fascism the enemy of the people (with T.U.C.) (1934) 
' .. ,The proposed "United Front." (1934) 
Statement on Fascism at Hone and Abroad (N.C.L.) (L934) 
.'.' .J~ ,~ " 
British Labour and Canmunism (N'.C.L.) (1936) 
, ,Labour's Immediate Programme. ,(1937) 
. ".,.', 
The Labour Party and the So-Called I Uni ty Campaign.' (1937) , 
~ --,; 6,.~',· ~: ~ 
Labour and the Popular Front. (1938) 
, -. -- i Unity - True or Sham? (1939) 
, \- ~- ~ 
Socialism or Surrender: Britain rejects the Popular Front. (1939) 
'About Turn' (Sta1in's'Men). (1940) 
I : " " 
The Electoral Truce. (1940) 
'1_' " . 
, "",I e' i .. 
Labour, the War and the Peace. ,(1940) , 
, Labour's Hane Policy. (1940) 
The People's Convention. (194i) , 
, • ->~ ~~'. _.1 ; .' 
• ,,t.';'" 
;" 
. , 
-- The Canmunist Party and the War: A'record of b.Yl>ocrisy and .treachery 
to the workers of Europe. (1943) , 
",:1(' . . __ ".,.-", >".' • 
The Canrnunist Party and Affiliation. (1946) 
Articles:! "L 
As qui th, Lady 
A Socialist 
o ' , 
ole, G.D.H~ 
" 0 I 
,0 e, G.D.H. 
, , 
. ", '"' ~ .' 
\,r /. " '", 1: ~. 
" , 
.' .:. -::: ~.' :. " ".~! ]> ' 
"Lib-Lab in the Tvmties. " New Outlook, 
52, March 1966. pp.' 16-17.,', "", ,,'fi ""~ ",", 
~ -~ ~.; . < 
"Notes on Democracy and Dictatorship." The 
Highwa,y, (November, 1933), pp 2-5." __ 
, , 
I"~ 
Cole , G.D.H. 
Cripps, .R.S. 
,-",' 
'" 
~aJ.ton, H. 
DaJ.ton, H. 
" 
, Durbin, E.pt .M. 
, ~.! 
" t;." <\ 
Jennings, W.J. 
., 
_ t?-, ~"~ '>f 
Jennings, W.J. 
. ' 
,taski, H. J. 
. 1 
L&Ski, H.J. 
Laski, H.J. 
taski, H.J. 
taski, H.J. 
Lees-Smith, M.B. 
H. 
R. 
. , 
\.. 
~ .. 
.525 
"The Political System of Russia". American Mercury, 
32, (1934), pp. 203-13. 
"Democracy v Dictatorship: The Issue for the Labour 
Partylt~ Political Quarterly, IV,4,' (October-December, 
1933). PP. 467-81. ' . . 
"The Labour Party Proposals for the Reform of 
Parliamentary Procedure." Political Quarterly, V,3, 
(July-September, .1934), pp. 469-79 •. , .. . '. 
"The Popular Front". Political Quarterly, VII,4, 
(~ctober-December, .193~), pp., 48;1-9 •.. : ... 
. -
"Democracy· and Socialism in Bri ta1n". Po1iticai 
Quarterly, VI,3, (July-September, 1935), pp. 379-85. 
, .,;. 
• • , ' ,. ,_ > , • ". .~.". 1-
"The Constitution Under Strain'''. Political Quarterly, 
III,2, (April-June 1932), pP. 194-205 •.. ' .... '" 
., ". >! "",\- "~ ~. 
,.",' ,"".<'" 
"The Technique of Opposition". Po1i tlca1" Q,ie.rler1y, 
VI,2, pp. 208-221. , ... , ...... . 
"Communism as a World Force". International Affairs, 
X, (January, 1931), pp. 21-30. .,...... . .' '-. 
~ ;,,',):'" ~ : ,:,,,; .. ~ > ~ :/~ _ .1:. ~~ •. ..,,?---->:~~~~ l~ 
"Political Science in' Great Britain"~ American 
Political Science Review, 19, (1925)~ pp. 96-99 • 
_,,, !.~.:, J '<' .. ~ _ , .•. - • _ .... .' ~""'" 
't ," _'~, ~t 
," .~, ,",' '< ~ 
/ 
tiThe Mother of Parliaments". Foreign Affairs, IX, 
(July, 1931), pp. 569-79. - .... -." .... - , .. 
~. ,~"': ..; 
"The New'Government and the Constitution". Labour 
Magazine, X, (1931), pp. 251-4. 
., 
: ':''',!. ; I;. 
"The Position and Prospects of Communism". Foreign 
Affairs, XI" (October, 1932), pp. 93-106.. , ..... . 
;,,"Why Electoral Reform Was Wanted: An Analysis of The 
,. 'New Bill".' Labour Magazine, IX, (1930/1), pp.439-443. 
; '-,"r ." ~ 2, ::"? .:" ~ ;>,,0 i.'~:~·<;:;.::/ '-. .. ;~:: '~ ;, ,{. ~"'"' ~ ... .... , ",-' 
. t", "Po1i t1ca1 Parties and the Next Election: Prospe~ts 
""', ". " "for the Labour Party". Political Quarterly, VI, 1, .' 
,:~' ..; ", " (JanuarY-Ma.rch~; 1935), pp.' 20-8., .. , . " .".' .' 
:' (~R~nlso~nces of Lib-Lab Days". New Outlook, 50, 
.' ( :,;;,' ; (January, 1966), pp. 18-24.·', :' ........ . 
.. ~~ / . .;1:- ,,/~ 1" 't' t ,"\) ." . ~ 
"A Critique of Guild Socialism". Labour'Month1Y, 
'(November, 1921), pp. 397-404.,,',,·· r •.. , , •••• 
.' . 
c. "So~i~Cha.ng~: Peaceful or Violent?" Political 
Qc;l.a.rter~y, X,1,' (January-March, 1939), pp. 1-9. 
".i. :~ ,,'": 
. .... :; -;", . 
·.1 
526 
'('It eflections on the Crisis: A Symposium." ' Political Quarterly, II, 4, 
October-December 1931). pp. 457-484. 
Strachey, J. &: Joad, C.E.M. ttParliamentary Refonn: The New Party's 
Tawney, R. H. 
Proposals." Political uarter1, II, 3, 
'(July-September, 1931. pp. 319-336. 
"ebb' B , . . itA Ref~nn Bill' for 1932." Political Quarterly, 
II, 1, (Januar.y~rch, 1931). pp 1-22. 
'ebb, S. , . "What 'Happened in 1931: A Record." Political 
Quarterl,z, III, 1, (January-March,1932). pp 1-17. 
~. ; 
Daily Herald.' 
Time~ .", :,,:', - • J ' 
Manchest~r G~rdian. ' 
Econani~t. " , ' 
Forward (G1asgavr). 
Labour Leader (1919/22). 
La~b~' ~ 'LabOur Weekly (1925/27). ~' ' ' 
J ,.' > ~' 
" ~ . Li~tener (f~ 1932)" 
-. '.: ',<""," ,Jt ,,..'.'- T-, 
~ ". " '" '" '~,..., .. ~-... 
Nation and Atheneum (1919/31). 
.,' N~ Clarion (1932/4). 
J: New Leade;;' (1922/32). ,_ ,," i'",' 
"" .. ". 
~~ew Statesman (and Nation).", '", , 
;', , .. 'S' -<:. -;: ,"1'; '-.-IS ,::.. ;-; :. '?-., 
Reyno1ds News. 
:;.':;"::,, Tribune (fran 1937). 
,_'c' -",,,, ,_"." • • ,'t-':<- {' 
.m~;~t"':,;~,"~·~;~~ish Trades UnionRevie~, (1919/22) .,. :~,;; " "'" 
Gulld~~ (Guild< s~iaii~t~"N~~ S~d~cl~) ~ (1918/23). 
(':;,' t ::i. Labo~ Jlagazin~' (1922/33).' , > , ';, ',', ' , 
,,. ;;,;':: Labour MonthlJ'. (trOll ,1920)., , ~ ", " '; '" 
" Labour Organiser (f~~ 1920). 
Socialist Leaguer (1934138). ' 
S~ia1ist Review (1919/31) ~ 
, . . -. 
Transport and Genera1Workers' Union Reoord (1921/51) •• ' " 
{ " 
527 
~e following were used for specific periods of reference: 
!ewspapers:' " . . Daily Ex:press. " 
Daily Telegraphl 
Daily Mail. 
. ~ .. . . . 
-' .1' 
,-"~ 
'-~(~ 
Evening Standard. 
Glasgow Herald • . ,~. , 
,:;, : '. I, i' .. ' Man:i:ng ~?,st " (to 1937). 
L :: i ~ News Chronicle (from 1930). 
, .~ _ .'I!;~ _: .; '. ~b~~~er .. ,,., .' 
Sunday Telegraph. 
::"~'C~": ',;"-;..,!",-'-..< .. :, *_~, ,6; ... , .. ,:<;, .... I: 
Sunday. Times • 
. i9:u.rnaJ.s: t~'i-
American Economic Review. 
~- "..;'. £\_":'"~,,. ;'~" "~ ;.-.:' .:·-·t' -." ;.' i~~",~· ~ ~~ 
American Mercury • 
. ,'; ~,. ',' ,'- ;;,;, Foreign Affairs. : ': ..... 
, 'c: ';. .~,.::".{ .. ,. , . • The Highway.' 
.. " -', 1J. ,., ....... '.. _ ,. ~: .,1.".. ,"0 
""; , 
;J l' ."~ , • 
" l{t 
Huntington Library Quarterly. 
:, .~._ ::~; ;'>:'::~,'.x5., ~ :>~-": '" ~ .~: ." " 'c-'," -, '. ~. ,,: /" :'"" '1·~~. " '! ~":." r ~ ,k ,,:" ~. : 
InternationSJ. 'Affairs. 
" 
;" ,.~. ~ L ft· N" " .,. i " 
. '",.,"., e 'ews.·· .. '" ... ,' , 
;J ~r' -, .~ '. Nation (New York). 
, ' . 
i!portS:·',:;;·~·;::LtU.~o ····;Labour Party Annual Conference'Reports (1919/51).~;', .. 
:, ..... ::.,., '.;:(' ::;! ic:;~a.des Union Congress AnnualRe;~rts, (1919/51). ~ 
. '. ' ...... 
"'- ," ~ ,-, , ;'.' .,. r>~ ,~.~" .~ '~:~:f" :'~'n& ~->.. ') t~·:~l \, "..;" ';, : .-.... ,~.' t ;"'-:"~ '. :_, ", "'-'" ..l', .:' ~ " 
.2.fficialPublications: 
·P';li~~~';~~~b~~~~o,:t.;ot£~~i8.J.~p~~,'· 5t~ S~ri~s., ,., :., : ,,' ";:;':" 
Pe.rliam.ent&1.'1 Papers',(for:Bills and Proceedings of Standing Committees). ',' 
,,' < -~: 
': - • • :' ";>, ':-~i., ",~. 1~ ·f "), fr ',' t.4 
Pt.tblio Ge~~ralAots. j •• " 
i.»~~S;'L(bi (~;:rj~; .:.i ~ <". ..,,' " " 
>''''":''~~~r:.:;-4''':o'';;-._-_''';l-'''''';#:''-'''''<::';'_'':!#~'''{~' ·\t .. ~~-;'.'.-;,.,: ~ ;'-<.~. ",," 1_',', :,':,;,.",- ') - <' '~, ::~,-~~,,_-
'~eot COuimi~t.e on -th;~n~e;ation of Ministers, H.C.241 • 
. . ,. " ...... 
',leot Committee OIl )(embers' :libq)enses, H~C.255.' (1920). 
~ ", ~ • ""# 
<1~)~oe on DeVOlution,: Letter from:Mr. Speaker to the Prime Ministerf~d.,~~~. 
528 
~te. by the Board of Inland Revenue. on Expenses of Members of Parliament 
_ d.1352. ,(1921). . . , 
Jo~t Sta:n~Ung Cclnmittee on the Sitt~s~f Par1iame~t, H.C. 112. (1924). 
Select Ccmni.ttee on Proc'edure (Unofficial Members' Business), .l!!.C. 102. (1927). 
Joint Caunittee on Suspension of Bills, H.C. 105. (1928/9). 
Select Ceirmi ttee on Procedure (Unofficial Meml>,~rs' !3usiness), H.C. 12. (1929/30). 
S(el.ect Canmittee on the House of :Meeting and Rising of the House, H.C. 126 •. 
:929/30). -
S~ie~tc~i~t~eo~ -Min~ters'. Renumeratio~, H.C. 170.(1929/30). 
Letter fran Viscount Ullswater to the Prime Minister, Cmd. 3636. (1929/30). 
Camnittee on.Finance and Industzy, Cmd. 3897. (1930/31)., 
· Camnittee on National.: Expenditure , Cmd. 3920 •. (1930/31).. . .. 
~', .. , .~:;~;":,~~,, t,::~);.r.r.':.~·:\; "., ->J;, ',., ;' '-.,t' ,:,;:.,'~~~ < ~:-'.> ~:- . . .;"/f ._"_~ 
· Select Caninittee;on Procedure. ~n' Public Business, H.C. 161. (1930/31). 
Se~ect Camdttee on Procedure on Public Business, H.C.129. (1931/32) • 
.; ,,' ," ", ,:~! '~' . .!- ('~ .... "; _~:: _ '~, .~"'~ 'A 
ccnmitt;e on'M~ste~': Po~~s; ~d~ "4.060. (1932). 
,': '., " .. ,,'-" '_: ..... ' .... -:.,.', ~£,\ .. """ ~.' .,f"-: ~~ ,"". \ ';, ... ~, ,'"I .~_ •. -;- , 
Select Ccmnittee on Procedure relat~g't()'Money Resolutions, H.C. ~. (1936/37). 
~~7~~ i ~ t~.~ 00 Pen~iorl~ t~~~~':" of ti.. House of Cannon.. Clnd. 56?!± • 
...... (Sei~ct C~itt~e!on Parliamentary Elections (Mr. Speaker's Seat). H.C. 98 • 
. 1938/39). . . ' . . , 
-.. ~" ~' '- ,.... . 
,p ,-. "" '- ... ~ .~ ,I> if 
'. Select Canmittee en Offices and Places of Profit Under the Crown, H.C. 120. 
'; '[ ~,,:,' "f ~:·Jt·"~., .. ,,,'· __ .,.,~:'~ .. ,:.Wt~'f- _'~'.>"".~. 
Ccnmittee en E1eotor~ Maohinery,·'cmd.,; 64P8~.· (1942/43) •. ". >-, 
Select C~tte~ ... ~ ~House of Oamnens (Rebuilding) ~ ·H.C'. 109~~ (1943/~) •...... 
'. -i';' t"~' "\' "';".",' ., "', '¥ ~. 
Conference on Electoral Refonn and Redistribution of Seats: Letter fraIl Mr. 
· Speaker to the Prime Minister, Cmd~' 65;&. (1943/44) •.. ' ,~~: '. >.; ':" ••. ,.:.. .••• > 
_ ./ ,~' _ J," ,)., ':' ,;, .i -. ~ , , I, 
. Conrerence en Electoral Refonn and Redistribution:, Letter dated 20 July ~944 
traa Mr. Speaker to the Prime Minister, Qnd~ 65ft'.: (1~3/~),.,', ~.' ·'c'" • 
. . &elect Ccmnittee on Statutory'~u1;~ .a~d· or~e~> ~.C. 113 •. (1943/44) •...... '
.' " :" ~;~~ --~2 _,' -:' ";"' .- '.:~'~~: ''-. '_~:_:'-.~:. __ ~;_,_ : __ ~ ':""'F: .. :::,,', .. \.: .. : .... ;/ .' '. ': ," ;"1 .,.~~" " 
. Oonferenoeon Postal Voting f'~~ilie Fo~es, Seamen and War Workers Abroad,; .' 
~d. 65~1.~;, (~~~(45)." '., ., :." '.::,e,,,:"., ",,~i. :',. •. '. _ . 
Boundary Camnisaion Report, chd. ·663ft. (19W45).,·<.,., " .,. 
,;' .J 
.1 
529 
,Select Camdttee, on Elections, H.C.3. (.3-1): H.C.71. (71-1): H.C.92. (92-1~. (1945/46) • 
S(e1ect Canmittee on Procedure, H.C.9 (9-1): H.C.58.(58-1): H.C.189.(189-1~ 
1945/46). , " • 
Inte~im RePort of the Committee on Electoral Refo~. emd. 6606. (1945/46). 
-~anmitt:e on Electoral Registration, Cmd. 7004. (1946/47. 
Sele~t C~ittee on Members' EXpenses', H.c.9.3(9.3-1r. (1945/46). 
Select Committee on the HOuse of Carunons Members' FUnds, H.C. 110.(1946/47). 
C.(cmnittee of Privileges, H.C.138.' (1946/47) ~ The A11i~han Cas'e. H.C.142. 
1946/47} - The Walkden Case. " -
~a1dRepor~ of the Canmi ttee onE~e~~~r~i ~w Reform, Cmd. 7286. (1947/48) • 
S~~ttish Affairs Memo~andum on Government Pr'OP~Sa1S , "Cmd. 7308. (1947/48). 
'" 
BoUX;dary Commission Reports, .9n~.2' 1. (1947/48) : Cmd.7260. (1947/48): ~d.736~. (1947/48): Cmd. 7270~ 1947/46): Chd.7274. (1947/48): . .9p~. 7400. (1947/48): Chd.7425. 1947/48) .~.. .,;;, 
Select Carmittee' on the ~lectio~~f' a' 'Member': (Cler~an' of the Church 
of, Ireland). H.C. 68. (68~1). (195~).,. " 
Select Cammitteeon Standing Orde~s, H.C.192. (1947/48). 
,Select Ccmnittee on Procedur~', ~.C.538. (1970/71). 
'.' 
it ~;:" ,~." 
< ~ ~ ~ _ .~ ~ __ ",,' ," z·~ >,- ,",e" 
Annual Register. 
Campion, LOrd' 
, , 
Craig, F.W.S. (Ed.) 
Cra1g, F.~.S. (Ed.) 
; A<.· 
l>egras , J. (Ed.) 
. / 'f :1 
Er$kine " lbv 
, 'vv ... 
~ ".-" 'f. .t ,",0' 14 
, , 
Eansard Sooiety. 
i -. 
" ~ ."~ 4. ..' ->,", 
. -~.. "" ..... , . 
1919~51. 
AriIntrOduction to the ProCedure of the 'House of' 
Ccmrnons. London:Maanillan, 1958. 3rd Edition. " , 
B~i'~ish General Election Manifestos 1218~1966.' 
Chichester: Political Reference Pub1ication,1970. ' 
, , 
- , ... 
British Parliamentary Election Statistics.' ' 
Chichester: Political Reference Publications, 1971. , 
" . " ~.' ,- .. 
'The Canmunis t International 1 1 - Docunents 
Vol. I. London: Oxford University Press, 1956 • 
Parli~~tary Practice. London: ButteI!orth, 
1957. 16th Edition., ", , .... 
t ,,--" "; p~'i~~~tary Refonn': A Sm.~ey of Suggested 
Reto.t;tqs. ' London: Casse1l for the Hansard 
Society, 1967. 2nd Edition. '.,. . 
. " 
·l1ntes Books of the House of Canmons J published after' the elections of 1929, 
1931, 1935, 1945 and 1950. ' 
,.j 
" :., 
" , , 
" 
, 
'1 ,"" 
~ONnARY MATERIAL: 
l!Qoks and Pamphlets: 
A.lle'n··, V L 
• • 
B~:, E.E. 
Bassett, R. 
'B~er, S.H: 
"", "". 13 ",J:;l J»:.";" 
la.xl.and, G. 
Brand, . C.F. 
'BriggS, A. ,&Saville, J. 
" Brockw~, '. A.F. 
Bromhead, P.A. 
•• 
A. . 
,'", !uJ.mer-Thomas, I. 
:Bu.tcha.:rt , M. 
530 
. ~ -, 
Trade Unions and the Government~· London: Longmans' 
Green,. ,1960. 
Nati~n~isation in British Politics:' The' Histo~ical 
Background. London: JonathanCape, ,1965.. , . , _ , , , , 
Th~ ~E~~~~tials of Parliame~tgy Democra.c:'!.' i~ndon: 
Ma.cmillan, .1935." ',. '. 
i • _~. '; 
"1931 :Political Crisis. London: Ma.cmillan, 1958. 
lvfud~~":B;iti~ri'p;litic~. LO~do'~~ Fab'er <&Fab~r', '" 
1965. . " , ... 
"rr!1e" Bri tiS~ C~~ist P~tY: A Sho;t Hi~toti~-
London: Lawrence &Wishart,1931. 
'" ~~. 
'J .H~ Thomas: vi Life for Unit;y. London:, Muller, 1964. 
I 
British Labour's Rise to Power: Eight Studies. 
California: StanfordUniversity Press, 1941. ' 
Histo;y of the International. Vol.2. 1914-194J. 
'London: Nelson, 1961. " ,:~., .;; ., .• " .. :, :.' ..... ;,. 
- ,.. ~, ~. ,'- '. <'. ~ '. • 
Essays in Labour History 1886-192J.Lon~on:.~millan, 
': 1971 •. "... ~,"':;' ,:;' ':; .. ~" .~ ':.; .. ,.'~' '.. .' , .' 
Socialism Tlu:m:ush Sirl:'! Yegs: The Life of Jowett '. 
'of Bradford 1864-1944. London: GeorgeAllan & Unwin 
for·the National Labour Press, 1946. 
{~~~at'e'~~~b~S'~ :~ill~'in ~~: ~riii~~' ParlianieQ~~' 
London: Rout ledg e & KeganPaul, ,1956. ;' . ; ".: : '" 
, . ,.'..' ~ '''. 
~The 'Life ::SAdTimes of mest Bevin. Vol. I •• Trade 
'. Uaion ,Leader ,1881-1940" ~ondon~ Heinemann,.~ 1960 .. ~, 
t h , ~ • ~ .' \.... • ~.. • -.-.-' '. f;~ r 
The' Life Md Times of mest Bevin, Vol.lliMinister '. ;'1 
of 'Labour 1940:45,. .London::Heinemann, :.1961. ",,' .. , ,.f 
-; '.. .. ., , ~. - . -
The'Growth ofth British'Par S stem Vol.II, 
, 1924= 4,. :~~~on:.iobn .Bar~~:,.,.1965.,,,. ,~.:t .... " .~ 
JA}B.>g~Nle: political" & Ec~nomic Writings~Lo~do~; 
Stanley.Nott, .1936 ... , . .. '. ..- , .. : ... , 
# ." .. 
F i. 
<,,,'~ ~;. 
:Butler, D. 
. :Butt, R. 
. .' 
,,- .;. ... ~ < • 
Carpenter, N. 
Cline, C.A. 
',.' 
531. 
The Electoral System in Great Britain Since 1918. 
Oxford;' ClarendonPress, .1963 •.. ' . ,,>' . " .. 
The Power of Parliament. London: Constable, 1967. 
Guild Socialism: An Historical and Critical Analysis. 
New ,York and London:.D. ,Appleton, .1922 •. '. ." " . . 
Recruits to Labour: The British Labour Party 1914-31. 
Syracuse,N~w.Yo~k:Syracuse University Press, 1963. 
Coates, K. & Topham, A.(eds.)Industrial·D~mocracy in'Great Britain. London: 
'-' ,'" Ma.cGibbon & Kee, '1968 •..... :., ,.' 
- - ~ -,: -. - . -. ....,~. . 
. COker, F.W. 
'., 
, , 
Coker, F.W. 
Cole, G.D.H. 
COle, G.D.H.· 
COle, G.D.H. 
COle , G.D.H. 
COle, G.D.H. 
~. 
COle, G.D.H. 
COle , . 
.:' ;- \ ;,..: ~j 
G.D.H. 
-':} 
COle; 14. 
.. ' .., 
.. , 
<;,~. -~ .. 
/ .. 
'r ><>~. 
K •. (ed.) 
C. 
" ~.;., ,. ~ :. 
,,'" 
"'~ ~ ~ ~ '" lI. ~' 
-. :r 
" 
• • : C," :' _.: J- ". ,~. " "" _ 
Pluralistic Theo es 'and the Attack U on State 
Sovereignty ,in Merriam& Barnes, eds. A Histo;-x 
of Political Theories' Recent Times. New.York:. 
Ma.cmillan, .1924.·.·~~>:~ ~:'f ·j':.~"n·' i.,_" ~', •• :.: ::1 
Recent Political Thought',New York:,D',Appleton_ 
Century,..1934.:~·'i,,:,>,·", .. ·l,'; , '; 
A Centuxy of Co-operatiog_ London: George Allen & 
Unwin.for;theCooperative Union, 1944. 
A History of Socialist Thought:. Socialism arid 
Fycism1931-1939. Vol. V. London: Ma.cmillan, .1960 • 
. ~~ ... ~.~-" ...... ,..: , .... ~-
A History of the Labour Pifty From 191&. London: ':,' 'i 
Routledge & KeganPaul, ,.1948 ... :. ~ .. ,.,. ~.; ~ '. ; 
.... ~. ""," 
. , 
A Short History of the British Working-Class Movement. 
London: GeorgeAllen &Unwin,.1952.::;<, ':':J ; .. ;, >~~: f ,- ~ , ~- ~ ~~ ':'-'~'#~~ ,', :.' .. ,~.'" ':, .;.~'.~"-:: +,,::; ~ :-~". -:,,' , 'i' ,.:~' i> ' 
BritishWorkiQ8-Class Politics 1832-1914_ London: 
Routledge&KeganPaul,·~941 .• ;;,:' .::' .' ",;.~. 
. ,,~ "~' .". - . . 
,. .'<t.". 01' ... ~'.' ... '. :.'~ ~ •• "~J",,- .; .: .... , '. ........ ',~~'~':.p...... ,'. '. ,.~ .. ,.;:. )" )~,)::,,~.;., ~~",:,,: ~ 
, The Development' of Socialism DuriM the past 50 Years. 
London: University ·of .London Athlone Press, 1951 ....... ' 
The 1ifeof G.D.H. Cole. London: Maomillan St. Martin's 
Press,.1911 •. ~", .. ".·.:;;' .. :· 'f',,; "~: .. ,.,:, , .• 
. ." •• ," * - .... 
!§le WellaS and The!; Work. London:, Fr8i8riclc Muller, 
'1949. ,.~:.; .': ,;,., ... ,.~.,.';:' -. €,;./;:, " .,. ',.:,.< 
A Stlt'lABel D!ltbotLiber!J.EnBlandin A..J.P. Tl\vlor,ed~ 
Lloyd Georse:.'lWeJ.,ve Essa.ys. London: Hamish Hamilton, ... " 
1911,. pp •. 287-313 •. ''': ,.~~~ .. :' ..... 
. -,. ,- .. .._. ;-
, \ 
,. " "'-.' 
532 
The Life of Richard Stafford Cripps. London: 
Hodder& Stoughton,1957 .. ' , . ,', , "', ' 
Corwell, E.M. (ed. Xollyd~, J.B.M.) 
COWling, M. 
. Crook, W.R. 
J)eane, H.".:. ,L, 
<.-, .:,. ": * \, '" ~ <-
DOUglas, R. 
laves, J. L' " 
, -" f ~'1 
~t~ri~k;··E. 
,lvan~t 'T~' ~ 
Feiling, i: 
jFoot, ll •. 
,< 
, !'.reemantle, A. 
'Glas., S.T,', 
\ 
Soviet Communism and Western Opinion 1919-1921. 
University of North Carolina: Chapel Hill, 1965.' 
, , 
The Impact of Labour 1920-24: The Beginning of 
Modern British Politics .. Cambridge; Cambridge. 
University Press, 1971 .. ",. ,_ , . 
The General Strike: A Study of Labour's Tragic 
Weapon in Theory and Practice. Chapel Hill" ',: 
North ,Carolina: University of North Carolina 
Press, 1931. 
Philip Snowden. Londo~:' Bmie' & RoCkliff,' 1966~'" 
fhe Politioal Ideas of Harold J. Laski. New York: 
Columbia University Press, .1955. ' 
The StrMse' De'~th 'of 'Lite~al 'E~l~d.'Lol1d;n;i ,. 
Constable, 1936. .." "". ," 
'~~ HistorY'oftrie~i;:ir~"P~t~·18io~19i6:. .::' 
London:Sidgwick& Jackson, .. 1971.,,"; " " . 
- • ", ;~ , -~, >---' ,. -"~, ~ 
Left in the Centre:' The' independent 'Labo~ 'Part;( ,~. 
1893-1940. London: Longmans Green, 1966. '. '" '" . 
• ... • .. # ~ ..... '" 
Emergency Powers and the Parliamenta;y Watchdo&= 
Parliament and the Executive in Great Britain . , 
1939-1951. London:Hansard .Society ,1957 •... =:,' •. 
, , .. ," ..... "-,,"<,, 'c . 
:- 1"., \0 ~ ". • .. .' , .. - l. '.: _ .. ,,' ". _ ',_ .... - _'. _ -." ~ ~. ':.' _ . .~ ,_ " 
The Life of James Rams@.v MaCDona.ld '1866-1912. 
London: Collins, 1939. ' . '., . . . . ., ,. , ;, . '. " c. 
'StaffOrd Cripp~':;;'i ;i~graPhy.,Lo"ndon;'·· H~iaemann, , , 
1949 ...... ' " .. '.,. , ':., ,','. ':-, 
Bey1n~'~nd~~;'G~orge Alle~ & Unwin, 19~6': ,c 
,,;' ~-
"!\be" Future' ot GOvertimep,t~:L~ndon: :M~thlien;~1946. 
, A ~ ~. • .' , • 
,;' t,,( "" ; f.- .~ ,"' ~ '" ~'~ ,;;..~":".. ~ ~ ~. • ~ .
. AB.BrAn :Sew: A. 13iosaps.v Vol,1 t 1897-1245. 
London: .KaoGibbon&Xee, .1962 .... , .. ' ..•.. ;.; ,;;, 
. . ' ~-' ,- r , •. -' -"- ~' ... 0_ 
; .• ,. c. , . 
" ' p <. ,"-
, J'i 
·'t 
;. I 
lakeman, E. . 
. Lewis, J. 
Lyman, R.W •. 
. ' ~ ''" 
. ... ~ ,,- 1 ., ... ". 0 
: llcAllister, G. 
llc:Brior, A.M. 
How Democra.cies Vote~ London: Fa.ber & Faber, 1970 • 
The Left Book'Club:'An Historical' Record. London: 
Gollancz,..1970 .. ". -, -,.;, ,_ 
The First Labour Government 1924. London: Chapman & 
Hall,. 1957 • . . . - , .. 
. ; 
James Maxton:ThePortrait of a Rebel •.. London: 
J .. Murry, ,1935.'" ... - . 
Fabian Socialism and English Politics 1884=1918 •. ; . 
Cambridge: .Cambridge University Press, -1962. v,~, 
llcCa.llum, R~B. ~ Redman, A. The British General Election of 1945. London: 
liaoFarlane, L. J. 
-." " ,~.,' >: .. " . .,' ::. 
ltackinto-sh, J .P. 
llcNa.1r, J •. : .• 
14arwiok, A. 
":.:','. , .l.:'~~ .:: "i t .,:,. t :~:".,7 00.) 
.J.ta.rw.iOk, '; A. 
Jliddlemu,I..X. &; Earnes, J. 
Oxford.University Press, 1947., 
The British Communist Party:' Its Origin and :~.:.:c:';~. 
Development until 1922 .. London: MacGibbon& Kee, 
1966. '- , , 
The' Labo~ P~ki~ ~~sition 1231-1938. London: 
GeorgeRoutledge & .SonsLtd., .1938 •. ; .. ,", 
"':" • ~ " ' .• >-; -; '.. -- - . ..., ::" 
James Maxton: The Beloved Rebel. London:' George 
Allen & .Unwin,1953 •. · . , 
.' 
HaroldLt¥i (182.3-1950) A Biographical Memoir~ . ,1 
London: .Victor .Gollancz, .1953 •. " '.. .. , ...... . 
Communism and th~ British Trade-Unions 1224-19JJ: .. 
A Stud.vof the National Minority Moyement. Oxford: 
. Clarendon . Press, .1969 •... , - .... :." ~,' -,':' '. 
- ",' ~. ";. c', ':_: i' ~. "'(.- .y t· ':.:" ->'-' '" ·:,.i~" 
kl1shPOJ.i tioal ~ pi;;U:~ism: . The ProbJ.em of Freedom 
. and .Orgap,isatios •. New .York: .Co~um?ia. .~niversity .• : .. 
. Press,. .1941 .. '"'. '." ' .. :.~ .............. .,.~" ..... . 
Cl~~~o~ Allen:' The op~n Conspirator. Lond?n: 
Oliver &I Boyd, ~:1964.:.; .' " . " ,'i . 
The DelVBe. : London: ' The Bodley }le~, 1965. '~ -
, • " .. - ,,_ ~:' C! .* ", t" '" 1. ,,,. 
~:~;!·~i~~. ~nf:'n: ~~id.nf.l~;~ NiC~lsO: .. 
,:\ -,: v." .' ".: .... :<:' ,",,:"~', ,,~.,-:,:' ::::. ~"'-'~' .. ~""" ;3-·"<1' '.--',:~ 
Psiipestm Soo1eJ.ism:·.A.ltwlyin the Politios of . 
Htb0JW.Londo.n: .Geor~e ~~e~;:~~~~n}}~61.. .,. ~ . 
Th~'staie' i~C'Pi~aii~t'·'s~~i~t;· •. : ~n~?,n~ c' We~de~feld 
&I :110'018., 1969. . .. , .... ;,;.;. i.l.." :,..., .~. '." 
d th St te London: George AlIen & T;a41 DnioR' is ea. 
Unrln,.1934. 
",< 
Mitchell, D. 
< ,'~ > 
14oran, Lord. 
Mu:rphy, J .T. 
. Murphy, J .T': . 
N8\Ylor,J.F. 
'N" '. 
:lchols, H.G. 
Nicolison, H. 
~' • It 
Pelling, H. 
", .• , l"',-' 
- . ,~ . - '. ',"':t 'It> 
Pelling, H. 
Prib:i.cevic, 'B. 
:', - y 
. !ooko\'l, L~' , ' 
,lover, C. 
....•... "'kS, B • 
. I' " 
.•.. ~ I;;~ss: < p; . 
. '·~ic1.elaq, R. 
535 
1919: Red Mirage., LondoIl,: ~onathan Cape, 1970. 
Winston Churchill; The Struggle for· Survival 1940-45. 
London : Constable, 1966. .' . . . . . . " .. 
Labour's Big Three. London: The Bodley Head, 1948 • 
Preparing for Power: A Critical: Stud.y of the History 
of . the British Working-Class Movement. London: ..... . 
Jonathan Cape, 1934.· 
.,," 
Labour's International Policy: The Labour Party in 
the ·1930' s.London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1969 •.. 
The British General Election' of '1950. London: 
Ma.cmillan, 1951 •. :· ..... . 
King Georse :hhe Fifth: His Life and Reiem. London: 
Consta.ble,1952.·, . ..~, , .. ' "" .. '......,. 
America and 'the British Left: From Bright to Bevin.·· 
London:A. & C •. Black,. :1956 •.. :' .. ">'~.' . > • ~.' • 
" ,"_ f 
'" .. ,,,-,.,,. "", 
Th~ British C~mmunist Party:'A Historical Profile •. 
London:A.& C.Black,.1958.· " . .. , ...... . 
The Builders' Hist~g.'London: The'Labour Publishing 
Co., 1923 •. '« '. . .. ; .. " ,'" . 
- . . :. 
The' Life' of Gearse Lansbw;y., London: Longmans Green, 
1951 ' ... '.' T • .. • .. .. I' ~ " " -~ • , ' _ " ~ • • • ~. .. •• , ~ 
Tbe'Sh~p St~8.rd~' Moven;,~ntand Wo~kers' Control 
1910-1922 •. Oxford: Basil Bla.ckwell, 1959., ': .. 
&~~~a.bleM~b~'rs:"A Stus,y,of 'the British B~~bencher. 
London: Fa.ber .& Fa.ber, .1964.,.,··;" ,.' .,; '.' c.' •. ,',. 
C~nt~p~r¥yPolitioa:{' ThoJsht iti England: Londo~:. 
Leona.rd .Pa.rsons,.1925 .. : , ;, '.' ," .. ". .. . . , 
, . 
H~!;,y:; ¥AA:oi'secret!.':.Lo,nd~n:"E~~lins, 1972." 
VI~ep,'s Suf'fra.se §Bd PVtv Politics io. Brita.ip,,· 
166-1214. London: . Routledse& Xegan Paul, 1967 • j; . iPsii !fag;o~~~ / in 'Th~PBbt §Bd Acti:og:' '-An ...... . 
..A.:1:chi6eot "7 . for a Better World." Albuquerque,. New 
. Mexioo·:Univsrsityof New Mexioo Press, 1952.. 
it~·&CO~~'I~,,!~:rlc~·G.P~: Pu.tn8m~· Sons, 1941.' 
:" •• < , " ~ , 
. pQi;Lt~MS a.rui the SlWUp. ,London: ~millan, .1967'-' 
~ -" ~ - ,. - ~ , -,. .I".~' • " .... ~ .. !' ,. .•• ~ • "-~~. ".>~.~' .. /.<~:; ,:' 
,Tolm" Stmhey~. LOo.don:. Eyre .. Metmen, 1973~ 
""/' 
;' ". 
'< i 
·'j.o 
,i 1: TO .. < 
. hanpson, J .A. 
Toole , M. 
Tracey, H. (Ed.)·· 
Tsu~uk:;'J.·· ·C· , . 
Ul' .' . 
am, A.B.' 
Ullm . an, R.H. 
\ 
\ 
Vernon, ~.~." & Mansergh, N. 
, W~dgeWood; C. v. 
'<~ i 
Weir,' L.M.·;:'~· 
Wertheimer, E. 
'. .1' 
..::.;. ,'-, .... '" 
. Williams, F. 
'.'C? 
"illiams, F. 
Wu '. liams, F. 
"Ood, N •. 
':' ,'.' 
~lstra., B;' 
~ne Collapse of the British Liberal Partl, 
Lexington, Massachusettes; D.C. Heath, 1969. 
Mrs. Bessie Bradock M.P.: A Biography. 
London: Robert Hale, 1957. ' 
. . . 
The Book of the Labour Party: Its Historl, 
Growth, Policl and Leaders •. London: Caxton 
Publishing Co., 1925. ." . . 
IiYndm~ and British Sociali~~' °L~nd~n: 
Oxford University Press, 1961. . 
, - -.: le ~ , ,. ", '1 Phil~sOPhical Foundations of English . 
Socialism. Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 1951. , . 
;/'" .. < 
;B~i ta:'in iand·theRussian' Ci~i1:\Vai,'November 
191B-February 1920. London: Oxford, '., ~. 
University Press, 196B. '" 
- "';-
Advisory Bodies: . A Study of Their Uses in . 
Relation to Central Government 1219-1232 •. 
London: George AlIen & Unwin, 1940. 
;:f,,~ . ":;'" :,. ~ ; ~ .. "; ~ '~ .• ~ < .~:; • > _ ~ ,:' :~ <.';' ',;, ,., . .:': Thi:~ Last of . the" Radicals: . Josiah Wedgwood ,M.P.
o
' 
London: Jonathan Cape, 1951. 
'.; ..... '" '" <'.," 
The . Tr~g~dy of Raffisa; M~ci;orl!~.ld; London: . 
Secker. & WaI,'berg, 193~. .:: ..: ",:," 
p~~t~~it:' of the La~~~rPa~tY:. "London and 
New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1929. 
:" ".~ " ..,' .:.~.:' .. -
i Pa t'~ern:' of : R~~~s·.· :.' L~~d'o~: LC)li~ans' G~een, . 
196~~ .... , . I,,;, .':;; }:: ';, .=.;" .. ~,..: :,'~". . 
E~n~~t BeviT;:Po~t~aii6f';;' 'Gr;~t EnglislDlan. " .. 
London: Hutchinson, 1952.; ;, 
, '"" ".'. ' ' ''., ...... "" ,,' ..... '" "," .~ '.'\" .'\0 ' •. 1: '.,"' ~ 
Fifty"Years' March:: Th~ R1seof' t·h~La.bou; . 
Party.' London: Odhams Press, 1950. 
The DoWnfall ~of the Lib'eral Party: 1914-12J2. 
London: .,.Coll1ns,1966. ' ... ,.'.,<' ....•...•. " ..•. 
~ ~ !.. :", :'; - • ,~ ., •• '_<" ~ ' .. or ., . .-; .... ~_ _'.,' - ' ; .: -:: ';'0' ..... 
C~i~ ~d British'InteliectUals •. London: 
Go11anoz, ,1959., f , ' 
~ i ". " .... " ... ~ .. ;. ,..;.,~~ . ,\ ... ,. t . .r 
- Geoffrei' Da~so~iand ~r T:irnes~ . London: 
HUtohinson, 1955. .... . " , .. 
Fran Pl~r~li~ ·'to· C~lleotivism: The DeveloPment 
of Harold Laski's Political Thought.· Assen The 
Nederiands : Van Groroum, .1968. -. <, 
;.:'] 
5.' 
-:-' . 
!!ticlel!~ 
• < <" 
'" .. " . 
. :Barker, E. 
:Bu:tns, J .H. 
Davies, N.-
Dow~e, R.E. 
Dowse, R.E. 
EJ.coCk, H.J. 
Golant, W. 
Bamilt'on; M.A. 
537. 
''British Ideas of a Social Parliament." American 
Political Science Review,. 44, (March 1950). pp, .14-22. 
'!The Scottish Committees of the House of Commons 
194a.:.1959". Political Studies, VIII, 3, (1960).Pp.272-
'. ., ..... ; , . . 296. 
"A Royal Weekend". Atlantic Monthll,. 149, (April, 
1932). PP. 501-8.. """,. , ..... '. . . 
"Lloyd George and Poland 1919-1920". Journal of 
Contemporary Histoty, VI, 3, (1971);Pp •. 132-55. 
~ ,.. -.- - ~ ,.;, !~~ :,' • -.. t •. ~ " -.: ~ ~> ~ .-,~ ,. i' 
"A Note on Ramsay MacDonald and Direct Action". 
Political Studies; IX, 2; (1961). pp. 306-8.'.:·:; . 
• ' • ,l.. ~ .:. .; ~ ~ ., 
. "The' P~liament~' La.bOur'Party in Opposition 1959-
. 1960". Parliamentary Affairs; XIII, 4. PP. 520-9.' 
l ~ "B~itai~8.nd\·t~i ;RUssio: Poli~h Fro~t'ier '1'91'9-19'21 < . 
. Historical Journal, XII,"l, (1969).' pp. 137-154.'; _ 
.~, ,... f t;~~·'Ea;~p~iit16a.l' Thought' ~i: G .R. Attlee". 
Political Quarterly, XI. 3, (July-September, 1969). 
pp.·309-15~· .. ';'" <. ; .",' • i.' , ',' ;,. 
;~ •• ~~~.MacDona.ld~. ~~~~~~~ .~on~~lY, 161 ~,' (1938) •.. 
"The Use of Committees b~ the House of Commons". . Ha.nson, :A.H. & Wiseman, lIe V. 
• Iiarrison, R. 
!ewes; A. 
LYInan, R. W • -. ' 
Public Law, 1959. pp. ,277-292., . 1 '. ': . 
"Labour Government: Then and Now". Political 9.uarterl;y, 
XLI, 1, (January-March 1970)., pp .. 67 ... 82.>< .L:..: c' . 
",< " 
tt~ild Soc'i~i~: "A Two Years' Test". American 
Economic Review, XII, (Ju.ne·1922). p;p;209-237. 
• ~ _<~ ',_ ~ '.' .'. ~>' .." • ,t • ~ , ~~." "l ,J 0, .: •• ' ;, ; \ •• , "~ '.' > 
. "> 
"James Raln.say" MacDonB.ld and the Leadership of the' 
Labour Party 1918-1922". JournaJ. of British Studies, 
II, 1, (November, 1962). Pp. 132-160. . '" " .. " 
'''The British Labour Party: The Conflict Between 
Socialist Ideals and Practical Politics between' 
, the Wars". Journal of British Studies, v, 1 t. 
.'.)d.·'·· .. :·, ;":.U,';·,., '::,·:,(November,~1965). pp. 140-152.:.<,,~ •.•. ': 
.. ,~ ~ f : ~.; .;. c.; .~-,. 
" 
;"~' tiThe Ceupon Eleotion of, 1918 and the Unionist . . 
: 'Members of Parliament". Jotp'Aal of Modern HiS. t .. o. tl. ' . 
.... ::. ~: .:XXXIV, 3, (September,.1962). pp. ~4-306 •. :<:,.:-
"Hands Off RUssia: . British Labour and the RUssio'-
Polish War, 1920". Past and Present, 38, (1968).' 
pp. 126-;152. ." .. 
./ 
i 
I 
I 
McICenzi~, R.T. 
, " 
Ma.ckintoSh,·J.P. 
MarqUlind, D. 
'. Marwick, A.J .B. 
.~ - , 
Moodie; G.C., 
,.~ 
'Mow~t, C.L. 
.Palmer, J. 
Pimlott, B. 
SfUn'U.els, S. 
,: .. '4". 
V~nta.rama.O.i, M.S. 
;- .... " >,101 
. . ~~lson, T.· 
-:1. "'''';'' 
Aea!iemic Joumals; 
538 
"Laski and the SociaJ. Bases of the Constitutiontt. 
'. Bri tish Journal of Sociolo&, 3, (1952). PP. 260-3. 
"Forti Years on?" PoliticaJ. g.uarterl:x:" XII, I,' 
(January-March 1970). pp., 42-55 •... __ 
ttThe Politics of Deprivation: Reconsidering the 
> Failure of Utopianism". Encounter, XXXII, 4, (April, 
1968). pp. 36-44. _... .. , 
ttThe Independent Labour Party in the Nineteen-
Twenties". :Bulletin of the Institute . of Historical 
Research, XXXV, ( 1962/3). pp. 62-74. ' , . , .. , . 
"The Monarch and the Selection of a Prime Minister: 
A Re-examination of the Crisis of 1931". Political 
Studies, V, 1, (1957).pp. 1-20. . - "" 
"The Fall of the Labour Government, August 1931". 
Huntb:£ton Libra.r:v Q;u.arterly, VII, 4 (1943/4). ~ 
pp. 353-86., " , , ,. ",.".-
"Allocation of Time: The Guillotine and Voluntary .. , 
Timetabl:Qt. Parliamentary Affairs, XIX' 3, (1969/70). 
Pp. 232-247 •.. "., -. ',-~"'" ... ~ .. ' ".- .".,", 
ttThe Socialist League: IntellectuaJ.s and the Left 
in the 1930's". Jouma.lof Contempora;x Historx" 
VI, 3,(1971)., pp. }2--:33. ',: .... :':, .. ~ ',~ 
'-"" -.. ,.,. '. ,; _, '. " :.,!;< ....... ->, __ ~.~,. '_". ", _·c· 
"Standing Committees in the Rouse of Commons". 
Parliamentcgy Affairs, XI, 3,(1957/8). pp. 303-17. 
-. t , • _ ,_. :"i ~ ,,',.j. .{" '.~, . .;,. " ,," -: !! "f 0" '-~ 
':;" .'-;-"; f", ;" -, '.-c' .•• '.' ........ ,.", 
"The Left Book Club" •. Journal of Contemporm " 
History, I, 2, (1966). pp~65-86.·"· ""-'.' ;."p:'::' 
, . ~ "" ,< 
!~~~ Ma.cDonald and. Bri ta.in t s Domestic Politics , . 
and Foreign Rela.tions 1919-::1931.'. Political Studies, .. ' 
VIII, ,3, pp. 231-49., ,"' . 'N' ,.,.,.;: •. , .... , " ,- - • '. >~'.'. , - - 11 
.l.. ~ ~ _ •. : : .. 
"The Coupon and, the British Genera.l. Election 'of 19~8". 
Joumai of Modern History, XXXVI' 1, ~ (Maroh,.1964). -
., ,:.' ,,',. . ,~ .... if '$~." -")F 
Amerioan Politioal Science Review • 
. """'" .. , 
British Institute .' of Historical; Re~ea.rch • 
. ' BritiSh Journal of SocioloQ'~ 
liboounter •. 
-, " '-,.'·-".i _, ' 
HistOrical Journal. 
" 
. 539 
Journal of British Studies. 
Journal,of Contemporary History. 
Journal of MOdern History. 
Parliamentary Affairs. 
Past and Present. 
Political Studies. 
Political Quarterly. 
Public Law. 
~neral Works: 
Birch, A.H. 
Brand, C.F~ 
Graves, R. & Hodge, A. 
McElwee, W. 
lwtQlCenzie, R.T. 
lIe.rwick, A. 
J4edJ.icott, W.N. 
J40Wa.t, C.L. 
J!uggerrid€e, M. . 
. :Pelling, X: 
Representative and Responsible Government: An . 
Essay on the British Constitution. London: 
George AlIen & Unwin,1964.····,' 
The British Labour Party: A Short Histo;y. London: 
Oxford Uni versi ty Press, ,1965. _.,. . .... 
The LggWeekend. London: Faber & Faber, 1940. 
Britain's Locust Years 1918-1940. London: Faber & 
Faber, 1962. ., , ..... ', . -. . - .. - . 
British Political Parties: The Distribution of Power 
Within the Conservative and Labour Parties. London:; 
Heinemann," 1963 • ..... ', .. , . , .",. 
c Britain in the Century ~of T~tal War: War~ Peace and 
Social Ch.apa:e.London: .The .Bodley .Head,1968 •.. ' .. 
. . ~ --.. . ...... , " .. 
Contempora;r England 1914-1964. London: Longmans 
Green,. .1967.· ', ... , .. , ... , , .. 
Britain Between the Wars'1918-1940. London: Methuen, 
1955. -., ~ - ....... ~ .. ' .....•.... '.- .. 
The Thirties: 19)0 to 1940 in Great Britain. London: ,-,;' 
. Collins, 1967 •. ' ..... , ... , .... ~: ....•... , 
. A Short History of the Labour Party. London: Ma.cmillan, 
1·961. ' .. ' .. ; . - -, . "" " ..... ', . . . . . . . .... '. 
.. 8e .. n, L.C .13. Po st:'Vic torioo Britain '1902-1951. London: Methuen, 1967, 
'j 
i 
1 
540 
Shinwell, E. The Labour Story. London: Ma.cdonald, 1963. 
Taurlor, A.J.P. English History 1914-1945. London and Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, .1965w .. 
" 
" 
'. 
